

Q U I N T I L I A N ' s
I N S T I T U T E S
O F T H E
O R A T O R.
V O L. II.

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I N
T W E L V E B O O K S.

Translated from the Original **LATIN**, according to the
Paris Edition of Professor **ROLLIN**, and illustrated with
Critical and Explanatory **NOTES**,

By **J. PATSALL, A. M.**

I N T W O V O L U M E S.

V O L. II.

L O N D O N,

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B O O K VII.

THE INTRODUCTION.

ENOUGH I think has been said of invention, having executed every thing, not only concerning the means for instructing, but also for affecting the judges. Now, as to construct an edifice, it is not sufficient to make a provision of stones and all other necessary materials and implements, unless the artist's hand is employed for disposing and placing them in order; so in matters of eloquence, how numerous soever the subjects may be, they will make but a confused heap, unless disposition forms of them a regular and uniform whole by adjusting and digesting them into order.

Disposition has not, without good reason, been reckoned the second of the five parts I mentioned, the first being of no significance without it. If you cast or fashion all the limbs of a statue, it will not be a statue, unless these limbs are properly put together; and if you change and transpose any part of the human body; or of other animals, though all other parts remain in their due proportion, it will notwithstanding be a monster. Dislocated limbs lose the use of their wonted exer-

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tions, and armies in confusion are an impediment to any just manœuvre. They are far I think from being mistaken, who have said, that the universe is maintained by the order and symmetry of its parts, and that all things would perish, if this order was disturbed. In like manner a speech wanting this quality, must run into extreme confusion, wandering about like a ship without a steersman, incoherent with itself, full of repetitions and omissions, losing its way as by night in unknown paths, and without proposing to itself any proper beginning or end, following rather the guidance of chance than of reason.

This whole book will be therefore calculated to serve the purposes of disposition, in which so many would not have been deficient, was it possible to ascertain rules for all sorts of subjects. But, as hitherto there has been an infinite disparity in the forms of law-suits, which is likely to continue; and as no cause for so many ages past, has been found intirely like another, the orator of consequence must trust to his own discerning faculties, must be watchful how he proceeds, must invent, judge, and take counsel with himself. Still I will not deny but that some things may be pointed out, and these I shall not omit.

C H A P. I.

Of Disposition.

- I. *What disposition is. Utility sometimes makes an alteration in it. II. To make a good disposition, all the particulars of causes must be well known. III. Whether we should begin from the most weighty matters. IV. A question is either simple or compound. What order is to be observed in both. V. Quintilian explains what himself was wont to observe on various occasions. VI. To shew how things may be invented and disposed in all causes, he produces an example of a subject for declamation, such as is usually proposed in schools. VII. The matter itself, and practice, better than art, shew how the disposition ought to be conducted.*

I. **D**IVISION being, as already specified, a distribution of a whole into its parts, and a distinct order of these parts among themselves; so likewise disposition, is a useful distribution of things or parts into places, assigning to each its proper places and connecting what went before with what follows. But let it be remembered that the good of the cause often makes an alteration in its disposition, and that the same question ought not always to be treated first by both parties. Of this, to pass by other examples, Demosthenes and Æschines are a sufficient instance, by their following a different order in the cause of Ctesiphon. The accuser began with the question of right, which seemed more favourable to him; and the advocate premised all the other heads, or almost

all of them, to prepare the judges for the same question, which he reserved for the end. Thus either party may begin as the interest of the cause directs, otherwise the order of the pleading would always lie at the plaintiff's discretion. .

II. It will not be amiss to set forth here what I practised myself: art and experience equally taught it me, and I never made a mystery of it. I was very careful in all my pleadings to know every thing belonging to the cause. . When therefore I had thoroughly passed it in review, I thought as much of what might make for the adversary as for myself.

And first, (a thing of no difficulty, yet the principal to be considered) I fixed upon what both parties might intend to enforce, the measures they might adopt, and the manner they might proceed in. I thought of what the plaintiff should alledge in the first place, and that must have been either something allowed of, or contested by the parties. If allowed of, it could not be the question of debate. I therefore passed to the defendant's answer, and examined it the same way. Sometimes the result was acknowledged by both parties. If the reverse happened, then a question for debate presented itself: "You killed that man; yes, I killed him." The fact being acknowledged, I pass over that point, and the defendant is to shew cause why he killed him. "A man detected in adultery, replies he, may be killed with the adulteress, and it is certain the law permits it." We must now proceed to a third proposition, which may be contested. "He was not an adulterer; he was." This is the question, and as the fact is doubtful,
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the affair will be conjectural. This third proposition may not likewise be contested, "I grant he was an adulterer, says the plaintiff, but it was not lawful for you to kill him, who have been incapacitated to commit such an act in consequence of your being banished, and noted for infamy." It then becomes a question of right. But if the fact is denied, and the proposition, "You killed him," is answered in the negative, the contest is instantly formed. So it is we should examine where the controversy begins, and consider what may lay the foundation of the first question. . .

III. As to what ought be observed by the pleader for the plaintiff, I do not intirely dissent from Celsus, who undoubtedly has followed Cicero, though I must say he is a little too positive in asserting, that he should place something strong in the beginning, what is strongest in the end, and the weaker things in the middle; because in the beginning an impression ought to be made on the judges, and in the end they ought to be convinced. But the defendant's cause ought most commonly to be otherwise managed, and particularly by first invalidating and refuting the heaviest charges brought against him, lest the judge perceiving an evasion in this respect, may shew dislike to the other parts of his defence.

This order, however, may be changed, when the other heads of the accusation are evidently false; though the main charge is hard to be refuted; for by first destroying the credibility of the accusers, the refutation of this main charge will come in opportunely, whilst the judges are well satisfied, that all hitherto advanced is vain and

nugatory. Yet a sort of apology will not be amiss, giving reasons for deferring the answer to the capital point, but promising it for a more proper place, to prevent its being imagined that the difficulty is dreaded.

It is also customary to begin with justifying the accused in regard to crimes of past life, in order to dispose the judges to a more placid temper on hearing the charge they are to pronounce judgment upon. But this too Cicero reserved for the end in his defence of Varenus, considering, not what was to be done in common practice, but what was most expedient on such an occasion.

IV. When the accusation consists of a simple question, one thing only being objected, we must see if it can be answered by one proposition, or by many. If by one, we will observe, whether the question coincides with the fact, or with a point of law. If with the fact, whether it is better to deny or defend what is objected. If with a point of law, of what sort this is, and whether it requires to be contested by the letter or the intention of the law. It will be easy to satisfy ourselves in this particular, by examining what law it is, in virtue of which the process has taken place. The defence may be conceived in many propositions, as by Cicero for Rabirius; "If he had killed him, he would have done right, but he did not kill him."

But when we say many things against one proposition, we must first think of all that can be said, and afterwards place the questions in the best order. Herein I am not of the same opinion as a little before concerning propositions as heads of accusation,

accusation, and what I granted concerning arguments, that we should sometimes begin with the strongest; for the force of questions ought always to be upon the increase, proceeding from the weakest to the strongest, whether of the same, or of a different kind. . .

V. It was a usual and particular consideration with me to investigate how I might go back, either from the last species, on which the cause commonly rests, to the first general question; or descend from the genus to the last species, even in matters of deliberation: as, suppose, Numa deliberates, whether he should receive the kingdom the Romans offer him. "Whether he should reign," will be the genus: "Whether he should reign in a strange city, the species: "Whether at Rome, and consequently, whether the Romans will admit such a king," the last species, as after it no other question can take place. . .

It was likewise * customary with me to make store of the adversary's concessions, such as I thought would be of advantage to me, and not only to press them home on him, but also to multiply them by division, as in this subject of controversy: a general, who had his father for competitor in contending for that honour, was made prisoner by the enemy. Some persons deputed to go and pay his ransom, meet the father on the road returning from the enemy, who says to them, "You go too late." They stop the father, search him, and find upon him a purse of gold concealed in his bosom. Pursuing, however, their intend-

* It is a species of division, when we shew, in what we and the adversary are agreed, and in what not.

ed journey, they find their general nailed to a cross, who says to them : “ You have a traitor among you, beware of him.” Hereupon the father is cited in judgment, and what are the things on the occasion which are acknowledged to have happened ? That there was treachery, is evident from the confession of the dying person ; so that the only question is to find out the traitor, and concurring circumstances will fix the guilt on the father, who cannot help confessing, that he went to the enemy, and privately, that he returned safe from them, and that they rewarded his treachery with gold, which he had kept concealed. One proposition, wherein undeniable facts are thus assembled, is sometimes of greater force than many, and the judges once prepossessed by it, are deaf to the defence. In the whole, the accuser finds his advantage in the assemblage of facts, and the accused his, in separating them.

Again, it was customary with me to do in regard to my whole matter, what I said is done in regard to arguments. Thus, by proposing a variety of particulars, which separately from the case would prove nothing, and afterwards rejecting them all but one, that only would remain, the credibility of which I intended to enforce. Suppose the crime of collusion is alledged by betraying one's cause to the adversary, it may be said on the occasion : “ Every man cited in justice, cannot be acquitted but by his innocence, or by the interest of a person in power, or by laying a restraint in some forcible manner upon the judges, or by corrupting them, or by the difficulty of finding sufficient proof, or by collusion : you acknowledge

the guilt of the party, that no power intervened, no force, no corruption, and that there was sufficient proof. Therefore you stand convicted of collusion." If I could not refute all, I refuted at least the greatest part; as for instance, "It is certain that man was killed; but not in a bye-place, which might make us suspect he was killed by thieves; not for the sake of booty, because he was robbed of nothing; not in expectation of inheriting his fortune, because he was poor: therefore malice was the cause of his death; but who was this his enemy?"

This method may equally facilitate * division and invention, as it must be of service to collate and discuss the possible circumstances, and by rejecting what is least probable, to come to what is most so. Milo is accused of killing Clodius: he either killed him or not. It were best to deny the fact; but if it could not be denied, he therefore killed him justly or unjustly. We will say, he killed him justly, and then he did it by inclination, or through necessity; for ignorance cannot be pretended. The act of the will here is a doubtful matter; but as people are apt to think he did so in consequence of such act, his defence is supported by adding, that this will in him pro-

* It so far facilitates division, by distinguishing what is agreed upon between us and the adversary, and what is not. It will therefore be of service to examine into all the motives; and the same will also help invention, because by gradually discussing different circumstances, we at length find what is most to our advantage. *Rejectionem facere* is said in the text, by way of metaphor; for after the prætor had balloted the judges, either party was allowed to except against a certain number of them.

ceeded from consulting the good of the republic. If it be said that he killed him through necessity, it was then a rencounter, and not an intended battle on his side. Still one of them must have way-laid the other, must have been the aggressor, and which was the person? Certainly Clodius. Do we not see how the very order of things leads necessarily to a defence? Again, he either designed to kill Clodius when he attacked him, or he did not. It is safer to say he did not: The * servants of Milo did it without the orders or knowledge of their master." But this so timid a defence, supporting but indifferently the first assertion of Milo's killing him justly, it is added, "The servants of Milo did what every one of us should be glad ours would do upon a like occasion." All this is the more useful, as often nothing of all that occurs pleases, and yet we must say something. Let us therefore minutely examine into the matter, for so will appear either what is best, or what is least hurtful to us. . .

VI. But how shall we find out the more abstruse and less common sort of questions? The same way, indeed, as we find out thoughts, words, figures, colouring, which is no otherwise than by the sagacity of the wit, care, and exercise. None of these particulars will ever escape an attentive orator, who takes nature for his guide. But most orators affecting a vain shew of eloquence, content themselves with places merely specious, or which make nothing towards the proof. Others, giving themselves little trouble about making a proper choice, take up with whatever presents it-

* Pro Milone, 19.

self. An example from a scholastic subject, neither new nor difficult, will illustrate what I here say.

“The son that does not appear in defence of his father accused of treason, is to be disinherited; and every man condemned for treason, is to be banished with his advocate.” A father is accused of treason, and one of his sons, by profession an orator, defends him: another son, who leads a country-life, does not assist at his trial. The father is found guilty, and is banished with his advocate. The other son having signalized himself in war against the enemies of the country, by way of reward obtains the restoration of his father and brother. The father, some time after his return, dies intestate. The son, who procured his pardon, claims a part of his inheritance; the orator makes a demand of the whole.

Now, our eloquent gentlemen, who deride the pains we put ourselves to in weighing the merit of unusual cases, will not fail to seize on what is most favourable in the characters. They will espouse the countryman’s cause against the orator; they will plead for a brave man against a coward; for a benefactor and deliverer against an ingrate; for him, who is contented with a part, against him, who would give his brother nothing out of his father’s substance. All these considerations arise from the subject, and they avail much, yet do not gain the cause. These partizans will besides hunt after, if possible, in the way of embellishment, some overstrained, extravagant, and obscure thoughts; for such is the eloquence of our

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days, the merit of which consists mostly in exciting the noise and bustle of admiration.

Others, who indeed design better, but look to only the surface of things as they flash in their eyes, excuse the countryman for not assisting at his father's trial, because he could be of no service to him; in which trial also the orator could boast of no real service he had done his father, as not being able to save him from condemnation. They therefore conclude, that the restorer of the family is more deserving of the inheritance than a covetous, worthless, and ungrateful person, who refuses to share it with his brother. This class of orators may likewise have an eye to a first question, regarding the law and the intention of the lawgiver, which if it be not invalidated, will exclude every other.

But the orator, who shall follow nature, will see clearly what the countryman ought first to plead. "My father dying intestate, left us his two sons, and by natural right I demand a part of his substance." What man, how ignorant, and illiterate soever, but would begin so, though even unacquainted with the nature of a proposition? He will afterwards expatiate a little on that natural law, observing that it is common to all nations, and very just. Now, what answer should be made to so reasonable a demand? This will instantly occur. "There is a law, in virtue of which, that person is disinherited, who does not plead for his father, accused of treason: you did not plead for him." This proposition is necessarily followed by an encomium on the law, which
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thus becomes a reproach to him, who was unobservant of it.

As yet no point has been contested, and we may reflect a little on the plaintiff's case. Will he not think unless quite stupid, that if the law is positive against him, no action lies on his part, and a trial will be ineffectual? It admits of no doubt that the law subsists in full force, and extends to him the infractor of it. What then shall he say? "My rural occupations exempt me from being affected by it."—But the law is comprehensive, and includes no exception; your plea therefore avails nothing. All that can be done on this emergency, is to examine, whether the law can be invalidated in any part of it. What else (I must often inculcate the advice,) does nature recommend and allow of, than that, when the letter of the law is against us, we should have recourse to the intention of the law-giver? The question will then become a general one, "Whether we must stand to the letter or intention of the law?" But by considering things in so vague and indeterminate a manner, the dispute would be perpetual on a matter of right, and still would remain undecided. We must consequently in this very case find some precedent that makes against the letter of the law. "Therefore every one, who has not pleaded on such trial, shall be disinherited." What! every one without an exception? Shall an infant son, or one that is sick, or going a journey, or upon duty in the army, or commissioned to act in some embassy, be disinherited for non-appearance on the occasion? So far the argument
holds

holds good; one might absent himself, and yet have a legal title to the inheritance.

He that made these reflections in favour of the farmer, let him now change * *fides*, and speak for the orator. "I readily grant what has been alleged, but you was neither an infant, nor sick, nor absent on a journey, nor on duty in the army, nor employed in an embassy." Nothing more occurs for a reply, but that a country life incapacitated him from being of service to his father. But an objection may be started, and manifestly against him. "I allow you was not capable of pleading properly in your father's defence, but you might at least have assisted at his trial." This being certain, he must return to the intention of the law-giver, observing, that the law pretends only to punish an unnatural disposition in children, which he cannot be charged with. "But you acted in this unnatural manner by deserving to be disinherited, though repentance or vanity might have afterwards prompted you to that sort of option. Besides your father may be said to be condemned on your account, as you seemed to have judged ill of his cause." The former here recriminates, that the orator must rather have been the cause of his father's condemnation, by having given offence to many, and so created enemies to their family. These reasons are supported only by conjectures, as is this other the farmer might use to give some colour to his absenting himself; that

* *Tibicinis Latini modo* in the text, alludes to a passage of Cicero's oration for Murena, n. 26, recommending the shifting of *fides*, as was done by the Latin flute-players, who occasionally changed left-handed flutes for right-handed.

his father's design was not to expose his whole family to the same danger. So far for the contents of the first question, arising from the letter and intention of the law.

Let our thoughts proceed further, and see if any thing else can be found out, and how it may be managed. By so doing I imitate one intent upon inquiries, and neglect the elegance of style, to make myself useful to the learner.

All the questions have hitherto been deduced from the person of the plaintiff; but we may, I think, form some concerning the father. The law expresses, that whoever assists not at his father's trial, shall be disinherited. Should not we examine, whether this law be general in regard to all fathers? This we often do in those controversies, in which we demand the laying in irons of such children as have not supported their parents in want. The question then may be; "Has a father a right to require this from a son, against whom he bore witness in judgment, or whom he had sold to a pander for the purposes of prostitution?" But should we attend to what has been agitated concerning the father in the present case; He was condemned, and does the law favour only fathers who have been acquitted? The question carries hardship on the face of it, but let us not despair. It is very probable the intention of the law-giver was, to deter children from being wanting to protect the innocence of their parents. The father cannot with a good countenance plead this, because he confesses his father to have been innocent; so that the dispute will afford another argument, on the clause "of banishing the condemned
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for treason with his advocate." It scarce could in any wise happen, that the law should inflict the same * punishment both on him who had defended his father, and on him who had not. Besides, there is no law for † relieving banished persons. It is not therefore probable that the law in question affects the son who was not the advocate of his condemned father, as in both cases he makes it doubted whether one under sentence of banishment can retain or recover any property. The orator, on his side, will adhere to the letter of the law, which makes no exception; that it therefore directed a punishment for all those who did not assist their father, that they might not be deterred from so doing by the danger of banishment; and that it was evident the father did not assist his father, though innocent.

Before we dismiss this litigation, it may be observed that two general questions may be made out of one state: "Is every son obliged to defend his father?" "Has every father a right to expect this service from his son?" Such are the questions deducible from two persons; but from the third, which is that of the adversary, no question can arise, because there is no dispute about his share.

Let not the matter, however, rest here, as all these things might be equally said, even if the father was not restored; neither let us hold to the

* The punishment is the same, which is the confiscation or loss of their goods; for he that is banished loses his goods, and he that is disinherited loses likewise his goods.

† Among the Romans, one under sentence of banishment was supposed dead in law, or so divested of every thing, that besides the loss of his goods, he lost also the right and privilege of a Roman citizen.

first thought, which occurs, that the father was restored by means of his son, the farmer. By examining well this consideration, we shall find something more; for as the species follows the genus, so the genus goes before the species. Let us therefore suppose that the father was restored by another. A ratiocinative question will thence arise, to be discussed by way of induction, as "Whether this restoration does not make void the sentence of condemnation, and is not of the same validity in law, as if no such sentence had ever passed?" The farmer may now plead, that having had only the option of one reward, he could not by means of it obtain the restoration of his father and brother, unless his father at the time of his restoration was deemed in law as a person never condemned, in virtue of which also his advocate was released from punishment as if he never had undertaken his defence. Then we come to what first occurred, that it was he who had procured the father's restoration; whereupon we again argue, "Whether the restorer should not be considered in the light of an advocate, having performed what the advocate intended, and there being no injustice in taking for a similarity, what is more than one?" Nothing more remains than the decision of equity, "Which of their pretensions is the more just?" This admits also of a division, the first question, supposing both to make a demand of the intire inheritance; and the second, as in the present case, the one to demand the * half, and the other, the whole, to the exclusion of his brother.

* *Semissim*, the one half of the inheritance. The ancient Romans dividing any thing into parts, as an inheritance or the like,
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Next to the clearing up of the merits of this cause, some retrospect to the father will be of great weight with the judges, especially as the question is for making a partition of his effects. This question will be therefore conjectural, considering his intention for dying intestate, and it belongs to quality, which serves to form another state. Most commonly indeed towards the end of pleadings, the orator falls upon natural equity, because the judges hear nothing so willingly; but he will sometimes change this order for the good of the cause, and prepare the judges to decide by equity, when the letter and rigour of the law are against him. This is all I had to recommend in general on this head. . * .

VII. There are many things of this sort, which cannot be taught without proposing the matter that is to be debated; for it is not enough to divide a cause into questions and places, as these parts also must have their order. In the exordium, something first is to be said, and something second, and so on; and every question, and place, has its respective disposition, as well as general questions. . This is what a writer can never make one sensible of to demonstration, unless he has a certain and determinate matter before him. But what will one or two do, even a hundred, or a thousand, amidst so infinite a scope of matter?

It is a master's business to shew daily in different kinds the order and connection of things, that practice may gradually point them out, and direct

like, call'd it *affim*, and the parts *uncias*. The *as* consisted of twelve *uncias*. Whence *ex affe hanc* was said to specify one that was sole and total heir.

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how to pass from like to like; for it is next to an impossibility to obviate all the operations of art. What painter ever learned to draw all the objects in nature? Yet, by being skilled in the manner of imitation, he will represent whatever he fancies. An artist may project a vessel, of which he never before saw a pattern. There are things then we learn of ourselves, without being taught. A physician will direct whatever is to be done in every sort of disease, and according to the indications of its several symptoms; and this will be the effect of his sagacity and experience; by judging in regard to his patients, from the diversity of pulsation in the veins, of the degree of heat; the manner of respiration, and the changes of colour.

We must therefore find many resources within ourselves; we must deliberate, as it were, with the causes we undertake; and must consider, that men found out the art of oratory, before they taught it. For that is the best disposition, and truest œconomy of a cause, which cannot be properly constituted, but according to its present circumstances. And hence it is, that we are to judge, when the exordium is necessary or not; when we are to use a continued narration, or divided into parts; when we are to begin from the origin of things, or in Homer's manner, from the middle or end; when we may set aside intirely the narration; when we may begin from our own, and when from the adversary's propositions; when from the strongest, and when from the weakest proofs; when in a cause questions may be directly discussed without an introduction, and when it is necessary to prepare the way for them by a recon-

mendatory preamble ; what the judge's mind may give immediate admission to, and what he must be gradually led to ; whether the adversary's proofs are to be refuted separately, or together ; whether moving the passions is to be reserved for the peroration, or to take place in all parts of the discourse ; whether we are to speak first on the rigour of the law, or on equity ; whether it be more advisable, first, to expose or palliate the crimes of past life, or those a man is charged with on his trial : If causes are complicated with a variety of incidental matter, what order ought to be kept, what affidavits or instruments of any kind ought to be read during the pleading, and what ought to be reserved to another time. It is so a general, by a proper distribution of his army, is ready on all emergencies : part of it he assigns for garrisoning forts, part for the defence of cities, the main body for taking the field, and detachments from it for the purposes of foraging, escorting convoys, and guarding passes, and defiles. In short, his wise precaution employs them by sea and land, according as he sees necessary.

None but the orator of genius, study, and knowledge, will be capable of effecting all this in a discourse. Let no one therefore expect to become eloquent, by the labour only of another. He must think of watching, waxing pale, and making various attempts. Every one must create his own powers, his own experience. He must not so much have an eye to our precepts, as retain a prompuary of them in himself, not as delivered, but as innate to him. Art indeed, if such there be, can quickly shew the way ; but art does enough,

nough, by placing in common the treasures of eloquence, it being our business to apply them to proper uses.

Besides the general disposition of a cause, there is another regarding its parts, and in these there is a something first, second, and third, which not only require to be placed in their order; but to be so joined together and cohering, that the junctures, as it were, imperceptible, might present to view a well framed body, and not members. To succeed in this respect, care must be taken in observing that every thing is in its place, that words are suited to words, and in no wise of a contradictory tendency, but calculated for one another. Thus different things from distant places, will not jar by collision, as if unknown to each other; but what goes before and what follows will chime in together as by a social compact; and the discourse will appear, not only ranged in accurate order, but likewise one continued piece of uniformity. But perhaps I proceed rather farther than I should, diverted from my byas by tracing the almost imperceptible connection that ought to be amongst the parts of a discourse. From disposition I therefore pass to elocution, which shall make the subject of my next book.

B O O K VIII.

THE INTRODUCTION

- I. *That youth are not to be loaded with precepts.*
 II. *An enumeration of the things which were said before, from Chapter 16. Book II. which chiefly belong to invention and disposition.* III. *Elocution is the most beautiful, and yet the most difficult part of Rhetoric.* IV. *Things rather than words, should be attended to.*

I. **I**N the five foregoing books I collected almost all that need be known concerning invention and disposition, of which indeed an exact and profound knowledge is necessary for those who design to perfect themselves in the art of oratory; but for beginners, a more brief and simple method seems best. This I presume to be so, from their being either deterred by the difficulty of so tedious and intricate an institution; or their being worn down by the treating of such rough matters, and especially at a time, when their mind wants to be nurtured, and their wit cherished by some indulgence; or if from learning these things only, they should imagine they had acquired a sufficient stock for becoming eloquent; or if from being bound down to certain laws of speaking, they should dread every stretch of genius beyond them. For these reasons some are of opinion, that the most exact writers on arts, were far from being eloquent themselves.

Young

Young beginners require, however, to be put at least upon the road, and this road ought to be smoothed to their steps, easy for walking in, and easily found out. It is therefore the business of the skilful master I mentioned, to make choice of the best and soundest principles, and to inculcate such of them as may seem most agreeable, without spending time in refuting others. His pupils will thus follow wherever he leads the way, and erudition will grow up as it receives strength from his instructions. They must first be made to believe, that there is no other road but that they are led into, and soon after, that it is the best. There are things, neither obscure, nor hard to be understood, which notwithstanding have been made so by the stubborn humour of authors in maintaining their different opinions. For which reason, he who now treats of the art of oratory, finds a greater difficulty in judging of what he may teach, than when he has judged, to teach it; yet, if we consider in a more particular manner the precepts concerning invention and disposition, we shall in the main find them but few, and if the learner conceives no dislike against them, he will find the way open to every thing else.

II. We have hitherto laboured much in shewing, that rhetoric is the science of speaking well; that it is useful, is an art, and a virtue; that its object comprehends all things which may be discussed in an oration; that these things are commonly found in one or other of its three kinds, consisting of the demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial; that every oration consists likewise of things and words; that in things invention is to

be considered, in words elocution, in both disposition; and that memory is to be their repository, and action their recommendation.

We have further shewn, that the duty of an orator is contained in instructing, moving, and pleasing; that the narration and proofs are appropriated for instructing, and the passions for moving, which may exert their powers in all parts of a cause, but more especially in the beginning and end; that to please, though included both in moving and instructing, more properly belongs to elocution; that some questions are infinite and others finite, contained in persons, places, and times; and that in every matter three questions are implied, "Whether it be, what it is, and of what kind?"

To these we added, that the demonstrative kind is calculated for praise or dispraise, in treating of which, we should attend to what the person we speak of has done, and what passed after his death. To this kind also are to be referred all questions concerning what is honest and useful; but these two points fall in likewise with the deliberative kind, which besides comprehends a third that is conjectural, wherein is examined, whether the affair deliberated upon be possible, and whether it may happen. And here we gave particular directions for the due observance of decorum, in regard to the person that speaks, and the person that is spoken to. Judicial causes we observed to consist of a single controverted point, or of many; . . . and every judicial cause of five parts, among which the intention of the exordium was to procure a benevolent attention, of the narration to
propose

propose the cause, the confirmation to prove it, the refutation to make void objections, the peroration, to refresh the memory of the judges, or to affect their minds by exciting passions in them.

To these we also added the places of arguments and passions, with an account of all the methods, whereby the judges might be inspired with indignant emotions, or pacified, or recreated by some pleasing fallies of wit and fancy. We likewise subjoined directions for making a proper division: so that, in the whole, nothing more need be observed, but that they who read this work with a design of improving themselves, may believe that there is a certain way, in which, without learning, nature ought of herself to effect many things; and from this cursory reflection it will appear, that the rules I have prescribed, have not been so much the invention of masters, as the result of their observations and experience.

III. What follows requires more labour and care, being now to treat of elocution, which in the opinion of all orators, is the most difficult part of our work. For M. Antonius, of whom we have already made mention, says, that he * had seen many good speakers, but none eloquent. He thinks it enough for a good speaker to say whatever is necessary on a subject; but to discuss it with grace and elegance is the property only of the most eloquent. If this perfection, down to the time he lived in, was not discoverable in any orator, and neither in himself, nor in L. Crassus, it is certain it was only wanting in them and their

* De Orat. i. 94.

predecessors, on account of its extreme difficulty. And Cicero † says, that invention and disposition shew the man of sense, but eloquence the orator. He therefore took particular pains about the precepts of this part; and that he had reason for so doing, the very name of eloquence sufficiently declares. For to be eloquent is nothing else than to be able to set forth all the lively images you have conceived in your mind, and to convey them to the hearers in the same rich colouring, without which all the precepts we have given are useless, and like a sword concealed, and kept sheathed in its scabbard.

This then is what we are principally to learn; this is what we cannot attain without the help of art; this ought to be the object of our study, our exercise, our imitation; this may be full employment for our whole life; by this one orator excells another; and from this proceeds the diversity of style, one better and more perfect than another. For we must not imagine, that the Asiatics, or others, whose style is corrupt, had no notion of invention and disposition; or that they whom we call dry orators, were destitute of sense, or blind in the management of causes: but rather that the first shewed no judgment nor moderation in their style, and the second wanted sufficient strength. Whence it appears, that there is a vice and virtue, a perfection and imperfection in speaking.

IV. But it should not be inferred from what is here said, that all our care must be about words. On the contrary, I assure such as would abuse this

† Orat. 44.

my concession, that I declare positively my disapprobation of those, who neglecting things, the nerves of causes, consume themselves in a frivolous study about words. This they do for the sake of elegance, which indeed is a fine quality when natural, but not when affected. Sound bodies, with a healthy state of blood, and strong by exercise, receive their beauty from the very things they receive their strength. They are fresh-coloured, active, and supple, neither too much, nor too little in flesh. Paint and polish them with feminine cosmetics, admiration ceases, the very pains taken to make them appear more beautiful, adding to the dislike we conceive for them. Yet a magnificent, though suitable dress, adds authority to man, as we find it expressed in a * Greek verse; but an effeminate dress, the garb of luxury and softness, lays open the corruption of the heart, without adding to the ornament of the body. In like manner, that translucent and flashy elocution of some, emasculates the things it clothes. I would therefore recommend care about words, but solicitude about things.

The choicest expressions are for the most part inherent to things, and are seen in their own light; but we search after them as if always hiding and stealing themselves away from us. Thus we never think, that what ought to be said, is, as it were, at hand: we fetch it from afar, and force

* He alludes to the Greek proverb: *Ἐμπερὶς ἀνὴρ: cloath's makes the man*, by which we signify that dress itself adds a certain magnificence and authority to men. Erasmus thinks that Quintilian means a verse from Homer, in which Nausicaë speaks concerning Ulysses. *Odyss. Book Z. or vi. v. 29.*

our invention. Eloquence requires a more manly temper; and if its whole body be sound and vigorous, it is quite regardless of the nicety of paring nails, and adjusting the hair.

It often too happens that an oration becomes worse by attending to these niceties, because simplicity, the language of truth, is its greatest ornament, and affectation the reverse. The expressions that make a shew of care, and that would fain appear also as newly framed, fine, and eloquent, lose the graces they aim at, and are far from being striking and well received, because they obscure the sense by spreading a sort of shadow about it; or by being too crowded they choak it up, like thick-sown grain that must run up too spindling. That which may be spoken in a plain direct manner, we express by paraphrase; and we use repetitions, where once saying is enough; and what is well signified by one word, we load with many; and most things we choose rather to signify by circumlocution, than by proper and pertinent terms.

And indeed, a proper word has now no attractive charms, nothing appearing to us fine which might have been said by another. We borrow metaphors from the whims and conceits of the most extravagant poets, and we fancy ourselves exceeding witty, when others must have a deal of wit to understand us. Cicero is explicit in his sentiments in this respect. "The greatest fault a speech can have, says he, * is when it departs from the common way of discourse, and the custom

of common sense." But Cicero will pass for a harsh and barbarous author, comparatively to us, who make slight of whatever nature dictates; who seek after, not ornaments, but delicacies and refinements, as if there was any beauty in words without an agreement with things; for if we were to labour our whole life in consulting their propriety, clearness, ornament, and due placing, we should lose the whole fruit of our studies.

And yet many are seen to stick at single words, even whilst they invent, and reflect on, and measure what they invent. If this was done designedly to use always the best, yet would this unhappy temper be detestable, as it must check the course of speaking, and extinguish the heat of thought by delay and diffidence. For the orator is wretched, and, I may say, poor, who cannot patiently lose a word. But he will lose none, who first has studied a good manner of speaking, and by reading well the best authors, has furnished himself with a copious supply of words, and made himself expert in the art of placing them. Much practice will afterwards so improve him, that he will always have them at hand and present to him, things naturally occurring with the proper way of expressing them.

But all this requires a previous study, an acquired faculty, and, I may say, a rich fund. For that sollicitude in regard to inventing, judging, and comparing, should take place when we learn, and not when we speak. Otherwise they who have not sufficiently cultivated their talents for speaking, will experience the fate of those who have made no provision for futurity. But if a proper stock for
elocution

elocution remains ready prepared, words will attend as in duty bound, and not so much in the way of answering exigencies, as always to seem inherent to the thought, and to follow as a shadow does a body.

Yet this care should not exceed its due bounds; for when words are authorized by use, are significant, elegant, and aptly placed, what more need we trouble ourselves about? But some will eternally find fault, and almost scan every syllable; who even when they have found what is best, seek after something that is more ancient, remote, and unexpected; not understanding that the thought must suffer in a discourse, must be nothing valuable, in which the words only are commendable. Let us therefore pay a singular regard to elocution, yet be convinced at the same time that nothing is to be done for the sake of words, they themselves having been invented for the sake of things. The most proper will be always those which are best expressive of the ideas of our mind, and produce in the ideas of the judges the effect we desire. Such undoubtedly will make a speech both admirable and pleasing; but not admirable in the degree we admire prodigies; nor pleasing by a vicious and unseemly pleasure, but a pleasure reflecting dignity with praise.

C H A P. I.

Of Elocution.

Elocution lies in words, either single or placed together. In regard to the single, we must consider, whether they are pure, clear, ornamental, and fit for producing what we intend they should. In those connected with each other, whether they are correct, properly placed, and figurative. He adds a few things to what he had before said on the purity and correctness of style.

WHAT the Greeks call *φράσις*, the Latins express by *elocutio*, elocution. It may be considered in regard to words, either taken separately or collectively. Separately, we are to observe whether they have the sanction of use, and are clear, productive of ornament, and suitable to what we design to effect. Collectively, whether correct, properly placed, and figurative. I need not say more concerning the purity and correctness of speaking, having already sufficiently discussed those points in my first book, where I treated of grammar.

There, however, I advised only guarding against the faults of style; but here it will not be amiss to observe, that nothing foreign, nor favouring of a provincial turn, should be admitted into it. For we may meet with many, who are not deficient in good language, but rather speak more curiously, than in taste. "It was so an Athenian old woman, having remarked in Theophrastus, tho' otherwise a person of elegant language, the affect-
ed

ed pronunciation of a certain word, called him a stranger; and being asked why she thought him so, answered, "because his accent was rather broad for being truly Attic." Pollio said, that the style of Livy, a man of wonderful eloquence, had a certain * Patavinity in it. Therefore, if possible, every word, and the very tone of voice, should bespeak the natural born citizen of Rome, that the language may be purely Roman, and not so, by a right difference from birth and education.

C H A P. I I .

Of Perspicuity.

I. Perspicuity depends principally on the propriety of words. II. How obscurity happens, and how it may be avoided.

I. PERSPICUITY † in words proceeds principally from their propriety; but this propriety is variously taken.

The proper name of every thing is what we first understand, though we do not always use it; because we ought to avoid all obscene, filthy, mean, and low expressions. By low expressions, I mean such as are beneath the dignity of things, and the persons we speak before. But some striving to avoid low expressions, fall into another extreme not less bad, which is shewing an aversion to words in common use, though necessarily re-

* A certain manner and turn of expression, rather favouring of Padua, than of Rome.

† Of perspicuity, See Cic. de Orat. l. iii. n. 48, 50.

quired by the nature of the subject; as an orator in a pleading called something by the name of a Spanish herb, which none could have understood but himself, had not Cassius Severus, to ridicule his vanity, told the assembly that it was Spanish broom he meant. I know not also why a famous orator thought "little fishes preserved in pickle," more elegant than the name he declined mentioning. There is not, however, any perfection in that sort of propriety, which consists in using a name for every thing; but impropriety, its contrary vice, is a great fault; such is that manner of expression in * Virgil: "Tantum sperare dolorem," hope for so great a misfortune." Yet, a word for not being very proper, is not therefore to be charged with impropriety, because in all languages several things have no proper name. To throw a dart, is properly to dart; but there is no particular appellation to express the action of him who throws a ball or stake. To stone is said well enough; but it is not possible to express by a single word the throwing of sods and shells. Hence it comes to pass that the putting of one word † abusively for another, is sometimes necessary. The metaphor also, than which there cannot be a greater embellishment to an oration, fits names to things that have none. Propriety therefore is not so much referred to a name, as to the force of signification, of which the understanding, and not the ear, will be always the better judge.

Secondly, that is called proper amongst many of the same name, whence the rest are borrowed.

* Æn. iv. 4:9.

† κατάχρησις.

"Vertex" signifies properly a water circulating round itself, and every thing moving in the form of a whirlpool. Hence has been called the crown of the head, by reason of the round made there by the hairs; as also the summit, or highest part in mountains. All these are properly denominated "vertices;" but the proper is the first signification. The same may be said of certain * fishes that have taken their appellation from things of a different nature, to which they bear a kind of resemblance.

Thirdly, an appellation is proper, when, tho' common to many things, it specifies one in particular, as the word "nænia," signifying properly a funeral elegy; and "augustale," a general's tent, but more properly the emperor's palace or pavilion. In the same rank may be placed certain names, which though common to many things, yet imply in their acceptation, one that is peculiarly so called by excellence; as "urbs," the city, to signify Rome; and "venales," slaves to be sold that never served before; and "Corinthia," the brass of Corinth; though there are many cities besides Rome, and many things to be sold besides slaves, and many metals of value besides Corinthian brass. But in all this nothing is directly interesting to the orator.

But there is a kind of propriety more immediately deserving of his notice, which is discoverable in certain sayings, very significative in their im-

* *Solea*, a sole, a well known flat fish, so called from resembling the sole of our foot. *Turdus* is a fish that haunts rocks, and was so called by the Romans, as resembling in its spots the bird we call a thrush.

port; as that of * Cato, who said that “Cæsar came sober to destroy the commonwealth.” Virgil and Horace, † afford many examples of such energetic proprieties. . What is most remarkable in every person and thing, is also said to be proper: thus Fabius, among many other titles acquired by his military achievements, received also the surname of *Cunctator*.

Emphatical words signifying more than they express, seem to make part of perspicuity, as they help the understanding. But I should rather give them a place among the ornaments of an oration, because they serve, not so much to make what we say intelligible, as to give it a latitude of sense.

II. I now proceed to consider obscurity, which may first be occasioned by words not in use; as if one should read the annals of our pontiffs, our oldest treaties of peace, and our most obsolete authors, to collect from them expressions, which cannot be understood. Some, by the singularity of this study, affect a character of erudition, that they may seem the only connoisseurs in such matters. We also fall into obscurity, by adopting words peculiar to certain countries, or technical terms, as “the ‡ wind Atabulus,” and “the ship § Saccaria;” all which are either not to be mentioned before judges, ignorant of their signifi-

* There is a propriety in the word *sober*, expressive of great care, diligence, and forecast; such as is usually met with in the sober.

† As deductum carmen, acrem tibiam, Hannibalem dirum Ec og. vi. 5. l. 1. Od. xii. l. 3. Od. iv.

‡ The proper name of a wind which infests Apulia. See Hor. lib. i. sat. 5. v. 78. *ὅτε ἄτρον βλάται.*

§ A ship laden with sacks of corn; or with bales of spice of different sorts.

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cation ; or if they are, they ought instantly to be explained. We may pass the same judgment on words of an equivocal meaning, as suppose "Taurus," which unless distinctly pointed out, may not be known, whether we understand by it, an animal, a mountain, a constellation, the name of a man, or the root of a tree.

The obscurity is still greater in a concatenation of words ; to avoid which, periods should never be so long, as not easily to be pursued by the attention ; nor so complicated and embarrassed by transposition, as not to be comprehended till the last words are pronounced. A confused mixture of words is again worse, as in this * verse of Virgil :

Saxa vocant Itali mediis quæ in fluctibus aras.

The parenthesis, though frequently used by orators and historians, for inserting another meaning in the midst of a period, embarrasses likewise the understanding, unless the insertion is short. On this account we find fault with that passage in † Virgil, where describing a colt, he says,

Nor dreads he empty noises ; TRAPP.

for having added many things by way of parenthesis, he afterwards in the fifth verse, returns to his first thought, and makes use of another figure :

Then if the clank of distant arms is heard
He paws impatient. TRAPP.

* *Æn.* i. 113.

† *Georg.* iii. 7.

Above all ambiguity ought to be avoided, not only that which makes the sense uncertain, as "*Chremetem audiivi percussisse Demeam*;" but that also, which, though not confounding the sense, falls into the same fault in regard to the placing of words; as if one should say, "*vidi hominem librum scribentem*." It is manifest, that it is the man who writes the book, but the ambiguity makes the composition faulty.

Some dreading, as it were, the common way of speaking, or imagining they distinguish themselves by a very elegant manner, crowd their speeches with a superfluity of words, expressing even the most simple matters by circumlocution; and then joining this series of words with another in the same strain, and mixing them up together, they draw their periods out into such a length, that they cannot possibly be pronounced with one breath.

Some even are industrious in making themselves obscure, and this vice is not a novelty; for I find that Livy * makes mention of a master in his time, who was wont to recommend obscurity to his scholars; and on inspecting an abstruse composition, did not hesitate to give it this incomparable elogium: "It is exceeding fine; for even I myself have not understood it."

Others fond of conciseness to an excess, retrench even necessary words in an oration, and as if it was enough for themselves to know what they have a mind to say, are quite regardless of being understood by others. For my part, I look upon a speech to be of no significancy, when to understand it, the audi-

* In his epistle to his son, which Quintilian makes mention of elsewhere.

tor wants help, or has an occasion for a more than ordinary sagacity. . Others besides, are so infatuated as to think, that nothing can be said so elegantly and exquisitely as when it wants an interpreter. This too is very acceptable to some auditors, who by piquing themselves on their understanding, are highly delighted with their penetration, and applaud themselves not in quality of auditors, but as inventors.

By us, however, let perspicuity be deemed a singular perfection. Let words be proper, let their order be not suspended by interruptions, nor the period spun out into too great a length; and let nothing be wanting nor superfluous. Thus will a discourse be favourably received by the learned, and will not surpass the capacity of common understandings. These are the best observations that can be made on the perspicuity required for elocution; for as to the perspicuity necessary for things, we have already spoken of it in the precepts of narration. But the way is much the same in all respects. For if we say neither less than we should, nor more, nor things out of order, nor in confusion, they will be clear and easily understood, even when the auditor is ever so little attentive. We may likewise think that the attention of the judge is not always so close, as to make him able to dispel of himself the obscurity of our thoughts, and clear up the darkness of our discourse by the light of his understanding. On the contrary, he is often distracted by a multiplicity of other thoughts, and we shall run the risque of his being regardless of what we say, unless our words strike his mind, even amidst his inattention,

as

as the brightness of the sun strikes our eyes. Wherefore far from his being able to understand us, we must strive by all possible means to make his conceptions clear and obvious ; and it is for this reason that we often repeat what we fancy he has not well comprehended at first : as, “ the fault may be imputed to me, for not having explained myself thoroughly ; I therefore repeat what I said in more intelligible terms.” And thus, an Orator is favourably thought of for saying over again what he pretends he has not clearly and properly expressed in the foregoing part of his discourse.

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C H A P. III.

Of Ornaments.

I. *The force of ornament.—It should be manly, not effeminate.—Diversified according to the kind of matter.* II. *There is an ornament in single words, and in their construction. In single, when many are synonymous, or signify the same thing, a choice should be made.* III. *Words are either proper, to which antiquity adds dignity.—Or newly coined, and here he treats of the method of coining words.—Or figurative, of which in another place.* IV. *Before he treats of the ornaments of words in construction, he touches upon the principal vices, contrary to ornament.* V. *He proceeds to ornament, to which principally contribute the ἐνάργεια or hypotyposis.—Similitudes.—Βραχυλογία.—Emphasis.—Ἀφαισις.* VI. *Lastly, he touches on the powers of the Orator in augmentation and diminution, of which more at large in the following chapter.*

I. **I** Now come to * ornament, in which undoubtedly more than in other parts, the orator is fond of displaying his talents for eloquence. But a slender degree of honour is acquired from speaking with correctness and perspicuity, as one thereby will only seem to be rather free from faults, than distinguished by any great perfection. Invention is often common to the orator with the illiterate; disposition may be

* Of ornament, see Cic. de Orat. I. iii. n. 91. 104. and n. 147. 170. and in Orat. n. 75. 86.

thought to be the effect of moderate learning; the masterly strokes of art are generally kept concealed, otherwise they would cease being what they are; in short all these matters can contribute only to the utility of the causes: but the orator will recommend himself in a very particular manner by the elegance of the ornaments he adopts; acquiring in other respects the approbation of the learned, and in this also the favour of popular applause.

Not so much with strong, as with shining armour, did Cicero engage in the cause of * Cornelius. He would not have been indebted for his success to merely instructing the judges, and speaking in a pure and clear style. These qualities would not have honoured him with the admiration and applause of the Roman people. It was the sublimity, and magnificence, and splendour, and dignity of his eloquence that forced from them those so signal demonstrations of their astonishment. Neither would such unusual eulogies have attended on the orator, if his speech had contained nothing extraordinary, nothing but what was common in it. And indeed, I believe that those present, had not an intimate feeling of what they were doing, and that what they did was neither spontaneously, nor from an act of judgment; but that by a sort of enthusiasm of mind, and not considering the place they were in, they broke out into those precipitate agitations.

These ornaments may therefore be thought to contribute not a little to the success of a cause.

* Pro Cornelio Balbo, vii. &c.

For they who hear willingly, are more attentive, and more disposed to believe. Most commonly it is pleasure that gains them over, and sometimes they are seized and hurried away with admiration. A glittering sword strikes the eyes with some terror, and thunder would not so shock us, if its crash only, and not its lightning was dreaded. Therefore Cicero with good reason says in one of his epistles to Brutus: "The * eloquence which does not excite admiration, I repute as nothing." Aristotle too would have us endeavour to attain this perfection.

But this embellishment, (I must again and again repeat it) ought to be manly, noble, and modest; neither inclining to effeminate delicacy, nor assuming a colour indebted to paint, but glistening with health and spirits. This is so true, that though in this respect virtues and vices border nearly upon each other, yet they who may adopt vices for virtues, will not be wanting to palliate the choice they make by some specious appellation.

Let therefore none of those, who build up their reputation on a † corrupt manner of eloquence, say that I am an enemy to such as speak with elegance. I do not deny that it is a perfection, but do not ascribe it to them. Shall I think a piece of ground better laid out and improved, in which one shall shew me lilies and violets, and pleasing cascades; than one where there is a full harvest, or vines

* Rhet. lib. iii.

† He calls *corrupt* those, who seek after little thoughts and points of wit, and who by too great an affectation of ornament, and as it were, of effeminate finery, corrupt the dignity of masculine eloquence: this vice prevailed much in Quintilian's time.

laden with grapes? Shall I esteem a barren plane-tree, and shorn myrtles, beyond the fruitful olive, and the elm courting the embraces of the vine? The rich may pride themselves in these pleasures of the eye; but how little would be their value if they had nothing else?

But shall no beauty, no symmetry be observed in the disposition of fruit-trees? Undoubtedly there should; and I would digest them into a certain order, and keep a due distance in planting them. What is more beautiful than that * quincunx, which whatever way you look, retains the same direct position? Planting them out so will also be of service to the growth of the trees, by their equally attracting the juices of the earth. I shall lop off the aspiring tops of my olive; it will spread more beautifully in a round form, and will produce fruit upon more branches. A horse, from having slender flanks, is reputed handsomer than another not framed in that manner; and the same quality also shews that he excels in swiftness. An athlete makes a beautiful sight, whose arms exhibit from exercise a full spring and play of the muscles; the same likewise must be best fitted for a combatant. Thus the true species is never without its utility, and this a slender judgment may easily discern.

But it will be of more importance to observe, that this decent attire ought to be varied according to the nature of the subject. And to begin with our first division, the same will not equally suit

* Quincunx is the order of trees, disposed triangle-wise. It was so called from the figure of the fifth number V, which a triangle is expressive of. See Virg. Georg. l. ii. v. 277.

demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial causes. The first calculated for ostentation, aims at nothing, but the pleasure of the auditory. It therefore displays all the riches of art, and exposes to full view all the pomp of eloquence; not acting by stratagem, nor striving for victory, but making praise and glory its sole and ultimate end. Whatever therefore may be pleasing in the thought, beautiful in the expression, agreeable in the turn, magnificent in the metaphor, elaborate in the composition, the orator will lay open for inspection, and, if it were possible, for handling, as a merchant exposes his wares: for in this kind, the success wholly regards him and not the cause.

But when the serious affair of a trial is depending, and the contest is truly in earnest, the care of reputation ought to be the orator's last concern. For which reason no one ought, when every thing is in a manner at stake, to be solicitous about words. This I do not say, that no sort of ornaments ought to take place in them, but that they should be more modest and severe, less apparent, and above all suited to the subject. For, in deliberations the senate require something more elevated; the assemblies of the people something more spirited; and at the bar public and capital causes something more accurate. But a private deliberation, and causes of trivial consequence, as the stating of accounts and the like, need little beyond the plain and easy manner of common discourse. Would it not be quite shameful to demand the payment of money lent in elaborate periods; or move the passions in speaking of the repairs of a gutter or sink; or sweat, and make a mighty bustle,

for * returning a slave on the hands of the seller? But to return to our subject.

II. And as the ornament as well as perspicuity of speech, consist either in single words or in many together, we shall consider what they separately require, and what in conjunction. Though there has been good reason for saying, that perspicuity is best suited by proper words, and ornament by metaphorical; yet, should we always know that an impropriety is never ornamental. But as many words signify very often the same thing, and are therefore called synonymous, some of these must be more decent, more sublime, more bright, more agreeable, and sweeter and fuller in pronunciation, than others. For as the more clear-sounding letters, communicate the like quality to the syllables they compose; so the words composed of these syllables become more sonorous, and the greater the force or sound of the syllables is, the more they fill or charm the ear. What the junction of syllables makes, the copulation of words makes also, such a word sounding well with one, which would sound ill with another.

There is, however, a great diversity in the use of words. Harsh words and shocking to the hearing, express best things of an atrocious nature. In general, the best of simple words are believed to be such as sound loudest in exclamation, or sweetest in a pleasing strain. Modest words will ever be preferred to those that must offend a chaste ear, and

* *Redditio* was to take place in virtue of the ædile's edict, when the person that sold to you a vicious or diseased slave, was to take him back and repay the money you gave for him, on ascertaining by complaint these his bad qualities.

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no polite discourse ever makes allowance for a filthy or sordid expression. Magnificent, noble, and sublime words are to be estimated by their congruity with the subject; for what is magnificent in one respect, swells into bombast in another; and what is low in a grand matter, may be proper in an humble situation. And as in a splendid style a low word must be very remarkable, and as it were a blemish to it; so a sublime and pompous expression cannot square with one that is plain and familiar, and must therefore be reputed corrupt, because it raises that which ought to recommend itself by native simplicity.

There are words, the elegance of which we are more sensible of, than we can well account for; as in * Virgil,

“ Cæsà jungebant fædera porcâ.”

The elegance consists in the adopting of the name, instead of which if he had used *porco*, it would have been low and mean. Some other words may be manifestly accounted for; and we therefore had reason to laugh lately at the poet for saying

“ Prætextam in cista mures rosere Camilli:”

Yet we admire that of † Virgil

“ Sæpè exiguus mus:”

For the epithet, “ exiguus” fit and proper, will not let us expect any thing of consequence; and the singular number has a prettier effect; and the un-

* *Æn.* i. 641.

† *Georg.* i. 131.

usual closing of the verse with a monosyllable, makes an additional beauty. Horace * had an eye to both these particulars in his

“Nascetur ridiculus mus.”

The style likewise should not always run in its elevated manner, but might occasionally remit something of it, because the meanness of words gives sometimes greater force to things. Was Cicero faulty in admitting a low expression, when he told Piso in his invective against him, “And now your whole family and household furniture may be carried off in a common waggon;” rather was it not his design to make more contemptible the man whose destruction he aimed at? . .

III. The words a language is composed of, are proper, newly coined, and metaphorical; and of the first of these it may be said, that antiquity adds dignity to them. Words indeed of the ancient dialect, which every one may not think of using, make a style more majestic and admirable. Virgil, among other instances, has shewed his accurate judgment, in the use he made of this ornamental part of his style; for *olli*, and *quianam*, and † *mi*, and *pone*, shine and diffuse through it that antique taste, which affords so much pleasure in pieces of painting, whence a certain majesty arises, inimitable by art. But we should be sparing in the use of these words, and not seek after them in times of the remotest antiquity. *Quæso* is ancient

* Art. Poet. 139.

† *Mi* for *mihi*, Æn. l. vi. v. 104. *Pone*, an ancient preposition for *post*. *Pone nos recede*, Plaut. But it is not met with in this sense in Virgil. *Pone* an adverb for *retro*, is not uncommon.

enough,

enough, but where is the * necessity of using it? *Oppido* had been used a little before our time, but I fear it is scarce now tolerable. *Antigerio* is of the same signification, but there is an insipid vanity in using it. Where is the occasion of saying † *ærumna*, as if *labor* was not sufficient? *Reor* is horrible, *autumo* passable, *prolem ducendam* favours of old tragedy, and *universam ejus prosapiam* is absurd. In short, our whole language has been in a manner changed. Yet there are some words still, which from being old, are particularly graceful; and some of them likewise are found necessary, as *enuncupare*, *effari*, with many others, which are grateful to the hearers, so affectation does not appear in the use of them. . .

To coin words, as I mentioned in the first ‡ book, is a liberty more allowed of in the Greeks, who have even presumed to adapt names to certain sounds and affections, and upon no other authority than that of the first men, who imposed

* Where is the necessity of using the word (*Quasô*)? Cannot many others be substituted for it, as *rogo*, *precor*, *obsecro*.

† There is a difference between *labor* and *ærumna*. The latter is defined by Cicero, Tusc. l. iv. n. 18 *ægritudo laboriosa*. See also de Fin. l. ii. n. 118. This word is often used by Cicero.

‡ Quintilian, in his first book thus speaks of coined words: (which passage we have omitted) "We may, however, sometimes hazard them, for as Cicero says, though at first they may appear strange and harsh, use will insensibly familiarize and soften them: yet the *ενομαστωσις* cannot in any wise be allowed us: [The inventing of words for specifying the tones, voices, cries, and other various affections of the beings we behold in nature.] For who could bear our coining any thing like what may otherwise be justly commendable in Homer, as *λυγξέ βιός*, and *διζέσθ φθαλμός*? [Iliad. iv. and Odyss. ix.] And we should not even attempt saying *balare* and *hinnire*, had they not the sanction of antiquity to make them tolerable.

appel-

appellations on things. Such of our Latins, as made any attempt in the compounding or deriving of words, have been generally unsuccessful; and when I was a young man, I remember it to be warmly contested between Pomponius and Seneca, whether *gradus eliminat* was expressed with propriety in a tragedy of Accius. The ancients made no scruple of saying *expellorat*, and of the same stamp is *exanimat*.

As to derivatives, Cicero gives us an example of them in * *beatitas* and *beatitudo*, which he finds harsh, but fancies they may be softened by use; and not from verbs only, but from nouns, some words have been derived, as by Cicero, † *sullaturit*, and by Asinius *fimbriaturit* and *figulaturit*.

We have several new coined words from the Greeks, and most of them are attributed to Sergius Flavius, of which some seem to be but indifferently relished, as *ens* and *essentia*; but I see no reason why we should have so great an aversion against them, unless we have a mind to be unjust to ourselves, and so become sufferers from the poverty of our language.

Some, however, stand their ground; for those now antiquated, were formerly new, and some even are but of a late date. Messala was the first that said *reatus*, and † Augustus *munerarium*. My masters doubted that *piratica* could be said as well as *musica* and *fabrica*. Cicero believes *favor* and *urbanus* to be new; for in an epistle to Brutus,

* De Nat. Deor. i. 95.

† Ad Attic. l. ix. ep. 12. *Sullaturit animus ejus & proscripturit*, is derived from Sulla or Sylla, who proscribed the Roman citizens.

he says, "Eum amorem, et eum (ut hoc verbo utar) favorem in consilium advocabo." And in another to Appius Pulcher: "Te hominem non solum sapientem, verum etiam (ut nunc loquimur) urbanum." The same supposes also, that Terence first used the word * *obsequium*. Cæcilius writing to Sisenna, makes use of the expression of *Albenti calo*. Hortensius seems to be the first that said *cervicem*; the ancients always used it in the plural number..

We may therefore allow ourselves the liberty of sometimes boldly hazarding a word; for I agree not with Celsus, who would debar the orator from framing any new manner of expression. Among the constituent words of a language, some, as † Cicero says, are native, that is, significative in the sense of their first institution; and others have been invented, and made out of these: so that, though we are not allowed to change the appellations which the first men, though rude and unpolished, imposed on things; yet may we claim the privilege those that came after them exercised, of deriving one word from another, multiplying it by the means of different inflections, and compounding a single word out of many. But if we might seem to ourselves too adventurous in our mode of expression, we should use precautions to prevent its being excepted against: "As to say so, if I may be allowed to use the expression, in some respect, permit me to say so." The same, in some measure, may be an apology for very

* This is not true; for it was used before Terence by Plautus and Nævius, and therefore Quintilian adds, *putat*.

† Partit. 16.

bold metaphors, which cannot be safely hazarded; and from our wariness it will appear we have not been mistaken in our judgment. We are recommended by a very elegant Greek precept on this occasion, "To ask * pardon for the hyperbole."

We cannot be judges of the goodness of a metaphor separately from the construction of the sentence it has a place in. It seems therefore enough has been said of words, which in themselves contain no perfection; yet cannot be held as destitute of ornament, unless they fall short of the dignity of the thing they are made to express. I always except against the enouncing of obscenities by their naked appellations; though indeed † some are of opinion they ought not to be avoided, because no word is impure in its nature; and if there be a deformity in the thing, whatever other term is used for expressing it, the same idea will notwithstanding be conveyed to the intellect: for my part holding to that modest decorum observed by us Romans, I shall still assert the same good cause by my silence, as I have already done on a like occasion.

IV. I shall now pass to the construction of words, observing that their ornamental part may be considered in two points of view; the first, as it regards the elocution we conceive in our minds; the second, the manner of expressing it. It is a matter of singular consequence that we should be

* *προσῆμιον αἰσῶσις τῇ ὑπερβολῇ*: that is, to shew how cautiously we venture on the hyperbole, and beg pardon for it, as it were to prevent being reprimanded for it.

† He understands the Stoics and Cynics. See Cicero *l. ix. ep. 22. ad Famil.*

clear in what ought to be amplified or diminished; whether we are to speak with heat or moderation; in a florid or austere style; in a copious or concise manner; in words of bitter invective, or in those shewing the placid and gentle disposition; with magnificence or plainness; gravity or politeness: besides which, it is equally important to know, what metaphors, what figures, what thoughts, what manner, what disposition, are fittest for effecting our design.

But being to speak of the ornaments of a discourse, it may not be amiss to touch first on qualities contrary to them; because the principal perfection consists in being free from faults. We must not therefore in any wise expect ornament in a discourse, that is not probable. Cicero * calls that kind probable, which is not more nor less than it ought. Not that it should not appear neat and polished, (for this is a part of ornament) but because every thing too much is always faulty. He would then have authority and weight in words; and thoughts sensible, or conformable to the opinions and manners of men. These inviolably retained and adhered to, he makes ample allowance for whatever else may contribute to illustrate a discourse. And thus it is, that metaphors, superlatives, epithets, compound, and synonymous words, so they seem expressive of the action and imitation of things, seldom fail of pleasing.

But as we design here to speak of the vices of discourse, we may first take notice of that con-

* Partit. 19.

struction which conveys an idea of * nastiness. . . Next to this unseemliness is the † meanness of expression, by which the magnitude or dignity of things is lessened; ‡ as “*Saxea est verruca in summo montis vertice;*” “It is a wart of stone on the top of a mountain.” The contrary vice, but the same in error, is to speak of little things in extravagant terms, unless done designedly to excite laughter. Therefore, you shall not call a parricide, a bad man; nor one that frequents the company of the ladies of the town, a cursed wicked fellow; because the first is too little, and the second too much. But the expression that is dull, flat, mean, jejune, sad, disagreeable, and careless, is easily discoverable from the opposite qualities of witty, lively, elegant, copious, cheerful, pleasing, and accurate.

We should also avoid the § fault which makes the sentence appear not full enough on account of something defective; though this is rather a vice of obscurity than want of ornament in speech. But when some particular reason occasions it, in that case it becomes a figure. We should likewise be aware of || tautology, which is the repetition of the same word, or many like it, or of the same things. This, though it does not seem to have been much guarded against by some authors of great note, is notwithstanding a fault; and Cicero himself, regardless of so trivial an ob-

* καθήφατον, as Dorica Castra.

† ταπεινότης.

‡ This example to signify a tomb, is taken from Cato's Origins.

§ μείωσις.

|| ταυτολογία.

servation, often falls into it, as in this * passage ;
 “ Non solum igitur illud iudicium iudicii simile,
 iudices, non fuit. .

A † similarity of expression is a vice still more considerable, as not easing the irksomeness of the mind by the graces of variety ; and from being all of one colour, it manifests a great deficiency in the art of oratory. It besides creates loathing, and at length becomes insupportable, both to the mind and ear, by a tedious repetition of the same cold thoughts, figures, and periods.

We must guard too against expressing things in more ‡ words than are necessary. An example of such prolixity is met with in Livy : “ The ambassadors, not having obtained peace, returned home, from whence they came.” But the paraphrase bordering upon this is reckoned an ornament.

The pleonasmus is likewise a vice, when it incumbers the sentence with superfluous words ; as if one should say, “ I myself have seen it with my eyes.” “ I saw it” would be sufficient. Cicero very humourously corrected a like way of speaking in Hirtius, who declaiming against Pansa, mentioned a mother who had gone beyond her term in child-bearing, saying “ She had carried her son ten months in her womb :” “ Yes, replied he, another woman might have carried him wrapped up in her cloak.” Sometimes, however, the pleonasmus is used for affirming positively a thing, as in this § example from Virgil :

* Pro Cluent. 96.

† μακρολογία.

‡ αμολογία.

§ Æn. iv. 359.

“ Vocemque

“Vocemque his auribus hausi.”

—“With these very ears his voice I heard.”

But it will be a fault, so often as it appears idle and superfluous, and not when used designedly.

There is another fault in being * over-nice, but this curious anxiety is as far distant from exactness, as superstition is from true religion. In short, every word that neither contributes to perspicuity, nor ornament, may be called vicious.

A perverse † affectation is faulty in all respects. All bombast, and flimsyness, and studied sweetness, and redundancies, and far-fetched thoughts, and witticisms, fall under the same denomination. Whatever, in fine, stretches beyond the bounds of perfection, may be called affectation; and this happens as often as the genius is destitute of judgment, and suffers itself to be deceived by an appearance of good. It is the worst of vices in matters of eloquence; for when others are avoided, this is sought after, and its whole trespass is against elocution. There are vices incident to things, which are so, from being devoid of sense, or common, or contrary, or unnecessary; and a corrupt style consists principally in the impropriety of words, in their redundancy, in their obscure import, in an emasculate composition, and in a puerile hunting after of synonymous or equivocal words. But every perverse affectation is in consequence of its idea, false, though every thing that

* *πιεσπυλα*, or *overdoing*, is as much in things as in words. It happens when we are over-careful and scrupulous; and then by adding, retrenching, or polishing too much, or by many and frequent alterations, we spoil the discourse, and make it unadorned and inelegant.

† *κακόζηλον*.

is false is not an affectation, which is saying a thing otherwise than as nature will have it, and than it ought to be, and than is sufficient. A discourse is therefore subject to become corrupt in as many ways as it will admit of ornament. But of this part I have treated more at large in * another work, and in this also shall often touch upon it in many places; for as I proceed in speaking of ornament, I shall occasionally point out such vices as bear a resemblance to perfections, in order to their being avoided. . .

V. † Ornament in a discourse is something more than perspicuity and probability. Its first degrees are conceiving and expressing thoughts; and the third, which illustrates them, is properly ornament.

Therefore the *ἐνάργεια*, which I mentioned in the precepts of narration, because evidence, or as others call it, representation is more than perspicuity, this appearing only, and that producing itself, I shall place first in the class of ornaments. And indeed, there cannot be a greater perfection, than to express the things we speak of, in such lively colours, as to seem to be really transacted in our presence. Our words are little efficacious, they assume not that absolute empire they ought to have, when they strike only the ear, and when the judge, who is to take cognizance of the matter,

* In his book on the causes of corrupt eloquence.

† An oration may have the perfections of perspicuity and probability, that is, have nothing more nor less, than it ought to have, as a little before defined by Cicero, and yet not possess ornament. That which is added to these two perfections, constitutes ornament,

believes

believes he is told something about it, but is not sensible of its being emphatically expressed, and shewn to the eyes of his mind. But as this perfection has different acceptations, and is therefore usually considered in many points of view, I shall not descend to all the subdivisions some are so fond of discussing, and increasing the number of, but shall content myself with touching upon the most necessary.

There is then one sort of it, by which the intire image of things is painted by words :

“ *Constitit * in digitos extemplò arrectus uterque.*”

“ *Forthwith, erect, and high upon their toes*
“ Both stand,” TRAPP.

and the other attitudes described in this passage, which set before us so lively a representation of the champions on the point of engaging, and in the very heat of contention, that the spectators could not see more of it. Cicero excels in this quality, as in all others. Can any one be so dull in conceiving the images of things, when he reads what he † says of Verres, “ A prætor of the Roman people, apparelled after the Greek mode, with sandals, a purple cloak, and trailing robe, stood on the shore, lolling indolently on his wench ;” as not only to see his very looks, the place where this scene was transacted, and his garb ; but even a part of the things, which the orator suppresses ? For my part, I seem to myself to see, the air of his countenance, and his eyes, and the shameful

* *Æn.* v. 426,

† *Verr.* vii. 8.

caresses of him and his harlot, and of those present the tacit detestation and timid bashfulness.

A second sort of this manner of representation, consists in making out of an assemblage of circumstances the image we endeavour to exhibit. An example of this we have in Cicero's description of a riotous banquet; for he alone can furnish us with examples of all sorts of ornaments: "I seemed to myself to see some coming in, others going out; some tottering with drunkenness, others yawning from yesterday's carousing. In the midst of these was Gallius, bedawbed with essences, and crowned with flowers. The floor of their apartment was all in a muck dirt, streaming with wine, and strewed all about with chaplets of faded flowers, and fish-bones." Who could have seen more that had been present?

In this manner pity grows upon us from hearing of the sacking of a town. Undoubtedly, he that acquaints us of such an event, comprehends all the incidents of so great a calamity; yet this cursory piece of intelligence makes but a languid impression upon minds. But if you enter into descriptive images of all that was included, as it were, in one word, flames will appear spreading through houses and temples; the crash of falling houses will be heard; and one confused noise formed out of all together: some will be seen striving to escape the danger, but know not where to shape their flight; others embracing for the last time their parents and relations: here, the dismal shrieks of women and piercing cries of children fill the mind with pity; there, the sighs and groans of old men, lamenting their unhappy fate for having
lived

lived so long to be witnesses of their country's desolation. A further addition to these scenes of woe, is the plunder of all things, as well sacred as profane; the avidity of the foldier prowling after and carrying away his prey; the wretched citizens dragged away in chains before their haughty conquerors; mothers struggling to keep with them their children; and slaughter still exercising its cruelties, wherever there is the least expectation of booty. Though all these particulars, as I said, are comprehended in the idea of the sacking of a town, yet it is saying less, that the town was sacked, than describing its destruction in this circumstantial manner.

Such circumstances may be made to appear evidently, if they retain a likeness to truth; and though they may not have happened in reality, yet as they might, the descriptive evidence is not the less exceptionable. The same evidence will arise also from accidents; as in the following examples:

——— * me horror chills

Shudd'ring, and fear congeals my curdling blood.

TRAPP.

——— † to their bosoms press'd

The frightened mothers clasp'd their crying babes.

TRAPP.

This perfection, the greatest in my opinion, a discourse can have, is very easily acquired, by only considering and following nature. For eloquence is a picture of the transactions of human life, every

* Æn. iii.

† Æn. vii.

one referring to himself what he hears, by making the case in some measure his own, and the mind receives very willingly whatever is familiarized to it by a sort of acquaintance.

To throw light also upon things, similitudes have been invented, some of which by way of proof are inserted among arguments, and others are calculated for expressing the images of things, the point we are here explaining.

——— * Thence like wolves
Prouling in gloomy shade, which hunger blind
Urges along, while their forsaken whelps
Expect them with dry jaws. TRAPP.

——— † Thence with all his body's force
Flings himself headlong from the steepy height
Down to the ocean: like the bird that flies
Low, skimming o'er the surface, near the sea,
Around the shores, around the fishy rocks.
TRAPP.

We must be exceeding cautious in regard to similitudes, that we do not use such as are either obscure, or unknown. For that which is assumed for the sake of illustrating another thing, ought indeed to be clearer than that which it so illustrates. We may therefore leave to poets all examples of this kind.

‡ As when Apollo leaves his winter seat
Lycia, and Xanthus' stream; and in its turn
Visits his native Delos, to restore
The festivals; about his altars croud,

* *Æn.* ii. 355 † *Æn.* iv. 254. ‡ *Æn.* iv. 143.

With mingled noise, the Cretians, Dryopes,
 And painted Agathyrsi: he on top
 Of Cynthus walks, and crowns his flowing hair
 With a soft wreath of greens, forms it with art,
 And winds it up in gold; his sounding shafts
 Hang on his shoulders. TRAPP.

It would not become an orator to paint in this manner an image by another less clear.

In speaking of arguments, I mentioned a kind of similitude, which, as an ornament to a discourse, contributes to make it sublime, florid, pleasing, and admirable. For the more a similitude is far fetched, the more it will appear new, and unexpected. Some may be thought common, yet will avail much for enforcing belief: "As a piece of ground becomes better and more fertile by cultivation, so does the mind by good institutions." "As physicians prescribe the amputation of a limb that manifestly tends to mortification, so would it be necessary to cut off all bad citizens, though even allied to us in blood." Here is something more * sublime: "Rocks and solitudes echo back the melody, and the fiercest beasts are often made more gentle, being astonished by the harmony of music." But this kind of similitude is often abused by the too great liberties our declaimers give themselves; for they use such as are false, neither do they make a just application of them to the subjects they would resemble them. This was the fault of certain comparisons not long since esteemed admirable. "The sources of great

* Pro Archia Poeta, n. 19.

rivers are navigable." "A generous tree yields fruit even in its state of plant."

In every comparison, the similitude either goes before, and the thing follows; or the thing goes before, and the similitude follows. But the similitude sometimes is free and separate: sometimes, which is best, it is connected with the thing, of which it is the image, this connection being made to aid and correspond * mutually on both sides. The similitude goes before in the example above cited,

Thence like wolves
Prouling in gloomy shade, &c.

It follows in the first book of the † Georgics, after a long complaint of civil and foreign wars:

As when the racers from their barriers start
Oft whirling round the goal; the charioteer
Vainly attempts to check the flying steeds:
Himself is borne away: the dusty car
Swift smokes along; nor bounding hears the
rein. TRAPP.

But the mutual connection is not specified in either.

By this mutual connection I understand a certain manner that by comparing two things, places them before the eyes, and shews them together. I meet with many fine examples in Virgil, but it is better to take them from orators. Cicero says in his oration for Murena: "They who have not a genius for playing on the lyre, may become ex-

* *αλληλεπιδόσεις*.

† V. 512.

pert at playing on the flute: (a proverbial saying among the Greeks to specify the man, who cannot make himself master of the superior sciences :) so among us, they who cannot become orators, turn to the study of the law." In another passage of the same oration, the connected comparison is conceived in a sort of poetical spirit. "As storms are often raised by the influence of some constellation, and often suddenly, and by some hidden cause, which cannot be accounted for; so the stormy agitations we sometimes behold in the assemblies of the people, are often occasioned by a malign influence easily discoverable by all; and often their cause is so obscure, as to seem merely the effect of chance." There are other similitudes very short, as this; "Strolling and wandering through forests like beasts." And that of Cicero against Clodius: "From which judgment, we have seen him escape naked, like a man from his house on fire." Like similitudes constantly occur from common discourse.

To this species may be referred an ornament, which not only represents things, but does it in a lively and concise manner. Undoubtedly, a conciseness to which nothing is wanting, is deservedly praised; that which only says * precisely what is necessary, is less estimable: but that which expresses much in a few words, is of all the most beautiful; as the remark of Sallust: "Mithridates corpore ingenti perinde armatus," "Mithridates having likewise the advantage of a huge bo-

* *Βραχυλογία*

dy." In an imitation of this manner, obscurity should be guarded against.

The emphasis, which makes us understand more than the things signify in themselves, is an ornament a-kin to this, but superior to it. Its species are two, one signifying more than it expresses; and the other signifying, even what it does not express.

We have an example of the first in Homer, where * Menelaus says, that the Greeks sat down at their ease in the paunch of the wooden horse; thus signifying by one word its enormous bulk: And in † Virgil, who represents the Greeks sliding down from this horse by a rope, which is enough to shew its great height. The same poet, by saying that Polyphemus lay extended from one end of his immense cave to the other, signified that his prodigious body was measured by the space of the place that contained it.

The second is in a word, either suppressed or cut off. Suppressed, as in a passage of Cicero's oration for Ligarius: "If, Cæsar, in your elevated degree of fortune and power, you had not as much clemency as you naturally have. I understand what I say." Cicero suppresses a thing, which we however understand, that some were not wanting to excite him to cruelty: cut off, by a figure called *apostrophe*, of which I shall speak in its place.

There is an emphasis also in common expressions, as, "You must shew yourself the man;"

* Odyss. iv. 272. † *Dimissum lapsi per funem*, Æn ii. 261.

and "He is a man;" and "We must live." So nearly for the most part does nature resemble art.

Eloquence, nevertheless, does not think it enough, to shew what it speaks of, in a clear and evident manner: it uses besides a variety of other expedients for embellishing a discourse. Thus it is that a simple and unaffected style is not without its beauty; but a beauty intirely pure and natural, such as is admired in women. Beauty is also annexed to a propriety and justness of expression, and this beauty is the more elegant, as it shews but little care. There is an abundance that is rich; an abundance that smiles amidst the gaiety of flowers; and there is more than one sort of power: for whatever is complete in its kind, cannot be destitute of its proper strength and efficacy. . .

VI. But according to a more adequate notion of the matter, the whole force of the orator, and all his powers, may be said to consist in augmenting and diminishing objects. There are as many ways for the one, as for the other; and from touching upon the principal, a judgment may be formed of the rest. These ways regard things and words. The invention and disposition of things we have already treated of: now, we shall examine, what elocution may raise by increasing, and what it may depress by lessening.

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C H A P. IV.

Of Amplification.

The first way of amplification is in the qualifying of a name.—There are four principal kinds of amplification. I. Increment. II. Comparison. III. Ratiocination. IV. Accumulation.—There are as many ways of diminishing as augmenting.

THE first way of amplifying or diminishing, consists in qualifying the name given to a thing; as if in speaking of one beaten, we should say he was murdered; or we should call a wicked man, a robber: or, on the contrary, if we said, that he who struck another, only touched him, or that wounded, but slightly hurt him. Of both we have an example in Cicero's oration for Cœlius: "Shall I repute him an adulterer for having addressed in rather too free a manner, a widow who lays no restraint on her licentious way of life, a wanton addicted to barefaced impudence, a lady who spares no cost to gratify her pleasures, a woman abandoned like an infamous harlot to her lusts?" On one side, he stigmatizes her wanton disposition with whoredom; and on the other, he represents to us a young man, who for a considerable time had entertained with her a criminal commerce, as a person who had only accosted her with too frank an air of gallantry.

This kind of amplification is still stronger and more manifest, when to names that express things simply, we oppose others which characterize them in a more ample manner. "Whom do ye think,

good firs, (says Cicerò against * Verres) we intend to accuse before your bench of justice? Not a thief, but a plunderer; not an adulterer, but a ravisher; not one merely guilty of sacrilege, but a violator of the most sacred rites of religion; not an assassin, but a most cruel executioner of our fellow-citizens and allies." The former way multiplies things, this augments them.

It seems then that amplification consists particularly of four sorts, increment, comparison, ratiocination, and accumulation.

I. Increment is very powerful, when of things in comparison the less considerable are even great. This is done by one degree, or several; and thus we proceed not only to the highest, but sometimes, as it were, beyond it. One example from Cicero will be sufficient to clear up all these particulars: "It is a signal trespass against our laws to lay in irons a Roman citizen, it is an unheard of crime to have him whipt, it is in a manner a parricide to put him to death; what shall I call it to make him die upon a cross?" If the Roman citizen had been only whipt, the orator would have made the cruelty greater by one degree, by alledging that a less punishment was even expressly forbid by the laws; and if this citizen had been only put to death, he would by many degrees have augmented the crime: yet, having said that to put to death a Roman citizen was in a manner a parricide, beyond which there was nothing, he added notwithstanding, "What shall I call it to make him die upon a cross?" And thus having aggra-

* Verr. v. n. 9.

vated Verres's crime in as great a degree as possible, it was necessary expressions should be wanting for his proceeding further.

There is a second way of adding to the superlative, as we find in * Virgil concerning Lausus:

With him his son appears
Lausus, than whom more beautiful was none,
Except Laurentian Turnus' graceful form.

TRAPP.

It was speaking superlatively to say, "Than whom more beautiful was none;" but afterwards something was placed beyond it.

There is also a third way, to which one does not ascend by degrees, because the object presented, is not only extensive, but carried so high that nothing can form a further progression. "Did you not kill your mother? What shall I say more? You killed your mother." This way of increasing is to make a thing so great, as not to admit of a farther augmentation.

Words receive an increase in a less sensible manner, yet perhaps more effectually, when without making a distinction, without pausing, and, as it were, in a breath, something always follows greater than that which goes before it. Such is the passage, wherein Cicero * speaks of Mark Antony's vomiting: "But in the assembly of the Roman people, a man charged with the business of the public, a master of the horse." Each particular is on the increase. In itself it is a bad thing to drink to the excess of being obliged to vomit,

* *Æn.* vii. 649.

† *Philip.* ii. 63.

even though none were present; it is worse to vomit in an assembly of people; very unseemly to do so in an assembly of the Roman people; and quite so for a man who had public business to transact, and in quality of master of the horse. Another would have distinguished these different degrees, and would have insisted on every one of them separately; but Cicero soars aloft, and arrives at the last excess, not by redoubled efforts, but by a spring of might and impetuosity.

II. But as this sort of amplification stretches always to a height, so that which is by comparison, receives increase from matters of less consequence. For by increasing what is less, that which exceeds, must necessarily be augmented in proportion. This is illustrated by an example from the same orator, and in the same passage. "If this had happened to you amidst the pleasures of the table, and in one of those monstrous fits of debauchery, to which you are familiarized, who would not think it shameful? But in the assembly of the Roman people." And by another example from the same, against * Cataline: "If indeed, all my domestics feared me, as all your fellow-citizens fear you, I should think it high time for me to quit my house."

Sometimes, by alledging an example, similar, as it were, to the fact in question, it must be so ordered, as to be made greater than the fact which we intend to exaggerate. Cicero, in his oration for Cluentius, after saying that a woman of Miletum was bribed by the heirs who were second in

* Catil. i. 17.

reversion, to procure an abortion in herself; "By how much the more is Oppianicus, adds he, deserving of a greater punishment for being guilty of the like injury? A woman, by so offering violence to her own body, turned her cruelty against herself; but Oppianicus exercised the same villiany by excruciating with poison the body of another."

Let it not be thought, that what I say here is the same, though like, what was said in the place of arguments, concerning the inferring of greater from less. There the business is to prove, here to amplify; and Cicero's design in the above comparison, is not so much to prove that Oppianicus was guilty of a crime, as to shew that his crime was enormous.

There is then a certain vicinity in things, tho' different; and for this reason I shall here repeat an example I made use of in the place of arguments, but not in the view there cited, in order to make appear, that in aggravating things, not only the whole of a fact is compared with another whole, but also parts with parts: "Publius Scipio, that great man, that worthy pontiff, could, though in a private capacity, have killed Tiberius Gracchus for scheming some slight alterations in state-affairs; and shall we consuls be not able to effect any thing against Cataline, who is well known to meditate nothing less than ravaging the whole world with fire and sword." Here Cataline, is compared with Gracchus; the state of the republic, with the whole world; a slight change, with slaughter, fire, and devastation; and a private man with consuls. All which particulars may furnish copious matter for amplification.

III. The amplification, which I said was conducted by ratiocination or induction, requires to be examined into, as to its being properly signified. Not that I am solicitous about the term, so the thing itself appears to those who are inclined to learn. I have, however, used it, because this sort of amplification is placed in one thing, and has its effect in another; because also one thing is aggravated, to corroborate the other; and then this other is inferred from it. Cicero reproaching Antony with his drunkenness and vomiting: "And you, cries he, with that throat, with those sides, and with that robust gladiator-frame of body." What are throat and sides to drunkenness? They are not idle. For by making an estimate of their powers, we shall be also able to make an estimate of the quantity of wine he had quaffed at the marriage-feast of Hippias, which, with all his gladiator strength of body, he was neither able to bear nor to digest. If therefore one thing is deduced from another, the name of induction will be here neither improper nor unusual.

This manner of amplification may be the result also of ensuing circumstances; for it may be inferred according to the foregoing example, that Antony must have drank to a prodigious excess, because his vomiting was neither the effect of chance, nor indisposition, as sometimes might happen; but of necessity, which compelled him to commit such an indecency in a place and time, when it was unpardonable; and because likewise a night was not capable of allaying the fumes of the meats and wine he had gorged himself with, their irritation, even to the next day, continuing

to act upon his overcharged, tho' strong stomach.

The same may arise too from preceding circumstances; for when Æolus, intreated by Juno to raise a storm,

——— turn'd his spear and push'd
The hollow mountain's side; out rush the winds,
Thronging, where way they find. TRAPP.

it appears how great the storm was likely to be.

Is it not also an amplification by induction, when having filled minds with the most indignant emotions against certain atrocious crimes, we then designedly extenuate them, that what follows may seem more enormous? So Cicero did in one of his pleadings against * Verres: "These are but light and trivial crimes in a man of his abandoned disposition. The captain of a man of war escaped being whipt by making him a handsome present: this was quite humane in him. Another to save himself from being beheaded, gave a large sum of money: this was quite customary." Did he not use this manner of reasoning, that the audience might understand from it, how great the crime to be inferred was, when these compared to it were only as so many acts of humanity, so many of his usual practices?

To the same kind of amplification may be referred the praises we bestow upon one thing, in the view of enhancing the merits of another. Thus, we extol the exploits of Annibal, to aggrandize

* Ver. vii. 116.

those of Scipio; and we admire the valour of the Gauls and Germans to exalt the glory of Cæsar.

Again, the same kind of amplification is deducible from what is said relatively to a thing, tho' it does not seem expressly to regard it. The Trojan * chieftans conferring together about the situation of their affairs, think it no disparagement to the Greeks or themselves, to have suffered so many ills for so long a time, on account of the beauty of Helen. What sort of beauty must we then fancy this of Helen to be? It is not Paris that induced her to elope with him, who gives this opinion; it is not a hot-headed youth, or one of no consequence. They are old men, renowned for wisdom, and Priam's counsellors. The king himself, tho' exhausted by a ten year's siege, tho' he had lost so many children by so ruinous a war, and tho' he then was standing on the precipice of his destruction: he, who ought to have detested; he, who ought to have abominated that beauty, to him the source of so many tears: the king himself, I say, hears all this, and calling her his daughter, makes her sit down by him, exculpates her, and cannot think that she is the cause of his misfortunes.

Still keeping amplification by induction in view, we are led to consider the extraordinary strength and stature of the heroes of former times, from the enormous size and weight of their armour. Of this sort was the † buckler of Ajax, and the lance of ‡ Achilles. How Virgil shines in this inductive perfection, may be seen by the description he

* Il. Book iii. 146. &c.

† Il. B. vii. 219.

‡ Il. B. xvi. 140.

gives us of his Cyclops. For how huge must I conceive that body to be, the hand of which could manage as a walking stick a * pine-tree lopped of its branches ? And according to another passage of the same poet, what must we think of the strength and size of Demoleos, whose coat of mail was so heavy, that two of the strongest men could scarce carry it on their shoulders ; yet was so far from embarrassing Demoleos, that even with it on he could † pursue the Trojans to their ramparts ?

Could Cicero imagine any thing stronger, or point out better the luxury of Mark Antony, than by saying : “ You might have seen the beds in the lodges of his slaves covered with Pompey’s richest tapestries ? ” The lodges of slaves decorated with tapestry, and the richest tapestry of the great Pompey ! Nothing beyond this can be said ; yet, if luxury reigned to an excess amongst slaves, it must of consequence be infinite in the master.

This is like what is called emphasis ; but the emphasis forms conjectures from words, and this from things, whereby it is stronger, as things are more efficacious than words.

IV. To amplification may likewise be ascribed a certain assemblage of words and thoughts, all tending to enforce the same thing ; for tho’ they do not ascend by degrees, still the object is magnified by this accumulation. “ What, ‡ Tubero, was your naked sword doing in the battle of Pharsalia ? Whose side would it’s point pierce ? What was the intention of your weapons ? What did you

* Trunca manum pinus regit. *Æn.* iii. 659.

† Cursu palantes Troas agebat ? *Æn.* v. 165.

‡ Pro. Lig. n. 9.

design yourself? What did your eyes seek after? What was the action of your hands? What the ardour of your mind? What did you desire? What did you wish for?" This is like a figure called * *coacervation*; but in it many things are heaped on each other, whereas here there is only a multiplication of one thing. This sort of amplification is usually made to rise by words running higher and higher: "Near † him stood the door-keeper of the prison, the prætor's executioner, the death and terror of our allies and fellow-citizens, his marshal Sextius."

The same is nearly the way of diminishing things, there being as many steps for coming down as going up. I shall therefore content myself with one example from Cicero, who thus speaks of an oration held by Rullus: "Some ‡ few, however, who happened to stand near him, supposed that he wanted to say something or other concerning the manner of agriculture." If Cicero designed to prove that Rullus was not understood, it was a diminution; if he had a mind to exaggerate the obscurity of his speech, it was an increment.

I know that the hyperbole may also seem to some a species of amplification, being very proper for either magnifying or diminishing things: But by going beyond the truth and nature of a thing, it is different from amplification, and therefore its place is among tropes. These I should immediately subjoin, was not their use in matters of elo-

* *συναρπασμός*.

† *Agr* ii. 13.

‡ *Verr.* vii. 117.

cution, peculiar to themselves, as not consisting of proper, but metaphorical words.

In the mean time, it may not be amiss to second, in some degree, the taste and inclination of the public, by not omitting to make some reflections on thoughts, a beauty, which most now judge to be the principal, if not the only ornament, of a discourse.

CHAP. V.

Of Thoughts.

- I. *How many kinds of thoughts there are.*—*Sententia*, or *γνώμη*.—*Enthymeme*, and *Epiphoneme*.—*Νόημα*.—*Clausula*.—II. *Some seek after nothing but thoughts.*—*Others condemn them intirely.*—*Neither think right.*

I. **T**HE ancient Latins signified by the word “*sententia*” whatever they conceived or felt in their minds. Besides being taken very often in this sense by orators, we still observe some remains of this first signification in ordinary use. For if we affirm any thing upon * oath ; if we felicitate persons upon any particular occasion, we use this word to denote that we speak from the sincerity of our heart. The word “*sensa*” too, had often the same meaning. ‘*Sensus*’ I suppose, regards certain organs of the body, so denominated ;

* *Ex animi nostri sententiâ* : the form of swearing among the ancient Romans : *non enim falsum jurare peiorare est, sed cum ex animi tui sententiâ juraris.* Cic. de Officiis.

but

but use will now have us call the conceptions of the mind "sensus"; and the ingenious and shining thoughts by which we wind up our periods, "sententiæ." They are not so frequently met with in the writings of the ancients, but in our times they have been carried to an excess. I therefore think it will be right to distinguish their different kinds, and say something of the use that may be made of them.

The most ancient are such as are properly called sentences, to which the Greeks give the name γνώμαι; and both names have been adopted from their being like counsels given, or decrees decisive of the nature of a thing. The sentence may be therefore a saying universally true and laudable, even when not applied to a subject. Sometimes it relates only to a thing, as "nothing gains hearts so much as goodness." Sometimes to a person, as this thought of Domitius Afer: "A prince, who desires to know all things, must have a great many things to pardon."

The sentence has sometimes been observed to be simple, as the just mentioned; sometimes accompanied with a reason; as, "In every * strife, the stronger, tho' injured, seems always to be the aggressor, on no other account, than because he is the stronger." Sometimes double, as "complaisance † procures friends, truth hatred." . . That is remarkable which arises from diversities, as, "death is not an evil, but the approaches of death are terrible." But some other sentences, as the following, are conceived in a direct manner,

* Salust, in the speech of Micipsa to Jugurtha.

† Terence, Andr.

as “ the * miser wants as much what he has, as what he has not.” Others become more forcible by a † figure making a change in the manner : as, “ is ‡ it so wretched a thing to die ? This thought is stronger than if one should say, directly, “ death is not so wretched a thing.” The same may be said of an indeterminate thought, which becomes proper by application ; so instead of observing in a direct and general manner, “ that it is easier to destroy a man, than to save him,” Medea expresses herself more vehemently in Ovid :

§ “ Save him I could, and dost thou vainly ask,
If I can him destroy ?”

Cicero applies it to the person : “ Your || fortune, Cæsar, has nothing more illustrious than to have it in your power ; nor your nature any thing better than to be willing to save unfortunate men from ruin.” Thus does he attribute to the person, what was proper to things.

We must be careful in regard to these thoughts, and this upon all occasions, that they may not be too frequent, nor visibly false, nor hazarded indiscriminately by every one. They are more becoming in the mouth of those who are respectable by their authority, that so the person may add to the weight of the thing. For who should endure a boy, or youth, or some mean and pitiful person,

* P. Syrus.

† This figure from making this change, is called *commutatio*:

‡ Æn. xii. 646.

§ *Servare potui, perdere an possim, ogas ?* || Pro. Lig. 38:

to judge of the justness of speaking, and affect the decisive air and tone of a master?

Whatever likewise we conceive in the mind is an enthymeme, which is properly a thought arising from contraries, and therefore seems to excel among all others; as, by mentioning the * Poet, we specify Homer; and the City, we specify Rome; both being so called by excellence. The enthymeme is not always used for the purpose of forming an argument, but sometimes for ornament sake, as by Cicero for Ligarius: "Shall they, Cæsar, whose impunity is an honour to your clemency, be the very persons to importune you most to cruel measures?" This he † observes, not with the view of enforcing a new reason, having before shewn the injustice of the proceeding; but he adds it as a reflection to the close of the argument, in the way of epiphoneme, which is not so much a proof, as a last insulting over an adversary; or rather, an exclamation made in the winding up on a thing already related or proved, as in this verse of Virgil,

"So ‡ vast the work to raise the Roman state!"

TRAPP.

* A thought from contraries is properly called an enthymeme, by seeming to be eminent above other kinds of enthymemes, as by the Poet, Homer is understood; and by the City, Rome; because Homer is superior among poets, and Rome among cities. This place is taken from the Topics of Tully, n. 55.

† This thought, which is from contraries, is not used as a proof; neither is it a new reason, and unlike those before alleged by Cicero; but is subjoined by way of ornament, after Cicero had proved by other arguments that Tubero's accusation was unjust.

‡ *Æn.* i. 37.

or

or in this reflection of Cicero, "the * honest young man, chose rather to commit a dangerous action, than to be consenting to one which must have made him infamous.

There is a thing, called by our moderns *νόημα*, by which we may understand every idea of the mind; but they have given it this name to signify something they would have understood, but not expressed. Of this sort is the saying of a sister in regard to her brother, whom she had redeemed several times from his engagements with gladiators, and who had brought an action against her on the law of talio, for cutting off his thumb whilst he slept, to make him incapable of fighting: "Be-gone, said she; you † deserve indeed to have your hand whole and intire;" meaning you deserve during your whole life to follow the infamous profession of a prize-fighter.

Some account is also made of the "clausula," which if it be what we call conclusion, or winding up, it is right, and necessary in some parts; such is that of Cicero: "‡ You must therefore, T-bero, begin by confessing your own fault, before you find any thing amiss in Ligarius." But our

* Pro Mil. n. 9.

† There were some in the confraternity of prize-fighters, as hirelings, who were obliged to fight sometimes even against their will. This person had often been bought off by his sister; still having a mighty desire for fighting, he could not help entering into new engagements. His sister therefore cut off his thumb to prevent his fighting more. So Atticus boasted, as we find related by Cornelius Nepos, that he had never been reconciled to his mother, whom he buried at the years of ninety, himself being then sixty-seven: whereby he signified that there was never any difference between them.

‡ Pro Lig. n. 2.

moderns think otherwise : they would have every passage, every paragraph at the end of it, strike the ear with some singularity of thought. They fancy it quite scandalous to draw breath in any place that does not court applause. Hence those little trifling points of flimsy wit, which they are obliged to seek after out of their subject ; it being impossible there should be so many good thoughts as there are periods in an oration. . .

The repeating of a word twice may be productive of some beauty in a thought, as in a letter written by Seneca, which Nero sent to the senate on the killing of his mother : “ *Salvum me esse adhuc nec credo, nec gaudeo ;* ” “ I am assured, that I need not now be under any apprehension that my life is in danger ; but I can neither believe so as yet, nor rejoice on that account.” The thought is more beautiful when conceived by contraries : “ I * well know whom I ought to avoid, but I know not whom I ought to follow.”

I find no fault with thoughts that are just and fall in properly ; but how many are there who are overfond of their little inventions, which tho’ they may at first sight flatter with a shew of wit, yet on a cursory examination, will be found silly and ridiculous. Of this sort may be the cold reflection on a man, who, having suffered shipwreck, and some time before having been a bankrupt on account of the bad produce of his farm, is supposed to be intent on hanging himself through despair of a better fortune : “ He, to whom neither the earth, nor the sea, have afforded a place of refuge,

* Cicero’s Epistles to Atticus, B. viii. Ep. 7. concerning Pompey and Cæsar.

let him try whether the air will prove a more favourable element." Or this, on a madman, to whom his father administered poison, on account of his eating his flesh : " He, who could devour that, ought to swallow this." Or this other, on a glutton, supposed to have formed a resolution of dying by hunger : " Yes, tie a rope about your neck ; you may well be angry with your gullet, or rather take poison, a glutton ought to die in the act of swallowing down something." There would be no end, if I was to animadvert upon all the forms of false brilliancy in thoughts, which have been adopted by our corruptors of eloquence. Let us rather then stop at an observation, which seems more necessary.

II. There are two different opinions concerning the use that ought to be made of ingenious thoughts. Some think there can never be enough of them ; others intirely proscribe them. Neither opinion is to my liking.

From being too crouded they obstruct and hurt one another, as appears by all things close sown and planted, of which none can shoot to a just size, for want of room to grow in. A piece of painting can have no relief, without a proper adjusting of shades and lights ; and therefore the masters in this art, when they have designed several figures on the same canvass, are careful in keeping distinct spaces, that the shades may not fall directly on the bodies.

This exuberance also must necessarily make a speech desultory and full of stops. For every thought has in itself a complete meaning, after which begins necessarily another. Whence the discourse, loose and disjointed, and composed not

of limbs but scraps, must of consequence be deficient in regularity of structure, not unlike bodies of a round figure which cannot admit of being properly joined together.

The colouring besides the style, how brilliant soever, is notwithstanding strangely deformed by a multiplicity and variety of spots. As therefore a * knot of purple affixed to its proper place, adds grace and elegance to a robe, which would appear ridiculous if interspersed with knots of different colours; so, tho' these thoughts shine and seem to stand out a little, yet may they well be resembled, not to the blaze of a flame, but to sparkles gushing out amidst smoke. And where the whole discourse becomes luminous, they cannot indeed appear, as the stars cease to be visible where the sun shines; and such as rise by reiterated and small efforts, will at best be but uneven, presenting, as it were, a craggy surface: neither will they excite admiration by any degree of eminency, whilst at the same time they must lose the graces of plainness.

It happens too, that they who hunt after nothing but thoughts, must necessarily hazard many that are trivial, cold, and silly; for there can be no choice amidst so great a number. We therefore see some so infatuated in this respect, as to set off with a thought both their division and arguments, and close them in the same whimsical manner: "Yes, thou adulterer, thou didst kill thy wife: If thou hadst only repudiated her, thou wouldst

* Certain knots or tufts of purple, inserted in the robes of senators, were called *Clavi*, as being like the heads of nails. They were reputed a great ornament to them, as perhaps spots of ermine are now in royal mantles, &c.

not have been excusable." A division. "Are you willing to be convinced, Sir, that this philter was poison? If this unfortunate man had not taken it, he still would have been living." An argument. And indeed, most of our moderns do not so much express many thoughts, as say all things in the way of thoughts.

For this reason, some have given their genius a quite contrary bent, avoiding and dreading all these engaging charms of eloquent composition, and approving nothing but what is plain, humble, and without the least shew of an attempt to rise. Thus through the fear of falling, they always grovel. Yet what so faulty in a good thought? Is it not of service to the cause? Is it not of weight with the judge? And does it not recommend the speaker?

Still you urge that it is a something which the ancients did not use. What term of antiquity will you be pleased to assign for this? If the most remote, we must then condemn Demosthenes, who ennobled eloquence with many graces unknown before his time. And how shall one approve of Cicero, who thinks there should be no deviation from the manner of Cato and the Gracchi? But even before these there was a plainer way of speaking.

For my part, I look upon these luminaries of an oration, as so many eyes planted in eloquence. But I would not have eyes disseminated all over the body, lest they might obstruct other limbs in performing their respective functions. However, of the two extremes, I should prefer the ancient unpolished manner, to modern licentiousness. But
a medium

a medium may be kept, as a proper standard ; just like an elegance without reproof in the pleasures of the table, in our wearing-apparel, and furniture, which we should endeavour, as much as possible, to preserve in the same just correspondence with virtue. Above all, let our care aim at being free from faults, lest striving to be better than the ancients, we fall into a worse extreme.

I shall now speak of tropes, which I said was the next part. Some of our most famous authors have called them “ motions.” It is usual with grammarians to deliver precepts upon them ; but in speaking of the uses they are appropriated to, I deferred entering into a more ample discussion in regard to them, as thinking their nature suited better the ornaments of discourse : Having therefore reserved them for a more considerable place in this work, I shall now treat of them in the following chapter.

C H A P. VI.

Of Tropes.

Tropes are of two sorts. I. Some are made use of for signification sake, as the metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, antonomasia, onomatopoeia, and catachresis. II. Others for the sake of ornament, as the epithet, allegory, ænigma, irony, paraphrase, hyperbaton, and hyperbole.

A* trope is the change of a word or speech from its proper signification to another, in order to

* Of tropes, see Cic. lib. iii. de Orat. n. 155, 170.

greater perfection. The genus, species, number, subordination, and relation of tropes, have given rise to disputes, which are not likely to be ever decided, either by grammarians among themselves, or between them and philosophers. Their contentious cavils being, however, of no service to the orator, we shall pass them by in silence, and attend only to the nature of such tropes as are necessary, and most in use; and in these too, shall content ourselves with observing, that some are adopted for the sake of signification, and some for the sake of ornament; that others take place in proper words, and others in metaphorical; and that by them not only the form of words is changed, but also that of their sense and composition. For which reason those seem to me to have been mistaken, who believed no other to be tropes, than such in which one word is put for another. I am not indeed ignorant that the tropes used as significative are ornamental; but the same cannot be said indiscriminately of all, some of them being intirely calculated for ornament.

I. Let us therefore begin with that which most frequently occurs, and is also the most beautiful; I mean the translation, which the Greeks call *metaphor*. Nature has so adapted it to us, that the illiterate, without thinking of it, often use it; and it is likewise so pleasing and graceful, that in the finest speech it will always shine forth by its own light. It cannot be vulgar, nor low, nor disagreeable, so it be properly applied. It adds also to the copiousness of language by changing what is harsh and unseemly in it, or borrowing what

it is deficient in ; and what is most difficult of all, it provides every thing with an appellation.

A name or word is therefore transferred from the place in which it is proper, into that where either a proper word is wanting, or the metaphorical is better than the proper. This we do through necessity, or to express a thing more emphatically, or, as I said, for ornament sake. Where none of these shall happen, the metaphor will be improper. "Peasants say through necessity the * vines bud ;" for what else could they say ? They say also that "a field of corn is dry or thirsty," and that "fruit trees are sick." Necessity makes us say that such a "man is hard or rough," there being no proper name for expressing these dispositions of the mind ; but when we say one is "inflamed with anger, fired with lust, fallen into error," we express the nature of these things in a more significant manner ; for not one of them is more proper in its own words than in these borrowed ones. There are others for the purpose of ornament, as "the light of the bar, the splendour of birth, the storms that rage in the assemblies of the people, and floods of eloquence." Cicero, in his oration for Milo, calls Clodius the "fountain of his glory ;" and in another passage calls him the "harvest and subject of the same glory."

In the whole, the metaphor is shorter than the similitude ; and the difference between them is, that the one is compared to the thing we have a mind to express, and the other is said for the thing itself. When I say of a man, that he fought like

* *Gemmant vites.*

a lion, it is a comparison; but when I say, that he is a lion, it becomes a metaphor.

It seems we may distinguish particularly four sorts of metaphors; the first, when in regard to animal beings we put one word for another, as if in speaking of the rider of a horse it should be said: "The governor curbed the horse with all his might;" or, as * Livy says, "that Cato made a practice of barking at Scipio." The second, when inanimate things are taken for others of the same kind; as "He † loos'd the navy's reins." The third, when inanimate things are substituted for animate, as "Was it the sword or destiny that dismayed the Grecian valour?" The fourth, when the contrary happens; as "The ‡ shepherd quite ignorant of the matter, in amazement hears the noise from the top of the rock." These tropes give occasion to a wonderful sublimity in the manner of expression, and more especially when they are boldly hazarded, and the metaphor lends a sort of life and action to inanimate things; as where Virgil says

§ Araxes' stream

Indignant with a bridge to be confin'd.

TRAPP.

And || Cicero: "What, Tubero, was your naked sword doing in the battle of Pharſalia? Whose side

* Lib. xxxvii. n. 54.

† *Æn.* vi. 1.

‡ *Æn.* ii. 307. It does not appear, says Rollin, by this example, where the animate thing is taken for the inanimate; unless perhaps, because *vertex*, which is the crown of the head is taken for the top of the mountain.

§ *Æn.* viii. 728.

|| *Pro Lig.* n. 9.

did its point aim at? What was the sense of your weapons?" Virgil sometimes uses a double metaphor; as * "With mortal poison arm'd the steel." For steel armed is a metaphor, and "armed with poison" is another. .

Now, as a moderate and proper use of the metaphor illustrates a discourse with beauties; so, when used too often, it obscures and makes its tedious; and when continued, it terminates in allegories and ænigmas. Some metaphors are rather low, as that of "a † wart of stone" before mentioned; and some others are fordid, for though ‡ Cicero properly expressed himself in saying "The sink of the republic," meaning the base and filthy disposition of bad citizens; yet I therefore should not approve of this other expression of an ancient orator: "You lanced the impostumes of the republic;" and Cicero himself would have us avoid all metaphors that convey an idea of nastiness of any kind, as "Glaucia, the kennel of the senate;" as also, such as are overstrained, or that come short of the due signification, as it oftener happens, or are grounded on a false similitude; of all which we may meet with but too many examples, when we once know that they are faults. But the superabundance of metaphors, is likewise vicious, and more especially when of the same sort. There are also hard ones, as those built on a distant similitude: Horace § says "The snow of the head," to signify "grey hairs;" and

* Æn. ix. 773.

† De Orat. iii. 163, and 164.

§ Hor. l. iv. Od. 13. *Capitis Nives*.

† Saxeæ est verruca.

“ Grim * Jove with hoary snow bespues the Alps.”

It is a great error to think, that the liberties allowable in poets, who refer all to the pleasures of the ear and imagination, and are often obliged to have recourse to different turns on account of measure, are also suitable to prose. The authority of Homer shall not be a sufficient sanction to me to say in a pleading “ The † shepherd of the people,” to signify a king: neither shall I say, “ Birds row with their wings,” though Virgil with great beauty used this way of speaking in regard to bees and Dedalus. For every metaphor ought to find the place empty it takes possession of; at least, it ought to fill it better than the proper word it excludes.

What I here say of the metaphor, is applicable in a somewhat more extensive sense to the synecdoche; for the intent and use of the former is to strike the mind by a sensible image, to characterize things, and to place them before the eyes; but the latter can diversify language, by making us from one understand many things, the whole from the part, the genus from the species, things that follow from things that go before, or *vice versa*: all which are more allowable in poets, than orators. A roof for a house, a blade for a sword, may be passable in prose; but we cannot with equal propriety say a stern for a ship, or firr for a plank, or quadrupede for a horse, as our poets have. We may, however, be indulged the li-

* *Jupiter hybernas cana nive conspuat Alpes*, a verse of Furius Bibaculus ridiculed by Horace. *Furius hybernas*, &c. Hor. l. ii. Sat. 5. v. 4.

† Il. ii. 85.

berty of using the singular for the plural, and the plural for the singular. Livy often says, "The Roman remained conqueror;" and Cicero writing to Brutus, says in the plural number, "We deceived the people, and we appeared to be orators;" though he only spoke of himself. This way is not inelegant, and use has adopted it in conversation. .

The metonymy is not much different from the synecdoche. It consists in substituting one name for another, and in assigning the cause for the effect, the inventor for the invention, and the deity for the thing it is supposed to preside over, as Ceres for corn or bread, Neptune for the sea; but *vice versa* the manner of expression would seem harsh.

It may not be amiss to point out how far this trope may be allowed the orator. Vulcan is often said for fire, and * Mars for war; but I doubt if the severity of the bar would admit of using Ceres and Bacchus to signify bread and wine. That which contains is usually taken for what is contained. Hence the expressions, "drink a bottle; well policed cities; a happy age." But the reverse is seldom attempted but by poets, for what orator would presume to say

————— † Next Ucalegon

Blazes aloft.

TRAPP.

unless this be rather a metonymy of the possessor for what he possesses, as a man may be said to be eaten up, whose patrimony is squandered away. .

* In the text, *vario Marte pugnatum*, an elegant turn of language.

† *Æn.* ii. 311.

Shewing the cause from the effect is frequently done both by poets and orators. Horace * says,

—— With equal foot, impartial fate
Knocks at the cottage, and the palace gate.

CREECH.

And † Virgil,

—— Pale diseases, querulous old age.

And the orator may say, “blind anger, merry youth, slothful indolence.”

The antonomasia is a trope that puts an equivalent in the place of a name. Poets use it frequently, and sometimes by a patronimical epithet, because taking away the name to which it is applied, it becomes an equivalent to it; as “Tydides, Pelides,” for the son of Tideus or Peleus: sometimes by an attribute characteristic of the person, as

‡ The fire of gods and king of men.

TRAPP.

to signify Jupiter: and sometimes, by doing a thing which may denote the person spoken of, as

———— § on it place

The Trojan arms, which in the chamber fixt
That traitor left.

TRAPP.

Orators make some use of it, though but seldom. They cannot with propriety say Tydides, and Pelides; yet they may for Scipio, “the destroyer of Numantia and Carthage;” for Cicero,

* Hor. l. i. Od. 4.

† Æn. i. 69, &c.

‡ Æn. vi. 275.

§ Æn. iv. 495.

“the prince of the Roman eloquence.” Cicero himself used this liberty in his oration for Murena: “It is not usual with you to commit faults, says the experienced old man to the noble citizen; and if you chance to commit any, I shall be sure to put you in mind of them.” Neither name is expressed, but both are understood.

The onomatopœia, which is the liberty of inventing names; for expressing some things, is scarce allowed us, though it be considered as one of the greatest advantages of the Greek language. There have been, however, many words invented by the first authors of our language, in order to adapt sounds to the nature of the affections they desired to express; and hence we may account for the origin of the words “to bellow, to hiss, and to murmur.” Afterwards, as if this fund was exhausted, we dared not to attempt any thing new, though many of the ancient words of this kind have ceased to be current; and hardly even are we allowed to form derivatives out of words in use, as “Sullaturit, proscripserit, and laureati postes, for lauro coronati.”

The catachresis is therefore the more necessary, by its giving a name to things which have none of their own. Thus Virgil says, that the Greeks tired out by the length of the siege of Troy,

———— * an horse erect

Of mountain bulk, by Pallas’ art divine.

TRAPP.

And we read in our old tragic poets: “The lion is going to bring forth his young,” though

* *Æn.* ii. 15.

the lion is the * father. There are a thousand examples of the sort. So "Acetabulum" is said not only of a vinegar bottle, but of many others; and "pyxis" signifies not only a box of box-wood, but of any other matter; and the word "parricide" is not only used for the murderer of his father, but also of his mother or brother. This trope must not be confounded with the metaphor, which is for things that have a name, whereas the catachresis is for these that have not. . .

II. Other tropes are used, not so much for signification, and strength of expression, as for ornament. Such is the epithet, which is properly called the apposite, though some give it the name of sequent. Poets use it oftener, and more freely than orators; it being enough for them that the epithet agrees with the word it is affixed to, and therefore we excuse in them the saying of "white teeth and humid wine." In prose, every epithet that does not effect something, is superfluous. This appears by the manner of expression being less without the help of the epithet, as "O the abominable wickedness! O the infamous lust!" Its chief beauty consists in metaphors, as "an unbridled passion, mad piles of building;" and it is commonly joined with other tropes, as where Virgil † says, "shameful poverty, mournful old age."

This is so necessary a sort of ornament, that language seems graceless and naked without it. However, a discourse should not be overcharged with many epithets, which must make it tedious,

* The word *leona*, lioness, was not then in use.

† *Æn.* vi. 276. *Georg.* iii. 67.

and embarrassed, like an army with a valet to every soldier, the number thus becoming double, but not the forces. Sometimes many epithets are made applicable to one word ; as,

———— * Anchises, favour'd with the bed
Of Venus, darling of the gods, and twice
Rescu'd from ruin'd Troy. TRAPP.

But two epithets to one word after this manner, has no good effect even in verse.

The epithet, as making no change, does not seem to some to be properly a trope. For if you separate what is so put by apposition, from the word proper to it, it must signify something of itself, and form an antonomasia ; if you say, “ he, who overthrew Numantia and Carthage,” it is an antonomasia : if you add Scipio, it is an apposite. As therefore the epithet must ever be joined with another word, it cannot properly be a trope.

The allegory, which we interpret inversion, says one thing and means another, and sometimes quite the reverse of what is said. The † Ode of Horace, in which by a ship, he means the commonwealth ; by the agitations of stormy seas, civil wars ; by a harbour, peace and concord ; may be an example of the first sort of allegory. . . Orators often use it, but seldom pure and intire, as in the just cited example ; for they often mix it up with words that make it clear and intelligible. It is pure and intire in those words of Cicero : “ I am surprized at, and I even pity that man,

* *Æn.* iii. 475.

† *Hor.* l. i. Od. 14.

who

who has so hankering a desire after calumny, that rather than refrain from it, he chooses to sink the vessel in which himself fails." But the mixt allegory is more frequently used, as in this other example from * Cicero: "As for other storms and tempests, I always believed Milo had no occasion to be apprehensive of any, except amidst those boisterous waves of the Assemblies of the People." If he had not added "the Assemblies of the People," it would have been a pure allegory; but by so doing, it became mixt, and in that manner it receives beauty from the borrowed words, and perspicuity from the proper.

But nothing has so beautiful an effect, as when there is an admixture of a similitude, allegory, and metaphor. "What † streight, what sea, is subject to so many storms, as the Assembly of the People? The one, by ebbing and flowing, has not so many waves, such changes, such agitations, as the other, in passing its votes, has inconstancy, trouble, and vexation. One day, one night, is enough to change the face of things: sometimes even the least rumour, the least noise, is a brisk gale of wind, waisting minds away, and shifting about all their former opinions."

Particular care should be taken to end with the same kind of metaphor we begin; for many having begun with a storm, end with a fire or downfall; a shameful incongruity, and evident sign of a want of judgment.

The allegory likewise in familiar conversation serves little wits for displaying their talents. Those common expressions at the bar, to engage, to strike

* Pro Mil. n. 5.

† Pro Mur. 35.

home,

home, to draw blood," are all allegorical, and though often used, are not displeasing. A newness, change, and variety in style and manner, are well received, and become the more agreeable, as less expected; yet here too should a want of moderation be guarded against, as all these graces must be lost by too much affectation.

There is an allegory in * examples when quoted without assigning a reason for them. "Dionysius at Corinth," is a proverbial saying among the Greeks. There are multitudes of such examples.

When the allegory is involved in obscurity it becomes an ænigma, which I must think indeed to be a vice, and for no other reason, than because perspicuity is a perfection. Poets, however, use it, as

Say † where, and my Apollo thou shalt be,
The sky in breadth three ells, no more, extends,
TRAPP.

And sometimes orators, as Cœlius, in saying a farthing ‡ Clytemnestra.

The

* The sense of this passage is, that examples frequently become allegorical, if so quoted as not to account for them by any illustration. The Lacedæmonians answered Philip, who had threatened them with a war, "that Dennis was at Corinth;" whereby they signified to him the various shiftings of fortune, and that a man may fall from a high station into great contempt. This Dennis was king of Sicily, and being expelled the kingdom for his tyranny, was, for a livelihood, compelled to teach music and the belles lettres at Corinth.

† Eclog iii. 104.

‡ *Clytemnestra quadrantaria* was said allegorically to signify an adulteress or harlot; for the *quadrans* was formerly the stated purchase of her favours. That Clytemnestra, Agamemnon's

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wife.

The allegory, that means quite the reverse of what is said, is properly an irony, and is understood from the tone of voice, the person's character, or nature of the thing. If the words disagree with any of these particulars, it is plain their intention is different. . .

The paraphrase is a trope, which explains by many words what may be said in one, or fewer. It is called also circumlocution, and we sometimes have recourse to it, through necessity, to disguise certain indecencies, or, as Sallust says, "to intimate our natural wants *." Sometimes it is entirely calculated for ornament, and with this view it is frequently used by poets, as in † Virgil,

'Twas now the season, when the first repose,
Sweet gift of Gods, on weary mortals creeps.

TRAPP.

Orators use it too pretty often, but always expressed in a more succinct manner. In short, whatever may be said in a few words, but in more, for ornament sake, is a circumlocution, a name indeed, not seemingly very proper to specify a beauty of discourse. When the paraphrase does not shew itself in the light of a beauty, it falls into a vice, called perissology; because in matters of eloquence, whatever does not help is rather a hindrance.

The hyperbaton likewise, or the transposition of a word, which the manner and beauty of composition make often so necessary, is not undeserving, was debauched by the adulterer Ægypthus, is a well known story.

* *Ad requisita naturæ.*

† *Æn. ii. 168.*

edly ranked among the perfections of eloquence. For a discourse often becomes rough, and harsh, and unconnected, and disagreeable by chasms, if the words are reduced to the necessity of their natural order; or if, as every word presents itself, it is linked to the next ensuing, tho' it cannot be made to square with them. Some must therefore be put back, others brought forward, and every one of them retain its suitable place, as differently shaped stones in a building. For we can neither cut words, nor polish them; in order to their more accurate junction, but we must use them such as they are, and choose for them a proper situation. And, indeed, nothing so much contributes to harmonious cadence in an oration, as a just change in the order of words.

A transposition in two words only, is called an *anastrophe*, as "*mecum, secum*," thus commonly expressed, and "*quibus de rebus*," the style of orators and historians. But when for the sake of beauty a word is transposed, which otherwise may seem as drawn out into greater length, it is then properly an *hyperbaton*: as "*animadverti, * judices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse partes*." The natural order, "*in duas partes divisam esse*," would be harsh and graceless. Poets sometimes, both transpose words, and divide them by a licence not allowable in prose, as :

† "*Hyberboreo septem subiecta trioni*." . .

The hyperbole, as a bolder sort of ornament, I reserve for the end. In quality of its being an

* Pro Cluent. n. 1.

† Geor. v. 381.

exaggeration surpassing truth, it may be equally proper for augmentation and diminution. There are many ways of expressing ourselves by the hyperbole ; for we either say more than what happened : as, “ * by disgorging the great quantity he had loaded his stomach with, he nasted his bosom, and the tribunal all over :” or, we magnify the reality of a thing, as

† On each side mighty rocks ; above the rest
Two threaten heav’n. TRAPP.

or we may magnify things by a similitude ;

——— ‡ The Cyclades uptorn,
You would have thought were floating on the
deep. TRAPP.

or by comparison, as

§ Swift shoots away, more swift than winds, or
wings
Of light’ning. TRAPP.

or by certain signs, as it were :

|| She o’er the tops of untouch’d corn would fly,
Skimming along, nor hurt the tender grain ;
Or run, supported on a swelling wave,
Thro’ the mid sea, nor tinge her nimble feet.
TRAPP.

or by a metaphor, as “ flying” in the first verse of the last example.

* Philip ii. 63.

† Æn. viii. 691.

|| Æn. vii. 808.

‡ Æn. ii. 166.

§ Æn. v. 319.

Sometimes an hyperbole is exaggerated by the superaddition of another, as in Cicero against * Antony : " Is there a gulph, a Carybdis, which can be compared with the gluttony of that man ? What, do I speak of a Carybdis ? If any such existed, it was but a single animal. The ocean, I believe indeed, is scarce capable of swallowing up in so short a time, so many things, so different in nature, and produced in so many far distant places."

I think there is a very beautiful hyperbole in a book of Pindar, the prince of lyric poets, which he intituled Hymns. To give us an idea of the rapidity with which Hercules made an attack upon the Meropes, a people said to have lived in the island of Cos, he does not compare him to fire, nor to wind, nor to the sea, but to a thunderbolt, as if these other things were too weak, and that thunder only could equal the hero's impetuosity. Much in Pindar's manner, Cicero says in one of his speeches against † Verres : " There lived for a good while in Sicily, not a Dennis, nor a Phalaris (for that island was formerly remarkable for producing many and cruel tyrants) but a new sort of monster, compounded out of that ancient savageness, which had established its abode in the same parts. And indeed, I cannot think, that Carybdis or Scylla were ever so terrible to shipping, as that same monster has been in the same streights."

There are as many ways of extenuating as magnifying by the hyperbole. The extreme leanness of a flock of sheep is expressed in Virgil by

* Philip ii. 67.

† Verr. vii. 144.

* —Thro' the skin their darting bones appear.

and Cicero, in an epigram, makes a jest of Varro's etymology of the word "fundus :"

"Fundum Varro vocat, quem possim mittere fundâ :

Ni tamen exciderit, quâ cava funda patet."

But even in the hyperbole we should keep to a certain moderation ; for though it surpasses belief, it ought not to be carried to an excess, as this would be a ready way to have it stigmatized with affectation. It is quite unnecessary to obviate the many vices, being all of them too well known, which arise from an abuse in this particular. It is therefore enough to hint, that the hyperbole tells lies, but not with the design of deceiving by the lies it tells. For which reason we should be the more cautious in regard to the height decency may allow us to carry a thing to, in which we are sensible we are far from being credited. Its most frequent aim is to excite laughter, and if the laugh takes, it is commended as the sally of a pleasing fancy ; if otherwise, the ridicule falls upon ourselves.

There is hardly any thing so much in use as the hyperbole, and the reason why the learned as well as the ignorant, the citizen as well as the clown, speak in that strain is, that all have naturally a desire implanted in them of magnifying and diminishing, and that no one seems contented with the

real truth. Yet is the hyperbole pardonable by our giving no positive assurance to enforce its credibility ; and it may be reckoned a beauty, so often as it is better to say more than less of a thing, when it is indeed extraordinary, and expression is not able to equal it. I shall not enlarge farther on this head, having in my Treatise on the Causes of the Corruption of Eloquence, discussed in an ample manner whatever may be thought to relate to it.

B O O K IX.

C H A P. I.

Of Figures.

- I. *In what figures are different from tropes.* II. *What a figure is. That figures are placed in thoughts or words.* III. *That figures of thoughts are conducive both in the way of proofs, and for moving the passions.*

I. **H**A V I N G in the last book spoke of tropes, this next belongs to figures, on account of the natural connection of one with the other. Many have thought figures to be tropes ; because, whether the latter are so called from their extraordinary formation, or the change they make in the construction of speech, whence they have acquired their name ; it must be confessed that both qualities are likewise discoverable in figures. Their use too is the same, by adding force and beauty to things. On the other hand, there are not wanting who give the name of figures to tropes. . . For which reason we should be more particular in specifying the difference of both. A trope is therefore a manner of speech, transferred from its natural and principal signification to another for the sake of ornament : or, as most grammarians define it, a word, transferred from the place where
it

it is proper, to that where it is not proper. But the figure, as its name imports, is a certain construction of speech removed from the common form and manner first presenting itself. Wherefore in tropes words are put for other words. . . but in figures nothing of the like happens, as a figure may exist in proper words, and these placed in their natural order.

II. Authors dispute with some warmth concerning the nature of figures, the number of their genus, and the diversity of their species. Let us therefore begin by examining what we ought to understand by a figure, which may signify two things ; first, any form of thought, which we may consider as we do the forms of bodies, all of them, how constructed soever, having some sort of external configuration. Secondly, (and this is properly what we call a figure) a manner of thinking and speaking, altered not without reason, from the ordinary and plain way. Just so, a body assumes occasionally different attitudes, as of sitting, lying down, and looking back. When therefore one in composition employs continually, or too often the same cases, tenses, numbers, or even measure, we commonly advise him to diversify the figures of speech for avoiding this disagreeable uniformity. Hereby we mean, as it were, that every part of speech is figurative. By the same figure we express an earnestness in * running frequently about, as we do in often and much † reading. The action in both has a similar tendency ; and thus, according to the first and common sense, a

* *Curfitare.*

† *Leſitare,*

figure is taken in, every thing may be said to be figurative.

But if certain habits, and, as it were, attitudes, are to be so called, we must then here take for figure whatever by an oratorical or poetical turn departs from the plain and direct way of speech; and hence will come true what we say, that such a discourse is destitute of figures, a considerable fault, and such another is figurative. . Therefore a figure is a form of speaking made to assume a new face by the contrivance of some art; and as all speech consists of thoughts and words, so is every * figure composed of these two parts.

III. Now, as it is natural to conceive things before we utter them, so I shall first speak of those figures which belong to the mind. Their utility is so great and general, that there is no point of eloquence but they may with dignity illustrate. For, tho' in proofs it may not seem of any moment in what figures things should be expressed, yet they contribute to make credible what we advance, and by them we imperceptibly insinuate ourselves into the minds of the judges. When gladiators fight, their direct blows are less dangerous, because seen coming and how aimed, and it is easy not only to avoid but to repel them; whereas back strokes, and such as have no certain aim, are less observable and harder to be avoided; the great science of this art consisting in making a feint at one place, and striking another. So, an oration that is artless, fights by its weight, bulk, and impulse; but one engaging by the aid

* Of the figures of thoughts and words, see Cic. de Orat. lib. iii. n. 201, 208,

of figures, which are as so many feints, varies its attacks, one time taking the enemy in flank, another time in the rear, and sometimes mustering all its forces on one side, to surprize all of a sudden the place it finds unguarded. Besides, nothing so much as figures makes passions to have such prevailing powers; for if the motions of the face, the eyes, the hands, are powerful towards making impressions on minds, what force will not the countenance of the discourse itself have, when conformable to the effects we are willing to produce by it? Add to this, that the use of figurative speech is a good recommendation of the orator's abilities, and withal is likely to make his pleading to be favourably received, whilst at the same time it eases the fatigue of minds by the charms of variety, and facilitates the expressing of things with more decency and safety. . *.

C H A P. II.

Of the Figures of Thoughts.

- I. *The figures of service in proofs, are the interrogation, the prolepsis, the dubitation, communication, sustentation, and permission.* II. *The figures best adapted for augmenting the passions, are the exclamation, Παρρησία, prosopopœia, apostrophe, hypotyposis, irony, aposiopesis, æthopoïia, the dissembling of art, and the emphasis.* III. *He explains what a figure is, and hereupon discusses some disputes regarding their use, as 1. Whether it be safe to speak openly. 2. Whether it be not decent. 3. How far embellishment may be a motive.*

I. **L**ET us begin with the figures that make the proof more forcible and vehement. There is a manner of interrogation which is simple, as

————— * but in your turn

At length inform me, who, and whence you are,
And whither bound ?

TRAPP.

But figurative, so often as used, not so much for asking, as pressing : “ Tubero, † what was your naked sword doing in the battle of Pharsalia ?” And “ how long, ‡ Cataline, will you abuse our patience ? And “ do you not perceive that your schemes are discovered ?” And the rest of this passage. This manner has much more fire and life

* Æn. i. 373. † Pro Lig. n. 9. ‡ Catil. i. n. 1.

than if he had coolly said : “ You have long abused our patience ;” and “ all your schemes are discovered” . . Sometimes the interrogation serves to make a person odious, as when Medea says in
* Seneca,

Where must I go ? and where am I commanded ?

Or, to excite compassion, as Sinon in † Virgil :

————— What land, he cry’d,
Or seas can now receive me ? TRAPP.

This figure abounds with variety, and may likewise be used for expressing indignation :

‡ And who will Juno’s deity adore
Henceforth ? Or honour on my altars lay ?
TRAPP.

And admiration :

————— § To what dire extremes
Wilt not thou, execrable thirst of gold
Urge mortal breasts ? TRAPP.

And making a command more urgent :

|| Will they not rush to arms ? from all the
town
Pursue ?— TRAPP.

The answer likewise is not without a figure, when a person asking one thing, is answered by another,

* V. 453.

† *Æn.* i. 52.

|| *Æn.* iv. 595.

‡ *Æn.* ii. 69.

§ *Æn.* iii. 56.

which

which is more to the respondent's advantage; and this happens, either by aggravating a crime, as a witness being asked, "if he had received a bastonading from the accused?" "And I was innocent too," answered he: or, by eluding an accusation, which is a very common case, as asking, if you had killed that man? You answered, a robber: and if you had taken forcible possession of that piece of ground? You answered, my own.

The dialogue arising from questions and answers to one's-self, has usually an agreeable effect, as in Cicero for Ligarius: "Before whom is it that I so speak? Before Cæsar, who, tho' he well knew what I said, yet restored me to the republic before he had seen me." The interrogation in his oration for Cœlius is otherwise couched, as supposed coming from an indifferent person: "one will say: Is this your morality? Is it thus you instruct youth?" And the rest of this passage, to which he answers: "For my part, good sirs! if any one had that strength of mind, that virtuous and chaste disposition, &c." To ask, and to answer directly, without waiting for the party's explaining himself, is another form of interrogation: "Did not you say you wanted a house? but you had one. Did you not say you had more than enough of money? But you wanted money." Some call this figure * subjection. .

The prevention, which is called prolepsis, has a wonderful effect in a pleading, by anticipating what the adversary may object against us. It is used in most parts of an oration, but especially in the exordium. .

* A sub-joining, or annexing of the answer.

The dubitation is a figure that makes the orator to be believed in some measure, when he pretends to be at a loss how to begin, and where to end; what he ought to say, or what he ought to be silent upon. Examples of this figure occur every where, but one will be sufficient: "For * my part, I confess, I know not on what side to turn myself. Shall I deny that the judges were so infamous as to suffer themselves to be corrupted, &c."

The communication is not very different from the prolepsis, when we either consult the adversaries themselves, as Domitius Afer in his defence of Cloantilla: "In her present distress, she neither knows what may be permitted a woman, nor what is becoming in a wife. Chance perhaps has brought you here together, to rid her of her embarrassment. You, her brother! Ye, the friends of her father! What are you pleased to advise her to do, and how to behave?" Or, we deliberate, as it were, with the judges, which is commonly done: "What do you advise?" And, "I ask you what ought to be done?" As Cato: "Prithce, tell me, if you were in the same situation, what else would you have done?" And in another place: "Remember, that the common interest is concerned, and that you are made judges in the matter."

But sometimes making a communication we add something unexpected to it, which in itself is a figure; as Cicero does against † Verres: "What next? What, think you, he has been further guilty of? Perhaps some theft, some rapine?" Then

* Pro Cluent. n. 4.

† Verr. vii. 10.

when he had long kept in suspense the minds of the judges, he added a crime by far more heinous. This Celsus calls * sustentation, of which there are two sorts ; for, on the contrary, having often filled minds with the expectation of mighty matters, we descend to something, either of little moment, or no way criminal. But as this usually happens not so much by communication, others have called it a paradox, which is something that was little expected. .

Permission derives almost from the same source as communication, by leaving some things to the arbitration of the judges, and some others occasionally to that of the adversaries. .

II. The figures, which are calculated for enlivening and giving strength to the passions, are founded chiefly on a sort of pretence ; for we often pretend anger, joy, fear, admiration, grief, indignation, wishes, and the like. Whence those sayings : “ Now I find myself quite free and at ease ; now I draw breath ; and all’s well ; and what madness is this ? And O Times ! O Manners ! And Unhappy Man that I am ! My tears are dried up, and yet my heart is pierced with the sharpest sorrow.” Some call these last examples exclamation, and give them a place among the figures of speech. But all sentiments of this sort, when they proceed from real feelings of the mind, are not figurative in the sense we now speak of ; yet are so undoubtedly when feigned, and the work of art.

The same may be said of the open way of speaking, which † Cornificius calls freedom of speech,

* A forbearance or delay.

† Rhet. iv. 48—51.

and the Greeks *παρρησία*. For what is less figurative than true liberty? Yet under it does adulation lurk frequently. When Cicero says for Ligarius: "The war being declared, Cæsar, and hostilities already commenced, without the least compulsion, but out of my own pure will, I engaged in that party which was against you;" he not only excuses Ligarius by shewing himself more culpable, but could not also pass a greater commendation on the conqueror's clemency. And when he says: "Declare the truth, Tiberò, what other was our design in taking up arms against Cæsar, than to have it in our power to do what he has done?" Thus does he give an admirable turn to the matter, to make both causes good; and he gains the benevolence of him, whose cause in the main was bad.

The *prosopopeia*, which consists in the representation of persons, is a bolder figure, and, as Cicero says, requires great powers of eloquence. It diversifies and animates the discourse in a wonderful manner. By it, we lay open the most secret * thoughts of our adversaries, and as if they were communicating them to one another; and this will not be so devoid of credibility, if we suppose them to have spoken things, which they rationally may have thought of. By it also, with the same face of probability, we introduce ourselves † speaking to others, and others among themselves; and to give the more weight to ‡ counsel, exhortation,

* See Verr. vii. n. 103.

† See pro Mil. n. 99, 100. Verr. vii. n. 109. Pro Quint. n. 71, 72. and 77, 78.

‡ See pro Cæl. n. 33, 36. Verr. vii. n. 117.

censure, complaint, praise, pity, we put them in the mouths of such as they may suit. We even by it, become still more adventurous, using the interposition of the Gods, and summoning the * dead out of their graves. It lends too a voice to † cities and nations. .

But in giving speech to things which nature makes no allowance for, the figure may be softened in this manner: “Indeed ‡ if the country, which is far dearer to me than my own life, if all Italy, if the whole republic, should so speak to me; Marcus Tullius, what are you doing?” Or, in this other, which is somewhat bolder: § “Your country, Cataline, which so pleads, and thus tacitly addresses herself to you: for some years past no atrocious crime has existed but by your scheming.” We also with very good effect pretend sometimes to have before our eyes the images of things or persons, and admire that the adversaries or judges are not the same way affected; as: “I think I see,” and “do not you think you see?” But fictions of this kind must be supported by an extraordinary force of eloquence; for things false and naturally incredible, must either make a stronger impression upon us, because they exceed truth; or they must be considered as nugatory, by being not true. .

We often give bodily forms to imaginary things, as ¶ Virgil does to Fame; and Prodi-

* See pro Cœl. n. 33. Rhet. l. iv. n. 67.

† See Catil. i. n. 18 and 27. l. iv. Rhet. n. 67.

‡ Cat. i. 27.

§ Cat. i. 18.

¶ Æn. iv. 474.

cus in * Xenophon, to Pleasure and Virtue; and Ennius to Life and Death, whose contests he describes in one of his satires.

The discourse, turned from the judge, and therefore called apostrophe, is of singular efficacy, whether we attack the adversary, as: "Tubero, what was your naked sword doing in the battle of Pharsalia?" Or, turn to some invocation, as: "O ye † Alban monuments and groves!" Or, implore the succour of the laws to make the infractor of them more odious, as: "O ‡ Porcian, and Sempronian laws!" . .

As to the figure, which paints the things we speak of, and places them, as Cicero says, before our eyes, it happens whenever instead of relating simply a fact, we rather shew how it passed, not in a general way, but in all its particular circumstances. This article in the last book I placed under evidence, the name which Celsus has given to that figure. By others it is called hypotyposis, and defined by them a representation of things so expressed by words, as to seem rather to be seen, than heard: § "Inflamed with a wicked and mad intention, he himself came into the Forum; his eyes sparkled with rage, and cruelty stood staring in every feature of his face." Here we are led to imagine, not only what has been or is transacted;

* Xenophon *ἐπιπομπή. β.* relates how Prodicus had imagined the figures of Pleasure and Virtue, conversing with Hercules in solitude, one of which counselled him to exert himself in heroic deeds, and the other invited him to the ease and indolence of life.

† Pro Mil. 85.

‡ Verr. vii. 161.

§ Verr. vii. 105, and 160.

but also what will be, and the consequences that are likely to ensue. Of all this Cicero gives us an admirable example in that part of his oration for * Milo, where he represents what Clodius would have done, if he could have forced himself into the pretorship. .

Some have called the irony, dissimulation ; which term not appearing fully expressive of the force and extent of this figure, we shall content ourselves, as we have chiefly hitherto done, with the Greek appellation. The irony therefore, which is considered as a figure, is not much different in its genus from that which is a trope. In both we must understand the contrary of what is said ; but by attentively considering the species, it will be easy to find a difference between them.

First, because the trope is more open ; and though it says one thing and means another, yet it does not disguise this meaning, every particular in it being almost quite plain and intelligible, as in these words of Cicero to † Cataline : “ By whom rejected, you went to your companion, that honest man, Marcellus.” The whole irony is in the words, “ that honest man,” whence, secondly, the trope is shorter. But in the figure, there is a dissembling of the whole intention, more apparent than real ; so that there the diversity lies in words, and here in sense, as is common in joking. Even sometimes all the proofs of a cause, and the whole life of a person is an irony. Such seemed that of Socrates, who assumed the character of one appearing as ignorant, and the admirer of others

* N. 67, and 88—90.

† Cat. i. 19.

deemed as wise. In short, the irony becomes a figure by a chain of several other ironies, which taken separately would be but tropes, just as a continuation of metaphors makes an allegory. .

There is an irony, when we seem to give an order, or authorize a permission, which we have no manner of inclination to; as :

* Away for Latium by the winds; go seek
Thy kingdom o'er the waves. TRAPP.

And when we grant our adversaries an advantage we should not be glad to find acknowledged in them. This concession is the more taunting and sarcastic, when the advantage is quite our own, and not the adversary's :

† And me do thou arraign
Of cowardice, thou, Drances; when thy hand
Such heaps of slaughter'd Trojans shall have
rais'd,
And all with martial trophies deck'd the fields.
TRAPP.

Or, on the contrary, when we impute, as it were, to ourselves a fault, which we have not been guilty of, and of which the shame falls upon our adversaries :

‡ Yes, I conducted th' adult'rer of Troy
To ravage Sparta. TRAPP.

In fine, this saying of one thing and meaning another, is not merely confined to persons, but may be extended to things, as appears from the whole

* Æn. iv. 381.

† Æn. xi. 383.

‡ Æn. x. 91.

exordium of Cicero's oration for Ligarius, and some exclamations extenuating the importance of the subject, as "forsooth! O good gods!" and

* Belike the gods are wond'rously concern'd
For his affairs; that care disturbs their rest. . .

TRAPP.

The aposiopesis, called by Cicero *reticentia*, is very proper for pointing out the emotions of passions: of anger, as:

† Whom I . . . but first 'tis fit we should
compose

The troubled ocean.

TRAPP.

Or, of cautiousness, and, as it were, some scruple: "Do you think he ever would presume to make mention of that law which Clodius prides himself in being the author of, whilst Milo was living, not to say whilst he was consul? For our parts, I believe there is not one of us all, who . . . I dare not explain myself." Demosthenes expresses himself much in the same way in the exordium of his oration for Ctesiphon. .

The imitation of the manners of others, commonly called *ethopeia*, and by some *mimesis*, may now have a place among the slighter passions. It mostly consists in eluding; but is equally applicable to facts and sayings. In representing facts, it retains much of the nature of the *hypotiposis*. In regard to sayings, the following example occurs in ‡ Terence: "Yes, madam, how well I knew what a pretty story you intended to tell me. A

* *Æn.* iv. 379.

† *Æn.* i. 139.

‡ *Eunuch*, act i. sc. 2. v. 75.

little girl was carried away by stealth from hence; my mother brought her up as her own; she was called my sister; I want to have her out of the captain's hands, to restore her to her parents." .

There are figures a-kin to this, which prove very agreeable, are a recommendation of the orator's abilities on account of the variety he introduces, and are likewise naturally of much service to the cause he has undertaken, in making him less suspected by the judge, from the air of simplicity and want of preparation he gives his discourse. This happens, when he either seems to retract, as Cicero pleading for Cælius: "Why have I introduced so grave a personage?" Or "I have hit upon the very thing without thinking of it." Or pretends to be embarrassed about finding what to say, as: "What remains yet?" And, "Have I forgot any thing?" Or, as Cicero says against Verres: "If I remember well, I have one more crime of that nature to lay before you;" and "One thing makes me remember another."

Hence arise many pleasing transitions, though indeed the transition is not a figure. Cicero, having related the example of Piso, who, though seated in his tribunal, was so indiscreet as to order a goldsmith to make him a ring; and as if this behaviour had recalled to his mind another of Verres, he * added: "Now, as I spoke of a ring, I call to mind a thing that had intirely escaped my memory. How many honest men are there, do you think, whose fingers Verres robbed of gold rings?" Sometimes also an ignorance in

* Verr. vi. 57.

certain things is affected, as: * “ Who did they say was the artificer of these statues? Who must he have been? Yes, it is very right; they said it was Polycletus.” This manner is available to more than one purpose; for often an orator appearing to have one thing in view, effects another, as here Cicero, by reproaching Verres with his passion for statues and paintings, is aware that the same be not imputed to himself. And when † Demosthenes swore by the manes of the brave citizens who were slain in the battles of Marathon and Salamis, his design was to soften in the mind of the Athenians, the idea entertained to his own disparagement, of the unfortunate battle at Cheronæa. .

The emphasis may also have a place among the figures of thoughts, when from some expression something concealed is understood, as when Dido says in ‡ Virgil,

Could not I have lived
Free, like the savages, without a crime,
Free from the nuptial bed? And ne’er have
known
Such plagues as these are. TRAPP.

For though she complains of infelicity in marriage, it appears notwithstanding that her affection for

* Verr. vi. n. 5.

† For Ctesiphon. At Cheronæa, a town of Bœotia, Philip, king of the Macedonians, conquered the Athenians. From that battle Demosthenes, having thrown away his buckler, made his escape. But Miltiades, in Marathon, a plain of the Athenian territory, conquered the army of Darius, king of the Persians; and Themistocles in the freights of Salamis destroyed the armament of Xerxes.

‡ Æn. iv. 550.

Æneas has so far the ascendant over her, as to induce her to think, that life is but melancholy and brute-like, without the sweets of conjugal society. Ovid furnishes us with another example of this sort, in which the meaning is deeper concealed. It is where Myrrha, declaring to her nurse the passion she had conceived for her own father, cries out, speaking of her mother,

* Happy woman, to have such a husband!

III. A-kin to this † is the figure or indeed the same, which we now make great use of. It will therefore be expected I should animadvert something on it. Its design is, to have what we do not express, suspected or guessed at; and this, not the reverse of what we say, as in the irony, but something latent, which the auditor is to discover. Our declaimers particularly are exceeding fond of this figure, and think it almost the only that deserves to be so called: whence the controversies called figurative. Its use is for any of the three following purposes; either that it is not safe to express openly our thoughts; or, that it is not decent so to do; or, that hereby they will be more striking in point of beauty, novelty, or variety, than they would in a direct and plain way.

I. In the first case, it is frequently adopted for scholastic exercises. But the business of the bar never implies this necessity of silence. It may, indeed, something like it, but more difficult to be

* Metam. x. 422.

† This whole passage is from a treatise of Dennis of Hali-carnassus, wherein he speaks of figurative controversies.

rightly

rightly managed, when a cause cannot be gained without giving offence to powerful persons of an opposite interest. Upon such an occasion this figure may be used, but sparingly and with circumspection; for an offence, though ever so cautiously intended, is always an offence, and the very instant the figure is * understood, all the advantage expected from it is lost. For which reason some reject all this artifice, whether understood or not. But moderation may be kept, so far as keeping the figure from becoming manifest. The contrary will happen, if the figure is made up of doubtful and equivocal words, as in regard to a daughter-in-law, suspected of criminal conversation with her husband's father. The son says, "I married a wife, who proved not disagreeable to my father." The matter itself must lead the judge to suspect its nature, and all other embarrassments must be removed, that this only might remain; to which passions will much contribute, and pronunciation interrupted by silence, and long pauses. So it will come to pass, that the judge set on quest of that I know not what, which he would not believe if he had heard it, will believe it, when he imagines the discovery to be the effect of his own sagacity.

But whatever precautions we have recourse to in these figures, they ought not to be frequent; as so they become too glaring, and not less forfeit all credibility than disgust minds. Shame will not be so much considered as a motive against speaking

* If as we proceed, the figure should be more liable to be discovered, it would lose the name of a figure. For art ceases to be art, so soon as it appears.

openly, as diffidence. In short, the best way to make the judge think well of this figurative manner, will be if he can fancy we have a reluctance to speak out. I met with some of this disposition in the course of my pleadings, and happened also to be engaged in a cause, a thing more rare, which I found could not be gained without this stratagem. I defended a woman, said to have substituted a will in the place of her husband's. It is true, that whilst her husband was on the point of expiring, she had concerted an agreement with the appointed heirs, who in virtue of a deed, attested by their hand-writing, obliged themselves to make over to her the husband's effects: for, as by law she could not be his heir, the expedient of this private feoffment of trust was devised for putting her in possession. It was easy to bring the controversy to an issue by an open declaration of what had passed, but in such case the inheritance was subject to confiscation. It was therefore my business so to manage the matter, that the judges might understand what was done, and the informers not have it in their power to avail themselves of any thing that was said. Both accordingly succeeded to my wish: and to avoid the imputation of vanity, I would not have mentioned this affair, were it not to shew, that even at the bar some use might be likewise made of these figures.

There are things, however, so hard to be proved, that it is much better to insinuate them in this figurative manner. Thus like a hidden weapon will they sometimes dart in, and cannot be extracted, as not appearing. But if you should say the
same

same openly, of course they are contradicted, and you are obliged to prove them.

2. If a respect for persons makes these figures necessary, which is the second case I mentioned, we must be the more cautious in what we say, as shame lays a greater restraint than fear on the ingenuous mind. And here the judge is to believe that we industriously cover what we know, and that we check, as it were, our words, which are for breaking out from us by the force of truth. For will not they against whom we speak, or the judges, or the auditory, less hate our desire of traducing a respectable character, if they believe it is with regret we proceed to do so? Or what signifies how a thing is said, so its nature and our intention are understood? . .

Of a similar tendency are those celebrated figures among the Greeks, by which are mollified the ideas of certain things that would otherwise appear harsh and ungrateful. Themistocles being to induce the Athenians to desert their city, desired them "To * leave it as a deposit in the hands of the Gods," because deserting it would convey rather too disagreeable an idea. Another being to counsel an expedient towards defraying the charges of the war, which was coining down their gold statues of Victory, turned the matter thus: "We must make use of our Victories." This whole manner is much in the strain of allegory, saying one thing and intending to have another understood.

There is another question concerning these figures, and this is, how they ought to be answer-

* Herod. lib. vi.

ed? Some are of opinion they ought to be laid open, like a wound, in order to cure its latent vice. This indeed, should be commonly done, as no other defence can be made, especially when these figures become the object of the debate. But when they consist merely of a matter of obloquy, it will be a point of good conscience not to understand, or pay any attention to them. Still when the hints are so frequent that we cannot help taking notice of them, it is quite necessary to insist that the adversaries should declare openly if they dare, that I know not what, they want to signify in so oblique a manner; or at least should not require, that the judges might not only understand, but also believe, what themselves have not the confidence to speak out. .

The third purpose of these figures, is for illustrating and beautifying the discourse. Cicero observes, as his opinion, that this does not fall upon the point contested between the parties; and such is that himself uses against * Clodius: "Having an exact knowledge of all our sacrifices, he made no doubt but he should easily appease the gods." . . Some of these figures also are founded upon a play of words, but are the most trivial of all, though Cicero says of Clodia, "That she was rather the friend than the enemy of all men." . .

* This was a tacit reproach to Clodius for his impudence in daring to enter the place where the Roman ladies celebrated the mysteries of the goddess Bona, to which no men were ever allowed access; and hence Cicero likewise facetiously hints, that he had a thorough knowledge of the mysterious rites of all their sacrifices.

C H A P. III.

Of the Figures of Words.

- I. *There are two kinds of these figures. The one grammatical. The praise of these figures. Some examples are produced.* II. *The other rhetorical; which happens, 1. By adding. Duplication. Anaphora. Epistrophe. Symplese. Repetition, which is of various sorts. Epanalepsis. Epanados. Polypoton. Anadiplosis. Synonymy. Expositio. Polysyndeton. Gradation. 2. By subtracting. Synecdoche, or Elleipsis. Asyndeton. Συζευγμένον, or Adjunction. 3. Or by similitude: Paronomasia. Antanaclassis. Or by equality: πᾶρison. ὁμοιοτέλειον. ὁμοιόπλωτον. ἰσόκωλον. Or by contraries: antitheton.* III. *How figures are to be used.*

I. **T**HE figures of words have been always in a fluctuating condition, changing continually according as use gives them its sanction. If we therefore compare our old language with the new, whatever almost we now speak will be found a figure, as “huic rei invidere,” and not as all the ancients and Cicero especially expressed it, “hanc rem;” and “incumbere illi,” for “in illum;” “plenum vino,” for “vini;” and “huic adulari,” for “hunc;” and an infinity of others now used: but I wish we have not innovated for the worse. There are, however, two kinds of figures for words: the first, properly ways of speaking; the second, more immediately regarding composition: and though both equally belong

to the art of oratory, we may call the first grammatical figures, and the second rhetorical.

The first spring from the same sources which the vices or solecisms of speech do. For each figure would be a solecism, if it fell from us inadvertently, and was not designedly sought after; but authority, antiquity, custom, and often some particular reason, most commonly stand up in its defence. It is therefore a perfection by receiving a turn from the plain and direct way of speaking, so that this turn can be justified by some plausible motive. However, in one thing particularly it is of great utility, by banishing the loathing that is created from a too uniform manner of speaking, and preserving us from a common and vulgar strain of expression: which if one uses sparingly, and as the matter shall seem to require, it will be the more delectable, as exalted by a sort of seasoning; but too much affectation will immediately forfeit all those charms of variety. Some figures indeed are so generally received, that they scarce now retain the name of figures. Their use therefore may be the more frequent, because the ear by being accustomed to them, must remark them less; whereas the more extraordinary sort of figures, and placed beyond the reach of common use, and consequently more noble, as they flatter the ear by the graces of novelty, so they grate upon it to satiety from being much used, shewing at the same time that they do not flow naturally from the speaker, but that they are far-fetched, and drawn out, and heaped together from all their lurking holes.

Figures

Figures become so in a variety of ways, and the gender of nouns is productive of them. "*Oc- culis capti talpæ*" and "*timidi damæ*" are said by Virgil; but there is a reason for this; because both sexes are comprehended under the noun substantive common. Verbs also are figurative, when one of a passive termination is put for a verb active, as * "*Fabricatus est gladium*," and "*inimicos punitus est*;" which is less surprising, because it is of the nature of verbs to express often in an active way what is passive, as "*vapulo*," and in a passive what is active, as "*arbitror, suspicor*." There are therefore frequent permutations, and many have both terminations with the same signification, as "*luxuriatur, luxuriat; fluctuatur, fluctuat; assentior, assentio; revertor, re- verto*." There are figures likewise in numbers, either when the plural is joined to the singular, as "*Gladio pugnacissima gens, Romani*," in which "*gens*" a collective noun, is equivalent to the plural number: or, when the singular is joined to the plural, as

" † *Quoi non risere parentes,*
Nec deus hunc mensa, dea nec dignata cubili
est."

Besides these, other figures are made out of the

* Pro Mil. 33.

† These verses have much puzzled grammarians. Many think *cui* should be read in the dative singular; but Quintilian takes it in the nominative plural, and immediately subjoins *hunc* for *hos*. See Ruæus on this passage of Virgil, Eclog. iv. v. 62.

change of the parts of speech, as by putting an infinitive for a noun.

Et nostrum istud vivere triste

Aspexi :

PERS. SAT. i. v. 10.

Where “vitam” is understood for “vivere :” or, a verb for a participle, as

“* Magnum dat ferre talentum ;”

Here “ferre” is used for “ferendum :” and a participle for a verb, as “volo datum,” for “dari.” . .

These figures, and the like, made out of a word either changed, added, retrenched, or transposed, have this peculiar to them, that they excite the auditor’s attention and do not suffer it to cool; and from their resemblance to faults, are productive of the like grateful effects as acid in meats, which sometimes quickens the taste, and revives the appetite. This will happen to be so, if their number is not too great, if they are not of the same kind, if they are not crowded upon one another, and if they are not frequently used; because their fewness, as well as variety, will prevent their being loathed.

II. The rhetorical figures of words are more smart and lively, not only administering graces to elocution, but also beauty and strength to thoughts.

1. Some of these are by addition, among which we may first consider the repetition of a word. For a word is † repeated, sometimes to strengthen

* Æn. v. 248.

† Geminatio.

and enlarge the sense, as "I * killed, I killed, not a spurius Melius:" the first "I killed" only shews, the second affirms. Or, sometimes, to denote a sentiment of compassion, as

† Ah! Corydon, Corydon, what frenzy turns
thy brain? TRAPP.

The same figure is sometimes ironically applied for depreciating a thing, and seems to have force and vehemence, when intermixed with exclamation: "I ‡ have seen, O the indignity! I have seen the great Pompey's goods sold at a public auction."—"You § live, what! you live, not to reform your conduct, but to become every day more audacious."

To insist upon a thing the same ¶ word is several times repeated, either in the beginning, as: ¶ "Are you regardless of the armed force kept about the palace, regardless of the city-watch, regardless of the fears of the people, regardless of the opinion all good men entertain of you, regardless of this so well fortified place for holding the senate, regardless of the looks and tacit condemnation of all the senators, who now sit round you?"

Or, in the ** end, as: "Who †† required these witnesses? Appius. Who produced them? Appius.

This example belongs also to another ‡‡ figure, in which the same words begin and end each ar-

* Pro Mil. n. 72.

† Philip. ii. 64.

‡ Anaphora.

** Epitrophe.

†† Simpliciter.

† Eclog. i. 69.

§ Cat. i. 4.

¶ Cat. i. 1.

†† Pro Mil. 59.

ticle; as "Who and who? Appius and Appius." Of which kind is the following: "Who * often broke their treaties? The Carthaginians. Who waged a cruel war in Italy? The Carthaginians. Who laid waste Italy? The Carthaginians. Who sue for pardon? The Carthaginians."

In parallels or comparisons, the first † words of every member are usually made to answer each other alternately: "You ‡ rise before day to give advice to those who come to consult you: he, to haste with his army where he intends to march. You are roused by the crowing of the cock: he, by the sound of trumpets. You know how to conduct a pleading: he, to draw up an army in order of battle. You attend to the welfare of your clients: he, to the security of cities and camps." Not contented with these graces, the orator gives a turn to the same figure, and proceeds thus: "He knows how to protect us from the invasions of the enemy; you, to defend us from the inclemency of the seasons: he is experienced in the art for extending our frontiers; you in the art of governing people."

The middle may be also made to answer the beginning; as:

—— § Thee Angitia's wood deplor'd,
Thee Fucinus within his crystal stream.

Or the end; as: "This || ship laden with Sicilian booty; and she herself a part of the booty."

* Rhet. iv. 25.

† Pro Mur. 22.

|| Verr. vii. 43.

‡ Repetition of various sorts.

§ Æn. vii. 759.

No one has doubted but that the middles might be likewise made to answer each other.

The * beginning and end answer also, as :
 “ Many and terrible punishments were invented
 for parents, and for relations, many.”

That too is a kind of repetition, which on mentioning two sorts of things or persons, resumes and speaks of them separately.

† Thence Iphitus, and Pelias, with myself,
 Were hurried : Iphitus, infirm with age,
 And Pelias, by a wound Ulysses gave.

TRAPP.

This figure is called by the Greeks ‡ Επείστρος, and by the Latins “ Regressio,” and by it not only in the same, but also in a different sense, the same words have a contrary signification ; as “ The § dignity of the princes was almost equal, but perhaps that of those who followed was not equal.”

This repetition is sometimes varied in cases and genders, as : “ Great pains are required for be-

* The epanalepsis is a repetition made in the beginning of the foregoing, and end of the following sentence : as in Cicero's oration for Marcellus, n. 17. *Vidimus tuam victoriam præliorum exitu terminatum : gladium vaginâ vacuum in urbe non vidimus.*

† *Æn.* ii. 435.

‡ The epanodos is properly, when we run over the same, reading the words in a transposed order, as in Cic. pro L. Man. n. 67. *Ecquæ putatis civitatem pacatam fuisse, quæ incupis sit ? Ecquæ locupletem, quæ illis pacata esse videatur ?* And *Paterculus*, l. ii. c. 117. says of Varus, the præfect of Syria : *quam (p. provinciam) pauper divitem ingressus, divites pauperem reliquit.*

§ *Pio Lig.* 19. Here it may not be amiss to remark, that some of these figures, for which Latin examples are quoted, cannot be made to appear in a satisfactory manner in the translation.

coming

coming eloquent ; it is a great thing." . . " Is this your father ? Do you call him father ? Are you the son of this father ?" When this figure is varied only in the cases, it is called *Polyptoton*. . .

The last word of the foregoing sentence, and the first of the following, is often the same. This figure is used pretty much in poetry ;

* You shall for Gallus dignify this verse,
Gallus, for whom my friendship grows each
hour. TRAPP.

And not seldom in oratory : " He lives, notwithstanding : what ? he lives ! yes, and has the impudence to come into the senate-house." . .

Words † also of the same signification are mustered together, as : " Since it is so, Cataline, proceed as you began : quit at length the city ; the gates are open, begone ;" and in another oration against the same : " He departed, he is gone, he broke out, he made his escape." . .

Not words only, but ‡ thoughts, all directed to the same purpose, are assembled together, as : " It was the profligacy of thought, and a certain darkness that hides the deformity of wicked acts, and the blazing firebrands of the Furies that egged him on." . . Words and thoughts signifying the same and different things, are assembled in like manner together, as : " I appeal to my enemies if all these particulars were not investigated, discovered,

* *Eclog. x. 72.*

† Synonymous, when many are brought together, signifying the same, or almost the same.

‡ This figure is called *expositio*. See *Cic. pro Lig. n. 9. pro Mil. n. 10.* It may also have a place among the figures of thoughts.

134 Q U I N T I L I A N's Book IX,
laid open, destroyed, defaced, extinguished by
me." . .

This last example forms also another figure, which from suppressing conjunctions, is called dissolution. It is of service, when we urge any thing in a warm and earnest manner. For each particular is inculcated, and the object in some measure multiplied; and it is used as well for thoughts as words. Cicero speaking against the harangue of Metellus, says: "Upon the discovery of the accomplices, I had them laid under an arrest, well guarded, brought before the senate," and this whole passage. The figure contrary to this abounds with copulatives. The first is called *asyndeton*, and the second *polysyndeton*.

* The shepherd all his substance with him brings,
Itinerant; his weapons, house, and Gods,
His trusty Spartan dog, and Cretian shafts. . .

TRAPP,

There is a coacervation in both examples of these figures, which, though opposite, spring from the same source, pressing home what we say in a more lively manner, and making a shew of energy, and passion, as it were, often breaking out.

The gradation, which is called *climax*, by being more open in its art, and having more affectation, ought to be used but seldom. It belongs also to those figures that add, from repeating what has been said, and resuming a part of what went before, in proceeding to something else. We have

* *Tectumque, laremque, armaque, amyclæumque canem, erissamque pharetram.* Georg. iii. 344.

an example of it in the celebrated oration of Demosthenes for Ctesiphon: "So far from saying these things, I did not write concerning them; and so far from writing, I did not go by any deputation to deliver them; and so far from going by deputation, I did not counsel a syllable of them to the Thebans." We have also some elegant examples from the Latins: "Scipio * by his industry acquired military experience; his military experience begat for him glory; and his glory, envy."

2. Figures occasioned by the retrenching of a word, are commonly adopted for the sake of conciseness and novelty. Of these first is the † synecdoche. . wherein the retrenched word is sufficiently understood by the rest, as in Cœlius against Antony: "The Greek all of flutter with joy." As soon as we have heard these words, we perceive that "began to be" is understood. . The second figure of this sort is that whereby copulatives are suppressed. It ‡ has been just mentioned. The third is called § adjunction, because the same word joins together several thoughts, which taken separately would each require it. This happens, by either prefixing a word to which the rest are referred, as; || "Vicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, rationem amentia," "Lust gained the ascend-

* Rhet. iv. 34.

† The synecdoche seems to be the same as the ellipse, to which is opposed the pleonasmus. *Huncine hominem? Huncine impudentiam? Huncine audaciam?* In which we understand *feremus*.

‡ Asyndeton.

§ *συνεγγυμία*,

|| Pro Cluent. 15.

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‡ Apyndeton.

§ συνζευγμένον.

|| Pro Cluent. 15.

ant over modesty, impudence over fear, madness over reason." Or making a word serve for concluding many things; as: * "Neque enim is es, Catalina, ut te aut pudor unquam a turpitudine, aut metus a periculo, aut ratio a furore revocaverit." "Thou art not indeed, Cataline, of such a disposition as to make us think, that shame will ever recall you from baseness, fear from danger, or reason from madness." There may be also a middle word, which may serve as a regimen to what goes before and follows. . .

3. There is a third sort of figures, which by a certain similarity in the sound or jingle of words, or by words of the same sound, but of different signification, strike the ear of the auditor, and awake his attention. Of this kind is the † paronomasia. . . and of like nature is the antanaclassis, which is the contrary signification of the same word. Proculus charging his son that he expected his death; "I do not expect it," answered the son: "Aye, but I would have you expect it," said the father. Sometimes the signification of the words is different, but there is a similarity in sound, as "Eum supplicio afficiendum dicas, quem supplicatione dignum judicaris." The same words become likewise of different significations by pro-

* Cat. i. 22.

† The paronomasia, or agnominatio, forms a different thought by the adding, retrenching, transposition, or change of some or more letters. By adding, as in the Heaut. of Terence, act ii sc. 2. v. 115 *Tiberunt parata verba, huic homini verba*. By retrenching, Cic. *Res mihi in visis visæ sunt*. And *O fortunatam, natam me consule Romam*. By transposition, Cic. l. i ad Attic. ep. x. *Consul autem ipse parvo animo & gravæ; facie magis quàm fac tuis ridiculus*. By changing, Phil. iii. 22. *Ex oratore arator factus*,

nouncing them long or short; and in regard to a play of words, which are figurative in this manner, I must say, that even in matters of pleasantry they are very insipid; and I am surprised how any could deliver precepts on them, examples of which I rather here quote for their being avoided than to recommend their imitation, as: “*Amari jucundum est, si curetur ne quid insit amari.*” “*Avium dulcedo ad avium ducit.*”

But there is greater elegance in the similarity of the words that are used for distinguishing the propriety of things, as: * “*Hanc reipublicæ pestem paulisper reprimi, non in perpetuum comprimi posse.*” And in such as by prepositions present a contrary sense, as: † “*Non emissus ex urbe, sed immissus in urbem esse videatur.*” But when the figure is accompanied by a noble thought, then the thought and figure are equally beautiful, as: “*Emit morte immortalitatem.*” The next examples are nugatory and frivolous: “*Non ‡ pisonum, sed pistorum,*” and “*Ex oratore arator.*” But the worst of all are the following: “*Ne patres conscripti videantur circumscripti,*” and “*Rarò evenit, sed vehementer venit.*” Thus it happens that some energetic and smart thought may receive a beauty that chimes in with the sound of a word; and on this occasion why should modesty hinder me from producing an example in my own family? One, who boasted he would sooner die in his embassy, than depart without executing the business he was charged with, my father said to him when he had returned in a few days without doing any

* Cat. i. 30.

† Cat. i. 27.

‡ Philip. v. 22.

thing, "Non exigo uti immoriaris legationi, sed immorare." Here the thought is striking, and the play of words is so much the more agreeable, as not affecting, but as it were naturally occurring from the words and behaviour of the party.

The ancients were very fond of those graces of eloquence which proceed from a jingle of words of an equal number of syllables, and a similar cadence. Gorgias wanted moderation in this respect, and Isocrates in the earlier part of his life was much taken with it. It seems also that Cicero took some delight in it; but besides being reserved in the pursuit of a taste, which is not vicious but when carried to an excess, he had the art of illustrating these superficial beauties, and compensating their inanity by the force and solidity of thought. In short, what in itself is a cold and empty affectation, appears in native colours, as soon as the importance of thought enhances its value.

There are nearly four ways of conducting this equal number of syllables. The first, as often as a word is sought for of the same quantity of syllables with another, or not much greater; as: "Puppæque tuæ, pubesque tuorum." And, "Sic in hac calamitosa fama, quasi in aliqua perniciosissima flamma." And, "Non enim tam spes laudanda, quam res est." Or, when the termination is alike; as: "Non verbis, sed armis." This has a beautiful effect when it falls in with a striking thought; as: "Quantum possis, in eo

semper experire ut profis." And this is what most take for the *πᾶριτον*.

The second consists in a * similarity of cadence, whereby the end of two or more members of a period sound alike; as: "Non modo ad salutem ejus extinguendam, sed etiam gloriam per tales viros infringendam." .

The third is when the similarity lies in the † same cases; as in a thought of Domitius Afer: "Amisso nuper infelicis aulæ, si non præsidio inter pericula, tamen solatio vitæ inter adversa." The sentence seems best conducted when the beginning and end correspond, as here, "præsidio, solatio."

The fourth may happen from having like members, and is called *ισόκωλον*; as, "Si quantum in agro locisque desertis audacia potest, tantum in foro atque judiciis impudentia valeret." This example shews the *ισόκωλον* and *ὁμοιόπλῳον*; this other, "Non minus nunc in causa cederet Aulus Cecinna Sexti Ebutii impudentiæ, quam tum in vi facienda cessit audaciæ," the *ισόκωλον*, *ὁμοιόπλῳον*, and *ὁμοιοτέλειον*. There is a beauty in this fourth manner when the words are repeated, but their construction varied; as, "Non minus cederet, quam cessit." .

The antithesis, called by the Latins *contrapositum*, happens in a variety of ways. For one word is opposed to another, as: "Vicit pudorem

* *ομοιοτέλειον*.

† This is called the *ομοιόπλῳον*, and is not when the members of the sentence end alike, but only when the cases are alike, though the sound is different: as, *Pollst auctoritate, circumfluit oribus, abundat amicis*: neither is it found in the end only, but may in the beginning and middle.

libido, timorem audacia, rationem amentia ;” or two words to two others, as : “ Non nostri ingenii, vestri auxilii est ;” or a thought to a thought, as : “ Dominetur in concionibus : jaceat in judiciis. . Odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam magnificentiam diligit,” . Or it happens by a reciprocation of words, as : “ Non ut edam vivo, sed ut vivam edo ;” or, when it is so turned, that though there be a change of case, the members of the sentence end the same way, as : “ Ut * in judiciis, & sine invidia culpa plectatur, & sine culpa invidia ponatur ;” or when the repetition of the same words helps to make the period conclude gracefully, as in Cicero concerning Sextus Roscius : “ Etenim cum artifex ejusmodi sit, ut solus dignus videatur esse qui scenam introeat ; tum vir ejusmodi est, ut solus videatur dignus, qui eo non accedat.” . .

III. I shall now only make these few cursory reflections on figures, that as they add a singular embellishment to the discourse when their use is just and seasonable, so nothing can appear so frivolous and silly, when they are immoderately sought after. There are some, who making little account of the importance of their matter, and the force and energy of thoughts, if they can but wrest words that signify nothing into a figurative manner, judge themselves to be great artists in composition. They therefore, for the sake of producing figures, are incessantly intent upon linking words to words, but to do so regardless of their meaning is as ridiculous, as to seek after gestures

* Pro Cluent. v.

and attitudes for a body without one. And yet the figures that have a justness in them, or are applicable with propriety, are not to be too crowded upon one another. A change of countenance, and expressive looks from the eyes, are great helps for gracing the pronounciation of words; but if one should distort his face into strange grimace, and exhibit a perpetual round of agitations in his forehead and eyes, he must necessarily expose himself to be laughed at. So it is with a discourse: an upright visage best becomes it; but as it ought not to stare immoveably stiff, so it ought to be restricted to the affecting impressions it receives from nature.

An orator should principally consider what each place, person, and time require. For the greater part of these figures is merely calculated for the pleasure of the ear; but when a weighty matter is to be worked up into a vehemency of passion, is to proceed by stimulating to indignant emotions, or bending the heart to compassion; who then could indure an orator, giving vent to his anger, his tears, and intreaties, in studied antitheses, similar cadences, and the inanity of a jingle of words, especially as in these very things the affected care of expression must make the passion suspected, and wherever the false glosses of art are displayed, there truth must appear absent.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Composition.

- I. *Why he writes of composition after Cicero.*—He refutes those who contend that the artless oration in point of composition, is both more natural and more manly—Composition is of service both for the purpose of creating pleasure, and of moving the passions.—Even the ancients paid some attention to it.
- II. *Speech, either free or bound by measure.*—In composition, order, junction, number, are considered.
- III. *Of order in single words, and words in the construction of speech.*
- IV. *Of junction, consisting of words, commas, colons, and periods.* He first treats of the junction of words; and then shortly of commas, and other members of speech.
- V. *Of numbers.* 1. *The difference between a number and rhythm. Division of rhythms.* 2. *The choice of words in order to composition.*—Measure observed with more difficulty in prose than in verse. 3. *Numbers are productive of their best effects in the end and beginning, and are also of service in the middle.* 4. *Verse should not be prosaic.* 5. *Of feet, and their structure.* 6. *How far the harmony of composition should be consulted.* 7. *What kind of composition should be used, and where; and here he treats of the members of speech, divided into commas, colons, and periods.*

- I. I Should not presume to write on * composition after Cicero, who, for aught I know, has taken more pains in discussing this point of

* On composition and numbers, see Cicero, de Orat. iii. 171, and 187. and especially in Orat. 140, 238.

the orator's duty than any other, were it not that some letters of his cotemporaries to him censure the manner he prescribes, and that others after him have made many observations on the same subject. I shall therefore agree in most things with Cicero ; in such as admit of no contradiction, I shall be more brief ; and in some few, shall perhaps dissent a little from him : yet, in proposing my own opinion, shall leave every one at liberty to judge for himself.

I well know, that there are some, who will not allow of any care in composition, contending that our words as they flow by chance, how uncouth soever they may sound, are not only more natural, but likewise more manly. If what first sprung from nature, indebted for nothing to care and industry, be only what they deem natural, I allow that the art of oratory in this respect has no pretensions to that quality. For it is certain that the first men did not speak according to the exactness of the rules of composition ; neither were they acquainted with the art of preparing by an exordium, informing by a narration, proving by arguments, and moving by passions. They were therefore deficient in all these particulars, and not in composition only ; and if they were not allowed to make any alterations for the better, of course they should not have exchanged their cottages for houses, nor their coverings of skins for more decent apparel, nor the mountains and forests in which they ranged, for the abode of cities in which they enjoy the comforts of social intercourse. And indeed, what art do we find coeval with the world ; and what is it of which the value is not enhanced

by improvement? Why do we restrain the luxuriance of our vines? Why do we dig about them? Why do we grub up the bramble-bushes in our fields? Yet the earth produces them. Why do we tame animals? Yet are they born with untractable dispositions. Rather let us say, that that is very natural, which nature permits us to meliorate in her handy-work.

Now, how can a jumble of uncouth words be more manly than a manner of expression that is well joined and properly placed? If some authors enervate the things they treat of, by straining them into certain * soft and lascivious measures, we must not hence judge that this is the fault of composition. By how much the current of rivers is swift and impetuous in a free and open channel, than amidst the obstruction of rocks breaking and struggling against the flow of their waters; by so much an oration that is properly connected, flows with its whole might, and is far preferable to one that is craggy and desultory by frequent interruptions. Why then should it be thought that strength and beauty are things incompatible, when on the contrary, nothing has its just

* *Parvi pedes, ut Sotadeorum & Galliamborum.* Sotadean verses consisted sometimes of iambics, sometimes of trochaics, sometimes of dactyls, and sometimes of anapaests, which being read backwards made another kind of verse. In some editions, *Callimachiorum* is read instead of *Galliamborum*, from the poet Callimachus, who composed some little iambic verses. We find however some trochaic Galliambian verses in Terence. Some read *Polyamborum*, which are iambic verses that are read backwards. However, what is here mentioned, should not be imputed to any vice in composition, but to the short measure of these sort of verses, and the lascivious and ludicrous manner they are conceived in.

value without art, and embellishment always attends on it? Do not we observe the javelin that has been cleverly whirled about, dart through the air with the best effect; and in managing a bow and arrow, is not the beauty of the attitude so much the more graceful, as the aim is more unerring? In feats of arms, and in all the exercises of the palæstra, is not his attitude best calculated for defence or offence, who uses a certain art in all his motions, and keeps to a certain position of the feet? Composition therefore, in my opinion, is to thoughts and words, what the dexterous management of a bow or * string may be for directing the aim of missile weapons; and I may say the most learned are persuaded, that it is greatly conducive not only to pleasure, but also to make an impression on minds. First, because it is scarce possible that a thing should affect the heart, which begins by grating upon the ear. Secondly, because we are naturally affected by harmony. Otherwise, the sounds of musical instruments, though they express no words, would not excite in us so great a variety of pleasing emotions. In sacred canticles, some airs are for elating the heart into raptures, others to replace the mind in its former tranquility. The sound of a trumpet is not the same, when it is the signal for a general engagement, and when on a defeat, it implores the conqueror's mercy; neither is it the same when an army marches up to give battle, and when it is

* *Amentum* in the text, is a loop, strap, lash, or string for holding a spear, sling, or javelin, chiefly in the middle, and for helping to drive it forth. *Amentaque torquent*, Virg. *Æn.* ix. 665.

intent on retreating. It was a common practice with the Pythagoric philosophers, to awake, at uprising, their minds by an air on the lyre, in order to make them more alert for action; and they had recourse to the same musical entertainment for disposing them to sleep, believing it to be a means to allay the relics of all such tumultuous thoughts as might have any way ruffled them in the course of the day.

If then so great a force resides in musical strains and modulations, what must it be with eloquence, the music of which is a speaking harmony? As much indeed as it is essential for a thought to be expressed in suitable words, so much is it for the same words to be disposed in a proper order by composition, that they may * flow and end harmoniously. Some things of little consequence in their import, and requiring but a moderate degree of elocution, are commendable only by this perfection; and there are others, which appear expressed with so much force, beauty, and sweetness, that if the order they stand in should be changed or disturbed, all force, beauty, and sweetness would vanish from them. Cicero makes the experiment on some of his own periods in his † Orator, as for instance: “*Nam neque me divitiæ movent, quibus omnes Africanos et Lælios multi venalitii mercatoresque superarunt.*” Make the least change, as, “*Multi superaverunt mercatores, venalitii-*

* By *exitu* in the text, Quintilian seems to understand the flowing of the period from the beginning, whence it has a sort of ending, to the conclusion where it stops. In this flowing then of the period, words are joined with one another; but there is a closing of this junction at the end.

† N. 232.

que," or in the following periods, they will be like so many broken, or obliquely darted javelins; quite out of the bias of their aim. Cicero corrects also some harshness that occurred to him in the compositions of Gracchus. This was becoming so great a master; but others may content themselves in trials on their own productions, curtailing what hangs loosely, and reducing all to just proportions. For what signifies searching after examples, when we may find enough of our own? So that it may be enough to have observed, that by dissolving the order of things, beautiful both in thought and elocution, you will introduce a greater deformity into the oration; because the neglect of due placing is discoverable from the lustre the words themselves are clothed with.

Now, tho' I grant that the art of composition is almost the last that has been perfected by orators; yet do I think that the ancients paid some attention to it in proportion to the progress they made. Cicero's * authority, how great soever, shall not persuade me, that Lyfias, Herodotus, and Thucydides, were little curious about it. They, perhaps, followed a different manner from that of Demosthenes, or Plato; though they too were unlike each other.

The style of Lyfias, the texture of which is so thin and plain, ought not to have been corrupted by florid periods. It would have lost by them the graces of its simple and unaffected colouring, which in him is the greatest perfection. By them also it would have lost all belief; for he wrote for others, and did not speak himself; whence his speeches

* Or. 186. & 219.

should have been like those delivered by unpolished and illiterate persons, which itself is a great perfection in the art of composition.

The style of history, which ought to be made to run in a certain pace, would be but ill suited by the several falls which rest the mind, and are so necessary to pleadings at the bar; neither would its design be answered by the artificial disposition of the beginning and ending of sentences. Yet in the harangues used in history, you may sometimes find similar cadences and antitheses. I indeed think that the whole style of Herodotus smoothly flows; even its dialect is so sweet, as to seem productive of some secret harmony. But I will soon speak of the diversity of styles, and now shall point out what is necessary to be observed by those who are willing to be informed of the right method of composition.

II. We must principally distinguish in this respect two sorts of prose, one bound by a certain texture, as in oratorical speeches; the other loose and free, as in conversation and the epistolary style; unless when these enter into discussions of things that seem not to suit their nature, as by treating of philosophy, politics, and the like. This I do not therefore say, as if what I here call free and loose, had not also a certain measure, and perhaps more difficult to be observed than any other; for neither the epistolary style, nor that of conversation, like to admit always of an hiatus from the meeting of vowels, or a privation of time which takes from words their support and measure: yet they do not flow, nor adhere, nor draw words from words, as in the orator's style;
but

but their ties are rather more lax, than none at all. Sometimes also in lesser causes the same unartful dress is very becoming, and these causes adopt not the same, but other measure, yet they conceal and guard against its appearing as much as possible.

But the connected series, first mentioned, has three different forms: articles, which are called commas; members, which are called colons; and the period, which is a going, or winding about, or continuation, or conclusion.

There are three things likewise necessary in every kind of composition; and these are order, juncture, and number.

III. We shall first speak of order, which takes place in words considered separately or joined together. In regard to the former, care must be taken that there be no decrease by joining a weaker word to a stronger, as accusing one of sacrilege, to give him afterwards the name of thief; or add the character of wanton fellow, to that of a highwayman: for the sense ought to increase and rise, which Cicero observes admirably where he says: "And * thou, with that voice, those lungs, and that gladiator-like vigour of thy whole body." Here one thing runs stronger than another; but if he had began with his whole body, he could not with propriety have descended to his voice and lungs. There is another natural order in saying rather the men and women, the day and night, the east and west, than otherwise. Some words by changing their order become superfluous. We say properly "*fratres gemini*," twins, but if

* Phil. ii 63.

“gemini” begins, it is unnecessary to add “fratres.” I cannot much commend the exactness of those, who would always have the nominative go before the verb, the verb before the adverb, and the noun substantive before the adjective and pronoun. The contrary often happens, and not without beauty. It argues likewise a scrupulous solicitude to be always attentive to the order of time; not but frequently it may be so better, but as sometimes prior transactions may carry more weight with them, it would not be amiss to place them after less considerable.

To end the sentence with a verb, is much the better way, when the composition permits it, because the force of language lies in verbs. But if the verb grates upon the ear, the consideration of harmony will exclude it that place, as may appear from the example of the greatest Greek and Latin orators. Undoubtedly if the verb be not in the * end, it will make an hyperbaton, which is reckoned among such tropes and figures as add beauty to discourse. Words in prose being not measured as the feet that compose verse, they are therefore transferred from place to place, that they may be joined where they best fit, as in a building, where the irregularity, how great soever, of rough stones, hits in with a proper stand. However, the happiest composition language can have, is to keep to a natural order, just connection, and a regularly flowing cadence.

* Every verb that does not rightly end the period, that is, which is not harmonious and sonorous in the end of the period, by being transferred else where, makes an hyperbaton.

But

But there are some transpositions of an immoderate length, as I hinted in the * foregoing books; and others are vicious in their composition, thro' a ridiculous affectation of softness. Of this kind are the following of Mæcenas: "*sole et aurora rubent plurima.*" "*Inter sacra movit aqua fraxinos.*" "*Ne exequias quidem unus inter miserimos viderem meas.*" This last is so much the worse, as Mæcenas makes his style to play the wanton, in a subject not only serious, but mournful.

There is oftentimes something very striking in a word. By placing it in the middle of a sentence, it might pass unnoticed, or be obscured by the other words that lie about it, but placing it in the end the auditor cannot help remarking and retaining it in his mind; as in this † example from Cicero: "*ut tibi necesse esset in conspectu populi Romani vomere postridie.*" Transpose the last word, and the idea of the whole will be much weakened; for this being the point, as it were, of the shaft levelled at Antony, and the auditory expecting nothing further than the necessity of vomiting, which was indeed foul enough in itself, he further added this other unseemliness, that the meats he had gorged overloaded his stomach even "*the day following.*"

Thus much I thought it necessary to speak of order, which, if it be vicious, tho' the discourse is connected and well cadenced, yet it deservedly may pass as deficient in composition.

IV. Juncture follows, which is equally requisite in words, articles, members, and periods, all these

* Book viii. chap. 2.

† Philip. ii. 63.

having their beauties and faults, in consequence of their manner of connection. And first, even the illiterate take notice of the coming together of two words, in which the last syllable of the foregoing, and the first of the following, form some * nasty expression. Next, there may be a meeting of vowels, by which the discourse will gape, stop, and, as it were, labour. But the most disagreeable effect will be from alliterations, and the hiatus occasioned by them will be very remarkable, especially in such as are pronounced with a hollow or open mouth. The sound of the *e* is full; that of the *i* thin and narrow: a fault therefore in these is less discernable. The fault also will not be so great in placing short syllables after long, or long after short; and still less by the coming together of two short. But it may be a general observation, that in the placing of syllables, their sound will be harsher, as they are pronounced with a like or different gaping of the mouth.

This, however, is not to be dreaded as a signal fault, and I know not which is worse herein, inattention or too great care. Such scrupulous fear must of consequence damp the heat and retard the impetuosity of speaking, whilst at the same time it diverts the mind from attending to thoughts which are of greater moment. As therefore it is carelessness to give into these faults, so it is meanness to be too much afraid of them. It is thought that all the disciples of Isocrates, and especially Theopompus, were deservedly censured for being over-nice in these particulars. Demosthenes and Cicero paid no great regard to them. For the

* As in Virgil, *Dorica castra. Cæca caligine.*

coming together of letters, which is called * *synalæphe*, makes the discourse to flow more smoothly, than if all the letters in words were to be fully pronounced ; and sometimes even words pronounced with an open mouth, are not without beauty, and give an air of grandeur and magnificence to what we say ; as : “ *pulchra oratione acta omnino jactare.*” Add to this, that long syllables, which require a fuller pronunciation, are somewhat benefited by the rest that takes place from the interposition of vowels. In short, it may be a just observation with Cicero on this occasion : “ that sort of gaping, say † he, and that coming together of vowels, has something soft, and may be an indication of a carelessness, not unpleasing in a man, who is more solicitous about his matter than the arrangement of words.”

Consonants likewise, especially the harsher, jarr with one another in the beginning of words, as *s* and *x* ; for though by clashing against each other, they lose their harsher and fuller sound, yet they thus produce a disagreeable hissing, as in “ *arx studiorum.*” For this reason Servius was of opinion that the letter *s* should be suppressed, as often as final, and followed by another consonant. Afranius blames him for so thinking, but Messala takes his part ; for they do not suppose that Lucilius left the *s* final where he says, “ *serenu' fuit,*” and

* The coalition of two vowels into one syllable, is called *synalæphe*, by grammarians, as *τένομα* for *τὸ ὄνομα*. Quintilian himself produces this example towards the latter part of this chapter : *ubi libido dominatur, innocentiae leve præsidium est.* He says this period is closed by a double anapæstus : for the *synalæphe* makes the last syllables to sound as but one.

† Orat 77.

"dignu' loco." Cicero in his Orator, mentions many of the ancients to have spoke in that manner. Whence, "Belligerare po' meridiem" and the "Die' hanc" of Cato the Censor, where the *m* is suppressed to soften the pronunciation. These ways of speaking some illiterate persons have been bold enough to alter in old books; but by so pretending to censure the ignorance of transcribers, they rather shew their own. But the letter *m*, as often as it is final, and followed by a vowel in the word next to it, may be said to pass into that vowel, and tho' retained in the orthography, is imperfectly expressed; as: "multum ille," and "quantum erat;" so that in some measure it yields the sound of a sort of new letter, being not suppressed, but blunted so as to be a mark between two vowels, to hinder one from falling intirely in upon the other.

Care also should be taken that the last syllables of the foregoing word be not the first of the following. No one will be surpris'd at this precept on observing, that it escaped Cicero in one of his epistles to Brutus: "res mihi invisæ visæ sunt Brute," and in this verse:

"O fortunatam natam me consule Romam."

Even the continuation of many monosyllables is vicious, as the composition by them must seem to jump from the many stops they will occasion. By the same reason, a continuation of short verbs and nouns ought to be avoided; and on the contrary, of long ones, because these in their turn cause a certain slowness in speaking.

With these faults may likewise be classed the joining of many words together, of similar cadences, terminations, and inflections. Neither is it seemly to continue verbs with verbs, or nouns with nouns, and the like; as even perfections will create a loathing, unless helped by the graces of variety.

The joining of articles and members requires a different management from words, though they may have a connection of first and last. But the composition is much interested in what is placed first. In the example of "*vomens frustis esculentis, vinum redolentibus, gremium suum et totum tribunal implevit;*" the force of the matter required the observing of this order: on the contrary (for I shall often use the same examples for different purposes, that they may be more familiar) in that of "*saxa atque solitudines voci respondent, bestiæ sæpe immanes cantu flectuntur atque consistunt;*" the sense would rise more by inverting the order; for tho' it be a greater matter to move rocks than beasts, yet the order as it stands lends beauty to the composition.

V. We may now pass to numbers; and in this respect it will not be amiss to consider, that every construction, measurement, and copulation of words, consists either of numbers, by which I understand rythms; or of metres, that is, a certain dimension.

I. Both are composed of feet, yet differ in this respect, that rythms or numbers consist of a certain space of time; and metres, besides this time, of a certain order to which they are restricted; and thus the rythm seems to belong to quantity,

city, and the metre to quality. The rythm is either of equal parts, as the dactyl, which has a long syllable equal to two short ones : (Not but other feet have the same property, but this retains the name of having equal parts ; for it is well known that a long syllable is equivalent to two times ; and a short, but to one :) or it is in a * fefquialteral proportion, as the pæon, composed of a long and three short, or three short and a long, or any other foot whatever, in which three times are to two in the same proportion : or it is double, as the iambus, composed of a short and long, or long and short. Of the same feet also is the metre composed, but with this difference, that it is of no significancy to the rythm, whether the dactyl has the first or last syllables short, because the rythm attends only to time ; and if the syllables it consists of, have the same intervals, and the measure of time is equal, it † wants nothing more : whereas in metre or verse, an anapæstus or spondee cannot be substituted in the place of a dactyl ; neither can a pæon in the same manner begin and end by short syllables. And not only verse does not admit one foot for another, but it does not even admit of a dactyle or spondee, for another dactyle or spondee ; for if you change the order of five continued dactyles, as in

* This term is used in geometry and arithmetic, to signify two lines or two numbers, of which the last contains the first intirely and its half ; 6 and 9, 20 and 30, are in a fefquialteral proportion.

† That is, from the beginning to the end ; because in the beginning the voice is raised, and is lowered in the end. Or he rather alludes to the custom of musicians, who measure the time by the raising or position of the foot or hand.

“*Panditur interea domus omnipotentis Olympi.*”

you break intirely the verse. . .

2. I now pass to collocation, the duty of which is to connect together words approved, made choice of, and having, as it were, a certain destination; for even the joining of harsh words together is much better than of such as * signify nothing. Yet will I always allow of the making of a choice, provided it be from among words of the same force and signification; of adding, so they be not idle; of retrenching, if unnecessary; of changing cases and numbers by figures, the variety of which being frequently adopted for embellishing composition, is, even exclusive of harmony, productive of pleasure. Besides, where reason pleads for a word, and custom for another, the preference may be given to that which seems more agreeable to the composition, as in “*vitavisse*” or “*vitasse*,” “*deprehendere*” or “*deprendere*.” Neither will I be against the † coalescence of syllables, or any thing else that is not a prejudice to the sense of what is said, or the beauty of eloquence. But the chief consideration here is to know, in what place a word squares best; and he will be accurate in composition, who is observant of this, but not principally for the sake of composition.

To keep to the due measure of feet in prose is more difficult than in verse; first, because verse is comprehended in few words, and prose on the con-

* Or that do not belong to the subject, or have no force.

† He means the *synalæphe*, of which before.

trary has long periods : secondly, because verse is always like itself, and runs in one strain ; but the composition of prose, unless diversified, will offend by monotony, and disgust by affectation.

3. Therefore an oration ought to be interspersed with numbers throughout the texture of all its parts ; for we cannot speak but by using words of short and long syllables, from the junction of which proceed feet. Numbers, however, are nowhere so much wanting, nor so remarkable as in the end of periods ; first, because every sense has its bounds, and takes up a natural space, by which it is divided from the beginning of what follows : next, because the ears attending to the continuation of words, and drawn, as it were, down the current of the oration, are then more competent judges, when that impetuosity ceases, and gives time for reflection. There should not therefore be any thing harsh, nor abrupt in that ending, which seems calculated for the respite and recreation of the mind and ear. This too is the resting-place of the oration, this the auditor expects, and here burst forth all his effusions of praise.

The beginnings of periods demand an equal care with the closing of them, for here also the auditor is attentive. But it is easier to observe numbers in the beginning of periods, as not depending on, nor connected with, what went before. But the ending of periods, how graceful soever it may be in composition and numbers, will lose all its charms, if we proceed to it by a harsh and precipitate beginning. The composition of Demosthenes seems

to be very correct in those words, *πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις*, and in those others, which, I fancy, Brutus is the only who dislikes ; *καὶ μήπω βάλλη μηδὲ τοξεύη* ; and yet Cicero is censured for having ended a period by the words, “ *familiaris cœperat esse balneatori*,” and another by “ *Archipiratæ*,” though “ *balneatori*” and “ *archipiratæ*” end the same way as *πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις*, and *μηδὲ τοξεύη*, the feet and numbers being the same. It may, however, be remarked, that in the periods of Demosthenes, the composition which precedes the ending, is more harmonious and correct than that of Cicero. Besides, Cicero concludes his periods with words, that have each five syllables ; a thing, even in verse, rather too soft and languid, and less harmonious and correct, as “ * *fortissima Tyndaridarum*.” If a verse likewise was to end with four syllables, as appears from the examples of “ *Apennino*,” “ *Armamentis*,” “ *Oriona*,” it could not be said to be unexceptionable. It will therefore be not an improper caution, to guard against the use of words of many syllables in the closing of periods.

As to the composition of the middle parts of a period, care must not only be taken of their connection with each other, but also that they may not seem slow, nor long ; nor, which is now a great vice, jump and start by being made up with many short syllables, and produce the same effect in the ear as the sounds of a child’s rattle. For as the ordering of the beginnings and endings is of much importance, as often as the sense begins or ends ; so in the middle too there is a sort of stress which

* Horat. i. sat. i. v. 100.

slightly infists; as the foot of people running, which though it makes no stop, yet leaves a track. It is therefore not only necessary to begin and end well the several members and articles, but the intermediate space, though continued without respiration, ought also to retain a sort of composition, by reason of the insensible pauses that serve as so many degrees for pronounciation. Who doubts of there being but one sense contained in those words, and that they are to be pronounced with one breath: "Animadverti, judices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse partes?" Yet the two first words, and the three which follow, and the two next, and the three last, have, as it were, their numbers which support the breath. Just so, musicians make an estimate of all their various tones. As these are grave, acute, slow, quick, high, low; so the composition resulting from them, will be chaste or wanton, harmonious or destitute of the proportions of harmony.

The close of some periods seems lame and to hang loose, if left to itself; but is commonly relieved and upheld by what follows; and thus that which would be a fault in the end, is mended by the continuation. "Non vult populus Romanus obsoletis criminibus accusari Verrem." Ending so would be harsh, but the period being continued by what follows, though the sense is different; "nova postulat, inaudita desiderat," the winding up is smooth and complete. "Ut adeas, tantum dabis," ends ill, being the last part of a trimeter verse. It is followed by: "ut cibum vestitumque intro ferre liceat, tantum," which is still precipitate;

cipitate; but it is finally strengthened and supported by "*recusabat nemo.*"

4. A whole verse in prose produces a very bad effect, and even a part of one is unseemly, more especially if it be the latter part that is found in the close of a period, or the first part in the beginning of one. The contrary is often very grateful, because the beginning of a verse ends well a period, so the words contain but few syllables, and the measure is conceived in iambics of six or eight feet. "*In * Africa fuisse,*" is the beginning of a trimeter iambic, and closes the first period of Cicero's oration for Ligarius. "*Esse videatur,*" which he uses rather too often, begins an octonary. . The ending of verses suits the beginning of an oration, as: "*etsi vereor, judices,*" and "*animadverti, judices.*" But beginnings do not hit well in with one another. Livy begins his history with the beginning of an hexameter verse: "*facturusne operæ pretium sim.*" It was so published by him, and is much better than the way it is corrected. Neither do the endings of verses suit the endings of periods, as the "*quo me vertam nescio*" of Cicero, which is the end of a trimeter. The worst closing of a period is with the end of an hexameter, as in this passage of one of Brutus's epistles: "*neque enim illi malunt habere tutores aut defensores, quanquam sciunt placuisse Catoni.*" . .

* *In Africa fuisse*, is the beginning of a trimeter iambic, and ends the first chapter of the oration for Ligarius, or first period, or part of the period. *Esse videatur* is the beginning of an octonary iambic, and ends most of Cicero's periods, for which reason his enemies have objected it as a fault in him.

5. But because prose consists of feet, as I said, it will not be amiss to mention something of them also ; and as their names are various, they should, it seems, be assigned proper appellations. Herein I shall follow Cicero, who took for guide the most eminent Greek authors. But thus far he deviates from them, in not exceeding feet of more than three syllables, though himself uses the pæon and * *dochimus*, the first of which runs to four, and the second to five syllables. He says, however, that some, and not without good reason, repute these sorts of feet, to be rather numbers than feet, because whatever exceeds three syllables, consists of many feet. There are four sorts of feet then that consist of but two syllables, and eight of three. The spondee is composed of two long ; the pyrrhichius, called by others periambus, of two short ; the iambic, of a short and long ; and the reverse of it, of a long and short ; this we call choreus, and others trochæus. Of feet of three syllables, is the dactyl, consisting of one long and two short. The anapæstus, on the contrary, consists of two short and one long. One short, between two long, constitutes the amphimacrus ; but its more common name is creticus. The amphibrachys has one long between two short ; the bacchius two long after one short, and contrary to it the palimbacchius, two long before one short. The trochæus is distinguished by having three short, and is therefore called tribrachys by those, who give to the

* The *dochimus* with Cicero and Quintilian, has the first short, then two long, the fourth short, and the last long ; as *amicos leves*. Some grammarians will have the two first short, as, *hyacinthini*.

choreus the name of trochæus : as many long compose the molossus.

Every one of these feet are adopted in prose, and the more time and stability they have, that is, the more they abound with long syllables, the more they give weight to the discourse. Short ones make it move on swifter ; but both qualities are useful in their proper places : for slowness where there is an occasion for swiftness, and swiftness where slowness is required, are equally faulty. . .

As no alteration happens in the nature of letters and syllables, the chief point of consideration will be, how they best can be made to coalesce with one another. Long syllables have, therefore, as I said, more authority and weight ; and short ones, more celerity ; which, if mixed with some long, they will seem only to run ; but with the addition of other short, will skip and bound. .

It is not only of moment what foot concludes, but also what foot immediately goes before it. Backwards not more than three, and these, if they have not three syllables, are to be repeated ; (but the exactness of poetical scanning is unnecessary, as the feet may be changed ;) and the same may be done if there be not less than two, otherwise it would be the measurement of verse and not numbers that we seek after. One, however, may at least be a dichoreus, if there be one consisting of a double choreus ; or a pæon, composed of a choreus and pyrrhichius, which is thought to be proper for beginnings. Or, on the contrary, a foot composed of three short and a long syllable, which is assigned for the concluding of a period. These are chiefly the two, which the masters of this art

speak of, calling all others, which are used in prose, pæons, of what dimensions soever they be. The dochimus likewise, composed of the bacchius and iambus, or the iambus and creticus, closes very well a period, and is a substantial and regular foot.

As to the spondee, which Demosthenes made great use of, it is always slow in its nature, but preceded by the creticus, has a very good effect, as in this example : “ de quo ego nihil dicam nisi depellendi criminis causâ.” What I said above is of much consequence, whether two feet are comprehended in one word, or both are free. Thus “ criminis causâ” ends strongly, “ archipiratæ is soft, and a tribrachys going before the spondee, makes it still softer, as “ facilitates, temeritates :” for there is something of an interval or latent time in the division of words, as in a spondee ; placed in the middle of a pentameter verse, which, unless composed of the end of one word, and the beginning of another, it would not make out the verse. . .

The dichoreus, much used in the Asiatic style of eloquence, concludes well, and of it we have this example in * Cicero : “ patris dictum sapiens, temeritas filii comprobavit.” The choreus will admit also before it the pyrrhichius, as : “ omnes prope cives virtute, gloria, dignitate superabat.” The dactyl also concludes well, unless the last syllable, the measure of which is discretionary, makes a creticus ; as “ mulierculâ nixus in litore.” It will properly admit of a creticus and iambus before it, but badly of a spondee, and

* Orat. 214.

worſe of the choreus. The amphibrachus may be in the end, unleſs we rather make a bacchius of it, as “*Quintum Ligarium in Africa fuiſſe.*”

The creticus is very good for beginnings, as “*quod precatus a diis immortalibus ſum,*” and for endings, as “*in conſpectu populi Romani vomere poſtridie.*” Whence it appears how well an anapæſtus, or a pæon, which ſeems fitteſt for the end, goes before it. But it will likewise follow itſelf properly, as “*ſervare quàm plurimos.*”

By enumerating the foregoing feet, I did not intend to lay it down as a law, that there were no others; but only to ſhew the effects produced commonly by them, and what appeared beſt in regard to their uſe. And indeed the anapæſtus has a good effect in junction with itſelf, thus making the end of a pentameter, or a * verſe that borrows its name from it: as, “*nam ubi libido dominatur, innocentiae leve præſidium eſt.*” For the ſynalæphe makes the two laſt ſyllables to ſound as but one; and the effect would be ſtill better in point of ſmoothneſs, from a ſpondee or bacchius going before, as by a ſlight alteration in the ſame example: “*leve innocentiae præſidium eſt.*” . .

6. But in treating this whole matter, I would have it underſtood, that my deſign is not, that a diſcourſe, which ſhould flow naturally, ought to waſte its vigour in meaſuring feet, and weighing ſyllables. Such occupation could only ſuit a poor and narrow genius; becauſe he who ſhould make it the principal object of his ſtudy, muſt of courſe

* By the anapæſtic rythm, he ſeems to ſignify a monometer anapæſtic verſe, conſiſting of two anapæſts.

not be able to attend to things of greater importance, must neglect solid beauties ; and all his merit would consist in the adjusting of pieces of various shapes together, like unto, as * Lucilius says, some artists, who consume their whole life in settling the proportions of a piece of Mosaic work. Will not the heat that animates the orator be cooled by this frivolous pursuit ? Will not the force and energy of his expressions be extinguished by it ? Just so, he that curbs the pace of horses, must make it slower ; and he that measures his steps, cannot go as fast as he otherwise would. Numbers are indeed found in composition, and it is with prose as with poetry, which artless, and without rule in the beginning, owes its establishment to the ear only, and the fortuitous repetition of the same cadences, disposed regularly by equal spaces. Poetic measure by certain feet did not occur till some time after. But the practice acquired by much writing will so influence our manner of composition, that we shall be able to hit upon directly the necessary numbers. Yet are not feet merely to be so much considered in a period, as what the period itself comprehends. Thus poets look not so much to the five or six parts which make out a verse, as to the verse itself. For poetry had a being, before even it stood the test of observation ; and this is a reason for the saying of

* He alludes to those verses of Lucilius ; *quam lepidè lexeis composuæ, ut tessellæ omnes arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato*. He calls *tessellæ*, small square stones, cut in due proportions for the laying of pavements with them, which are called *tessellated*. But the *vermiculated* work is that, which consists of small, but various forms, representing a diversity of things.

Ennius, that before his time the * language of fauns and oracles was conceived in a sort of verse. The rank therefore versification † holds in a poem, composition holds in prose. We cannot appeal to better judges in the matter than our ears. They perceive when the composition is full, and require something when it is defective ; they are offended by harshness, and soothed by the gentle flow of that which is mild ; perplexed and wry turns rouse their indignation, but they are pleased with such as are stable and manly ; they are in pain about what they find maimed, and loathe what is redundant and superfluous. And hence it is, that the learned may be deemed judges of composition from their knowledge of rules ; but the ignorant from their sentiment of pleasure.

But some things cannot be made to correspond with the directions of art. The condition of the period must therefore be altered, if not found right as it was begun. But what precept can here take place ? The diversity of figures is often a help to composition when it seems to flag. But of what sort should these figures be, of words or thoughts ? Here too there is no precept. We must therefore examine into what occurs, and deliberate with the matter as it stands. Now, if we consider the extent of the periods themselves, which is a great point in composition, what other test can this be put to, but that of the ears ? Why are some pe-

* *Versibus quos olim fauni vatesque cantabant.*

† Versification, is the observing of certain rules and feet in poetry. Whence those are called versifiers, who compose poems by rule, though they cannot properly be styled poets ; for the name of poet contains something more noble and exalted in its idea.

riods full enough with a few words, and sometimes even too full, when others with a greater number, appear mutilated and shorter than they ought to be? Why in others, though the sense seems complete, do we find something of a vacant place? “Neminem * *vestrū* ignorare arbitror, *judices, hunc per hosce dies sermonem vulgi, atque hanc opinionem populi Romani fuisse.*” Why “*hosce*” rather than “*hos*” which has nothing harsh in it. I cannot perhaps assign a reason why I think so, but I am sensible it is better. Why was it not enough for Cicero to say, “*sermonem vulgi fuisse?*” The composition allowed of it: yet I cannot say, on consulting my ear, that it would be satisfied, if this double manner of expressing the same thought was wanting. It is the interior sentiment that must be decisive in this whole matter; and this is so true, that he who is not intelligent in the accuracy and sweetness of composition, executes both notwithstanding better by the guidance of nature than art; still would it be advisable for art and nature to go together.

7. It is quite necessary for the orator to know the kind of composition he should occasionally use. This point includes two observations; the one, regarding feet; the other, the various forms of composition resulting from them. It is of these various forms I shall first speak, which I before mentioned to consist of articles, members, and periods.

The † article, as far as I am able to judge, is
a sense

* Verr. iii. n. 1.

† What is here said by Quintilian concerning periods, members,

a sense comprehended in certain words, the number of which is still incomplete. Most authors make it a part of a member. Such is this example from Cicero : “ Domus tibi deerat ? At habebas. Pecunia superabat ? At egebas.” Articles may be also contained in single words ; as : “ diximus, testes dare volumus. “ Diximus” here makes the article.

bers, and articles, being somewhat obscure ; it may not be improper to explain the whole briefly thus :

A period is a circuit of words and sentences, making a perfect sense, as : *si quantum in agro locisque desertis audacia potest, tantum in foro atque in judiciis impudentia valeret ; non minus in causa cederet Aul. Cæcinnæ Sixt. Ebutii impudentiæ, quam tum in rei facienda cessit audaciæ.* Pro Cæcin. 1. See also the beginning of the Orat. de Provinc. Consul.

A period consists of members or colons ; and of commas, which are also called articles. A member is an assemblage of words of a perfect sense, yet suspended so as not to let appear the whole thought, as : *si quantum in agro locisque desertis audacia potest.*

A comma takes place, when each member, each phrase, or even word, is distinguished by stops, as : *O scelus ! ô pestis ! ô labe !* in Pis. 56. *Abiit, excessit, evasit, crupit.* Catil. ii. 1.

A period is either simple, or compound. Simple is of one member, as : “ Alexander by living temperately, would have made his name venerable to posterity.”

Compound is of two, three, or four members ; and is seldom, or never lengthened out to five members, or more ; as then it would be not so much a period, as a periodical oration.

Of two members. “ If Alexander had lived temperately, he would have been revered by posterity.”

Of three members. “ If by how much Alexander excelled other generals in warlike exploits, by so much he also exceeded them in the commendable quality of temperance, his name would have been remembered with the highest veneration by posterity.”

Of four members. “ If by how much Alexander excelled other generals in warlike exploits, by so much he also exceeded them in the commendable quality of temperance ; he would have been not less revered by posterity, than whilst living he is said to have been beloved by his own people, and renowned for empire and dignity.

A mem-

A member is a sense comprized in a number of words which is complete, but abstracted from the whole body, effects nothing of itself. The number of words is complete in "O callidos homines!" but considered apart from what went before and after, is of little import: just so the hands, feet, and head, are considered as useless, when severed from the body. "O rem excogitatam! O ingenia metuenda!" are examples of the same sort, but do not coalesce into a body till the last conclusion makes the sense of the whole perfect: "quem, quæso, nostrum fecellit, id vos ita esse facturos?" This * Cicero takes to be very concise and perfect in the sense. The articles and members are therefore commonly intermixed, and require a conclusion.

Cicero gives many names to the period, calling it a winding about, a circuit, a comprehension, continuation, and circumscription. It is of two kinds, the one simple, when a single sense is drawn out into a pretty considerable number of words: the other compound, by consisting of members and articles, which include several senses, as: "aderat janitor carceris; & carnifex prætoris, &c." The period has at least two members. Upon a medium difference, its complete number seems to be four; but it frequently admits of more. Its measure is restricted by Cicero to the time of repeating four iambic verses, or to the

* So Cicero speaks of the same place in Orat. 225. "The comprehension follows last, but of two members, which cannot be shorter." By dissolving this period, the two members are readily found, as: "id fecistis, & neminem nostrum fecellit."

continuance of the breath ; and its conditions to be good are, to conclude the sense ; to be clear, that it may be understood ; and not to be of too great a length, that it may be contained in the memory. The member of a period which is longer than it ought to be, is slow, and that which is shorter, is unstable.

Wherever the orator has an occasion to behave sharply, to press home, to act boldly and resolutely, he should speak by members and articles. This manner is of vast power and efficacy in an oration ; and therefore the composition is to adapt itself to the nature of things, that even rough things being conceived in rough sounds and numbers, the hearer may be made to enter into all the passions of the speaker. It would be advisable for the most part to make the narration in members ; or if periods are used, they ought to be more loose, and less elaborate than elsewhere. But I except such narrations as are more calculated for ornament, than giving information ; as the Rape of Proserpine in one of Cicero's orations against Verres. Here the composition should be smooth and flowing.

The period is proper for the exordiums of greater causes, where the matter requires solicitude, commendation, pity. Also in common places, and in every sort of amplification ; but if you accuse, it ought to be close and compact ; if you praise, full, round, and flowing. It is likewise of good service in perorations ; but may be used without restriction, wherever the composition requires to be set off in something of a grand and noble manner, and when the judge has not only

a thorough knowledge of the matter that lies before him, but is also captivated with the beauty of the discourse, and trusting to the orator, suffers himself to be led away by the sense of pleasure.

History does not so much stand in need of a periodical flow of words, as it likes to run round in a sort of perpetual circle. For all its members are connected with each other, by its slipping and gliding along, as men strengthening their pace, holding and held, in taking each other by the hand. Whatever belongs to the demonstrative kind, has freer and more flowing numbers. The judicial and deliberative, as various in their matter, so they occasionally require a different sort of composition.

It is now here, that of the two observations I above * spoke of, the other naturally presents itself. For who doubts but that some things are to be expressed in a gentle way, others with more heat, others sublimely, others contentiously, and others gravely? Feet composed of long syllables suit best grave, sublime, and ornamental subjects. The grave will take up a longer space in the pronunciation, and the sublime and ornamental will demand a clear and sonorous expression, rather than the contrary. Feet of short syllables are more agreeable to arguments, division, raillery, and whatever partakes of the nature of ordinary conversation.

The composition of the exordium will therefore be different according as the subject may require. For the mind of the judge is variously prepared, and we must, pursuant to times and circumstances,

* In the division, n. 7.

declare our mournful plight, appear modest, tart, grave, insinuating; move to mercy and exhort to diligence. These, different as their nature is, so the composition of them must be conducted in a different way. Cicero did not use the same numbers in the exordium of his orations for Milo, Cluentius, and Ligarius.

The narration most commonly requires slower, and as I may say, more modest feet, and mixed pretty much with nouns. For if on one side verbs make it closer; on the other, they give it more elevation than agrees well with its simplicity. But its principal aim is to instruct, and fix things in the mind; a work not to be done in haste; so that the whole narration seems to me to consist of longer members and shorter periods.

Arguments being naturally sharp and rapid, ought to have feet corresponding with these two qualities; yet not the trochæus, which though quick and voluble, has no strength. Other feet of an admixture of long and short, but not with more long than short, are best for this purpose. The noble and elevated parts which illustrate a discourse, naturally assume the magnificence of great and sonorous words; they are fond of the dactyle, and the full sound of the pæon, which last, though it contains more short than long syllables, is sufficiently replete with harmony. Tartness and acrimony on the contrary, are best exerted by iambics, not only because these feet have but two syllables, and therefore form, as it were, a more frequent percussion, a thing opposite to the state of gentle quietude; but also, because they rise in all their parts, and beginning by a
short,

short, lean and collect strength on the support of a long syllable. For this reason they are better than the choreus, which from long falls into short. The humble parts of a discourse, such is commonly the peroration, make choice of feet, which are slow, obtuse, and best befitting the tone of a suppliant. .

Now, to put an end to this matter, let it be in some measure a general observation, that the composition ought to be modelled on the manner of pronunciation. In exordiums, are we not most commonly modest, unless when in a cause of accusation we strive to irritate the minds of the judges? Are we not copious and explicit in the narration; in arguments animated and lively, which appears even by our actions; in common places and descriptions exuberant and lavish of ornaments; and in perorations for the most part, weighed down by distress? Of the variety that ought to be kept in a discourse, we may find another parallel instance in the motions of the body. Have not all of them their times which regulate their respective degrees of slowness and celerity? And for dancing as well as singing, does not music use numbers which the beating of time makes us sensible of? Our voice and action are indeed expressive of our interior feelings in regard to the nature of the things we speak of, and need we then be surprised if a like conformity ought to be found in the feet that enter the composition of a piece of eloquence? Ought not sublime matters be made to walk in majestic solemnity, the mild to keep in a gentle pace, the brisk and lively to bound with rapidity, and the nice and delicate to flow smoothly. Where
likewise

likewise necessary, we may affect even bombast, which appears in its greatest pomp amidst spondees and iambs, as :

“ * Hyperoargus sceptrā mihi liquit Pelops.” . .

And satire and scandal are found to vent most effectually their virulence in iambs, as :

“ Quis hoc potest videre ? Quis potest pati ?
Nisi impudicus, et vorax, et aleo ?”

However in the whole, if faults in composition be unavoidable, I should rather give the preference to that which is harsh and rough, than to that which is nerveless and emasculated, such as many now affectedly study, and daily corrupt more and more by a wantonness in numbers, more becoming a † dance than the majesty of eloquence. But I cannot say that any composition is good, how perfect soever otherwise, that constantly presents the same form, and continually falls into the same feet. A constant observation of similar measures and cadences, is a sort of versification, and all prose, in which this fault is discoverable, can have no allowance made for it, by reason of its manifest affectation, (the very suspicion of which ought to be avoided) and its uniformity, which of

* This verse is otherwise quoted by Seneca, in epist. 80. *En impero Argis, regna mihi liquit Pelops.*

† *Syntonorum modis saltitantes.* Syntoni are thought to be persons intelligent in music, who by striking on, or stopping properly some musical instrument, directed dancers in the several steps they were to take, and all the measures and evolutions of the dance. Others gave them that name, from corresponding by the motions of their body with the tones and modulations of singers.

course must fatigue and disgust the mind. This vice may have some engaging charms at first sight, but the greater its sweets are, the shorter will be their continuance; and the orator once herein detected of any anxious concern, will instantly lose all belief, and vain will be all the impressions he thought to make on minds; for how is it to be expected, that a judge will believe a man, or suffer himself to be grieved or angered upon his account, whom he observes to have attended to nothing more than the display of such trifles? Some of the connections of smooth composition, ought therefore to be designedly broke into; and it is no small labour to make them appear not laboured.

Let us not be such slaves to the placing of words, as to study longer than necessary transpositions, lest what we do for pleasing, may displease by being affected. Neither let a fondness for making the composition flow with smoothness, prevail on us to set aside a word, otherwise proper and becoming; as no word, in reality, can prove disagreeable enough to be excluded a place, unless it be that in the avoiding of such words, we rather consult the facility than the good of composition. But I do not make this remark, with the view of censuring the Latins for being more nice in composition than the Attics, though their language has not so much variety in it, nor so many graces; neither do I impute it as a fault to Cicero for being more curious in this respect than Demosthenes. But I shall explain in my last book the difference between the Greek and Latin tongues, it being

time to finish this, which already has passed its prescribed bounds.

To conclude, composition ought to be graceful, agreeable, various. Its parts are three, order, connection, number. Its art consists in adding, retrenching, changing. Its qualities are, according to the nature of the things treated of. The care of composition ought to be great, but not to take place of the care of thinking and speaking. What deserves to be particularly attended to is the concealing of the care of composition, that the numbers may seem to flow of their own accord, and not with the least constraint or affectation.

B O O K X.

C H A P. I.

Of the Copiousness of Words.

- I. *Facility of speaking acquired by reading, writing, speaking. (To reading is referred hearing and imitation: to writing, correctness and reflection.) The orator must acquire a stock of wealth, which consists of plenty of things and words. He does not now treat of things. II. A copious stock of words ought to be acquired with judgment.—It is acquired by hearing and reading.—The advantages of both.—The best authors are to be read, and how.—All is not equally commendable in the best. III. How much and how far, poets, historians, and philosophers, are of service to the orator. IV. Some reflections on the reading of the ancients and moderns.—Different opinions in this respect. V. He characterizes the most eminent of the Greek authors by their several perfections. 1. Epic, elegiac, iambic, lyric, tragic, and comic poets. 2. Historians. 3. Orators. 4. Philosophers. VI. He observes the same order in regard to the Latins.*

- I. **T**HE precepts of eloquence hitherto given, though necessary to be known, are not of themselves capable of making us truly eloquent, unless we acquire a certain facility, or contract a

habit of reducing them to practice, which, whether acquired better by writing, reading, or speaking, is, I know, a question, that is commonly controverted. I should carefully examine into the matter, if we could content ourselves with any one of these particulars; but their connection is so intimate, that one failing, we must in vain labour to become proficient in the rest. Eloquence will never be solid and robust, unless it collects strength and confidence from much writing and composing; and without examples from reading, that labour will wander for want of a guide; and though it be known how every thing ought to be said, yet the orator who is not possessed of a talent for speaking, always ready to exert itself on occasion, will be like a man watching over a hidden treasure.

Now, as any one thing may be very necessary, it will not for that reason be immediately of the greatest consequence for constituting the orator. For certainly, the business of the orator being to speak, that talent will claim the priority; because it is manifest that the art of oratory hence derived its beginning, that imitation next followed, and that the care of writing was last in succession. But as there is no coming to the conclusion of a work, but by a beginning, so in the progress of the work, the first things that facilitated the execution of it, will appear the least considerable.

But our design is not here to give instructions for the manner of training up an orator. We have done that sufficiently, at least to the utmost of our abilities, * already. Now we treat the ora-

* In the first and second books.

tor as an athlete, expert in all his master's lessons, and only wanting to be prepared by some exercise for the real combats he is to engage in. Our orator being supposed conversant in the way of inventing and disposing things, of making a choice of words, and placing them in proper order, requires nothing further than the knowledge of the means, whereby in the best and easiest manner he may execute what he has learned. It cannot then be doubted, but that he must acquire a certain stock of wealth, in order to have it ready for use whenever wanting; and this stock of wealth consists in a plentiful provision of things and words.

II. Things are peculiar to each cause, or common to few; but a provision of words must be indiscriminately made for all subjects. If each word was precisely significative of each thing, our embarrassment would be less, as then words would immediately present themselves with things; but some being more proper than others, or more ornamental, or more emphatical, or more harmonious; all ought, not only to be known, but kept ready, and in sight, as it were, that when they shew themselves to the orator's judgment, he may easily make a choice of the best.

I know that some make a practice of classing together all synonymous words, and getting them by heart, that one might the easier occur out of many; and when they have used a word, if shortly after they should want it again, to avoid repetition, they take another of the same signification. A pains-taking of this sort, must be childish, wretched, and of little or no utility; for it is only a croud that is mustered together, out of which

indifferently the first at hand is taken; whereas the copiousness of language I speak of, is to be the acquisition of judgment, with the view of attaining the true expressive force of eloquence, and not the empty volubility of speech a Charlatan discants in. This can no otherwise be effected than by hearing and reading the best things; and it is by our attention herein, that we shall not only know the appellations of things, but what is fittest for every place. For all words, in a manner, few only excepted, which favour of immodesty, find room in an oratorical composition. Even these are found not amiss in some iambics, and the old comic poets; but we orators are to look to ourselves and guard against all reproach. So that all words, those excepted which I spoke of, are some where as good as need be, there being sometimes an occasion for the low and vulgar, because where these may seem mean amidst the graces of elegance, where the subject requires, they are said with propriety.

To know how to distinguish them, and to become acquainted not only with their signification, but the various forms and measures of their declensions and conjugations, are things not attainable but by frequent reading and hearing: I say hearing, because all the language we learn is first transmitted to us through the channel of the ears. For which reason * infants, whom some princes

* Psammetichus, king of Egypt, according to Herodotus, in the beginning of his second book, procured mute nurses to take care of some infants whom he had ordered to be brought up in a desert. After two years old, when hungry, they perhaps pronounced the word *beccas*, which signifies in the Phrygian tongue *bread or food*.

had the curiosity of having brought up by mute nurses in desert places, though said to have uttered some words, yet they remained destitute of the faculty of speaking.

There are words very different, but their nature is such, that they are expressive of the same thing ; so that as to the signification it is indifferent which of them is used, as " *ensis*" and " *gladius*." There are others, which though serving to express two different things, yet by a trope present the same idea to the mind, as " *ferrum*" and " *mucro*;" and it is also by a catachresis that we call " *sicarii*" all those who have committed a murder by any sort of weapon. Some things we express by circumlocution as " * *pressi copia lactis*;" and we make others figurative by a change in the manner of expressing them. Thus for " *scio*," we say " *non ignoro*" " *non me fugit*," " *non me præterit*," " *quis nescit?*" " *Nemini dubium est*." We may also borrow from a word of nearly the same import, by substituting one for the other, as for " *scio*," " *intelligo*, *sentio*, *video*," which often have the same signification. Reading will abundantly supply us with a diversity of such ways of speaking, that we may use them, not merely as they occur, but when they seem most proper; for it is not always that they directly signify the same thing, because though I may say " *video*" to express rightly the understanding of the mind, yet I cannot say " *intelligo*" applying it to the sight of the eyes; neither as " *mucro*" indicates " *gladius*," so does " *gladius*" indicate " *mucro*."

By these means may the copiousness of language be acquired, but not so as to read and hear for the sake of words only. All may observe examples of whatever art teaches, and these will be more efficacious than precepts, when the learner has proceeded so far, as to be capable of understanding them without a teacher, and can build upon his own bottom; because what the teacher delivers precepts for, the orator shews.

In some eloquent compositions we may profit more by reading, and in some others more by hearing them pronounced. The speaker keeps awake all our senses, and spirits us up by the fire that animates him. We are struck, not by the image and exterior of things, but by the things themselves. All is life and motion, and with solicitude for his success, we favourably receive all he says, as recommended by the charms of novelty. Together with the orator, we find ourselves deeply interested in the issue of the trial, and the safety of the parties, whose defence he has undertaken. Besides these, we find other motives to affect us. A fine voice, a graceful action corresponding with what is said, and a manner of pronunciation, which perhaps is the most powerful accomplishment of eloquence: in short, every thing conducted and managed in the way that is most becoming.

In reading, our judgment goes upon surer ground, because often our good wishes for the speaker, or the applause bestowed on him, surprises us into approbation. We are ashamed to differ in opinion from others, and by a sort of tacit bashfulness are kept from believing ourselves more intelligent than they are; though indeed we

are at the same time sensible that the taste of the greater number is vicious, and that sycophants, even persons hired to applaud, extol things, which cannot please us; as on the contrary it also happens, that a bad taste can have no relish for the best things. Reading is besides attended with the advantage of being free, and not escaping us by the rapidity which accompanies action; and we may often go over the same things, whether we doubt of their accuracy, or are willing to fix them in our memories. Repeating and reviewing will therefore be highly necessary; for as meats are chewed, and in some measure humected, before they descend into the stomach, in order to facilitate their digestion; so reading is fittest for being laid up in the memory, and being an object of imitation, when it is not in a crude state, but rather softened and elaborated by long meditation.

None, however, but the best authors, and such as we are least liable to be deceived in, demand this care, which should be diligent, and extended even almost to the pains, as it were, of transcribing them. Neither ought judgment to be passed on the whole from examining a part, but the book fully perused, should have a second reading, and especially an oration, the perfections of which are often designedly kept concealed. The orator indeed often prepares, dissembles, lies in wait, and says things in the first part of the pleading, which he avails himself of in the last. They may therefore be less pleasing in their place, whilst we still remain ignorant of the design for their being said. For which reason after a due consideration of particulars,

ticalars, it would not be amiss to resume the whole.

But the greatest utility would be in studying those causes, on which we have written pleadings; and in reading, when it shall so happen, such as have been pronounced on both sides of the question; as for and against Ctesiphon, those of Demosthenes and Æschines; of Servius Sulpitius and Messala, for and against Aufidia; of Pollio and Cassius, in the cause of Aspernas, and many others. Here too, if the oratorical abilities do not seem to be upon an equality, we may consult some for becoming acquainted with the state of the question, as in opposition to Cicero, Tubero's oration against Ligarius, and that of Hortensius for Verres.

It will also be of service to know, how two orators handled the same cause, on the side of the defence. Callidius pleaded for the restoration of Cicero to his house; and Brutus, for exercise sake, wrote an oration for Milo, though Celsus mistakenly says, he had pronounced it. Pollio and Messala defended the same persons, and I well remember to have heard celebrated the orations of Domitius Afer, Crispus Passienus, and Decimus Lælius, for Volusenus Catulus.

In reading these authors, how renowned soever, we must not immediately imagine that all is perfect in them; for they sometimes make a false step, or sink under their burden, or indulge the smiling fancies of their genius, or at times give into inattention, and are borne down by lassitude. Cicero * remarks some nods in Demosthenes, and

* Or. 104.

Horace * says the same of Homer. They are great men, it is certain, but still they are men; and they, who impose it as a law on themselves to follow them blindly in all respects, fall into the error of imitating what is weakest in them, (which is more easily done than their perfections) and of thinking themselves abundantly like them, when they have copied only their faults.

That judgment, however, which is passed on the merit of such great men, ought to be with singular modesty and circumspection, lest, as it generally happens, they condemn what they do not understand. But if there be no avoiding a mistake on either side, I would rather counsel the reader to approve of all, than find many faults in their productions.

III. Theophrastus says, that the reading of poets is of vast service to the orator. Many, and with good reason, are of the same opinion, as from them may be derived sprightliness in thought, sublimity in expression, force and variety in sentiment, propriety and decorum in character, together with that recreation for cheering and recruiting minds which have been for any time harassed by the drudgery of the bar. Therefore Cicero thinks † relaxation should be sought for amidst the pleasure of poetic reading.

Let it notwithstanding be remembered, that poets are not in all things to be imitated by the orator, neither in the liberty of words, nor licence of figures. The whole of that study is calculated for ostentation. Its sole aim is plea-

* Art. Poet. 359. † De Orat. ii. n. 14. and pro Arch. n. 6.

sure, and it invariably pursues it, not only by fictions of what is false, but of some things that are incredible. It is sure also of meeting with partizans to espouse its cause, because as bound down to a certain necessity of feet, it cannot always use proper words, and being driven out of the strait road, must turn into some bye-ways of speaking, and be compelled both to change some words, and to lengthen, shorten, transpose, and divide them. As for orators, they must stand their ground completely armed in the order of battle, and being to fight for matters of the highest consequence, must think of nothing but gaining the victory.

Still would I not have their armour appear squalid and covered with rust, but retain rather a brightness that dismays, such as of polished steel, striking both the mind and eyes with awe; and not the splendor of gold and silver, a weak safe-guard indeed, and rather dangerous to the bearer.

History likewise, by its mild and grateful sap, may afford kind nutriment to an oratorical composition. Yet should the orator so read history, as to be convinced that most of its perfections ought to be avoided by him. It nearly borders upon poetry, and may be held as a poem, unrestrained by the laws of verse. Its object is to narrate, and not to prove, and its whole business neither intends action nor contention, but to transmit facts to posterity, and enhance the reputation of its author. Therefore by a freer manner of expression, and bolder figures it avoids that loathing which is otherwise inseparable from the tediousness of narratives.

But,

But, as I before mentioned, neither Sallust's conciseness, than which nothing can be so exquisitely charming to attentive and learned ears, will have any effect on a judge, whose mind is taken up with a multiplicity of affairs, and who often is likewise illiterate; nor will the sweetness and abundance of Livy sufficiently instruct him, who, regardless of the beauties of narration, wants the matter to be put to the test of proofs. Add to this, that Cicero does not * think that even Thucydides or Xenophon are of any real service to the orator, though he says the one animates by the alarm he sounds, and the Muses speak by the mouth of the other.

We may nevertheless be allowed to use sometimes in digressions the lustre of history, but not in any essential point of debate, where we must remember we do not want the supple exertions of an athlete's muscles, but the nervous brandishings of the soldier's arm; and where also the versatile-colour-robe, which Demetrius Phalereus is said to have worn, will ill become the dust of the bar.

There is another utility in the reading of history, and indeed the greatest, but not relative to the present matter. This proceeds from the knowledge of things and examples, which the orator ought to be well versed in, that all his testimonies may not be from the parties, but many of them taken from antiquity, which by history he will be well acquainted with; and these testimonies will be the more powerful, as the only

* Orat. 30, 31, 32.

exempt from the suspicion of prejudice and partiality.

By seeking insights, and borrowing many things from the works of philosophers, has been the fault of orators, in consequence of their having made over to them the better part of their duty. For they discuss, and hold warm disputations on the nature of justice, honesty, utility, and their contraries; as also on divine things; and the Socratic arguments by induction, are very proper to prepare the future orator for altercations and interrogatories. But this reading requires not less discernment than the former; for though in the main the matter to be treated of may be the same, yet we should know that there is a difference in the condition of a cause and disputation, the bar and a school, mere precepts and an affair brought to trial.

IV. The utility of reading being so considerable as it appears to be, many, I fancy, may not be satisfied with what I have said, unless I also point out what authors ought to be read and pass some strictures on their particular excellencies. Doing so in regard to each author, would be an endless piece of work. Cicero, in his* Brutus, has taken up a number of pages in speaking only of the Roman orators, without mentioning any of his own contemporaries, except Cæsar and Marcellus; and if so, how should I be able to fix bounds to this work, was I to give an account of them, their successors, and all the Greeks, with philosophers and poets? The surest way would undoubtedly

* Brut. 248.

be to follow the compendious method of Livy, as set forth in his Epistle to his Son, " that Demosthenes and Cicero are principally to be read, and next, such as are most like them."

I should not, however, be against giving a general notion of my sentiments in this matter, and shall therefore venture to say, that there are few, or rather hardly one of those who have stood the test of time, but may be read with some profit by the judicious. Cicero himself confesses, that he had received great helps from old authors, who are indeed very ingenious, but wanted art. I pass nearly the same judgment on the merit of our moderns. Which of them is so despicable, as not to have at least some advantage, which may make him reasonably hope to pass to posterity ? If he has any thing to plead in his favour, it will immediately appear from inspecting the first pages ; and if not, we shall soon rid our hands of him, and not lose time in making further experiments. But for an author to have something good, something to our purpose, it does not follow, that he is quite proper for creating that copiousness of language we here speak of.

But before I speak of the respective merit of authors, I must make in a few words some general reflections on the diversity of taste in regard to matters of eloquence. Some think that the antients only deserve to be read, persuaded that none else have distinguished themselves by natural eloquence, and that strength of language, so becoming men. Others are captivated with the flowery profusion of the orators of the present age, with their delicate turns, and with all the blandishments they

they curiously invent to charm the ears of an ignorant multitude. Some choose to follow the plain and direct way of speaking. Others take to be found and truly Attic, whatever is close, neat, and departs but little from ordinary conversation. Some are delighted with a more elevated, more impetuous, and more fiery force of genius. Others, and not a few, are fond of a smooth, elegant, and polite manner. I shall speak of this difference of taste more at large, when I come to examine * the style that may seem most proper for the orator.

V. In the mean time I shall cursorily touch upon the advantages those may reap from reading, who by that exercise endeavour to improve in themselves the talent of speaking; and for this purpose shall cull out a few authors, who have been truly eminent. It will be an easy matter for the studious, to judge which are most like these, that no one may complain of my omitting, perhaps, any of those, whom he greatly approves of; for indeed many more than I shall name, well deserve to be read. But what I here intimate, must be supposed to regard the sort of reading that is best calculated for forming the orator.

1. Therefore as Aratus in his *Phænomena*, thinks he should begin by † Jupiter, so we may seem to begin properly from Homer. He it is that gave birth to, and set the example, of all parts of eloquence, just as himself says, the ‡ course of rivers and springs of fountains owe their origin

* Book xii. c. 10.

† Aratus so begins his *Astrological Dissertations*. Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχαίσιβα. *Ab. Jove Principium.*

‡ Il. l. xxi. v. 195.

to the ocean. No one, in great subjects, has excelled him in elevation; nor in small by propriety. He is florid and close, grave and agreeable, admirable for his concise as well as copious manner, and not only eminent for poetical, but likewise oratorical abilities.

For to say nothing of his Eulogiums, of his hortative and consolatory Speeches, does not even the ninth book, which contains the embassy to Achilles; or the first, which relates the contention between the Chieftains; or the second, which records their deliberations, explain all the art of pleadings and counsels? As to the moving of the passions, the milder or the more impetuous sort, no one can be so incompetent a judge as not to discern but that he had equal powers in both respects.

Again, in the beginning of both his poems, has he not in a few verses not only observed, but established the rules of an exordium? He makes the auditor benevolent, by the invocation of the Goddesses, which are supposed to preside over Poets; attentive, by the importance of the matter he proposes; and docile, by giving him a full view of it. Who made ever a more concise narration, than the person who * relates the death of Patroclus; or one more exact, and to the life, than him who gives an † account of the battle of the Curetes and Ætoliens? And as to similitudes, amplifications, examples, digressions, signs of things and arguments, and all the other particulars of proving and refuting, so numerous are the instances that oc-

* Il. l. xvi. v. 18—21. † Il. l. ix. v. 525, &c.

cur, that even they who have written of arts, cite illustrations of these matters from that poet. Besides, in the way of epilogue; what has ever been found to equal the moving prayer of Priam, entreating Achilles to restore to him his son's body?

In short, if we look to the force of his words, the beauty of his thoughts, the figures he adopts, the disposition of his whole work, we cannot help observing but that they exceed the bounds of human wit. So that these must be great, who are able to attain his perfections, not by imitation, which is scarce possible, but by knowing and understanding him. He has undoubtedly left far behind him all others, in all kinds of eloquence, especially the heroic Poets, because in a like matter the comparison may seem more conspicuous.

Hesiod seldom rises, and his occupation lies mostly in finding names for things; yet his precepts aptly mingled with useful thoughts, the sweetness of his expression, and his pleasing manner, give him the palm in the middle kind of eloquence.

Antimachus, on the contrary, has force and solidity, and his style, by being out of the road of what is common, has its due share of praise. But though the almost unanimous assent of grammarians places him in the second rank after Hesiod; yet is he so deficient in the management of passions, in agreeableness, in disposition, and in art, that it plainly appears how wide the difference must be between being near to one, and second after him.

Panyasis is thought to contain a mixture of both these poets, but equals neither in the powers

of elocution. He surpasses, however, Hesiod by the choice of his matter, and Antimachus by order and disposition.

Apollonius * does not appear in that catalogue of poets, which we retain from their critics, the grammarians Aristarchus and Aristophanes, as not having inserted in it any of their contemporaries. Yet he published a work, commendable for a certain mediocrity which is well supported.

The matter of Aratus is motionless, and without variety and sentiment; neither in it is any person introduced speaking. But his abilities fall not short of the work he thought himself equal to.

Theocritus is admirable in his kind; but his rustic and pastoral muse not only dreads the bar, but even to make its appearance in the city.

Here I imagine several busied in crouding in the names of many other poets. Has not Pisander, says one, worthily sung the achievements of Hercules? Have Macer and Virgil followed, without reason, † Nicander, says another; and shall we pass by Euphorion, of whom had not Virgil approved, he certainly would not have made such honourable mention of him in his ‡ Bucolics; and says another, has § Horace, to no purpose, named Tyrteus immediately after Homer?

* Apollonius the Rhodian, wrote the Expedition of the Argonauts. He lived in the time of the grammarians, Aristarchus and Aristophanes of Byzantium; who, in the reign of Ptolemy Philometor, had passed a severe criticism on authors.

† A poet of Colophon, who, among other things, wrote Georgics.

‡ Ibo & Chalcidico quæ sunt mihi condita versu, &c. Eclog. x. 40.

§ Art. Poet. 502.

I answer, that there is no one so little versed in the knowledge of authors, but may, by the help of the catalogue of a library, transcribe at least their names into a work. I am not unacquainted with those I pass by, neither do I condemn them on that account, having before declared that all have their utility; but we shall return to them when our eloquence has attained a proper degree of consistence. So it often happens in grand entertainments, when after having satisfied ourselves with the best meats, the most common have their turn, and please at least by their variety.

Then we may also take into our hands elegy, in which Callimachus is reported to hold the first rank, and Philætes the second, which is generally given up to him. But whilst we are endeavouring, as I said, to acquire that substantial facility, we should contract a familiarity with the best authors, and strengthen our conceptions, and lay deep the colouring of eloquence, rather by the well-digested reading of some good books, than by the reading of many.

Therefore out of the three writers of iambics, who have received the approbation of Aristarchus, Archilochus is the only that will contribute most to the facility we ought to acquire. We find in him an extraordinary force of expression, bold thoughts, short, lively, and piercing strokes of wit. He abounds with blood and nerves, and if he may appear to some inferior to any other, the fault should rather be imputed to his matter, than genius.

There are nine lyric poets, and Pindar far excells all of them, by the magnificence of his

enthusiasm, the sublimity of his thoughts, the beauty of figures, the happy copiousness of things and words, and a flood, as it were, of eloquence : upon which account, * Horace justly believes him inimitable.

The subjects Stesichorus has treated, afford also a sufficient demonstration of the strength of his genius, having sung the greatest wars and the most illustrious captains, and having supported all the weight of epic poetry on his lyre. He makes his heroes act and speak with a becoming dignity and propriety ; and if he had kept to a just moderation, no other would have come nearer Homer ; but he is redundant and overflows, a vice undoubtedly deserving reprehension, but it is a vice of abundance.

Alceus † is very deserving of the present of the golden lute for that part of his work, in which, fired by a noble indignation, he inveighs against tyrants. The reading likewise of some parts of him may improve our morals. His style is concise, magnificent, correct, and in many respects he resembles Homer ; but he descends sometimes to sportive trifles and amours, though indeed more fit for greater subjects.

Simonides neat and plain, is mostly commendable for a propriety and sweetness of diction. His chief talent, however, lies in softening the heart by sentiments of pity, and some in this respect prefer him to all the other lyric poets.

The ancient Comedy is almost the only that preserves unadulterated the native graces of the

* Horat. Od. ii. l. 4.

† Horat. Od. xiii. l. 2.

Attic language. It is, besides, remarkable for a liberty which is very eloquent ; and though it particularly excels in the ridicule of human follies and indiscretions, yet its force and energy in other parts is very considerable. For it is grand, and elegant, and beautiful, and I know not, if any other thing, next to Homer, (whom we must always except, as he himself excepts Achilles) be more proper to form orators, or comes nearer to their manner. Its authors are many, but Aristophanes, Cratinus, and Eupolis are the chief.

Æschylus is the first who gave birth to Tragedy. He is sublime, and grave, and often pompous to a fault. But his plots are mostly ill contrived and as ill conducted. For which reason, the Athenians permitted the poets, who came after him, to correct his pieces, and fit them for the stage ; and by this means many of these poets had the honour of being crowned.

Sophocles and Euripides brought tragedy to greater perfection ; but their different manner has occasioned a dispute among the learned concerning their greater poetic merit. For my part, I shall leave the matter undecided, as making nothing to my present purpose. It must nevertheless be confessed, that Euripides will be of much greater utility for those who design themselves for the bar ; for besides that his style (and this is what is found fault with by those, to whom the buskin, and majesty, and tone of Sophocles seem to have something more elevated) comes nearer the oratorical kind ; he likewise abounds with fine thoughts, and in philosophic maxims, is almost upon equality with philosophers, and in his dialogue may be

compared with the best speakers at the bar. He is again wonderful for his masterly strokes in all the passions, and more especially for exciting commiseration.

Menander, as he often testifies himself, was a great admirer of Euripides, and also an imitator of him, though in a different kind of writing. This comic poet, if read well, may alone, in my opinion, be sufficient for procuring all the advantages proposed from my precepts; so exactly expressed by him is the picture he has given us of human life, so fruitful is his wit in invention, so beautiful his elocution, so proper his characters, passions, and manners. I must undoubtedly deem those to be persons of some penetration, who have ascribed to Menander the orations published by the name of Charisius. But he appears to me a greater orator in his comedies; unless perhaps it may be said that his *Nomotheton*, *Epiclesus*, *Hypobolimæum*, and some other pieces, are not natural representations of what is transacted in judicial causes, or rather not accurate examples of oratorical abilities.

I likewise think that he may be of still greater service to declaimers, because according to the nature of controversies, they are obliged to assume many different characters; as of fathers, sons, husbands, military men, farmers; the rich, the poor, the angry person, the suppliant, the mild-tempered and the ill-natured. In all which, decorum has been admirably observed by this poet, who has truly surpassed all other writers in comedy, and eclipsed them by the splendor of his name and reputation.

There

There are other comic poets, among whom something good for our purpose may be selected, if read with a mind disposed to overlook their faults. Of these, Philemon is the principal, who deserves the second rank with as much justice after Menander, as he was unjustly preferred to him by the corrupt taste of his age.

2. There have been many famous writers of history, but all agree in giving the preference to two, whose perfections, though different, have acquired an almost equal degree of praise. Thucydides is close, concise, and ever going on. Herodotus is sweet, natural, and copious. The one is remarkable for his animated expression of the more impetuous passions, the other for gentle persuasion in the milder : the former succeeds in harangues and has more force ; the other in speeches of familiar intercourse, and gives more pleasure.

Theopompus, who follows them, has less of the historian in him, and more of the orator, having been of that profession a considerable time, before he engaged in the writing of history. Philistus deserves to be distinguished from among the croud of the historians that next followed after these three. He imitated Thucydides, weaker, it is true, than his original, but somewhat more clear.

Ephorus, so Isocrates thinks, has not fire enough, and wants rousing by a spur. Clitarchus has a great share of wit, but his veracity, as an historian, is much doubted. Timagenes, who was not born till long after, is commendable for having repaired with new lustre the care of writing history, which had been laid aside. I have not

forgot Xenophon, but he is better classed with philosophers.

3. A numerous band of orators follows, for Athens produced ten of them, contemporary with one another. Demosthenes was by far the chief of them, and held to be in a manner the only model for eloquence: so great is his force; so close are all things in him, and tended with certain nerves; so great is his accuracy in not adopting any idle expression, and so just his precision, that nothing wanting, nothing redundant can be found in him. Æschines is more full, more diffusive, and appears the more grand, as his parts spread wider: he has more flesh, but not so many sinews. Hyperides is exceeding sweet, acute, and neat; but he is fitter, not to say more useful, for causes of lesser importance.

Lyfias, elder than these, is subtile and elegant, and if it was enough for the orator to instruct, none could be found more perfect than he is. There is nothing idle, nothing far-fetched in him; yet is he more like a clear brook, than a great river. Isocrates in a different kind of eloquence, is fine and polished, and better adapted for engaging in a mock than real battle. He was studious of all the beauties of discourse, and had his reasons for it, having calculated his eloquence for schools, and not for contentions at the bar. His invention was easy, he was very fond of graces and embellishments, and so nice was he in his composition, that his extreme care is not without reprehension.

These I take to be the principal, but not the only perfections, in the just mentioned orators.

There are others, who, I am sensible, are not without their degree of merit ; and I even acknowledge Demetrius Phalereus to be possessed of great wit and oratorical abilities, though said to be the first that had warped eloquence. He deserves to be remembered, if for no other reason, than being the last of the Attics, who can properly be styled an orator ; and Cicero * prefers him to all others in the middle kind of eloquence.

4. Among philosophers, by whom Cicero confesses he has been furnished with many eloquent resources, who doubts of Plato's being the chief, whether we consider the acuteness of his dissertations, or his divine Homerial faculty of elocution ? He soars high above prose, and even common poetry ; which is only poetry, because comprized in a certain number of feet ; and he seems to me not so much endowed with the wit of a man, as inspired by a sort of Delphic oracle.

What shall I say of Xenophon's unaffected agreeableness, so unattainable by any imitation, that the Graces themselves seemed to have composed his language ? The testimony of the ancient comedy concerning Pericles, is very justly applicable to him, " That the Goddess of Persuasion had seated herself on his lips."

And what shall I say of the elegance of the other disciples of Socrates ? What of Aristotle ? I am at a loss to know, what most to admire in him ; his vast and profound erudition, or the great number of his writings, or his pleasing style and manner, or the inventions and penetration of his wit, or the variety of his works. And, as to

* Orat. 92.

Theophrastus, his elocution has something so noble and so divine, that it may be said his name has been hence derived.

The ancient stoics were less studious about eloquence, but their lessons of virtue are very notable; their reasonings are just, and they prove well what they inculcate. They were, in fine, more acute in discussing the nature of things, than curious in the display of fine language, which they did not in the least affect.

VI. I think of following the same order in regard to our Roman authors.

1. As therefore speaking of the Greeks we began with Homer, so of the Latins, we cannot more happily begin than with Virgil, who of all their poets and ours in the epic style, is without all doubt the only that comes nearest to Homer. I shall here use the same words which in my youth-age I heard from Domitius Afer, who on my asking him, what poet he believed approached nearest Homer, said: "Virgil is the second, but nearer the first, than a third." And indeed, though obliged to give way to Homer's heavenly and immortal genius, yet in Virgil are discoverable a greater exactness and care, it being incumbent on him to take more pains: so that what we lose on the side of the eminency of qualities, we perhaps gain on that of justness and equability.

All our other poets, who use the same manner of verse with Virgil, follow at a distance. Macer and Lucretius may indeed be read, but not in order to that copious language for constituting the body of eloquence we here speak of. Both have elegantly treated their subject, but the one is ra-

1 ther

ther low, and the other difficult. Varro * Attacinus, so far as in some vogue for being the interpreter of another's work, does not deserve to be rejected, but he is not rich enough in expression for improving the requisites of oratory. Ennius we revere as groves sacred for their antiquity, in which huge old oaks affect us less by their beauty, than by the religious awe they inspire us with.

Other poets, as nearer our time, will contribute more to the copiousness of expression we speak of. Ovid, in his heroic poetry, as well as in his other compositions, plays the wanton, is florid to an excess, and too fond of his own wit; yet are some parts in him highly finished, for which he may be justly commended. If Cornelius Severus, though a better versifier than poet, had gone through his Sicilian war, as he had executed the first book, we could not with justice refuse him the second place. But an untimely death hindered his putting the finishing hand to his work. His juvenile productions, however, shew him to be of great genius, and of admirable taste for one of his years.

We lately have had a great loss in Valerius Flaccus. Sallustius Bassus had so vehement and poetic a genius, that even old age could not bring it to a just maturity. Rabirius and Pedo are not unworthy of being known by those who have leisure time enough on their hands. Lucan

* Varro Attacinus lived in the time of Ovid, and translated into Latin verse, the expedition of the Argonauts, written by Apollonius the Rhodian. He was called Attacinus from Attax, a village of the Narbonensian Gaul, according to Eusebius; or according to others, from the river Attax.

is hot, impetuous, and much famed for his bright thoughts; but to speak my real sentiments of him, I think he should rather be classed with orators than with poets.

To these we have given the title of poets, because the care of governing the world has taken off * Germanicus Augustus from the pursuit of his favourite studies, the gods having thought it but little to have made him the greatest of poets. Still what can be more sublime, more learned, and more perfect in all respects, than the works which he began when first he bore a part in the government? Who should sing wars better than him, who so nobly achieves them? Who else could so favourably be heard by the Muses? Upon whom should Minerva shower down her accomplishments more willingly, than upon a prince who had always made this goddess his favourite deity? Future ages shall make more ample eulogiums of this rare talent; for now the merit of the poet is eclipsed in him by the splendour of his other more illustrious qualities. Yet suffer, Cæsar, that we who cultivate letters, pass by not in silence so heavenly a gift as this, and that we teach posterity at least by this † verse of Virgil, that to crown your august forehead

* Some commentators understand this of Germanicus the son of Drusus, but they are much mistaken; and it is evident that Quintilian means the emperor Domitian, who assumed this title, as if he had conquered Germany, as also that of the son of Pallas, both which may appear from his medals; and to the latter alludes what is said in the Latin text: *cui magis suas artes aperiret familiare numen Minervæ.*

† Eclog. viii. v. 13.

————— the ivy wreath
 Might creep intermingl'd with thy conqu'ring
 bays. TRAPP.

We dispute it with the Greeks also in elegy, and Tibullus herein seems to me to have distinguished himself by his elegance and purity. Some prefer Propertius to him. Ovid is more lascivious than either, and Gallus harsher.

Satire is intirely of our invention, and Lucilius is the first among us who has been much celebrated for his taste in that way. He still has such fond admirers, that they make no scruple of preferring him not only to all satirists, but even to all other poets. For my part, as far as I dissent from their opinion, so far do I also from that of Horace, who says, "Lucilius runs muddy, yet has something worth notice." For I find in him a wonderful erudition, and a pleasing freedom of speech, productive of a sharp, yet well seasoned railery.

Horace is more correct and pure, and has succeeded admirably in exposing the ridiculous humours of men. Persius, though he wrote but one book, has deserved great praise. There are famous satirists now living, who hereafter will have honourable mention made of them.

There is another sort of satire, and more ancient, intermixed with a variety of different kinds of verse. Such is the Menippeæ of Terentius Varro, the most learned of the Romans. This same person has distinguished himself by a diversity of other compositions. He had a profound knowledge of the Latin tongue, and of all antiquity,

tiquity, and of the Greek history, and of our own transactions. However, the reading of his works will make us more learned than eloquent.

None of our poets have ever seemed so fond of the iambic verse as to confine themselves intirely to its use. Some have placed it between other verses, and its tartness is adopted by Catullus, Bibaculus, and Horace, though in the last an * epode is found to follow it.

But of our lyric poets, Horace is almost the only that deserves to be read; for he rises at times, abounds with sweetness and grace, and happily hazards a variety of figures and words. If one should be desirous of reading any other, I would recommend Cæsius Bassus, whom I not long since had some knowledge of; but there are persons now living who by far excell him.

Our most famous tragic writers were Accius and Pacuvius, both remarkable for the weight of their thoughts and expressions, and the dignity of their characters. But they have little of that polished and perfect manner, so desirable in works of this kind, a fault, not so much to be imputed to them, as to the age they lived in. Accius is said to have more force, and they, who affect to appear more learned, find more art and learning in Pacuvius. The *Thyestes* of Varius may stand in competition with any Greek tragedy; and the *Medea* of Ovid shews what he was capable of, if he had chose to curb a little, and not indulge so much

* An epode is called a shorter verse, subjoined to a longer, and, as it were, chiming in with it; from *ἐπώδω*, *accino*. Horace in the book, thence called *Epodon*, often subjoins dimeters to trimeter iambic verses.

his genius. Pomponius Secundus is the only of those I have seen, who has succeeded best in tragedy, and though the last generation thought he had not tragic fire enough, yet they acknowledged that he excelled in erudition and the elegance of his style and manner.

We must allow that comedy is our weaker side, though Varro, on the authority of Ælius Stolo, says that "The Muses would have spoke the language of Plautus, if they had a mind to speak Latin;" though the ancients are lavish in their praises of Cæcilius; and though the comedies of Terence are ascribed to Scipio Africanus, which undoubtedly are extremely elegant, and would have been far more graceful, if the measure of the verses was confined to * trimeter iambs. We scarce can delineate a faint shadow of the beauties of Greek comedy; for the Latin seems to me so little susceptible of the graces peculiar to the Attic language, that the Greeks themselves retain no more of them, the moment they speak in another dialect. Afranius excelled in comedies built intirely on a Latin † plan. I wish he had not sullied his subjects with infamous love-intrigues, by which he has left us but an indifferent idea of his own moral character.

2. But we are not inferior to the Greeks in his-

* Terence, as was customary with comic poets, makes use of iambs of all sorts of measure, that is, of tetrameters, which have eight feet. Quintilian wishes he had used only trimeters, which consist of six feet.

† *Togata comediae* are those which were intirely Latin, that is, conformable to the manners and customs of the Romans; as *palliatæ* were called such as had been composed in imitation of the Greeks.

tory; for I should not be afraid to oppose Sallust to Thucydides, neither should I injure Herodotus by comparing Livy with him. If we look to Livy's narrative, what shall we find so pleasing, and so admirably plain. He is eloquent in his harangues beyond expression; so great is the propriety of all he says, as well in regard to circumstances as to persons. As to passions, especially those of the softer kind, no historian, to speak modestly, has expressed them in more natural colours. His different perfections may therefore be held as a just equivalent to Sallust's immortal conciseness, according to the judicious remark of Servilius Novianus, who said they were more equal than alike. This same person I had once the honour to be a pupil to. He too, was an historian of great genius and reputation. He is sententious, but less close than the importance of history requires. Bassus Aufidius, who had wrote before him, seems to have supported the character of historian better in his books of the German war. He is undoubtedly estimable in all respects, yet in some things short of his own abilities.

An * historian, now living, adorns the glory of our age, and deserves to live for ever in the memory of future ones. His name, now only guessed at, will be famous hereafter. He has many admirers, but few imitators, for fear the love of truth might be hurtful to them, as it was to

* Some think Pliny is here hinted at; but most that he means Tacitus, and this is more probable. Perhaps he then through fear of the times, curtailed his writings of many things, which were afterwards restored.

him,

him, though he had retrenched a good part of what he had written. But his elevation of mind and bold thoughts sufficiently appear from what is extant. There are several other good historiographers; but it is our business to point out the kind of reading that is fittest for the orator, and not pass in review whole libraries.

3. I proceed to our orators, who likewise may put the Roman eloquence upon a par with the Grecian. Cicero I would strenuously oppose to any of them, though conscious of the quarrel I should bring upon myself, by comparing him with Demosthenes, in a time so critical as this; especially as my subject does not oblige me to it, neither is it of any consequence, when it is my real opinion that Demosthenes ought to be particularly read, or rather got by heart.

I must say, notwithstanding, that I judge them to be alike in most of the great qualities they possessed: alike in design, disposition, the manner of dividing, of preparing minds, of proving, in short, in every thing belonging to invention. In elocution, there is some difference. The one is more compact, the other more copious; the one closes in with his adversary, the other allows him more ground to fight in; the one is always subtle and keen in argument, the other is perhaps less so, but has often more weight; from the one nothing can be retrenched, neither can any thing be added to the other; the one has more study, the other more nature.

As to raillery, and exciting commiseration, two very powerful things, the advantage lies on

our side; and perhaps the * custom of Athens was the cause of our not finding in Demosthenes the pathos of perorations. But the genius of our language does not permit us the beauties the Attics were wont to admire in him. However, in the epistolary style, though we have letters of both, there is no comparison.

Still ought we to yield, if for no other reason, than because Demosthenes was before Cicero, and because the Roman orator, how great soever, is indebted for a good part of his merit to the Athenian. For it seems to me that Cicero, having bent all his thoughts on the Greeks, towards forming himself on their model, had at length made constituents of his character, the force of Demosthenes, the abundance of Plato, and the sweetness of Isocrates. Neither did he only by his application, extract what was best in these great originals, but by the happy fruitfulness of his immortal genius, produce himself the greater part, or rather all of these same perfections. And to make use of an expression of Pindar, he does not collect the water of rains to remedy a natural dryness, but flows continually himself from a source of living waters, and seems to have existed by a peculiar gift of providence, that in him eloquence might make trial of her whole strength, and her most powerful exertions.

For who can instruct with more exactness, and move with more vehemency? What orator ever possessed so pleasing a manner, that the very things he forcibly wrests from you, you fancy

* It was not allowed at Athens to move the passions; consequently the peroration was inadmissible.

you grant him; and when by his violence he carries off the judge, yet does the judge seem to himself to obey his own motion, and not to be hurried away by that of another? Besides, in all he says, there is so much authority and weight, that you are ashamed to differ from him in opinion; and it is not the zeal of an advocate you find in him, but rather the faith and sincerity of a witness or judge. And what at the same time is more admirable, all these particulars, any one of which might not be attainable by another without infinite pains, seem to flow from him naturally; so that his discourses, the most charming, the most harmonious, which possibly can be heard, retain notwithstanding so great an air of happy ease, that they seem to have cost him nothing.

With good reason therefore is he said by his contemporaries to reign at the bar; and he has so far gained the good graces of posterity, that Cicero is now less the name of a man, than the name of eloquence itself. Let us then keep him in view; let him be our model, and let that orator think he has made a considerable progress, when he once has conceived a love and taste for Cicero.

Asinius Pollio is remarkable for his great invention, and for his exactness, which some think to be upon the extreme; his design besides is well formed, and his manner seems spirited enough. But his style is so distant in sweetness and purity from that of Cicero, that he may seem to have existed an age before him.

Messala, on the contrary, is neat, polite, and natural. His noble manner declares in some measure the nobility of his extraction, but he seems not to have strength enough.

If Cæsar had made the bar his principal occupation, no other of our orators could have better disputed the prize of eloquence with Cicero. So great is his force, so sharp his wit, so active his fire, that it plainly appears, he spoke with as much spirit, as he fought. A wonderful elegance and purity of language, which he made his particular study, was a further embellishment of all these his talents for eloquence.

Cælius was master of great natural parts, and there was a singular prettiness in his way of forming an accusation. It were much to be wished, that his conduct had been better, and life longer.

I have met with persons, who preferred Calvus to all our orators; and others, who were of opinion, that the too great rigour he had exercised upon himself in point of precision, had debilitated his oratorical talents. However his speeches are chaste and grave, correct, and frequently also vehement. His taste of writing was Attic, and his untimely death was so far an injury to him, if he designed to add to, but not to retrench any thing from his compositions.

Servius Sulpitius is most worthy of the great reputation he acquired by his three pleadings. Cassius Severus, if read with judgment, will afford many things worthy of imitation; and if with his other perfections, he had laid on a finer colouring,

colouring, and added more body to his style, he might have had a place in the first rank. He had a deal of wit and force, seasoned with a raillery, sometimes exceeding tart, sometimes nice and delicate ; but he followed more his passion than judgment, and his jokes having been rather bitter and taunting, could not therefore escape appearing frequently ridiculous.

There have been many other good speakers, whom it would be too tedious to mention. Of those I have seen, Domitius Afer and Julius Africanus were the most eminent. The first claims the preference by his elegant composition, and the whole manner of his eloquence, which deservedly give him a right to a place among the ancients. The second has more fire, but is over-nice in words, is sometimes rather long in his composition, and little reserved in the use of metaphors.

We lately could boast of several fine wits. Trachallus was for the most part sublime, was plain enough, and you might say that he aimed at perfection in all respects. By hearing him speak, you might think him still greater; for his voice was so fine, that I never heard any thing like it; and his pronunciation and aspect were so graceful, that they could even charm on a theatre. In short, he possessed in a great degree all external advantages. Vibius Crispus was neat in his composition, and his manner quite pleasing; but he was better at managing private than public causes.

If Julius Secundus had lived longer, he would undoubtedly have left a great name to posterity.

He would have added, and he constantly added to his other rare qualities, all that was deficient in him; I mean, a want of duly exerting himself in contestation, and a greater attention to things than words. But though cut off by death, he deserves a considerable place among orators; so great in the main is his eloquence; so delectable are the graces, with which he explains every thing; so clear, sweet, and beautiful is his style; so proper are his expressions, those even which may seem to be far-fetched; and so strong in signification and emphatical are some, which are boldly hazarded.

Those, who may write after me on orators, will not fail of an ample matter of praise, in regard to the fine wits, who are now the ornament of the bar. We have some old advocates of consummate merit, illustrious rivals of the ancients; and our young ones tend to perfection by an industrious imitation of their talents.

4. There remains only to speak of those, who have written on subjects of philosophy. Hitherto we have had but few eloquent in this kind. Cicero, as in all other respects, so also in this, was a worthy rival of Plato. Brutus has written some excellent treatises, the merit of which is far superior to that of his orations. He supports admirably well the weight of his matter, and seems to feel what he says. Cornelius Celsus, in the manner of the Sceptics, has written a good many tracts, which are not without elegance and perspicuity. Plancus among the Stoics, may be read with profit, for being acquainted with the things he discusses. Catus, an Epicurean, has some levity in his

his way, but in the main, is not an unpleasing author.

I have designedly hitherto omitted speaking of Seneca, who was conversant in all kinds of eloquence, upon account of the opinion persons falsely entertained, of my not only condemning his writings, but also personally hating him. I drew this aspersion upon me, by my endeavour to bring over eloquence to a more austere taste, which had been corrupted and enervated by very many softnesses and delicacies. Then it was that Seneca was almost the only author young persons read with pleasure. I did not indeed strive to exclude him absolutely, but could not bear he should be preferred to others much better, * whom he took all possible pains to cry down; because, as conscious to himself that he had taken to a different route from their way of writing, he could not otherwise expect to please those who had a taste for them. It was, however, Seneca's lot to be more loved than imitated, and his partizans run as wide from him, as much as himself had fallen from the ancients. Yet it were to be wished that they had proved themselves like to, or had come near him. But they were fond of nothing in him but his faults, and every one strove to copy from him those he could. Then priding themselves for speaking like Seneca, of course they could not help bringing him into disgrace.

His perfections, abstractedly from this corrupt taste he had given occasion to, were many and

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great. His wit was easy and fruitful, his erudition considerable, his knowledge extensive, in which last point he had been sometimes led into mistakes, probably by those whom he had charged to make researches for him. There is hardly a branch of study but he has written something upon; for we have his orations, his poems, epistles, and dialogues. In philosophic matters he was not so accurate, but was admirable for his invectives against vice.

He has many bright thoughts, and many things are well worth reading in him for the improvement of the moral character; but his elocution is for the most part corrupt, and the more dangerous, as its vices are of a sweet and alluring nature. One could wish he had wrote with his own genius, and another's judgment. For if he had rejected some things, if he had less studiously affected some engaging beauties, if he had not been over-fond of all his productions, if he had not weakened the importance of his matter by frivolous thoughts, he would have been honoured, rather by the approbation of the learned, than the love of striplings.

However, such as he is, he may be read when the taste is formed, and strengthened by a more austere kind of eloquence, if for no other reason than because he can exercise the judgment on both sides. For, as I said, many things in him are worthy of praise, worthy even of admiration, if a proper choice had been made, which I wish he had made himself; as, indeed, that nature was deserving of an inclination to embrace what was better, which had abilities to effect whatever it inclined to.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

Of Imitation.

- I. *That it is useful and necessary.—We must not content ourselves with the inventions of others, but strive to invent something ourselves.—Also, to excell those we imitate.*
- II. *We must well consider whom, and what we imitate in them.—Every one in imitation ought to consult his own abilities.*
- III. *Decorum is to be preserved in the matter we treat of.—We must be careful, not to devote ourselves to any one kind:—nor to any one author.*
- IV. *Imitation should be, not in words only, but much more in things.*

I. **I**T is from the abovementioned, and other authors, worthy of being read, that we ought to borrow the copiousness of language, the variety of figures, and the manner of composition; and when these have been duly attended to, our next care ought to be to direct our thoughts to the imitation of all their perfections, as it cannot be doubted but that a great part of art is contained in imitation. For, as invention first took place, and is a principal concern; so it is useful to imitate what has been well invented. The whole conduct of life should aim at this point of view, to be willing to do ourselves what we approve of in others. So children, to acquire the practice of writing, study to form the characters marked out before them; so one learning music accompanies the voice of his teacher; painters keep an eye
upon

upon the works of former masters in the art; and farmers cultivate their grounds as the experience of others and their own direct them. We observe, in fine, that the beginnings of every discipline are formed according to some proposed model. We must, indeed, be either like or unlike that which is good; and to be like is rarely the effect of nature, though often the fruit of imitation.

But this very thing, which makes much easier to us the knowledge of all matters, than could be compassed by those who had no prescript to follow, will in the main be of disservice, unless our application to it is guided by caution and judgment. Therefore imitation of itself will not be sufficient, if, upon no other account, than that it is the mark of an indolent mind to rest satisfied with the inventions of others; and what progress could be made in those times that were without an example, if men were supposed to do or think of nothing, but merely what they had-already known? The consequence must be, that no invention would ever have taken place. Why then should we decline to attempt the inventing of a thing, which did not exist before us? The ancients in their rough and unpolished state, could, by the force of genius only, give birth to many things, and shall we not be excited to make inquiries, well knowing that they have found who had taken the trouble to seek? And as they, who had not a teacher in any one particular, could, notwithstanding, oblige posterity with several discoveries, shall not the experience of these things avail us for exploring others; or shall we have nothing but that for which we are indebted to another? Just so some painters,

as knowing only how to copy, remain always slaves to the proportions and lines they see before them.

It is likewise unseemly to be contented with imitation, how exact soever; for again, what improvement could be made, if no one effected more than his model? We should have nothing more excellent in poetry than Livius Andronicus, nor any thing in history superior to the Annals of our Pontiffs. We should still sail on planks, and all our painting would consist in tracing the extremities of the shadow bodies make, when opposed to light. Take a cursory view of all arts, and you will not find one, which has remained such as it was invented; not one, circumscribed by the bounds of its origin; unless, perhaps, we condemn our times for being so unhappy as to give growth to nothing; for indeed nothing grows by imitation only. If we were not allowed to make an addition to what went before us, how should we ever hope to find perfection in any orator, it being evident that among the best of those we have hitherto had any knowledge of, there has not been one without some fault, or some deficiency?

Even they, who do not tend to the greatest perfection, ought to strive to exceed rather, than merely follow others; for he that contends to be first, though he may not surpass, will at least equal; whereas he who thinks he must tread in another's footsteps, will never be able to come up with him, because the follower will be always behind.

Add to this, that it is commonly easier to do more, than the same thing; for similitude is perplexed

plexed with difficulties, and to such a degree, that even nature cannot compass the making of things so perfectly similar, as not to exhibit some sensible difference.

Again, every thing like another, cannot equal in exactness that which it imitates: a shadow is weaker than a body, an image falls short of reality, and the action of a stage-player is faintly expressive of the true emotions of the mind. The same happens likewise in oratorical compositions. Those we copy after are endowed with nature, and innate force; whereas every imitation is a counterfeit, or at best a servile subjecting of ourselves to the manner of another. And hence declamations retain little of the animating spirit of orations, the subject being here real, and there fictitious.

There is besides no imitating of the greatest accomplishments of an orator. His genius, invention, force, ease, and whatever cannot be taught by art, are not attainable. Therefore many, when they have selected a certain manner of expression, or a certain measure in composition, which they have remarked in an orator, vainly imagine themselves like him, by the choice they have made; little reflecting that language is ever in a fluctuating condition, and consequently that some words must become obsolete, others in vogue, of all which, custom is the only infallible rule. For words, in their nature, are neither good nor bad, (being of themselves mere sounds) but only as they are opportunely and properly, or otherwise, applied; and the composition thence resulting, will then appear, as much adapted to things, as delectable by its variety.

II. The

II. The most accurate judgment is, therefore, required for examining into the particulars of this part of the orator's study. First, who ought to be imitated, as a great many take for models very bad originals. Secondly, what is deserving of imitation, even in those that are made choice of; for the best authors are not without their faults, and the learned are liberal in their criticisms upon one another. So that I could wish that eloquence was as much improved by the imitation of the good and the true, as it is debased by that of the bad and false.

At least, let not those who are endowed with a competent judgment for avoiding what is bad, think it enough to have copied in themselves an image of perfection, and only, as I may say, the skin of eloquence, or rather those * figures of Epicurus, which he says are continually flying off from the surface of bodies. This is the fate of those, who, by not having sounded the depths of what may be supposed oratorical perfection, fit themselves to what appears on a slight inspection; and tho' they may be very successful in imitation, as not much different in the choice of expression and harmony of cadence, yet are they far from attaining the force and invention of their original: most commonly, they degenerate into what is worse, and laying hold of such vices as lie in the proximity of perfections, for grand, they become bombastic; for close, thin; for strong, rash; for florid, pro-

* Epicurus says, that images and representations, after the manner of external appearances, are continually flying off from bodies, and by striking upon the eye, so cause vision. However, he says this only according to the opinion of Democritus.

fusely adorned ; for harmonious in composition, bounding amidst the wantonness of number ; and for simple, graceless through negligence.

Again, in another point of view, if, in the roughness of a barbarous style they have produced any cold and empty conceit, they fancy themselves upon an equality with the ancients ; if they want the lustre of ornaments and thoughts, they are quite in the Attic taste ; if they affect conciseness to the degree of becoming obscure, they surpass Sallust and Thucydides ; if dry and hungry, they rival Pollio ; if careless and flat by circumlocution, they swear Cicero would have so expressed himself. Nay, have I known some elate with the notion of having perfectly acquired that great orator's manner, if they could only end a period by "*esse videatur.*" Therefore the first consideration ought to be, to understand what we design to imitate ; and to know upon what account it deserves to be imitated.

The next consideration should be to consult with ourselves, whether our abilities are equal to the task. For some things are inimitable, either that nature, for that purpose, may be too weak in her efforts, or that there may be a repugnancy in the genius. One of a slender and delicate genius, ought not to attempt subjects that are strong and violent ; neither ought that which is strong, and at the same time ungovernable, waste its strength through a love for refinement, and so fall short of the desired elegance. For nothing is so unbecoming as to clothe with roughness that which is soft and tender.

It

It seems, notwithstanding, that I recommended to the master, whom I gave instructions to in my second book, not to teach the things only to which he might see the genius of his pupils best fitted by nature, it being likewise his duty to help in each of them whatever he finds good, and, as much as possible, to add what is deficient, and to correct and alter some things; for he is the guide and fashioner of others' geniuses, though it is difficult to mould one's own nature into that of others: yet must I observe, that this same master, whatever desire he may have to see in his scholars all sorts of advantages and perfections, will labour to no purpose by forcing nature in any one of them.

III. There is another thing to be equally avoided, a fault common to many, which is imitating in oratory poets and historians, and orators or declaimers in history or poetry. These compositions have all their laws and properties. Comedy does not strut in buskins, neither does tragedy trip along in slippers. Yet has every species of eloquence something common to other species, and it is this something common to all, which we should endeavour to imitate.

There is too this inconveniency attending on being addicted to any one particular quality, that if the satyrical strain of an orator should hit the fancy of some, they cannot divest themselves of it, even in causes, where mildness of temper and moderation must prevail; and if taken with the plain, simple, and unaffected manner of another, how, in imitating it, shall they support the weight of a cause of importance? There is certainly then a differ-

difference in the condition of causes, not only amongst themselves, but amongst the parts of each cause; and some things require to be expressed mildly, others roughly, others impetuously, others gently, others for the sake of instructing, and others for moving; of all which it is manifest the ways are unlike and different.

I therefore would not advise so close and intimate an adhesion to any one, as to imitate him unreservedly in all respects. Demosthenes was by far the most unexceptionable of the Greeks, yet others on some occasions might have said something better. He had, indeed, many excellencies, but by being highly worthy of our imitation, it does not follow that he is the only that ought to be imitated. But would it not be enough to speak upon all things, as Cicero did? It certainly would, if we were possessed of his abilities: yet what should hinder our occasionally adopting the force of Cæsar, the asperity of Cœlius, the accuracy of Pollio, and the judgment of Calvus? For besides that it argues prudence to convert into our own substance, if possible, what is best in every one; it should be considered, that if amidst the great difficulties imitation intangles us in, we only form ourselves on one original, we shall scarce be able to retain a part. Therefore, when in a manner it is unattainable by human powers, to express the intire resemblance of him you make choice of, let us place before our eyes the excellencies of many, and having copied one perfection from one, and another from another, let us make them to coalesce for use, wherever they may suit our subject.

IV. Imit-

IV. Imitation also (for I shall often repeat the same) must not be in words only. Rather ought our thoughts aim at knowing how well the just mentioned great orators maintained dignity and propriety in things and persons, how well they managed their design, how they conducted their disposition, and how far even every thing, which seemed calculated for pleasing, tended to gain their point: how they behaved in the exordium, how they ordered and diversified the narration, what strength of argument they used in proving and refuting, how powerful they were in exciting all sorts of passions, and how far popular praise may be made conducive to the good of the cause, which indeed is a fine thing, when it comes spontaneously, and not when it is courted. If we previously weigh well these matters, we then shall truly fit ourselves for imitation.

Now he, who to these can superadd his own excellencies, for supplying what has been deficient, and retrenching what has been redundant in the originals he has undertaken to imitate, will be the perfect orator we seek for; and it is now incumbent on him to render himself consummate in eloquence, so much the more, as he has a far greater number of examples for imitation, than they, who are still reputed masters, had; whose glory it is to have surpassed all that went before them, and to have left memorable lessons to posterity.

C H A P. III.

Of Writing.

- I. *Its great utility.* II. *We must write as accurately as possible; and this care is necessary in the beginning.* III. *He blames the hateful peevishness of some in writing, of which he produces an example.—Dispatch in writing is much facilitated by a previous attentive consideration of the matter.—He reproves the carelessness of some.* IV. *He condemns the custom of dictating.—A private place, and not groves and woods, are fittest for writing.* V. *How far night-lucubration is useful.* VI. *Which is better to write on waxen tablets, or parchment; and how this should be done.*

I. **T**HE helps we borrow from imitation are foreign, but of those which we must acquire ourselves, as writing costs us more labour, so also it is of much greater utility. It is with good reason Cicero calls the * pen, the true artist and best master of eloquence; words, which he puts into the mouth of † Lucius Crassus, to make the authority of that great man serve as a sanction to his own judgment.

We must write, therefore, with all possible care, and write much; for as the earth by being deeply digged up, becomes more fertile, and in a better condition for nurturing and fructifying the seeds

* The *stylus* of the ancients so rendered improperly.

† De Orat. i. 150.

committed to her bosom ; so the talent of writing, if it be not superficially cultivated, will pour out the fruits of study more plentifully, and preserve them more faithfully. And unless one is conscious to himself of having taken much pains in writing, that readiness at extempore-speaking will afford only a vain loquacity, being productive of words that are born and die instantly on the lips. Here are the roots, here are the foundations of eloquence ; here wealth is stored up as in a sacred repository, to be drawn out for use on any sudden emergency. Above all things therefore, let us create for ourselves a stock of strength, sufficient for making us stand firm in every glorious strife, and not to be exhausted by spending. Nature herself was not willing that any thing great should be perfected in a short time ; she has annexed difficulties to each noble work, and has even established this law in births, that the greater the animal is to be, the longer it is to remain shut up in its parent's womb.

II. But as two questions here present themselves for discussion, how, and upon what we should exercise ourselves in writing, I shall follow that * order, and in this chapter speak of the first.—In the beginning our composition may even be slow, so it be exact. Let us seek after what is best, and not be pleased with what immediately occurs : let judgment decide the merit of our inventions, and disposition direct the order of them when approved

* In this chapter, he treats of the first question, relating to the manner and order of writing : in the fifth chapter, he discusses the second question, which concerns the subjects on which principally the orator ought to exercise his style.

of. A choice too must be made of things and words, and a scrutiny passed upon the goodness of each.

Next, let the way of placing be attended to, by turning and transposing words, in order to judge of their harmony, and not to place them at hazard, and as they occur. To do this with more exactness, the last lines of what has been written are often to be repeated : for besides, that what goes before and follows, will be better connected ; the heat also of thought, which has cooled by the delay of writing, will resume new strength, and, as it were, a new degree of velocity by going back : just so, in a match of jumping, the stretch bounds farther, by taking a run to the mark that is to be jumped from ; and in throwing a javelin, we draw back our arm ; and to shoot an arrow, we pull back the bow-string.

Yet if a brisk gale blows, we may suffer it to swell our sails, so that favour does not lead us into a deception. For all our thoughts please us at the time of their birth, otherwise we should not have written them. Still let us consult our judgment, and revise that suspected facility. So we learn Sallust wrote ; and indeed the pains he took appear evidently from his laboured composition. Virgil * too, as Varus tells us, wrote but very few verses in a day.

But the orator, not being so circumstanced, I therefore require this delay and care in the beginning. To write as well as we possibly can, must be our principal aim, and we must exact it

* See Gell. l. xvii. c. 10.

from ourselves. Practice will create expedition. Things gradually will present themselves with more facility, words will correspond with them, composition will follow, every thing, in fine, as in a well regulated family, will be ready in its department. The whole is, that swift writing does not make us write well, but good writing will make us write swift.

But having acquired this facility, then it is that we are to stop short, and look before us, and check, as with a curb, our impetuosity, like that of a mettlesome horse striving to run away with his rider. This care, far from retarding, will supply us with new vigour to proceed.

III. On the other hand, I would not have those, whose style is arrived at a certain degree of maturity, harass themselves with the trouble of perpetually finding fault with their compositions. And indeed, how shall that orator acquit himself of his duty to the public, who should waste so much time on each part of a pleading? There are some, who are never satisfied with what they do. They would alter, and say every thing otherwise than it occurs: mistrustful indeed, and deserving ill of their abilities, for thinking that exactness, which they make an embarrassment to themselves of in writing. I cannot well say, which I think more in the wrong, they who are pleased with every thing in their productions, or they who like nothing in them. For it often happens, that even some young persons of pregnant parts, suffer themselves to be consumed by a useless labour, and at length are obliged to condemn

themselves to a shameful silence, through a desire of doing too well.

This puts me in mind of what I heard Julius Secundus say concerning what had been said to himself by his uncle. We were both of the same age and intimate friends, as is well known; and he was a man of surprising eloquence, though scrupulously exact. His uncle Julius Florus was the most renowned for eloquence in the province of Gaul, where he had last established himself, and as well by that talent, as in other respects, was a credit to his family. Secundus still remained at school, and he once happening to observe him melancholy, asked the reason of his being so dejected. The youth did not conceal from him, that for three days together he had ineffectually wreaked his invention to hit upon an exordium to a speech given him to be composed, which not only afflicted him for the present, but made him even despair for the time to come. At which Florus smiling said: "What, child! will you do better than you can?" This is the very thing I had to recommend. We must indeed strive to do as well as we can, but this must be according to the measure of our abilities; for it is study and application that will make us proficient, and not discontent and vexation.

Besides practice, which certainly goes a great way, there is a method to be observed for acquiring a readiness in writing. In order to this, we may be advised to decline the indolent posture we assume by looking up at the ceiling, and exciting thoughts by muttering, as if chance should
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throw in our way something to our purpose. We might rather in a manner more becoming men apply ourselves to write and meditate, examining what the subject requires, what decorum ought to be kept in regard to the persons interested, what are the circumstances of time, and how the judge is likely to be disposed: thus nature herself will suggest what ought to begin, and what ought to follow. The greater part of our matter so plainly presents itself, that it flashes in our eyes, unless we shut them against it; and if the illiterate and peasants are not long at a loss how to begin, what a shame must it be that learning should create difficulties in doing the same? Then let us not think, that what lies hid, is always best: if so, it were better to be silent, if nothing seemed proper to be said, but what we do not find.

Others give into a fault different from this, by slightly running over their matter, and writing down extempore whatever may occur amidst the sallies of a heated imagination. This, which they call their foul copy, they afterwards revise, and settle in better order; but it is the words they correct, and the harmony of the periods they strive to adjust, whilst the same levity remains in the things they had so precipitately heaped together. It will, be therefore much more advisable so to order the work from the beginning, that it may not require to be fabricated anew, but only to be filed and polished. Sometimes, however, we may let the mind indulge its fancy and sensibility in things, in which heat is commonly happier in its effect, than care and exactness.

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IV. From

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IV. From my disapprobation of this carelessness in writing, one may judge what I think of the fancy of dictating which some are so taken with. To writing indeed, how swift soever it may be, the hand which cannot keep up with the celerity of thought, must give some delay; but are not the inconveniencies of dictating greater? He, to whom we dictate, urges us to proceed; and we are ashamed at times even to doubt, or stop short, or make any alteration, as if afraid of one privy to our incapacity. Whence it comes to pass, that intent chiefly upon connecting one sense with another, we let escape us several things, not only fortuitous and shapeless, but sometimes improper, which neither shew the exactness of one that writes, nor the fire of one that speaks without preparation. Besides, if the amanuensis be slow in writing, or commits some error in reading what has been dictated, then is the flow of thought retarded by this intervening obstruction, and sometimes the whole attention is unhinged by it, as well as by anger, which is natural enough on these occasions.

There are also many things accompanying, and in some measure exciting the transports and heat of composition, as tossing of the hands, distorting of the features of the face, turning from one side to the other, and sometimes finding fault, together with other particulars noted by Persius *, where he speaks of the inanity of some authors, as banging the writing-desk, biting the nails, and

* Satir. i. 106. *Nec pluteum cædit, nec demorſos sapit ungues.*

the like, all which are ridiculous, unless we are alone.

In fine, to obviate what ought to be principally attended to on this head, I may say, that it cannot be doubted, but that privacy, which is destroyed by dictating, and the profoundest silence, suit best the reflection that is necessary for him who writes.

It does not, however, follow, that we should immediately abide by the counsel of those, who believe that woods and groves are the properest places for recollection and study, because the freshness of air and the many engaging charms that reign in these parts, beget an elevation of mind, and a more happy turn of thought. Such a retreat seems indeed to me, rather conducive to pleasure, than an incentive to study; as the very things that delight, must necessarily divert us from attending to what we are about. In reality, the mind cannot be intent upon many things together, and wherever it looks to, it must at that instant at least lose sight of its main point of view. Wherefore the amenity of woods, and the course of rivers, and the breezes blowing about the branches of trees, and the song of birds, and the freedom of prospect, are all so many attractions, that the pleasure conceived from them, seems to me rather to slacken thought, than keep it stretched. Demosthenes was quite right, when in order to study, he shut himself up in a place, where he could neither hear nor see any thing to distract him. Thus it was that his eyes could not compel his mind to attend to other matters.

V. And

V. And thus we may judge of the advantage of lucubration, when the silence of the night, a shut up chamber, and one light, keep the mind, collected, as it were, upon its subject. But this manner of study, much more than any other, requires a good state of health; and in order to preserve that health, it should be used but sparingly, as otherwise we incroach upon nature, by allotting to hard labour a time, which she has granted to us for the rest of our body, and the recruiting of our strength. It may be enough to grant to this labour what we can well spare from sleep; for even fatigue is a great obstacle to the keenness of study; and the day is more than sufficient for him, who is master of his time. It is the multiplicity of business that obliges us to study by night; yet is lucubration best calculated for study, when we set about it fresh, in good health, and in a good flow of spirits.

But silence, retreat, and a mind disincumbered of care, though greatly to be wished for, cannot always fall to our lot. For which reason, if any noise or disturbance might happen, we should not immediately desist and deplore the time as lost. Rather let us strive against inconveniencies, and contract a habit of conquering all obstacles by the dint of application, which if we unreservedly direct to what we are about, nothing of what affects the eyes or ears, will have access to the mind. And if a chance thought so often fixes the attention, that we do not see those we meet, and miss our way, will not the same happen when we proceed to think with a deliberate intention?

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We must not tamper with the causes of sloth ; for if we think we ought not to study, but when fresh for it, but when chearful, and devoid of all other care, we shall never want a reason for self-indulgence. Wherefore in the midst of a croud, on a journey, at a banquet, and even in a tumultuous assembly of the people, we may make a kind of solitude for our thoughts. Otherwise, what should become of us, when, in the midst of the Forum, amidst the hearing of so many causes, amidst broils, contentions, and unexpected clamours, we are often to make extempore speeches, if we could find only in solitude the notes we take down in writing. It was for being prepared at all events, that Demosthenes, who had been so great a lover of privacy, was wont to study his speeches near that part of the sea shore, where the waves dashed with the greatest noise, to prevent his being dismayed by the uproars which often happened in the assemblies of the Athenian people.

VI. Every thing regarding studies should seem of some importance, and therefore I shall not omit giving directions about a small concern, which is, that it is best to write on waxen tablets, because we can more easily deface what has been written ; unless weakness of sight should rather require the use of parchment. It helps indeed the sight, but from the frequent necessity of dipping the pen in ink, retards the hand, and breaks the flow of thought.

Both should have blank pages left in them, to make room for adding whatever might be thought necessary ; for a want of room sometimes makes

us loath to correct, or at least confounds the former matter by the interlining of new.

I would not advise procuring wide pages in the tablets, having known a young gentleman accustomed to make long discourses, because he measured them by the number of lines. His friends had often endeavoured to correct this fault in him, but to no purpose, till the size of his tablets was changed.

There ought also a space or margin to be left for noting the things that present themselves out of their rank, such, I mean, as do not belong to the parts we are actually composing. For sometimes we chance to hit upon excellent thoughts, which it is neither proper to insert for the present, nor safe to postpone taking a memorandum of; because otherwise they escape us, or if we keep them in mind, they divert us from other thoughts. It is therefore best to keep them upon record.

CHAPTER IV.

Of emendation, or correction.

CORRECTION follows, a very useful part of study, it being believed, and not without reason, that the * pen does as much service in defacing as writing. The business of correcting is to add, retrench, and alter. Adding and re-

* One extremity of the stylus was pointed, with which they wrote; the other blunt and flat, with which they expunged; as may appear from Horace; *sæpe stylum vertas, iterum quæ digna legi sint scripturus.*

trenching

trenching are effected with greater ease, but to keep down what swells, to raise what is low, to restrain what is luxuriant, to dispose what is not in order, to make compact what is loose, to circumscribe within its just bounds what is otherwise extravagant, imply something of a more than ordinary labour and sagacity; as we must condemn the things that pleased, and find others that escaped us. The best way, undoubtedly, of correcting our compositions, is to lay them up for some time, and afterwards to return to them as something new, and executed by another, to prevent our being possessed with that parental fondness, which is so natural in regard to every newly born offspring.

But this counsel cannot be always followed, more especially by an orator, who, to satisfy the duties of his profession, is obliged to write oftener than another. The manner of correcting ought likewise to have certain bounds fixed to it; for some return to all they have written as faulty, and as if nothing was allowed to be right which is first, they deem any thing else better; and this they do as often as they take in hand their compositions, not unlike surgeons, cutting away even sound parts. Thus do their works remain replete with scars, and bloodless, and much the worse for all this accuracy. Let there be then some time or other something that may please, or at least be sufficient, that the file may polish the work, and not wear it down.

The time also to be taken up in correcting should have its bounds. That Cinna spent nine years

years in writing his * *Smyrna*; and Isocrates ten in composing his panegyric, are things that do not regard the orator; because the help of correction, if carried on so extremely slow, would to him be of no manner of significancy.

CHAP. V.

What subjects ought to be principally written upon.

- I. *In the beginning it will be of service to translate Greek into Latin.—Also to change the words in Latin authors.—Cicero is refuted.—We should go over and treat our own compositions in a variety of ways.* II. *The simpler the matter is, the better for acquiring a facility in writing.—Theses. Proving and refuting of opinions. Common places.—Declamations.—History. Dialogues. Poems.—Youth should not spend much time in declamations.—They should treat on both sides of the question, the causes which they have heard pleaded, or others.—He speaks again of declamations.*

THE next thing that † remains for consideration, are the subjects to be made choice of for writing; and here it does not seem necessary to point out, which ought to begin and follow,

* A piece, so called he had written for the stage, as we find by this distich of Catullus,

*Smyrna mihi Cinna nonam post denique misseri,
Scripta fuit, nonamque edita post hyemem.*

† In the third chapter he proposed two heads: "How, and what things ought to be written." He now discusses the second part.

having

having already in my first book, prescribed the order for conducting the studies of children, and in my second, of more advanced years. What I now would have done, in order to acquire a copiousness and facility of expression, is to translate Greek into Latin, which our ancient orators thought to be a good exercise for that purpose. Lucius Crassus says in Cicero's books of the * Orator, that he made it a common practice, and Cicero frequently recommends it from his own example, having himself published versions of some books of Plato and Xenophon. Messala too, was fond of this exercise, and wrote many orations translated from the Greek, and all of them of such remarkable elegance, that he may be said to vie with that of Hyperides for Phryne, in all the delicacies of the Attic style, so difficult to be imitated by the Latins.

The advantages of this exercise are manifest, so much the more, as the Greek authors abound with excellent things, and have much improved eloquence, by rules of art; and as by translating them we may use the choicest expressions, and all our own may serve. As to figures, the principal ornament of a discourse, we have been under a necessity of imagining several quite different, the genius of both languages not equally admitting the same.

To turn Latin into other words, may also be of great service. No one, I believe, will doubt of this in regard to poetry, which is said to have been the only exercise of Sulpicius. For the su-

* De Orat. i. 155.

blime spirit of poetry naturally raises the style, and words boldly hazarded by poetical licence engage us to make efforts to express the same things, if not in so elevated a manner, at least in a more proper : and indeed we may lend an oratorical energy to the substance of the thought, supply what the poet has omitted, and curtail his diffusiveness. And I would not have this paraphrase to be merely an interpretation, but rather a sort of emulation and strife to express the same thoughts with equal dignity, though in a different manner.

I therefore differ in opinion from those, who dislike any attempt made for turning in the same way our Latin orations, because, as fancying the best expressions to have been already adopted, whatever is otherwise said, must of consequence be worse. But we must not always despair of our not being able to find any thing better than what has been said ; neither has nature made eloquence so jejune and barren, as to imply an impossibility of expressing well more than once the same thing ; unless it be said, that the gestures of Comedians may be expressive of words in a variety of ways, but that the powers of the Orator falling short of them, cannot clothe a matter in other words than it has already been. But supposing that what we invent is neither better nor equal ; it may at least come near it. Do not we ourselves express twice and oftener the same thing differently, and do not thoughts upon thoughts sometimes occur in regard to it ? Unless perhaps we can contend with ourselves, and not with others. If there was only one way of saying a thing well, we might think,
indeed,

indeed, that they who had passed before in it, had shut it up against us. But there are now innumerable ways, and many of them lead to the same point of destination. Conciseness has its charms, so also has copiousness. There is sometimes more force and beauty in the use of a metaphorical word, and sometimes of one that is proper. One thing pleases, because expressed naturally, another because figuratively. In short, the difficulty this exercise is attended with, may itself be of singular utility.

Is not this the real case, and do we not thus become better acquainted with the greatest authors? We do not read them superficially, but examine into and discuss every particular; and we judge and are sensible of their perfections, if by no other way, than by not being able to imitate them.

Besides exercising ourselves in the writings of others, we may profit much by variously treating our own; as perhaps in pitching upon some passages, which we may strive to transform into a diversity of ways, as the same lump of wax may be made to assume many different shapes.

II. The most simple matters, I think, are best calculated for making us expert in these exercises; for in such as are complex from the multiplicity of persons, motives, times, places, sayings, facts, our inability may lie concealed, more especially amidst so many things presenting themselves on all sides, whereby a just choice is made very difficult. So that it may seem rather to be an indication of tendency to oratorical perfection, to be able to extend the bounds of what is naturally contracted, to make much of what is little and in-

considerable, to diversify similarities, to set off with agreeableness what is plain and obvious, and to throw into many lights a subject, on which seemingly but little can be said.

In order hereto, the indefinite questions, called *Theses*, will be of much service; a thing, we find, which Cicero, though a supreme magistrate in the republic, and in the height of his reputation for eloquence, was wont to exercise himself in. Common places will likewise render good service, and we know that many of the kind have been written by orators. He, therefore, who can copiously treat such plain matters, which seem no way perplexed by intricacies, will succeed afterwards better in the more complicated, and at length will be capable of being ready at all sorts of causes, all which consist of general questions. For it little matters . . . in regard to the point to be decided, whether Milo had justice on his side in killing Clodius; or, whether it is lawful to kill one who lies in wait to attempt our life, or a bad member of the community, even though not intent on perpetrating so treacherous a deed? Whether Cato acted honestly in disposing of his wife Martia in marriage to Hortensius: or, whether such an act is consistent with the character of a good and upright man? Judgment here falls upon the persons, but the debate is concerning the things.

As to declamations, I mean those that are executed in schools of rhetoric, if they have truth or probability for their foundation, and are conducted like pleadings at the bar, they may not only be very useful for the training up of an orator, as serving both to exercise invention and disposition;

but also for such as have made a far greater progress, and have already distinguished themselves at the bar. And indeed, eloquence by the use of declamation, is nurtured, and appears more florid and fair, as from a nicer sort of diet, and is refreshed and renewed after the fatigues it had undergone amidst the constant asperities of pleading.

For which reason, in order to a further exercise of the style, I would sometimes recommend Essays in the copious flow of history, and the free and easy fancy of dialogues. Nay even, nothing amiss would follow from the amusement of poetic composition. Just so Athletes, interrupting the course at stated times of their regimen in diet and exercises, indulge themselves with ease and a more pleasing sort of food. Cicero likewise seems to me to have distinguished himself by so lively and bright a manner of eloquence, from having sought the recreation of such delectable studies. For if we were conversant in nothing but law-suits, the brightness of our style would insensibly contract dimness, and its flexibility grow callous, and the edge of the wit would run blunt from being engaged in a constant round of battles.

But as the pampered manner of eloquence, which is borrowed from declamation, reflects and recruits those who come exercised to it by actual service at the bar; so our young candidates for oratory ought not to be familiarized over-much to these false images and vain phantoms of things, lest that having waxed old in the shade of such illusions, they find it hard to inure themselves to real dangers, dreading to face them as the daz-

zling light of the sun. We have an instance of this as it is said in the person of Porcius Latro, the first eminent professor of rhetoric at Rome, who presuming, in consequence of his great reputation for eloquence in his school, that he might undertake to plead at the bar, and being accordingly about to speak, found himself obliged to intreat the audience that the benches might be transplanted into the * town-hall; so disconcerted was he, and so new did the sky appear to him, that one should think his eloquence was contained within the precinct of a roof and walls.

I would therefore counsel the youth, who has been carefully taught the method of invention and elocution by his masters, (the labour attending which is not very great, so these masters know how to teach); and who has acquired some facility by exercise, to choose for himself some orator, which was customary with our ancestors, to make him his guide and model. I would likewise counsel him to frequent regularly the bar, and be a constant spectator of the warfare he destines himself for. It might not be amiss too, if he composed himself the causes he heard pleaded, and even others, on both sides of the question, so they were real causes: thus making himself ready, gladiator-like, for offence or defence, with sword and buckler. In this manner it was, that Brutus, as before mentioned, exercised himself in the cause of Milo; and doing so is much better, than answering the pleadings of the ancients, as Sestius has done in

* *Basilica*, a town-hall, as resembling perhaps his school more than the forum or bar; and from this passage, it is probable that the Roman bar was an uncovered place.

refutation of Cicero's oration for the same, though from that defence he could not have had an exact knowledge of the other side of the question.

The youth then will be sooner fitted for bar-pleadings, whom his master shall oblige to compose his declamations as like truth as possible, and to work up equally all parts of them, because they now content themselves with what is easiest and most specious in the subject. The chief hindrance to this, as I remarked in the second book, is commonly the too great number of pupils, the custom of making them declaim publicly on certain days, and in some measure the opinion of parents, forming an estimate of their childrens proficiency, not so much from the merit of their performances, as from their number. But according to what I said, as I think, in the first book, the good master will not encumber himself with a greater number than he is well able to teach; he will also take care to retrench all superfluities in their compositions, to keep them to the points in question, and not suffer them to make excursions, as it happens, into things foreign to the subject. Again, he will do well in allowing a longer time for their studying and writing the whole matter of the declamation, or producing only a part of it within a limited time. For they will profit more from one part well worked up, than from many begun, or merely sketched out. It happens otherwise that a thing is not put in its place, neither does that which is to begin, keep its rank; because they curiously collect the flowerets of all parts, and heap them promiscuously into that they intend to pronounce;

whence under an apprehension of losing the beautiful passages that should follow in course, they throw into confusion the foregoing matter.

C H A P. VI.

Of Thinking, or Meditation.

MEDITATION borders upon the nature of writing, receives its strength from it, and is a something lying between the labour of composition, and the hazard of extempore-speaking. Its utility is indeed very considerable, and there are frequent occasions for it; for we cannot always write, nor every where; but meditation is of most times and places. In few hours it takes a comprehensive view even of great and important causes. If our sleep is interrupted at night, darkness makes it more active. During the day, in the midst of our occupations, it finds some leisure time for contemplating its object, and seldom or ever remains idle; and not only assigns to things their due order, which is doing a great deal, but also joins words, and so frames the adhesion of all parts of the discourse, that nothing but writing it out, seems wanting. And thus likewise for the most part it remains more tenaciously rivetted in the memory, as it cannot be let to slip away by the security of writing.

But we cannot attain suddenly nor soon to that force of thought which is required for profound meditation. First, by much practice in writing, we must bring our style to so proper a consistence,
that

that directly and without impediment it may follow the flow of thought : secondly, we must by degrees, accustom our mind to take in at first but so much as it can give a faithful account of, and next to proceed by so moderate an increase, that the labour may not seem to itself any way painful : thirdly, there should be an additional encrease with the same precautions : lastly, all these particulars are to be embodied, and kept together by practice and much exercise ; and as this depends in a great measure on memory, I therefore say here but a part of what I should, reserving the rest for that * place. From what has been said, it may, however, appear, that when there is no deficiency or obstacle in point of genius, one may by the assiduity of application, attain to the expressing of the things he conceived in his mind, as truly and as faithfully, as those he had written and committed to memory. Cicero acquaints us, that among the Greeks, Metrodorus, Sceptius, and Eriphylus the Rhodian, and among the Latins, Hortensius could repeat word for word in pleading, all that they had before meditated.

Supposing now that something bright, some new idea should spring up in the midst of our pronouncing a discourse, should we so scrupulously adhere to what we have written as not to make room for it ? An oration, though ever so elaborately composed, is not to be so highly prized, as to give no admission even to a gift of fortune ; though the contrary is evident by our often inserting a sudden after-thought in what we have writ-

* Book xi. c. 2.

ten. This whole kind of exercise should therefore be so ordered, that we easily might digress from, and return to it at pleasure; for if on one side, our principal care ought to be to come prepared from home in order to speak in public; on the other, it would be a notable piece of folly to reject a present which the circumstance of time offers for our service. Let then our thoughts and meditation be so far prepared, that fortune may have it in her power not to frustrate, but to help us.

It will be so, if strong and faithful memory, makes whatever we have meditated upon, to flow from us with an air of security; yet unless this meditation also is well digested, and sinks deep in the mind, we shall shew pain and embarrassment in expressing ourselves, as if we solely depended upon memory; and if this should be the case, I would prefer an extempore rashness to the incoherency and suspension of thought. Nothing has a worse effect than an unseasonable recollection; because eager to recall the ideas which fly from us, we lose those that present themselves, and seek things rather from memory than our subject. But in regard to either, I should rather pay more attention to the subject, as many more things may be found, than are so in fact.

C H A P. VII.

Of the talent of extempore-speaking.

- I. *How useful and necessary it is.* II. *How it is acquired.* III. *And how preserved.*

THE talent of speaking extempore is the greatest emolument we receive from our studies ; and, as it were, a very ample reward for our long and painful labours ; and he that has not acquired it, will do well in my opinion by renouncing the functions of the bar, and employing the talent of writing that remains to him rather upon something else. For I can hardly believe that a man of integrity, would profess assisting those who should want his help, and yet find himself incapable of assisting them in any imminent danger. Such behaviour would be not unlike that of a pilot, who should shew a weather-beaten ship a harbour at a distance, where it could not enter but in a calm. There are, indeed, very many and pressing occasions for pleading without preparation, either before magistrates, or when a cause is brought to trial before the day fixed for it ; and if there be then an absolute necessity of saving, I say, not only a good citizen, but a parent, a friend, who implore the help of our ministry, and are likely to be ruined unless that instant assisted, shall we stand mute, ask for time, and seek after retreat and silence, till words are fabricated in their defence, are committed to memory, and our voice and lungs are prepared for pleading?

pleading? No sufficient reason can, I think, be given, why an orator should be unprepared on any emergency.

How must it fare with him, when he is to answer an adversary? For often what we have supposed to be the adversary's state of the matter, and against which we have calculated our speech, we find ourselves much mistaken in, and suddenly the whole cause is changed. As therefore a navigator shifts his manner of steering according as the winds set in upon his ship, so an orator must shift about according to the diversity of causes he has to plead. Of what effect would so much practice in writing be, so much reading, and so long a course of study, if the same difficulties remained that occurred in the beginning? That man indeed must be thought to have lost all his past labour, who is constantly obliged to put himself to the same pains. But I do not make these reflections, that the orator should prefer extempore-speaking, but that he occasionally might speak so.

II. We shall acquire this talent chiefly in this manner. Let us first be acquainted with the way of speaking, which may be compared to the running of a race, which cannot be performed, unless we know whence, and where we are to run. So in this respect, it is not enough not to be ignorant of the parts of judicial causes, or of the disposing of questions in proper order, though these make a principal consideration; but also, of what is first, and what follows in a place, which are so linked by nature, that they cannot be altered, or taken asunder without causing confusion. Now he that is learning the way he is to walk in, will

no

no doubt suffer himself to be guided by the order of things as they occur ; for which reason, persons even of slender practice will easily observe how a narration is to be conducted. Next, they will know what questions arise on every point, that they may not hesitate in regard to what they are to say, nor be distracted by thoughts foreign to their matter, nor confound this matter by jumbling things together, jumping, as it were, here and there, and stopping no where. Lastly, they must keep within certain bounds, which cannot be done without division. Thus having, to the best of their abilities, effected whatever they proposed to themselves, they may think they are come to the end.

These are the documents of art ; but it is study, as I said, that must furnish us with a copiousness of the best expressions, and our manner of speaking must be so formed by much and accurate composition, that what we even give utterance to suddenly, might appear as if it was written. In short, when we have written much, we shall be able to speak much ; for custom and exercise contribute most to acquire facility, and if there be an intermission in them, though but short, that readiness will not only be retarded, but a kind of torpor will ensue and may prevail.

Though we stand in need of a certain natural mobility of mind, that whilst we express what is next to our thoughts, we may be able to construct what lies further off, and keep our voice always provided with a succession of formed thought ; yet scarce can either nature or art divide the mind on so manifold a business as to attend at once to invention,

invention, disposition, elocution, the order of words and things, and what is to be said on the present occasion, the next, and the following, together with the particular attention that is to be paid to voice, pronunciation, and gesture. A sort of intuitive and anticipating view, is, therefore, quite necessary for these purposes, and the matter should be made to act previously to itself, by surveying the further parts, according as the foregoing are pronounced, that, till we come to the end, we may proceed as much by looking before us, as by stepping forward. This forecast then must be thought highly necessary, unless, regardless of it, we are rather willing to hesitate every moment, and utter things by scraps and halves, like persons interrupted by sobs.

There is, therefore, a certain habit, which we cannot account for, and for which we are no way indebted to reflection. In consequence of this habit, among other instances, we find the hand run in writing, and the eyes see in reading several lines at once, with their stops and breaks; and they have sooner read what follows, than the tongue has articulated what goes before. The wonders we see performed by * artists in dexterity of hand, have no other principle, as it is by a certain slight that the things which they cast away from them, seem again to come into their hands, and fly off where they command them.

* *Pilarii* in the Latin text, are jugglers, that seem to do wonders by the dextrous management of cups and balls. *Ventilatores* are those who play off their tricks with so much art, that what they have in their hands, disappear, and seem to pass into air.

But

But we shall not profit by this habit, but so far as the art I spoke of, has paved the way for it, that that, for which no reason can be assigned, may, notwithstanding, appear as grounded upon reason. For none, indeed, shall seem to me to make a speech, unless they do it with order, ornament, and elocution ; and for this reason, I shall never be an admirer of the connection of a tumultuary or fortuitous harangue, which I have taken notice to have been extremely well performed, even amidst the fierce objurgations of women. Heat and spirit may be productive of a speech, attended with better success than a studied one ; and on these occasions, as Cicero relates, the ancients were wont to say, that a God spoke from the mouths of men.

But without having recourse to the interposition of a Deity, the reason of this is plain, and so much the more, as passions, when the mind is strongly affected by them, and images, when recent, manifest themselves by lively and rapid expressions, which sometimes cool in the slowness of composition, and by being put off for any time, may not return. But when an unhappy scrupulous care about words, stops us short at every step we take, we can no longer expect that volubility of speech ; and though single expressions may seem well chosen, yet as not fluent, they will seem painful. We must therefore endeavour to have a clear conception of things by means of the images before spoken of, placing all that we have to say concerning persons and questions before our eyes, and entering into all the passions our subject can well admit

admit of. For it is the sensibility of the heart, and perturbation of the mind, that make us eloquent ; and therefore the illiterate do not want words, when stimulated to speak through passion or interest. We must strive also to lend the attention of the mind, not to any object singly, but to many together ; that, if we cast our eye upon any point of view, we may be able to see all in a direct line, and about it, and not the last only, but as far as the last.

The shame likewise of stopping short, and the desire of being applauded, are wonderful incitements for the orator's acquitting himself to advantage ; and it may seem wonderful, when writing delights in privacy, and cannot abide a witness, how extempore speaking feels itself animated by a full auditory, as a soldier is animated to battle, by seeing the * standards of the army ranged and mustered together. For how difficultly soever thoughts may occur, the necessity of speaking compels the finding of them, and the desire of pleasing seconds and increases the efforts. So much do all things look to a reward, that even eloquence, though containing much pleasure in itself, is vastly taken with the present fruits of praise and reputation.

But no person ought to be so confident of his abilities, as to hope, that immediately on the first trial he shall acquire this talent. What I inculcated concerning meditation, may be here appli-

* The military standards among the Romans were placed together in the front of battle, as a signal of an intention to give battle.

cable, that the talent of extempore-speaking should proceed gradually from small beginnings to its greatest perfection, to which nothing can contribute so much as practice. It ought besides to be perfected to such a degree, that meditation, though safer, might not exceed it in goodness, because many have attained to this facility, not only in prose, but even in verse, as Antipater Sidonius, and Licinius Archias, if herein we believe the authority of * Cicero. This talent of extempore-versification has been, and may still be remarked in some of our contemporaries; but as more specious, than useful and necessary, if I speak of it, it is not so much for commending it, as to shew that it is a useful example towards encouraging those, who fit themselves for the bar.

Again, I never would have so much confidence placed in this facility, as to exclude at least a short time, which is scarce ever wanting, and which is always allowed in trials and pleadings at the bar, for reflecting on what we are to say. It should seem, indeed, that no one can plead a cause he knows nothing of; yet do we see some declaimers so perversely vain, as to pride themselves in being able to speak on a controversy, by only learning what it is upon; and what is more nugatory and buffoon-like, they will ask you by what word you would choose they should begin. But eloquence, we may say, cannot help deriding in her turn, those who are such a disgrace to her; as in reality, from the desire of appearing learned to fools, they must themselves appear fools to the learned.

* De Orat. iii. 194. pro Arch. 18.

But if it so happened, that we were obliged to speak in public without any preparation, then would we have an occasion for an extraordinary presence of mind, and our whole attention being engrossed by things, we should, for the present, remit something in the care of words, if it was not practicable to attend to both. Then also a slower pronounciation, and a manner of keeping our words, as it were, in suspense, would afford time for reflection; but this must be so managed, that we may seem to think, and not to hesitate: and this we do, whilst we are sailing out of port, if the wind drives us forward, and our rigging is not yet quite fitted to: afterwards, as we proceed, we shall lay our cables in order, hoist our sails, and display them for receiving the favourable gale. Doing so is more eligible, than to deliver ourselves up at once to a torrent of useles words, and suffer ourselves to be swept away as it were by a storm.

III. But this talent is preserved with no less pains than it is acquired. An art once learned, is not forgot; but it does not follow, that expertness will continue after the disuse of it: writing, when neglected for some time, will lose something of its former readiness: so with the talent of extempore-speaking: it is acquired by exercise, and can be retained only by exercise. Now the best way of exercising ourselves, is to speak daily upon some subject or other, in the presence of many persons, whose judgment and opinion we pay a deference to; for it seldom happens that one sufficiently respects himself; or we should speak alone, rather than not speak at all.

There

There is another exercise for thought, which is to meditate upon our subject, and treat it mentally from the beginning to the end. This is practicable at all times, and in all places; so we have nothing else to do; and is in some measure of greater utility than the foregoing; because, in the one, things are disposed with more accuracy; whereas, in the other, our whole sollicitude is to continue the thread of the discourse. Again, the former is of more service by strengthening the voice, forming the pronounciation and gesture; and the motions and attitudes the orator puts himself into, by the tossing about of his hands, and the stamping of his foot, must give life and spirit to this his action, just as a lion is said to rouse his courage by striking his flanks with his tail.

But we should study always and every where. For there is scarce a day so taken up with business, but may afford something to be gained from it for the sake of study; or, as * Cicero says of Brutus, but may have some moment snatched from it, for the purpose of writing, reading, or speaking. † C. Carbo, even in his tent, and amidst the horrors of war, was wont to exercise himself in the talent of speaking. I should not forget also, that Cicero upon all occasions advises us, not to neglect our manner of speaking, that what we say, may, in regard to the subject, be as proper, as correct, and as accurate as possible.

But we must never write more than when we are to speak much extempore. Thus weight will be

* Orat. xxxiv.

† He embraced the party of Marius against Sylla.

preserved in what we say, and that light facility, floating as it were on the surface, will thereby become heavier, and run deeper. Just so vine-dressers cut off the nearest roots of a vine, which may draw it to the surface of the ground, that the lower roots may gain strength by striking deep. And for aught I know, both exercises, under the direction of care and study, may be a mutual help to each other; so that by writing, we may speak with more exactness; and by speaking, write with more ease. We ought therefore write as often as we can, and if not at leisure for so doing, we should meditate; but if neither can take place, the orator must use his best endeavours to guard against surprize, and to keep his client from appearing to be destitute of assistance.

Some orators, who have had much business on their hands, most commonly wrote little more than the principal heads, and the exordium: other points they fixed in their memory by meditation only; and any sudden occurrence they replied to extempore. This was a practice of Cicero, as appears by his * Notes. There are likewise extant some notes of others, and these perhaps were invented, as the orators wrote them down in order to speak upon them, and were afterwards digested into books, as the notes of all the causes pleaded by Servius Sulpitius, of whom we have three orations perfect. But these notes are so exact, that they seem to me to be composed by him for the

* *Commentarii*; notes, were books that contained the heads of things. They were written by orators for the disposition of the cause, and as helps to memory.

service of posterity. As for Cicero's, he made them only for his own use ; but his freedman Tyro has given us an abridgment of them, which I do not mention by way of disparagement, but rather to commend their merit.

In this way, I greatly approve of those short annotations and memorandum-books, which may be held in the hand, and which it is allowed now and then to cast an eye upon. I cannot say that I like what Lænas recommends, which is to note down all the heads of whatever we are to speak to. This security begets a remissness of thought during the action, and tears asunder, and deforms the discourse. I think, indeed, that nothing ought to be written when we design to speak extempore. For it happens, that thought, by calling us back to that which we have set down in writing, will hinder us to try our present fortune ; and so the mind fluctuating between both, when it loses sight of what is written, cannot well recover itself by seeking after something new.—A place is assigned for memory in the next book, but cannot be subjoined to this article, because previous to it some other matters require to be considered.

B O O K X I.

C H A P. I.

Of speaking with Justness and Propriety.

- I. *How necessary it is to speak with propriety.* II. *We must diligently consider what we propose to ourselves in speaking.—Especially what is becoming.—And here he speaks of Socrates.—Decorum depends on circumstances.* III. *An orator should avoid all self-boasting, particularly of his talents for eloquence.—Cicero is defended against calumniators.—Confidence may be allowed to eloquence.—But that arrogance ought to be avoided, by which the orator asserts he is confident of the merits of his cause.—Also an impudent, tumultuous, and angry action.—Much more flattery, scurrility, obscenity.* IV. *We should consider,* 1. *Who speaks.* For a different kind of eloquence becomes different orators. 2. *For whom.* 3. *Before whom.* 4. *At what time, and in what place.* 5. *In what cause.* Subjects in the demonstrative kind admit of more ornament.—Some causes will not bear the lustre of ornaments. 6. *Especially, against whom.—How it may be proper to speak against parents, relations, and the like.—What should be our treatment of those we are loath to offend.* V. *What commendations we may pass on the person of an enemy, or on one, whose conduct is not irreproachable, and how we may praise any one of his actions.—How the person of the judge ought to be treated.—In what manner*

we may censure in others what we have done ourselves.—How we may attack a whole class of people.—Whatever is too much, trespasses against decorum.

I. **H**AVING acquired, as directed in the foregoing book, the talents of writing, meditating, and even extempore-speaking, when there is a necessity for it; our next care must be to express things with propriety, which Cicero * shews to be the fourth perfection of elocution, and in my opinion, it is highly necessary. For, as the dress of an oration is various in its sorts, and different in the manner of suiting; unless it be fitted to things and persons, it will not only not add lustre to, but rather destroy it, and convert the force of things into the reverse of what it ought to be. It will avail little that words are pure, and significative, and elegant, and figurative, and harmonious, unless they agree with the things, of which we are willing the judges should be persuaded, and the sentiments we design to inspire them with. Of what significancy will it be to adopt a sublime style, in causes of little moment; one that is poor, and meagre, in grand and important; florid and gay, in the grave and serious; mild, in the rough; menacing, in the supplicative; slow, in the vehement; violent and boisterous, in the ludicrous? As if necklaces, bracelets, and trailing gowns, the attire of women, could become men; or that a triumphant habit, than which nothing can be imagined more majestic, could sit well on a woman,

* De Orat. iij.

Cicero, in his third * book of the Orator, does but touch upon this point, though he may seem to have omitted nothing by saying, "that one sort of style cannot suit every cause, nor auditor, nor person, nor time." In his Orator, he says the same without a much further illustration. But † there Lucius Crassus, as conferring with great orators, and men of learning, thinks it enough to hint it only among connoisseurs. And here too Cicero, addressing Brutus, says that having a thorough knowledge of these particulars, he therefore has spoke of them but cursorily, though the matter be copious and is treated at large by philosophers. But for my part, having professed in this work the forming of an orator, it is incumbent on me, not so much to speak to the learned, as to the learner, and therefore I hope to be pardoned, if I shall discuss this subject in a more ample manner.

II. We should therefore know above all things, what is meet for conciliating, in forming, and affecting the judge; and what we aim at in every part of our discourse. We shall not therefore use any obsolete, or metaphorical, or newly coined words, in the exordium, narration, and proofs; nor a flow of striking periods, when the cause is to be divided and digested into its parts; nor a low, common, and unconnected manner of expression, in perorations; nor shall we dry up tears by a strain of jesting, where there is a necessity of exciting commiseration. For every ornament is not so much calculated for itself, as on account of the thing to whose condition it may be applicable;

* N. 210.

† N. 70, 74, 123, &c.

neither is what you say of so much concern, as in what place it is said. But this whole propriety in speaking, is not so restricted to elocution, as to have nothing common with invention ; for if words only have so much weight, how much more ought not things to have ? But the necessary observations in this respect, have been already made according to the order of matters, explained in this work.

It cannot be too much inculcated, that he principally will speak with justness and propriety, who not only pays attention to the utility of what is said, but also considers how far it may be becoming. I am well aware that these two things most commonly go together ; for what is becoming is generally useful, and nothing contributes so much to procure the favour of the judges, as on the other hand, when this decorum is wanting, nothing will so much alienate their minds. They sometimes, however, are repugnant to each other, and as often as this happens, decorum should take place of utility.

None, I believe, are ignorant, that nothing could have been of greater service to Socrates, in order to get acquitted on his trial, than if he had availed himself of the judicial kind of defence, and by a submissive speech had procured the benevolence of the judges, and justified himself in regard to the crimes laid to his charge. But such behaviour was no way becoming in Socrates ; and therefore he spoke to his judges, not as a person conscious to himself of any * guilt, but as one who assumed

* It was customary at Athens, if the crime was not capital, to ask the delinquent what punishment or penalty he thought
S 4 he

ed to himself prerogatives, and was deserving of considerable honours. Unwilling to do any thing unworthy of the elevated wisdom he had always made profession of, he chose rather to make a sacrifice of his short remains of life, than lose the fruits of all the years he had lived to see. And as the men of his age might have been biased in their judgments towards doing him justice, he reserved himself for the judgment of posterity; and at the expence of a few days of a far advanced old age, acquired a glory which will live for ever. Therefore though Lysias, the most eminent orator of his time, had brought him a defence he had written for his service, he declined making any use of it; not but it was very good, but he could not think it suited his circumstances. This example alone is sufficient to make appear, that the end of the orator is to speak well, and not to persuade, as undertaking to persuade, may be attended with no honour. Whence the conduct of Socrates was not useful to his cause; but what was more valuable and worthy of him, it was useful to the man.

We use, however, this distinction, in thus separating utility from decorum, rather according to the common way of speaking, than the exactness of truth: unless perhaps we imagine, that the * first of the Scipio's, who was honoured with the name of Africanus, did not consult utility, by choosing rather to banish himself from his country, than be obliged to defend his integrity in answer to the

he had incurred, or deserved. But Socrates answered that he deserved to be maintained at the public expence in the Prytaneum, which was accounted a very great honour among the Greeks. *De Orat. i. 231.*

† *Liv. l. xxxviii. n. 50, 60.*

accusation of a mean tribune of the people : or that P. Rutilius knew not what was most expedient for him, when accused he spoke much like Socrates, and afterwards being recalled from banishment by P. Sylla, scorned to accept the favour. — These great men judged they should despise those trivial considerations, when balanced against their honour, how much soever they otherwise might be prized by men of abject desires, and therefore are they become everlasting objects of our admiration. Neither should we be so mean as to repute useless what we commend ; but be the difference as it may, it seldom happens that the orator has an occasion to introduce a distinctive mark : so that, as I said, most commonly in every kind of cause, what is becoming is also useful.

The nature of some things is such, that it becomes all manner of persons, and on all occasions, and every where, to counsel, and say, and do what is honest ; and acting contrary, is no where, and on no account, befitting any one. There are other things of less consideration, placed as it were in a medium between vice and virtue, and though allowable in some, are not decent in others ; or, they are reprehensible, or excusable, more or less, according to person, time, place, and motive. When we then speak of the affairs of others, or our own, we must make a distinction between them, though we know there is an unseemliness for the most part in both.

III. Above all things, it never becomes a person to be a self-boaster, and especially an orator to be vainly proud of his eloquence ; which not only creates a loathing in the hearer, but for the
most

most part excites even aversion. Our mind is act-
ed by something grand and noble, in consequence
of which we cannot brook the arrogance of a su-
perior ; and therefore we raise those who are in a
lowly plight, or shew a wilful submission, because
we seem to ourselves to do this, as if of more im-
portance than they are, and as often as jealousy
passes off, a humane disposition will of course suc-
ceed. But he that extols himself over-much, is
believed to depress and despise us, and not so much
to make himself great, as others less. Add to this,
that they who move in a lower sphere, though nei-
ther willing to yield nor able to contend, envy
him notwithstanding, who raises himself above
others ; whilst superiors deride, and the good
censure his arrogance. You may likewise gene-
rally find the vain-glorious undeceived in the
good opinion they entertained of themselves, and
though they might not, considering the respect due
to others, they * should rest satisfied with the in-
terior sentiment of their own merit.

Cicero has been much carped at for his vanity,
though he boasted more of the good he did, and
his services, than of his eloquence in his orations.
He had indeed some reason to boast of his services ;
for he either defended those who had assisted him

* This whole passage is obscure and probably corrupt. Rol-
lin explains the last part of it thus : " Some arrogant persons
attribute things falsely to themselves, and this is a ridiculous
vanity ; others, things that are true, but are not therefore less
arrogant, because they may think truly, but too finely of them-
selves. For it is enough to be arrogant, if one should be too
conscious to himself of his abilities in speaking." This in the
main is a good explanation, but seems to be rather refused, if
not over-strained.

in quashing Cataline's conspiracy, or he endeavoured to blunt the edge of envy, which, however, he was not able to cope with, having suffered banishment in recompence for having saved his country; so that the frequent mention of what he had done in his consulship, might seem as much a justification of his conduct, as a desire of glory. As to eloquence, when he allowed the orators, who pleaded in opposition to himself, or clients, to be possessed of it in a very eminent degree, he never arrogated any thing out of reason to himself; witness the beginning of his Oration for the poet Archias: "if am master, good sirs, of any genius or parts, as I am sensible, if any, they are but slender." And this passage of his Oration for Quintius: "the more I was convinced of my incapacity, the more I strove to find resources in application." Besides, when in order to bring Verres to a trial, it was of some importance to fix upon an accuser, and the choice lay between him and Q. Cecilius, he rather aimed at intimating his want of proper qualifications, than arrogated any to himself, as not being possessed indeed of oratorical abilities equal to the task, but that he had done all he could to acquire them. Sometimes in his Epistles, corresponding familiarly with his friends, and sometimes in his Dialogues, though assuming another character, he speaks his real sentiments of his own eloquence.

Yet I know not but to brag boldly and openly is more tolerable, there being a sort of simplicity in so doing, than that one with a counterfeit modesty should insinuate, that indeed he is not poor, though known to be wealthy; that he is not

of

of mean birth, though of noble descent; that his interest is inconsiderable, though very powerful; and that his abilities in speaking are very slender, though remarkable for being eloquent. To seek by deriding others, to bring them into contempt, is also extreme haughtiness. But let us leave to others the care of praising us; for we ourselves, as Demosthenes says, ought to blush when others praise us.

This I do not say to deter the orator from sometimes speaking favourably of what he has himself transacted, as the same Demosthenes did in his defence of Ctesiphon, which, however, he so qualified, as to shew the necessity of doing so, and to throw all the odium of it on him, who compelled him to it. And Cicero, often speaking of Catiline's conspiracy, sometimes attributes the suppressing of it to the patriotic spirit of the senate, sometimes to the providence of the immortal gods. Against enemies and calumniators he assumes more to himself, and it was reasonable he should stand so on his defence. It were, however, to be wished he was more sparing of self-commendation in his * verses, and that he had been more upon his guard against the spite of some, who have not ceased reproaching him with his

“*Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea linguæ*”

And his

“*O fortunatam natam me consule Romam!*”

* Cicero wrote in verse three books of his own times, as himself writes to Lentulus, *Epist. ix. l. 1.* towards the end. In these he was no way sparing of his own praises.

And

And his Jove, who invited him into the assembly of the gods; and his Minerva, who condescended to teach him all arts and sciences: all which extravagant fancies he thought he might be permitted to indulge himself in, according to the example of some Greek authors.

But though boasting of eloquence be unbecoming in an orator, he may notwithstanding be allowed a reasonable confidence; for who can blame this manner of Cicero's * expressing himself: "What shall I think? Shall I imagine myself despised? I do not see what Antony can despise, neither in my life, nor my reputation, nor my transactions, nor in this my small share of genius." And soon after more openly: "Was he inclined to make trial of his oratorical abilities against mine? Certainly, he cou'd not confer a greater obligation upon me; for what could I more abundantly wish for than myself to speak for myself, and to speak against Antony?"

They likewise are arrogant, who are peremptory in asserting the goodness of their cause, and that if it were not such, they would not have undertaken it. The judges indeed cannot bear to hear one presuming to exercise their function; nor must an orator expect that his opinion will be so prevalent among adversaries, as was that of Pythagoras among his disciples, who were wont to produce his "*Ipse dixit*" as a reason for every thing. But this will be more or less blameable in consequence of the character of the persons who speak. Some excuse will be admitted in fa-

* Philip. n. 2.

your of an orator, respectable by age, dignity, and authority; but the confidence ought not to be so great in any one, as not to be tempered by some mitigation, and more especially in all the particulars, where the orator instances in himself, and draws arguments from his own person. When Cicero spoke of his birth, he might perhaps have passed for vain, by alledging it was no dishonour to be the son of a Roman knight; but he gave an advantageous turn to this matter, by uniting his dignity with that of the judges: "Certainly, * these accusers must be very thoughtless persons to imagine it criminal in a man to be the son of a Roman knight, having you for judges, and me for adversary."

An impudent, tumultuous, and angry way of pleading, is unbecoming in all; and the older, the more experienced an orator is, and the greater degree of authority he may have, the more he makes himself reprehensible by thus forgetting himself. You may see some wranglers under no restraint, either by respect to the judges, or by the custom and way of pleading; and this their disposition makes manifest how little at heart they have the management and pleading of a cause. What we speak is indeed commonly an indication of our morals, and lays open the secrets of the mind; and it is not without reason that the Greeks use this proverbial expression: † "As one lives, so he speaks."

There are other faults still more unbecoming,

* Pro Cæl. n. 4.

† "Let me hear you speak, and I will tell you, what you are."

as base flattery, affected scurrility, no regard paid to shame or modesty in things or words, and the same regardless disposition on all occasions, where one's authority is concerned. All these faults are commonly remarkable in those who make it their business to please and divert others.

IV. There is a decorum to be kept also in the manner of eloquence, one kind becoming one which would not another.

I. A copious, magnificent, bold, and florid style, becomes less a man advanced in years, than one that is close, gentle, and exact, and such as Cicero gives us an idea of, when he says that his eloquence began to grow hoary. Any thing fine and taudry will indeed no more become that age, than does the gay and splendid attire of purple and scarlet. On the other hand, a florid composition, and thoughts very boldly hazarded, will be liked in a young man; whereas a dry style, circumspect, and concise, displeases by its affectation of severity, the austerity of old persons manners, being looked upon as an untimely production in youth.

A plain, unaffected style suits military men; and they who profess themselves philosophers, as some do, ought not to seek after the embellishment of ornaments, and more especially the strong perturbations of passions, which themselves repute as vices. A choicer sort of expression, and an harmonious composition, are likewise foreign to their purpose. For not only sprightly images, as in Cicero, “ rocks * and solitudes become res-

* Pro Arch. 19,

ponſive to the voice :” but even of a more manly caſt, as : “ Ye * ſepulchres and groves of the Albans ! You I now implore and call to bear witneſs : yes, ye altars of the Albans ! companions and coeval with the ſacred religious rites of the Romans, which that monſter of impiety has deſtroyed ; it is you, I ſay, that I now invoke, and call to bear witneſs :” become not the beard and gravity of a philoſopher.

But the man in a civil capacity, the ſtateſman, the real ſage, whom I have here undertaken to form, who will not devote himſelf to idle diſputes, but to the adminiſtration of the commonwealth, which our philoſophers will not meddle with : this man, I ſay, in order to effect his deſign, may freely uſe whatever ſhall contribute to make his diſcourſe more perſuaſive ; yet with a firm reſolution of never perſuading any thing, but what is juſt and honeſt.

There is a kind of eloquence becoming princes, which others could not be allowed to affect ; and there is too ſome difference between this princely eloquence, and that of generals of armies, and men renowned for their victories and triumphs ; as Pompey is ſaid to be eloquent enough in the accounts he gave of his military achievements ; and the Cato who killed himſelf in the civil war, was reputed an eloquent ſenator.

The ſame word in the mouth of different perſons, would argue perhaps freedom in one, folly in another, and pride in a third. What † Therſites ſays againſt Agamemnon is ridiculous ; ſup-

* Pro Mil. 85.

† Iliad. β. 225, &c.

pose Diomedes, or one upon a par with him, had said the same, they would appear to have spoken with great magnanimity. "Must I respect you as a consul," said L. Crassus to Philip, and you will not respect me as a senator?" Words of candour, in which nothing indeed can be found amiss, yet not likely to be taken in good part from any one. A † poet says, it gave him little concern "Whether Cæsar was black or white:" it was folly in him to say so; and if Cæsar had said the same of the poet, it would be pride. A greater regard should be paid to this propriety of character by comic and tragic poets, because many and various are represented by them.

They, who write speeches for others, ought likewise to be observant of the same propriety; and so ought declaimers. For we do not always speak as advocates, but often as parties concerned in the suit. Even in the causes, wherein we plead as advocates, the same difference ought to be carefully observed; for assuming a different character, and speaking, as it were by the mouth of another, we must give them their own manners, to whom we lend our voice. We are not to ‡ represent P. Clodius in that amiable light we ought his venerable ancestor the blind Appius; nor the father in the comedy of Cecilius, as we do the father in the comedy of Terence. What can be

* De Orat. iii. iv.

† He means the poet Catullus, who wrote so of Cæsar:

Nil nimium, Cæsar, studeo tibi velle placere;

Nec scire utrum sis albus an ater homo.

Signifying proverbially how little he cared, whether Cæsar was an honest or dishonest man.

‡ Pro Cæl. n. 33. 38.

more brutal than that * officer of Verres: "To see him, you must pay so much?" What more expressive of an unshaken constancy of mind than the † words "I am a Roman citizen!" the only uttered by an unfortunate man, whilst under the punishment of whipping, to which he had been condemned by Verres? The words used by Cicero in the peroration of his speech for Milo, how worthy were they and becoming a man, who so often, for the love of the republic, had curbed a seditious citizen, and by his courage braved all his wicked attempts? In short, there is not only as much variety in the assuming of these counterfeit characters, as in the cause itself; but more also, because by them we give words and sentiments to children, women, intire nations, and even to mute beings, all which require a peculiarity in their manner of speaking.

2. The same decorum should be observed in regard to the respective characters of those in whose defence we plead. We must speak differently for them according as each is of high or low degree, an object of hatred or favour; and according to their intentions, and the difference of their past conduct. Nothing will have so good an effect in favour of the orator himself, as an humane, easy temper, moderation, and benevolence. Sometimes the reverse of this behaviour will be equally becoming in the good man, as shewing hatred for the wicked, concern for the public good, zeal in prosecuting crimes and injustice; and all the

* Ver. vii. 117.

† Ver. vii. 117.

other laudable sentiments I mentioned in the beginning.

3. And not only it is a matter of concern, who you are and for whom you plead; but also before whom. Fortune and power make a great difference in judges, and therefore the same way of proceeding cannot with decency take place before the prince, a magistrate, a senator; and a private person, though commissioned to take cognizance of the matter: neither is the canvassing of things submitted to arbitration, to be conducted with the same solemnity, as trials of a public nature; for as anxiety, and care, and every engine set to work for enforcing and making the most of what is said, is becoming the orator, who pleads in a capital cause; so a like sollicitude is frivolous in a trifling cause, and that man must deservedly be laughed at, who being to speak before his judge on some trivial affair, should use such a declaration as * this of Cicero, "That not only his mind was in agitations, but that his body did all over shudder with horrors."

Who also is ignorant but that senatorial gravity requires one sort of eloquence, and popular levity another? For considering the difference in character and disposition of judges, the same manner would not be becoming before grave men, that might before others of a different temper; neither would the same be relished by a man of learning, which would wonderfully please the peasant or soldier. Sometimes too there is a necessity of adapting what is said to the capacity of some

* Ver. i. 41.

judges, by making it short, easy, and familiar, that they may the better understand and comprehend the subject.

4. What is agreeable to time and place, requires also its due degree of notice. The time may happen to be appropriated for joy, and it may for mourning; we may not be confined to a limited time, and we may. To all these circumstances must the orator adapt himself. And as to place, it matters much, whether you speak in one that is public, or private; in a place of solemnity, or otherwise; in a different city or your own; in a camp, or the Forum. Every one of these circumstances requires its own form, and a certain peculiar manner of eloquence; the same way as in the transactions of life, the same thing may not equally be proper to be done in the Forum, the senate, the Campus Martius, at the theatre, and at home; because very many things, not reprehensible in their nature, and therefore occasionally necessary, may be accounted unseemly, if done elsewhere than allowed of by custom.

5. I have before remarked, that subjects in the demonstrative kind, as being calculated for the pleasure of the auditor, may be illustrated with greater pomp and splendour, than such as are in the deliberative and judicial kinds, because these treat of business, and are discussed with more contention. To this remark, however, it may not be amiss to add, that the condition of causes, makes some otherwise great perfections in eloquence to be less becoming. Who could endure that a man, whose life is at stake, should, in plead-

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ing his cause, before his prince or conqueror, affect frequent metaphors, words newly coined, or borrowed from remote antiquity, a composition quite out of the common way, flowing periods, ingenious thoughts, and florid common places? Will not all this refinement destroy that appearance of sollicitude so necessary to a man in danger; and should not rather mercy be asked for, a help which innocence itself stands in need of? And can any one be moved at his misfortunes, and wish he may be acquitted, whom he sees puffed up with pride, a self-boaster, and ostentatiously vain of his eloquence? No surely; but he will hate him for hunting after words, for being solicitous about the reputation of wit, and for being at leisure to think of shewing himself eloquent. Cælius seems to me to have been intirely sensible of what is here observed, in his defence of the cause, in which himself was indicted for an assault: "And in regard to what I shall offer, I hope none of you, good sirs, nor any of my accusers, will find any thing offensive in the disposition of my mind, or in the air of my countenance; nor any thing rude in my words, or in the least proud and haughty in my gesture."

Some actions consist of satisfaction, supplication, confession, and in these, would it be proper to weep in pretty thoughts? Shall epiphonems and enthymems make sentiments of pity to dwell on the mind? Shall not whatever is superadded to true feelings, lessen their force, and loosen the bonds of compassion by the disregard that is had to the exciting of it? Suppose a father was to demand justice for the death of his son, or for

an injury done him worse than death; would he, instead of being contented with telling briefly and plainly how the thing happened, strive to please in the narration by a purity and elegance of language? Would he draw out his arguments on his fingers, and court applause from a delicate turn in his proposition and division; and, as is commonly the fashion on these occasions, would he speak with an unmeaning face, and an inattention to shew himself any way affected? Alas! where in the mean time has his grief fled? Where have his tears stopped short? And how shall he recover himself from the dilemma, so calm an observance of the precepts of art has thrown him into? Will not rather from the beginning to the end a continued groan burst forth from him, and will he not constantly retain the same face of sorrow and dejection, if he has a mind to make the audience sympathise with him in his grief? Which, if he slackens for one moment, he will not be able to call it back to the notice of the judges.

This is what our declaimers should particularly attend to, and I admonish them of it, because I do not regret thinking of them in this work, that I may neglect nothing of any utility to youth, as having undertaken their instruction. And indeed, a due decorum kept herein, is of so much the more consequence, as the subjects feigned in schools are greatly susceptible of sentiments, and we speak in them generally as parties, and not as advocates. Suppose a subject thus framed: a wretch requests the senate for leave to put himself to death, either upon account of some great misfortune that has happened to him, or for expiating his

his crimes. In an affair of this nature, it is not only a trespass upon decorum, to assume a musical tone of voice, a fault, however, not uncommon, and to be lavish of ornaments; but also to argue the case, without mixing it up with sentimental emotions, and even so, that they may appear strongest in the proof. For he, who in pleading can suspend his grief, will seem as if he could easily prevail upon himself to lay it aside intirely.

6. For aught I know likewise, the decorum I here speak of, ought in some measure to be kept in regard to those against whom we speak, as undoubtedly in all accusations it should appear, that it is with reluctance we proceed to them. For which reason I am much displeased with this onset of Cassius Severus: "Good Gods! I live, and the greatest pleasure I have in living, is to see Aspernas in the state of a criminal." For it does not seem that he stands forth his accuser on any just or necessary account, but merely for the satisfaction he finds in so doing. This may be a general observation in regard to causes, but some of them require a moderation that is peculiar to their nature. He that petitions for being appointed administrator of his father's fortune, must shew a sensible regret for his insanity; and on the other hand, a father, who pleads against his son, how grievous soever his cause of complaint may be against him, ought to deplore the melancholy necessity he is reduced to; and this not in a few words only, but the whole action should indicate striking symptoms of the same,

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that he may appear not so much to speak from his lips, as from the bottom of his heart. In like manner, a guardian, on the accusation of his ward, should never, in so great a degree betray the emotions of his resentment, as to seem to deface all vestiges of the love he bears the father's memory, which ought in some measure to be held as sacred by him.

There is one thing, and a point of great difficulty, which it seems ought to be added to this place, as consisting in knowing by what means certain things, rather unbecoming in their nature, and which, if we had our option, we should choose to be silent upon, may notwithstanding be becoming in us to speak of. What can have so disagreeable an aspect, or what can grate more upon the ear, than to hear a son, or for him advocates, pleading against a mother? And yet, there is sometimes a necessity for it, as happened in the cause of Cluentius Habitus; though not always in the same way as Cicero proceeded against Saffia: not because he did not conduct the affair in the best manner, but because it is of singular consequence, in what, and how offence is given. She therefore, as having made a manifest attempt against the life of her son, deserved to be used very roughly. Yet there were two very particular things, which Cicero proved very admirable in his management of. The first, was his not being forgetful of the respect due to parents; and the second was his tracing the affair from its origin, with the intent of shewing, that what he was to say against the mother, was not only a duty, but a kind of necessity incumbent on him.

This

This was his first exposition, though it made nothing to the present question; so persuaded he was that in a difficult and intricate cause the consideration of what was becoming should first take place: and thus it was that he averted from the son, the odium that might fall upon him from naming the mother, and in the end laid it all to her charge.

But a mother, in a matter of less consequence, or one less odious, may sometimes proceed against her son; and in such case, the speech in the son's defence ought to be conceived in a more gentle and placable manner. For by a readiness to give satisfaction, we either lessen the odium she made us incur, or we make it fall upon herself; and if it appears that the son is very sorry he is forced to defend himself in this manner, it will be believed that he is wronged, and he will of course be found deserving of compassion. It may also be proper to palm upon others the malignity of the accusation, supposing the mother to be excited to it by the artifice of some ill-intentioned people; we may, however, protest, that we had rather suffer all, than make a return of obloquy in the same manner, and though we have just reason to make complaints, we think it more decent to stifle them. Besides, if any thing is to be laid to the charge of the mother, it is the advocate's duty to have it believed, that he does it contrary to the son's inclination, and not to betray his cause. Thus both will recommend themselves to notice. What I said of the mother may be equally applicable to the father; for I well know that contests at law sometimes happen between

tween fathers and sons, especially in cases of emancipation.

The same precautions will be necessary in regard to other degrees of kindred, that we may be thought to speak against our will, through necessity, and with moderation, and this more or less in proportion to the respect that is due to them. The same deference is becoming in freedmen towards their patrons; and to sum up all in a few words, it will never be seemly to proceed against such persons in the way, we should take it extremely ill of them, if they had proceeded against ourselves.

We owe sometimes the same consideration likewise to persons of rank and dignity, in order that, by justifying the liberties we take, no one may think we have offended them through wantonness or vanity. On this account it was that Cicero, not having it in his power to defend the cause of Oppius, but by a rough treatment of Cotta, made use of a long preamble to excuse the necessity of this his duty. Sometimes also inferiors, especially young people, should be pardoned, or dealt gently with. Cicero uses this lenitive in defence of Cælius against Atracinus, expostulating with him so sweetly, that he seems less to treat him as an enemy, than to admonish him as a father, though Atracinus was a young nobleman, and had some grounds for his accusation.

But the difficulty may not consist so much, in making the judges, or the auditory, sensible of our moderation, as it does when we apprehend giving offence to those against whom we plead,

Cicero,

Cicero, in pleading for Murena, had two such persons in Sulpitius and Cato, whom it was incumbent on him to be upon his guard against giving offence to. With what decency, after having granted Sulpitius all sorts of advantages and virtues, does he refuse him the art of succeeding in his pursuit of the consulship? What other particular could there be, which a man of his birth, and reputation in the knowledge of the law, could suffer himself with less regret to be defeated in? But how well does he justify his defence, when he says, that though himself had supported the suit of Sulpitius against the honour of Murena, yet it was not becoming in him to do the same in a capital accusation. How nice, how delicate were his touches on Cato! First, he admired his virtues, and next represented him as a man rather hard, though less so through the fault of his nature, than the rigour of the sect of the Stoics, of which he had professed himself a member. So that one might say, it was not a contestation at law between them, but a dispute upon some philosophic question.

There cannot therefore be a more excellent method, nor a surer kind of precept, than to abide by what has been observed by this great man. Are you willing to refuse an advantage to any one, and at the same time not to displease him, grant him all others; say that in that only he is less skilled than in the rest, and give a reason, if possible, why it is so: or you may represent him somewhat stiff in opinion, or credulous, or passionate, or egged on by others. And it may be a general way of qualifying all such causes, if not
only

only honour, but humanity appears in the whole action; that our motives are just for pleading; that we use all the moderation in our power; and that necessity has extorted from us whatever may seem to be otherwise.

V. The case is different, but not so difficult, when we are obliged to commend some actions of bad men, and whom in the main we hate: for be the person as he may, goodness is commendable wherever found. Cicero pleaded for Gabinius and Vatinius, men who before had been his declared enemies, and against whom he had also wrote invectives. But his sollicitude that his honour on that account might not be called in question, rather than any desire of inhancing the reputation of his talents, was enough to make it believed that the cause he had undertaken was just. He found himself more embarrassed on the trial of Cluentius, being under a necessity of making Scamander a delinquent, whose cause he had before pleaded. But this he did in a no less graceful than plausible manner, excusing himself on the inexperience of the earlier part of his life, and the importunities of those who engaged him in the cause. He would besides have done more prejudice to his veracity, especially if in a cause on which so many suspicions were entertained, he had made himself appear to be a man capable of rashly undertaking the defence of those whom he knew to be really guilty.

The cause to be defended may also be so critical in its nature, that it will be the judge's interest to pronounce against us; and if so, though we find it difficult to persuade him, it will be
easy

easy to observe what is expedient upon the occasion. Placing an intire confidence in his justice, and not in the merits of the cause, we shall not pretend to be under the least apprehension of mis-carrying. We shall flatter him on the score of his honour, which we dare say he will preserve inviolate; and shall convince him, that his integrity and upright intentions will shine so much the more conspicuous in passing sentence, by how much the less he gratifies his resentment or private interest.

In this manner, in regard to the judges from whom we have appealed, if we should be sent back to them, we may plead some reason of necessity for what had happened, if the cause will admit of this plea, or error, or at least, some suspicion. The safest way, however, would be to confess our fault, and offer attonement for it, and by all manner of ways we should endeavour to make the judges sensible of the shame that must await them if they persisted in making a sacrifice of us to their resentment.

The same cause may likewise sometimes happen to come before the judge, on which he has already passed sentence; and hereupon we may in general observe, that we had no inclination to call in question his decision in another court of justice, presuming none ought to rectify what we apprehended amiss, but himself; but that, as is frequently the case, in most causes, we were ignorant of some material circumstances, or wanted witnesses, or that the counsel were remiss in their duty, a charge, we must venture upon with great caution, and particularly when we can urge nothing else. .

It may happen that the very thing we have done ourselves, may be an object of complaint and reprehension in another. It was so Tubero made it a crime in Ligarius to have been in Africa. . And how he could do so in point of decorum, I am indeed at a loss to discover, unless something be found in the consideration of person, age, time, cause, place, inclination, to admit of a disparity. Tubero alledges his youth ; that he had accompanied his father, who had been sent by the senate to buy provisions, and not with the view of making him a partizan in the war ; and that for his part, as soon as he conveniently could, he withdrew from any further engagement : whereas Ligarius continued exercising hostilities, not to promote the interest of Pompey, between whom and Cæsar there was only a contention of dignity, both wishing well in the main to the commonwealth, but in defence of Juba and the Africans, inveterate enemies of the Roman people. It is indeed an easy matter to accuse others of a fault we have committed ourselves, when we acknowledge our own guilt ; but then our merit in so doing must be left to the decision of the judge, and not depend on our own ; and if no excuse is admissible, repentance only will be our best plea. For that person may seem to have sufficiently corrected himself, who has conceived a hatred against the means that led him out of his proper by-ways. . .

Where I spoke on the subject of raillery, I made some reflections on the indecency of reproaching any one with his birth or fortune, or wantonly insulting any particular class of men, a whole nation, or people. But sometimes the duty of an advocate

advocate obliges him to animadvert on the whole body of a certain set of men, as of freedmen, soldiers, publicans, and the like ; on which occasion there is one common way of qualifying what he says, by making it appear, that it is with reluctance he touches upon the offensive part ; neither will he form his attack upon all indiscriminately, but only upon what is truly blameable ; and his censure he will compensate by an encomium upon some good quality. If you say that soldiers are somewhat rapacious, you may add, that this is no wonder, from their presuming they ought to be more amply rewarded on account of the dangers they expose themselves to, and the blood that they spill in defence of the state. If you represent them as addicted to acts of wantonness, you may palliate the same by their being more accustomed to war than peace. You may weaken the credibility of freedmen, but still commend that industry in them whereby they extricated themselves from bondage.

As to what belongs to foreign nations, Cicero variously has treated this subject, as it suited the cause he pleaded. To invalidate the veracity of some * Greek witnesses, he grants the Greeks a knowledge in science, and polite letters, and professes himself on that account a great admirer of their nation. He vilifies the † Sardinians, and treats the Allobroges as enemies ; and nothing of all this, when said, seemed improper, or out of the road of decorum.

* Pro. Flac. n. 9.

† Pro. Font. 16, 23.

Some things that are rather hateful, may be placed in a more pleasing point of view, by qualifying them with softer appellations. Thus may a person of too rigid and harsh a temper, be termed somewhat severe; one that is unjust, as not conscious to himself that he has done wrong; and one that is inflexibly obstinate, as a little too tenacious of his opinion. By the application of lenitives in this manner, you may bring over those against whom you speak, to a more rational way of thinking.

But nothing can depart so much from the rule of decorum, as that which is excessive; and therefore though the propriety may be natural enough; yet unless tempered by a certain measure, it will lose all its graces. Judgment rather than precepts will enable us to form a just estimate, how much is sufficient, and how much the ears may receive; for this matter is neither guided by weight nor measure, because as in the use of food, some meats are more filling than others.

It may not be amiss to add also this short remark, that commonly very different perfections of eloquence have not only their admirers, but are often commended by the same persons. Cicero * somewhere writes; that perfection consists in expressing things so as you may believe you can easily effect the same by imitation; but cannot; and in another place, that he did not make it his business to speak, so as that any one might be confident of being able to speak in like wise; but in a manner that none could attain to. Herein is a

* Orat. 76.

seeming contradiction ; yet both positions are true, and deservedly commendable, being only different by the nature of causes, and the manner of treating them : because that simplicity, and as it were, security of unaffected discourse, becomes wonderfully small causes ; whereas the sublime and admirable, as more proportionate, suits better the greater. Cicero excels in both. The one, in the judgment of the ignorant may be easily acquired, but neither in that of connoisseurs.

C H A P. II.

Of Memory.

I. *It consists of nature and art. Its great utility and efficacy.* II. *Simonides the first inventor of artificial memory.* III. *Its method.—Not approved of by Quintilian.* IV. *He adds more simple precepts: To get by heart in parts, affixing certain signs to them.—To get by heart in the same waxen tablets, which you have written.—To try your memory from time to time, whether you get by heart in silence, or by hearing another read.* V. *Division and composition are great helps to memory.—Exercise, the greatest art of memory.—Recent memory little faithful in many things.—Whether we should get by heart word for word.—Instances of the great force of memory.*

I. **S**OME have thought memory to be a pure gift of nature, and nature no doubt contributes much to it ; but it receives an augmenta-

tion, as all other things do, by improvement : whence the whole labour we hitherto spoke of, would be ineffectual, unless its respective parts were all formed and acted on by memory, as by their life and soul. Every discipline depends on memory, and in vain are we taught, if whatever we hear, flies off from us. It is the same faculty that lays before us examples, laws, answers, sayings, memorable facts, and all in such abundance, that the orator by making a good provision of them, will be enabled to have them in readiness upon an occasion ; and it is therefore that memory has been with good reason styled the treasure of eloquence.

He that is to speak much in public, ought to have equally a faithful retention and ready conception, and not only in two or three readings, ought to commit to memory what he has written, but even apprehend in what he has only meditated, the same things, words, and order ; and remember whatever has been said by the adverse party, yet not so as to be obliged to refute their allegations in the same order, but to give every thing its proper place. Extempore speeches seem to me to have their being from no other power of the mind ; for whilst we say one thing, we are to attend to what we should say next : so that as the thought is always busy in exploring farther off, beyond its actual object, whatever in the mean time it finds, it lays up in the repository of memory, which this memory, as a hand acting between, receives from invention, and delivers up to elocution.

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I can hardly think I should spend much time here in discussing what it is that constitutes memory; though most are of opinion that it consists in certain vestiges impressed on the mind, and there retained, as the signatures of rings on wax. However, I can hardly believe that the memory is better or worse according to the * constitution of the body.

Its nature, in regard to the soul, strikes me with more admiration. And indeed, it is astonishing how former ideas, almost obliterated, present themselves to us of a sudden, not only when we endeavour to recall them, but sometimes spontaneously, and both awake and asleep. The same is likewise in some measure remarkable in regard to those † animals, which, though seemingly destitute of understanding, remember, and have a knowledge of things, and how far soever they may stray from their accustomed habitations, they again return to them. What? Is not this a surprizing variety, that our more recent ideas should vanish from, and our more ancient abide with us? We forget what passed yesterday, and yet remember what we did in childhood. We seek after some things, and they secrete themselves; and perhaps when least thought of, they occur: so that memory is not always in a permanent condition, but at times goes and comes.

* Some philosophers were of opinion, that the memory was sometimes better, sometimes worse, according to the constitution of the body, which Quintilian calls here *habit*, *habitus*.

† This seems well accounted for by memory's depending on, or making a part of the internal senses, which are common to brutes with men; or rather, as M. Buffon observes, all animals are directed in their knowledge by sensations of reminiscence.

We should notwithstanding be unacquainted with the efficacy of this divine faculty, did not eloquence display it in its full light. Not only it points out to us the order of things, but even of words, and the number it supplies us with is not small, but so abounding, that in the longest pleadings, patience is sooner wanting to the hearer, than memory to the speaker.

And this may be an argument, that memory in some wise is directed by art, and nature helped by method, when the learned can effect what the unlearned and unexperienced cannot; though I find in * Plato, that the use of letters is an obstacle to memory; because what we have committed to writing, we cease keeping, and at length forget by that security. And no doubt, the attention of the mind is of singular consequence in this respect, when not drawn off like the eye, from the contemplation of the things it beholds. Whence it happens, that this attention retains by thought, what we have wrote for several days together for the purpose of committing to memory.

II. Simonides is said to be the first that had given any notion of artificial memory; and concerning this there is a celebrated tale, which gives an account, that having for a stipulated sum, composed a poem, as was customary, in honour of a champion, who had been crowned as victor in the Olympic games; and having demanded payment, received only the half, because according to the common practice of poets, he had digressed in praise of Castor and Pollux: for which reason he

* In Phædr. & Timæo.

was told to demand the other half from those whose feats he had passed so fine an eulogium on ; and if what the story says be true, he was paid in this manner. For the champion having made a sumptuous entertainment to solemnize his victory, and Simonides being invited to it, when the company were in the height of their merry-making, a messenger came in and told the poet, that two young men on horseback wanted mightily to see him. Hereupon stepping out to meet them, they instantly disappeared, but the event shewed their gratitude to him. For he had scarce got over the threshold of the house, when the roof of the banquet-apartment fell in, and so bruised and crushed the guests, that their relations clearing away the rubbish in order to their burial, could neither distinguish by any mark their faces, nor their limbs. Then Simonides recollecting the order in which every one sat at table, is said to have restored to them their bodies.

Authors are not agreed, whether this poem was written for Glaucus the Carystian, or Leocrates, or Agatharcus, or Scopas ; and whether the house was at Tharsalis, as Simonides himself seems to hint in a certain passage of his works, and as said to be by Apollodorus, Eratosthenes, Euphorion, and Eurypylus of Larissæum ; or whether it was at Cranon, as we find by Apollas Callimachus, whom Cicero by copying after gave occasion to the spreading of this tale. 'Tis certain that Scopas, a Thessalian of distinction, perished at this banquet, and with him, as some say, his sister's son, and it is thought also, most of his children. But this whole story of the Tyndaridæ is in my

opinion fabulous ; the poet himself mentions it nowhere, who undoubtedly would not be silent in regard to an event, so much to his honour.

III. From this act of Simonides it appears, that memory may be helped by certain images marked out in the mind, and of this every one may be convinced by his own experience. For when after some time we return to places we formerly were in, we not only know them again, but remember what we did in them, the persons we had seen, and the very thoughts that employed our mind. Art therefore here, as in most things, proceeds from experimental knowledge.

For exercising memory, many make choice of a spacious place, remarkable for a great variety of things, as suppose a large house, divided into many apartments. Whatever in it is worth notice, they carefully fix in the mind, that the thought without delay and hesitation may be able to run over all its parts. The first material point is to be at no loss in recollection ; for that memory ought to be very good, which is to help another.

Then what they have written down, or meditated upon, they mark with another sign, to keep them in mind of it ; and this sign may be for the matter they are to speak of, as of navigation, warfare ; or, for some * word ; because in case of forgetfulness they may recover themselves by recollecting only a single word. The sign for na-

* That sign is either for the subject to be spoken of, as an anchor, if it be upon navigation ; or some word, as if the period was to begin with *scilicet*, then *scilicet* may be the sign.

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vigation, may be an anchor ; for warfare, something belonging to arms.

They dispose then these particulars thus : the first complete sense or place they assign to the porch or threshold ; the second to the hall ; next, they range about the galleries, parlours, bed-chambers, and the like ; annexing some idea to each of them, and observing always a certain order.

This done, when they are to make trial of memory, they begin with passing in review all these places, and what they reposit in each of them, they demand back, and are reminded by their images ; so that, how great soever the number of things be they are to remember, they are all so connected, as in the figuring in of a company of dancers, that they cannot err joining the foregoing with the following, by the trouble only of getting by heart.

What I said of a house, may be applicable to any public structure or work, to what may be observed on a long journey, or in making the tour of cities, or in viewing a piece of painting. If such places afford no proper images, they may be framed according to fancy.

It is therefore necessary to have places, either fictitious or real, and a number of images or signs, which may be imagined at pleasure. By images I understand marks, which direct to the things that are to be got by heart ; or as Cicero * says, places may be imagined to be as the wax we write upon, and images as the letters impressed on that wax. But it is best to quote his own † words :

* De Orat. ii. 354.

† De Orat. ii. 358.

“ We ought to make use of a great number of places, all full in view, very remarkable, and of a moderate distance from each other; and of images having life and motion, strong, well specified, and such as may easily present themselves to the mind, and strike it in a moment.” I therefore am the more surpris'd how Metrodorus could find three hundred and sixty places in the twelve signs of the zodiac; a strange piece of vanity indeed in this man, who by priding himself in his memory, chose rather to give the honour of it to his industry, than to nature.

To declare my sentiments concerning this method, I will not deny but it may be of service in some respects, as when many names of things are to be remembered in the same order they have been heard. For by assigning these names to their respective places, as the table to the porch, the bed to the hall, and so of other things; and then passing them in review, they are found where they were placed. And perhaps it is in this manner that the memory of those had been helped, who at the close of an auction, could give an account of every article they had sold to different persons, as might appear from the entry made of the same in the cashier's books. This, it is said, has been done by * Hortensius.

* Hortensius, on being challenged to it by Sisenna, sat a whole day at an auction; and when it was over, gave an account of the things sold, the names of the buyers, and the different prices, in the order as each article was disposed of. What Quintilian says here of the *argentarii*, who were what we call *bankers*, *cashiers*, *scrivners*, &c. it seems that they, or their deputies, assisted at all public sales and auctions, kept accounts of what was sold, and transacted all the money-matters.

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But this method will be of less service for retaining a whole discourse. Thought cannot have a prescript for the same images as things, the image of thought being purely arbitrary, though indeed a framed or real image may equally put us in mind. But suppose that the meaning of a discourse could be signified by certain images, how shall the copulations and order of words be pointed out by the same art? At least, certain conjunctions will never admit of being marked out by any images. We may have, it is true, as short-hand writers, certain marks for all things, and as it were, infinite places, to represent, suppose, all the words contained in the five books of the second pleading against Verres, in order to remember them all as set down: but to repeat these as Cicero did, shall we not be puzzled by the double effort of attention in the memory? For how should words chained together flow, if for every word we were to attend to its mark? Wherefore Carneades, and the abovementioned Metrodorus, who had used, as * Cicero says, this exercise, may, with all my heart, keep to themselves their method: I think indeed I can prescribe one more plain, and easy in practice.

IV. The committing to memory of a long speech, will be best effected by parts, as thus memory will be less sensible of its burden. But these parts should not be scraps or sentences, for so, their multitude by dividing, would harass memory too much. I cannot well prescribe their extent, but it may be as each passage shall end, unless per-

* *De Orat.* ii. 360.

haps this passage is so long, as to require likewise to be divided. Certain rests, however, should take place, that frequent meditation may continue the series of the words, (the hardest thing to be mastered in this matter), and afterwards the repeated order join the parts themselves.

It would not be amiss, to make their adhesion easier and stronger, to affix to them some marks, the remembering of which may be a warning to, and rousing, as it were, of the memory. No one can have so poor a memory, as to forget the sign he has appointed for each place; and if slow at being perfect in any place, the sign he has marked it with, will ripen his memory.

Hence it has been found serviceable in this art, to place signs before those parts, which have slipped the memory; perhaps, an anchor, as above-mentioned, if we are to speak of a ship; and a dart, if a battle. These signs are far from being idle, and from one point of reminiscence ensues another; as when the shifting of a ring from one finger to another, or tying something to it, puts us in mind why we did so.

There are other helps which may serve to make memory still surer, as when the idea we are desirous to retain, can be revived by one that is similar to it. Thus, in names, if Fabius is to be remembered, let us think of the celebrated Cunctator, whom we cannot well forget, or some friend of the same name. This is still easier in certain names, as those of Aper, Urfus, Naso, Crispus, by recollecting the things so called. Original names likewise serve to make us remember their derivatives,

tives, as if we had an occasion to remember such names as Cicerō, Verrius, and Aurelius.

But all will find their memory greatly helped by getting by heart out of the same waxen tablets they have written upon. For he that afterwards goes over as a reader what he has written, follows it, as it were, step by step, and has it present before his eyes, not only in the pages, but nearly in the very lines. And if a blot, addition, or alteration should happen, they will be as so many marks, which a cursory inspection of, will keep from going astray.

There is a method, not unlike the * art I first spoke of; and if experience has set me right, it is more expeditious, and attended with better effect. This is to get by heart in silence. Nothing could indeed be better than this method, were it not subject to distractions from other thoughts arising in the mind; for which reason attention must be kept up with the voice, that the memory may be helped by the double impression of speaking and hearing. But this voice ought to be low, or rather only a sort of humming. He that gets by heart by another's reading to him, is in one respect kept slow, because the sense of seeing is quicker and sharper than that of hearing; but in another respect he may be helped by it, because from hearing once or twice, he may immediately try his memory, and keep pace with the reader. Still it would be advisable for him to examine from time to time how far his retention has been good, be-

* He that uses artificial memory, gets by heart in silence, because what he hears, he lays up in images and places. It is therefore Quintilian says, that this method is like it.

cause continued reading equally passes over what is fixed, and what is not, in the memory. Besides the accession of a greater degree of attention, no time can be lost in the trial, which must otherwise happen by rehearsing with it what we have been already perfect in. So that it is only the things, which escaped our memory that we go over again, that they may take the deeper root; and it commonly happens, that these we retain the best, for no other reason than because they escaped us. Now, for the purpose of getting by heart as well as for writing, I may add, that good health, our food well digested, and our mind free from other thoughts, are equally necessary.

V. But to get by heart with more facility what we have written, and to retain what we have only meditated, division and composition are almost the only expedients, except exercise, which is the chief.

He that shall make a proper division, will never be at a loss in pursuing the order of things. For if we say what ought to be said, there will be always a certain sequence, as first, second, third, not only in the placing of questions, but also treating them; and all the constituent parts of a discourse are so linked with each other, that nothing can be retrenched from, nor added to them, without immediately perceiving it. It is said of Scævola, that having lost a game at draughts, he afterwards recollected, as he was going into the country, the whole order of the play, and in so perfect a manner, that returning to him with whom he had played, he gave him a distinct account of all the different shiftings of the men,
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and the mistakes himself had made, all which the other confessed to have happened as he said. If then order has so powerful an effect, when as much the result of another's will as our own, what may it not execute in an oration, when it lies at our discretion to put it under such management as we judge proper?

Accuracy of composition by the chain of connection it is drawn out in, will be another guide to the memory. For as we more easily get by heart verse than prose, so do we prose that is measured by the harmony of numbers, than that which is loose. Thus it happens, that what may seem to have been said extempore, can be repeated word for word. My memory, though slender, was capable of so doing, when, at the time I was wont to declaim in public, to honour the coming in of some person of consideration, I resumed a part of my matter. That I here speak truth may be attested by many still living.

But if any one should ask me what the real and identical art is for helping memory, I would tell him that it consists in labour and exercise; and that nothing is so efficacious as much getting by heart, much thinking; and this daily, if possible. Nothing is so increased as memory is with care, and nothing through negligence so soon falls away. Let therefore, as I directed, children be early accustomed to get by heart a good many things; and whatever age shall apply itself to the cultivating of memory, will soon with resolution, get rid of the loathing that may ensue from often going over that which has been written and read, and, as it were, rechewing the same food.

This labour may become lighter, if first we begin to get by heart but a few things, and these of such nature, as will create no disgust. Afterwards we may venture upon adding daily some lines, the accession of which will not occasion any sense of increase in our labour, and at length this accession will admit of no bounds. It would be advisable to begin with poetry, next to proceed to oratory, and lastly to exercise ourselves on things more loosely written, and more out of the road of oratorical composition, such as the writings of lawyers; for the matters of exercise ought rather to be more difficult, in order to make that more easy, in view of which the exercise is intended: just so, athletes accustom their hands to the waving and catching of leaden weights, in order to supple them for more firmly grasping, when they are to use them empty and naked against their antagonists.

I must not omit a thing, which may be known from daily experience, that recent memory in slow wits is scarce ever faithful. It is astonishing, and we cannot well account for it, how much the interval of a night strengthens memory; whether, during this time, the labour of memory is in a quiescent state, fatigue having been a hindrance to it; or whether it is ripened or digested; or whether its strongest part lies in reminiscence. However this matter may stand, it is certain, that the ideas which did not readily present themselves, flow in spontaneously the next day; so that the same time may be said to strengthen memory, which usually is a cause of introducing forgetfulness. On the other hand, the quick and ready
memory

memory is commonly found to pass soon away. Having discharged a present duty, it presumes it is not further indebted to futurity, and departs as if it had obtained its dismissal. Whence it is not surprising that the things the mind has longest reflected upon, make the deepest impressions on it.

From this diversity of wits a doubt has risen, whether orators ought to get by heart word for word; or whether it be sufficient to retain the substance only and order of things. No general answer can be given in this case. For if memory be good, and time not wanting, I should not let a single syllable escape me, otherwise composition would be to no purpose; and this more especially we should exact of ourselves from the time of early youth, so inuring the memory to this custom by exercise, that we may never learn to seek such self-indulgence. To have therefore a prompter, or to look into one's paper, is not excusable, as authorising the liberty of neglect; for he who thus is under no dread of being out, will never imagine that he is not perfect. Yet from not being sensible of this, the action necessarily suffers by interruptions, the discourse halts and stumbles, and the orator that pronounces it, like one getting by heart, loses all the beauty of what he had written, acknowledging it to be such by his way of going on. All this unseemliness is guarded against by memory, which besides being creative of the reputation of ready wit and presence of mind, makes what we say to appear, as not brought from home, but found on the spot, and is at the same time of singular benefit, as well to

the orator as to the cause itself. For a judge more admires, and is less apprehensive of what he does not think is prepared against himself; and this is a principal point to be attended to in pleadings, that some things, which have been written extremely well connected, might come from us as loose and disjointed, and that sometimes like persons thinking and doubting, we might seem to seek after what we do not want to seek. No one therefore can be ignorant of what I here inculcate as most advisable in regard to memory.

But if any one's memory should be naturally hard, or if time presses, it would serve to no purpose to be tied down to the pronouncing of every word, as the missing of any one might occasion an ugly hesitation, or silence the speaker. It must then be much safer, having well studied the things themselves, to make a reserve of the liberty of speaking as may be judged proper. For every one with reluctance loses the word he had made choice of, neither does he easily replace it by another, whilst seeking after that which he had written. But this indeed cannot remedy a weak memory, being only of service to those who have acquired some readiness in extempore speaking; and if both expedients are equally impracticable to an orator, I would counsel him to renounce intirely the labour of pleading, and if of any merit in point of literature, to apply himself rather to writing. But so poor a memory is seldom met with.

But to how great a degree memory may be improved by nature and study, Themistocles may be an instance, who, we are assured, learned to
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ſpeak perfectly the Perſian language in a year; or Mithridates, who is ſaid to have ſpoken the different languages of the two and twenty nations, he reigned as king over; or the rich Roman, Craſſus, who whilſt governor of Aſia, was ſo well acquainted with the five Greek dialeſts, that he adminiſtered juſtice to each appellant in his own; or Cyrus, who, it is believed, could call every one of his ſoldiers by their name. Theodeſtes is ſaid to have repeated inſtantly any number of verſes which he had heard. Some now living, are ſaid to be expert in doing the ſame, but of this I never happened to be a witneſs; yet the thing is credible, or may ſo far be ſerviceable, that he who believes it, may hope to be able to effect the ſame.

C H A P. III.

Of Pronunciation.

- I. *Its great power and efficacy.*—Wants the superintendence of nature and care.—Is divided into voice and gesture. II. *Nature and practice are principal considerations in regard to the goodness of the voice.*—What care of the voice is necessary to be taken by the orator.—The best method for exercising the voice. III. *The voice ought to be as the discourse,* 1. *Correct.* 2. *Clear.* 3. *Graceful.*—And here he treats of several vices of pronunciation, and particularly of monotony and canting, or a singing tone. 4. *Just: that is, suitable to the things spoken of.* IV. *Of gesture.*—Its great power.—The parts of the body that belong to gesture.—The orator's dress and care of his person. V. *Pronunciation consists as much in gesture as voice, and requires to be suited to things and persons.*—Four things are therefore to be considered.—1. *The kind of cause.* 2. *The parts of the oration.*—And here he teaches what the orator ought to observe in rising up before he speaks.—What in the exordium.—What in the narration.—What in the proofs.—What in the peroration. 3. *Sentences.* 4. *Words themselves.* VI. *A different manner in pleading suits different persons. Moderation becomes all.*

- I. **P**RONUNCIATION* is called by most authors action; but the former name seems rather to agree with the voice, and the latter with

* Of pronunciation, see Cic. de Orat. iii. 213, 228.

gesture. Cicero, * speaking of action, calls it sometimes a kind of language; and sometimes a certain eloquence of the body; but he makes its parts † two, which are the same as those of pronunciation, that is, voice and motion. Wherefore both appellations may be used indiscriminately.

As to the thing itself, it is of wonderful power and efficacy in orators, what we have composed within ourselves not being of so much consequence, as how it is delivered, because every one is affected in proportion as he is made to hear. For which reason, there is no proof so strong, though it may come from an orator, but will lose its force, unless aided by an emphatical tone in the speaker; and all passions must become languid, unless spirited up by the voice, air of the countenance, and attitude of the body. Happy indeed, must we be, when the judges catch the same fire that animates us! But we must never expect to move them whilst we continue in a state of supineness and security: of course they will sympathise with us in our oscurity, and cannot help it.

Of the powers of pronunciation we have sufficient instances in stage-actors, who add so many graces to the best poets, that we are infinitely more pleased in hearing them thus rehearsed, than in reading them ourselves: even for the worst poets they obtain a favourable hearing; and though we would not give a place to their pieces in our libraries, we find notwithstanding that they meet applause on the stage. If then in things, which

* *De Orat.* iii. 222.

† *Orat.* 55.

we know to be mere fiction and subjects of inanity, pronunciation can effect us to so great a degree, as to excite in us anger, tears, and concern ; what must the situation of our minds be in matters of reality ?

I dare say that an indifferent speech, recommended by the force of action, will carry more weight with it, than the best, deficient in that particular. Demosthenes being asked what was the greatest excellency in oratory, gave the preference to pronunciation, and assigned to it the second and third place till no further question was put to him ; whereby it appeared that he judged it to be, not so much the principal, as the only excellency. And it was on that account himself applied so diligently to acquire it under the tuition of Andronicus, the comedian : whence the Rhodians admiring his oration for Ctesiphon, as pronounced by Æschines : “ Your admiration little surprizes me, says Æschines ; but what would it be, if you had heard Demosthenes himself pronounce it.” Cicero too is of opinion, that * action is most potent in eloquence ; that Cn. Lentulus gained more reputation by it, than from being otherwise properly eloquent ; that by it C. Gracchus in lamenting his brother’s death, drew tears from the whole assembly of the Roman people ; and that † Antonius and Crassus were much distinguished by it, but ‡ Q. Hortensius in a far superior degree to them. This I the rather believe in regard to Hortensius, because his writings fall much short of his great character for eloquence. He was long

* De Orat. 214.

† Brut. 141.

‡ Ib. 303.

esteemed our first orator ; afterwards was reputed Cicero's rival ; and lastly, as long as he lived, second next to him : so that there must have appeared something pleasing in his manner, which we do not find in the reading of his works. And indeed, as words are of much efficacy in themselves, as the voice adds a peculiar force to things, and as gesture and motion are not without their signification, some perfection must necessarily be the result of their coalition.

There are some notwithstanding who think, that an artless action, and such as the impetuosity of the mind gives birth to, is more forcible, and the only that is becoming men. And these, for aught I know, are they, who make it their business to find fault with all care, and art, and ornament, in speaking, and whatever is acquired by study, as affected and unnatural ; or they are, perhaps, of the disposition of those, who pretend to imitate antiquity by a rusticity of words and accent, as Cicero * mentions of Cotta. But whilst I allow them to enjoy their way of thinking, and to imagine that it is enough for men to be born, to become orators ; I hope, at least, they will excuse the trouble I here put myself to, and will not take it amiss in me for believing, that nothing is perfect, but where nature is helped by care.

Still am I not so peremptory in what I say, as not to attribute herein to nature the principal qualification. For certainly he cannot pronounce well, who is not ready in retaining what he has written,

* De Orat. iii. 42. & 46. Brut. 259.

or what he is to speak extempore; neither can he, if impeded by some remediless vices of utterance. The body too may have some notable deformity, which it is not possible for art to mend; and the voice, unless properly toned, will not be fit for forming a good pronunciation. We may manage as we please a good and sound voice; but one that is bad or weak, is a hindrance in the execution of many things, as swelling into a full tone, and making exclamations; whilst also it forces us into some things that are disagreeable, as to fall in it, to make false inflections, and to strive to recruit a hoarse throat, and fatigued lungs by an ugly whining. But we suppose an orator so accomplished by nature in this particular, as not to make our directions in regard to it useless.

Now, as all action, as I said, is divided into two parts, voice and gesture; whereof one strikes the eyes, and the other the ears, through which two senses every passion has access to the mind, I shall speak first of the voice, to which the gesture is supposed to conform itself.

II. The first observation that takes place in regard to the voice, is its nature; and the second, the use that is made of it.

We judge of its nature by quantity and quality. Its quantity is rather simple, being in general either great or small; but between these extremities there are middle species, and many gradations from the lowest tone to the highest, and from the highest to the lowest. There is a greater diversity in its quality; for it is clear or husky, full or shrill, mild or rough, contracted or diffusive, hard or flexible, loud or obtuse. The intervals of re-
spiration

piration are also either longer or shorter. How all this happens, and may be accounted for, is unnecessary for my present subject to discuss; as whether caused by the difference of those parts, into which the air is received for forming the voice; or the difference of the ducts, through which it passes out, as through the tubes of an organ: or whether this be a quality peculiar to it; or whether it be as it is set in motion; or lastly, whether it be most helped by the efforts of the lungs, or the strength of the chest, or even of the head? For there is a necessity for all these parts, and not any of them singly; as not only for the sweetness of the mouth, but of the nose also, thro' both which the remainder of the voice passes out. And the tone resulting from this combination, ought to be quite agreeable, and not harsh and grating as conceived in the way of reproach.

The way of using the voice is manifold; for besides the tripartite difference of acute, grave, and circumflex, there is an occasion for several tones, some strong, others slack; some high, others low; as also for spaces, sometimes slower, sometimes quicker, but between these there are many middle ones: and, as the face, though composed of very few parts, has a multitude of diversity in it; so the voice, though we can give names but to few species in it, yet these species are so differently modified, that every one is distinguished by his own, and so remarkably, that they are as much perceptible to the ear, as the lineaments and features of the face to the eye.

It is with the voice, as with all natural endowments; care augments and fortifies, want of due

exercise diminishes and weakens it. But the care required for orators, is not the same as that which is taught by * *singing-masters* ; though many things are common to both, as strength of body, that the voice may not dwindle into its smallness, as in squeaking eunuchs, in women, and in sick persons. This good condition of body is acquired by walking, by unction and friction, by continence, and by food of easy digestion, which is temperance. The throat besides should be in good order, that is, soft and pliable, otherwise the voice may crack and become rough, may suffer by suffocation, wheezing, and huskiness. For, as a flute with the same breath makes one sound when the holes are stopped, another when they are not, another when some foreign matter has got into it, another when cracked ; so the throat and other corresponding parts, when inflated, strangle the voice ; when obtuse, make it thick ; when sharp, make it shrill ; and when convulsed, fill it with inequalities like organs in confusion. The breath is also interrupted by some obstruction, as a small stream of water by a pebble, the running of which, tho' collected a little beyond this pebble, yet leaves something of a hollow behind the place where it met with the resistance. Too much moisture also as it embarrasses the voice, so when spent, it choaks it up ; and fatigue not only hurts the body for the present, but for some time after.

But though exercise be equally good for singers and orators, to rectify whatever may happen

* *Phonastæ*, the masters that taught singing, or to exercise the voice, were so called.

amiss in the voice, yet their manner of care in this respect admits of a considerable difference. For it is not possible for a man occupied in so many duties of civil life, to have stated times for enjoying the pleasure of a walk; neither can he be at leisure for modulating his voice on all sorts of tones from the highest to the lowest; nor can he whenever he pleases dispense with pleading, being often to speak on the trials of many causes; nor can he observe the same regimen in diet. For he has not an occasion, so much for a soft and sweet voice, as for a strong and durable one; and though fingers by their quavers and modulations may thrill into softness the highest sounds, yet orators must speak often with heat and vehemence, must watch whole nights, must imbibe the smoak of their lamps, and must long remain in sweaty garments. They should not therefore soften it by the study of any delicacies, neither should they inure it to a custom, it must not be suffered to contract; but its exercise ought to be such as the use it is destined for; and it ought not to moulder away by silence, but gather strength by practice, which at length conquers all difficulties.

It would be best to get by heart the things you intend as subjects for exercising pronunciation; for he that speaks extempore is taken off by attending to his voice, from that sentimental emotion which is conceived by the nature of the thing itself. But the passages so got by heart, should contain as much variety as possible, and admit of exclamation, and the contentious heat of dispute, and occasionally the free and familiar tone, and that which will bear inflexions, that thus exercised
on

on all together, we may be prepared at all events. This is what ought to be done ; otherwise, that smooth, sleek, and pampered voice, will not be able to undergo any thing of an unusual trial ; just like bodies accustomed to the oil and exercises of the wrestling-school, which how well-looking soever they may be, and fit for their own manner of strife, if you should order upon a military expedition, and to take long marches, to carry burdens, and be whole nights upon guard ; you would soon see them quite faint from fatigue, and to wish themselves back amidst their unctions, and own way of sweat and toil. However, in such a work as this, who, in order to preserve a fine voice, could, bear to find the orator counselled to avoid speaking in sunshine, and in windy, cloudy, and dry weather ? If he is to speak in the forum, exposed to the sun, or on a windy, wet, or hot day, shall he therefore desert his clients ? And, as to the advice some give of not venturing to speak in public, on a full stomach, or drunk, or after vomiting, I believe no man in his senses would be guilty of so much indiscretion.

But it is not without good foundation that I find most authors agree in advising to be moderate in the exercise of the voice at the time of passing from childhood to youth-age, because it is naturally then embarrassed, not, I think, upon account of heat, as some imagine, for this heat is greater in riper age ; but rather upon account of moisture, with which this time of life becomes turgid. Then it is that their nostrils appear bloated, and their chest dilated ; and every thing in them, budding, as it were, is tender and liable to injury.

But

But to return to my subject : it will not be improper to observe, that when the voice is once come to a due degree of strength and consistence, the best exercise it can then have, as nearest the orator's function, will be to pronounce daily something in the manner of a pleading at the bar. Thus will not only the voice and lungs be fortified, but a graceful and suitable motion of the body will accompany what is said.

III. Pronunciation to be good, ought to be distinguished by all the excellencies of a discourse ; and as a discourse ought to be correct, clear, elegant, and just ; so ought also pronunciation.

I. It will be correct, that is, free from faults, if the tongue be loose, articulate, sweet, and polite : that is, in which no tone of rusticity or peregrinity is discoverable. It is easy to distinguish a foreigner from a Greek by the very sound of their pronunciation ; for men are known by their tone in speaking, as metals by their tinkling : and hence will happen what Ennius approved of, when he called Cathegus a * sweet-tongued man, and not what Cicero found fault with in those, who rather barked, as he said, than pleaded. There are indeed many vices of pronunciation, but of these I have spoke in some part of my first book, where I gave directions for forming the speech of children, judging it more adviseable to mention them in regard to an age, in which they might admit of correction.

Let therefore in the first place the voice be, I may say, sound, that is, retain none of the just men-

* Brut. 58.

tioned faults. Next, let it not be deafish, uncouth, bawling, harsh, stiff, vain glorious, thick, mincing, ill-articulated, crabbed, small, soft, effeminate; and lastly, let the breath be free and easy, of a reasonable length, and not hard to be recovered.

2. The pronunciation will be clear, first, if all words be articulated, part of which is often eaten up, and part left unpronounced, and many do not pronounce the last syllables, whilst they lean upon the sound of the first. But as it is necessary to give a full sound to words, so to tell over, as it were, and reckon every letter, must be very troublesome and disagreeable. For vowels frequently suffer an ellision, and the sound of some consonants when a vowel follows, is partly drowned. I have already given examples of both, in "multum ille et terris." The coming together also of words of a harsh pronunciation is avoided, as "pellexit & collegit," and such as have been mentioned elsewhere; and therefore Catullus is * commended for having made choice of letters of a soft and easy pronunciation.

The second thing to be observed in regard to the pronunciation being clear, is keeping distinct the parts of the discourse, that he who speaks may begin and end where he ought. It will be also necessary to take notice in what place the sense ought to be † kept up, and, as it were, suspended, and where it is to end, as being complete. The sense in "arma virumque cano," is suspended, because "virum" belongs to what follows to make "vi-

* Brut. 259. & de Orat. lib. iii. 42.

† This the Greeks called *ὑποδιαστολή* or *ὑποστιγμαί*, and both words are understood by grammarians for interpunction.

rum Trojæ qui primus ab oris.” And here again the sense is suspended ; for though there be a difference between whence one comes and where he comes, yet no * distinction ought to be made, both depending on the same word “ venit.” “ Italiam” makes a third suspension, because by being placed before “ fato profugus,” it divides the sense continued by “ Italiam Lavinaque.” For the same reason, “ fato profugus” will make a fourth suspension, and “ Lavinaque venit littora” by closing the first sense, will be the distinction between it and the following sense. But in these distinctions likewise, we should observe sometimes longer, and sometimes shorter pauses ; for there is a difference between a distinction ending a sense and a period : so after the distinction of “ littora,” I shall recover my breath, and pass instantly to the following sense ; and when I come to, “ atque altæ mœnia Romæ,” I will lower a little my voice, make a longer pause, and then form a new beginning.

There are † sometimes certain pauses, even in periods, without drawing breath, as in this : “ But in the assembly of the Roman people, a man in public employ, a master of the horse, &c.” This period has many members, for the senses are all different ; yet as the amplification is conceived in an uniform manner, short pauses should take place

* Quintilian makes a difference between distinguishing and suspending. For that is suspended which has a slight difference, but distinguished which has a greater, that in some measure the sense may seem to be perfect.

† When the period is closed, we are to draw breath ; but in its parts, as members, and articles, there ought to be a pause without drawing breath ; or if we should draw breath, it ought to be not perceptible.

in its intervals, but so as not to interrupt the texture of the period. There is however, sometimes a necessity of drawing breath, but it should be done without any perceptible pause, and by way of stealth ; otherwise, if remarkable, it may cause as much obscurity as a false distinction. And this perfection of distinguishing may perhaps be considered as of little moment ; but it is certain that without it no action can be any way tolerable.

3. Pronunciation is elegant, when seconded by a voice that is easy, loud, fine, flexible, strong, sweet, durable, clear, pure, sonorous, and dwelling upon the ear. For there is a certain voice fit for being heard, not so much by its loudness, as by its propriety, being manageable at pleasure, and susceptible of all manner of tones and inflexions, as a musical instrument that is perfect and well mounted. As adjuncts to this voice, the lungs should be strong, and the breath of good continuance, proof against labour. A tone greatly upon the base, or greatly upon the treble, may occasionally agree well with music, but never with a discourse of oratory. The one, little clear, but too full, cannot affect minds with any emotion : the other too sharp, and overstrained in clearness, and besides surpassing what is natural, can neither admit of a due inflexion from pronunciation, nor bear to be held for any time so on the stretch. For the voice, as the strings of a musical instrument, the flacker it is, the graver and fuller it will be ; and the more it is stretched, the more will it be thin and sharp. Thus flats have no force, and sharps are in danger of breaking asunder. Middle tones will therefore suit best the orator ; and these, when

his vehemence is upon the swell, are to be raised higher ; but will require to be tempered upon a lower key, when he subsides into strains more peaceful.

Equability is a consideration that deserves first to be attended to in regard to a proper way of pronouncing, that the speech may not jump by unequal spaces and sounds, mingling long with short, flats with sharps, high with low, and thus making the discourse lame by so disorderly an inequality. Variety is a second consideration, and a very principal one, as all pronunciation may be said to depend upon it. Some may think that these two qualities jar with each other, but the reverse will appear, from the one's having for its opposite, inequality ; and the other, a tiresome uniformity, ever presenting one and the same aspect.

The art of introducing variety in pronunciation, besides being graceful, serves to renew the auditor's attention, and is as a relaxation to the speaker by a change in his labour, as of standing, walking, sitting, leaning, none of which attitudes he can long continue in. But a point of far greater consequence, and which I shall soon treat of, is the conforming of our voice to the nature of the things we speak of, and the present situation of our minds, that all with exactness may tally together.

Let us therefore avoid what the Greeks call a monotony, which is pronouncing a discourse in the same breath and tone ; and not only we ought not to speak every thing with clamour, which is madness ; nor in the way of common conversation, which is cold and motionless ; nor with a low humming voice, which takes away from action all its

sprightlineſs : but we ought ſo to ſpeak, that in the ſame parts, and in the ſame paſſions, there may be ſome nice and accurate inflections of the voice, as the dignity of words, the nature of thoughts, the beginning and end of periods, and the ſeveral tranſitions we make may require : herein imitating thoſe painters of antiquity, who, though they made uſe only of one colour, yet were ingenious enough to give a greater relief to ſome parts than others, without which they could not have given even to the out-lines of the members their juſt proportions.

Let us paſs in review for our inſtruction in this particular, the beginning of that noble diſcourſe of Cicero for Milo : ſhould not at every diſtinction, though in the ſame period, the tone of voice and countenance be changed ? “ Though I apprehend, good ſirs ! it may be ſhameful in me, to ſhew fear whiſt I ſpeak in defence of the braveſt of men.” Theſe are words deſignedly modeſt and expreſſive of fear, as being an exordium, and the exordium of a man who had a true feeling of deep concern ; yet was there a neceſſity for a fuller and more erect pronounciation when he ſaid, “ in defence of the braveſt of men,” than when he ſaid, “ though I apprehend,” and “ it may be ſhameful,” and “ to ſhew fear.” In the ſecond member, at drawing breath, it was neceſſary he ſhould raiſe his voice by a natural effort, that he might pronounce what follows with leſs fear, and ſhew the greatneſs of Milo’s ſoul. “ And that in me it is not becoming, when T. Annius Milo is more ſollicitous for the ſafety of the republic, than his own.” Next, he makes a complaint, as it were, againſt him-

himself : “ To have it not in my power to make appear a like greatness of soul in support of his cause.” Then he adds, in the view of throwing an odium on the manner of trial : “ Yet does this new form of a new sort of trial, strike terror into my eyes.” Now he speaks with assurance, and marches on with flying colours : “ Which, on what side soever they turn, seek after in vain the ancient custom of the bar, and the usual form of judgments.” Which thought he improves, and amply expatiates upon : “ For the bench of judges is not surrounded by a croud of people, as usual, &c.” These remarks I on purpose made to shew, that not only in the parts of a cause, but also in the members and articles of a period, there is some variety in pronunciation, without which we cannot well specify the difference of more and less.

But the voice ought never to be wound up beyond its powers ; for by so doing it is often suffocated, and by a greater effort becomes less clear, and at length overstrained breaks out into a * sound much resembling the crowing of a young cock. Neither is what we say to be thrown into confusion by too much volubility, which must needs destroy the distinction of sense, weaken the force of the passions we intend to inspire, and sometimes defraud the words themselves of some part of their weight. The contrary vice is too great a slowness. By it we discover the great difficulty we are put to in finding what we are to say, whilst our torpid manner forces the auditory into drowsiness,

* Called by the Greeks κλωσμος.

and what may prove of worse consequence, the time * fixed for our speaking is in the mean time fully elapsed.

To avoid these two last inconveniencies, our pronounciation ought to be ready, not precipitate ; moderate, not slow. The breath too ought not to be drawn so often as to make the sentences appear to be cut through and mangled ; nor need it be held to the pitch of being quite lost. The sound of the breath so spent is quite disagreeable, and like that of those who have dived under water, is fetched with difficulty, is long in recovering, and is out of character and unseasonable, because the orator does so, not by inclination, but through necessity. When therefore he has a long period to pronounce, let him make ready for it by drawing breath, which he must not be long about, nor do with noise, nor let to be taken notice of. In other parts, he may freely draw breath between the connections of the discourse.

However, the breath is to be so exercised, as to make its continuance as long as possible. Demosthenes, in order to this, was wont to repeat in one breath, and by gradually raising his voice, as many verses as he well could ; and the same orator, to pronounce more freely and articulately all sorts of words, made a practice of rehearsing at home his speeches by suppling his tongue with a parcel of pebbles rolled about his mouth.

* *Aquam perdit* : he here alludes to the water-hour-glasses, which measured the time allotted for the orator to speak in, by the running out of the water. Hence the saying : *dicere ad clepsydram*.

Sometimes the breath is long, and full enough, and clear, yet not of due consistence, and therefore tremulous ; as bodies making a shew of health, but scarce able to support themselves from a debility in the nerves. The Greeks call this a * *faultering*. Some do not draw in their breath, but suck it in with a hissing, between the interstices of their teeth. Others, by a sort of frequent panting, and clear enough inwardly, imitate beasts of burden labouring under their yoke and load ; and this not a few affect, as if pregnant with more invention, and with a greater flow of eloquence than can well pass out of their mouth.

Others are subject to a kind of obstruction in their pronunciation, and, as it were, a struggling with their words ; and as to coughing, and frequently spitting, and forcing phlegm out of the lungs, and bespattering the bye-standers with the moisture of the mouth, and suffering the greater part of the breath to pass in speaking through the nostrils ; all these, though not immediately vices of the voice, yet, as incidental to it, I have thought not improper to mention here by way of caution.

But any of these faults, in my opinion, is more tolerable, than the custom of canting, which now prevails as much in pleadings at the bar, as declamations. I am at a loss to say, whether this practice be more useless than absonant from reason. For what is less becoming in an orator than a theatrical thrilling, or something like the bawlings of drunken people in the height of a debauch ? What is more contrary to the moving of the pas-

* *βραγγος.*

sions, as, when the orator should shew grief, anger, indignation, pity, not only to set aside these sentiments, which the judges should be made to imbibe ; but even to violate the majesty of the bar, by seeking after the pleasure of a * frivolous amusement, not unlike the preposterous manner of the Lycian and Carian orators, in whining and singing out, as Cicero says, even their epilogues ?

But we have trespassed, even beyond what may be allowable in a more grave and severe way of singing. Yet, at any rate, can this singing be excusable ? Who, pray, can sing with a face of any decency, I do not say in a cause of murder, sacrilege, parricide ; but in a disputation upon the stating of accounts, or other money-transactions ? But if singing must be adopted, I see no reason why we should not keep tune in the modulations of our voice with pipes and flutes, nay even with drums, which is more akin to this wretched nonsense. Still we seem to be mightily taken with the fancy of our sing-song ; as what we sing ourselves, is not unpleasing to us, and we find less labour in it, than in the proper way of pronouncing. Besides, we cannot help imagining but that there are many auditors, who in consequence of their attachment to other vices in life, may be fond of having their ears thus agreeably flattered. Why then should a singing pronunciation be found

* *Ludorum talarium licentia* : Quintilian alludes here to the custom of playing after meals, at backgammon, in which game they were wont to express the produce of the dice in a recitative strain of music. Some commentators have substituted *Lyciorum* & *Carum* for *ludorum talarium*, which would make void the allusion ; and indeed the sense, if so, would be more rational.

fault with? And does not Cicero * himself say, that there is a sort of obscure chanting in oratory? Yes, truly; and this proceeds from some natural imperfection. I shall soon shew in what, and how far this inflexion may be admissible, and even singing, but rather an obscure kind of singing, which most persons will not understand to be such.

Now it is time to examine what a just pronunciation is; which certainly cannot be any other than that which is fitted to the things we speak of; and this is for the most part effected by the passions of the mind, the voice being generally modified according to the determination of the will. But as some passions are true, others counterfeited and imitated, the true will naturally break out, as in grief, anger, indignation; yet are they artless, and therefore not to be subjected to rules of discipline. On the contrary, those copied by imitation, depend on art; but being devoid of nature, to express, we must endeavour to feel them, in figuring to ourselves a lively image of things, and in being affected by them as by realities. Thus the voice, as the interpreter of our sentiments, will transmit our disposition of mind to the judges; for it is the index, and, as it were, the pattern of the mind; and it receives as many impressions, and admits of as many charges, as the mind itself does.

Therefore in joyous concerns it is full, plain, and, as animated with mirth, flows in a strain of gladsome emotions. In contention, it gives, erect, a full stretch to all its nerves and powers. In an-

* Orat. 58.

ger it is boisterous, and rough, and impetuous, and uses frequent respiration ; for the breath cannot be of any continuance when immoderate in its effusions. It is somewhat slowly toned in bringing an odium upon a person, because commonly none but those of abject sentiments can entertain so mean a passion. But in soothing, confessing, giving satisfaction, intreating, it is mild and submissive. When it persuades, advises, promises, comforts, it is grave ; in fear and bashfulness, it is narrowed ; in exhortations, it is strong ; in disputes, round ; in pity, tender and mournful ; and designedly, as rather obscure : but in digressions, it gives full scope to volubility, and seems secure of being clear ; and in narratives, and familiar discourse, it is strait and even, holding a certain medium between the tones that are flat and sharp. In vehement passions it rises, in more tranquil it falls, but higher or lower proportionately to the degree of either.

IV. The tone of voice that seems required for every part of a discourse, I shall omit speaking of for a while, that I may first speak of gesture, which accords with the voice ; and with it also obeys the will.

The great efficacy of gesture in an orator, may sufficiently appear, if from nothing else, than its signifying most things without words. Not only the hands, but a nod declares our will, and in the dumb these stand in lieu of speech. A salutation is frequently understood and affects without expressing a word ; and from the countenance and gait we pass judgment on the disposition of mind. In animals too, which are destitute of the gift of speech,

speech, their passions of anger, joy, fondness, are discoverable from the language of the eyes, and some other signs of the body. And no wonder if these, which notwithstanding strike the senses by some motion, affect us so much, when a piece of painting, though a silent work, and never varying, is capable of exciting sentiments, which sometimes seem to surpass the force of eloquent speech.

On the other hand, if gesture and the countenance are unmeaning and disagree with what is said ; if we speak mournful things with an air of mirth, if we affirm some things, and yet seem to think the reverse, our words will lose not only all their weight, but likewise belief.

Justness too arises from gesture and motion ; and therefore Demosthenes was wont to adjust his action before a large mirror ; for though the brightness of its polish reflected left-hand images, yet it was enough for him to trust his eyes to be convinced of what he thus was able to produce.

The head is the principal part in action, as it is in the body, and is equally calculated for producing that justness I spoke of, and being expressive of it. The means towards qualifying it for these purposes, is first to keep it strait, and in a natural position ; for when downcast, it may denote meanness ; drawn back, arrogance ; inclined on one side, indolence ; and hard and stiff, something of a savage disposition.

It must next receive just motions from the action, to agree with the gesture ; and accompany the hands and sides. The looks always turn along with the gesture, except in regard to things, which we should condemn or not allow, or remove from

us, that we may seem to bear the same aversion to them in our countenance, and keep them back with our hand :

“ Ye * gods ! avert so great a plague from earth.”

TRAPP,

And,

— † “ I such honour must indeed refuse.”

The head is many ways expressive of gesture ; for besides the motions for granting, refusing, affirming, there are also some for bashfulness, and doubt, and admiration, and indignation, which are well known and common to all.

The directors of theatrical rehearsals repute it faulty to make a gesture with the head alone ; even its frequent nods are not excusable ; but to toss the head to and fro, and whirl about the hair, is certainly an emblem of madness.

But the face is what is most powerful in the head. By it, we appear suppliant, menacing, mild, mournful, joyous, proud, submissive. From it men hang, as it were, on it they look, and even examine it before we speak. By the face we shew fondness for some persons, and hate others ; by it also we understand many things, and it is often equivalent in expression to whatever can be said in words. For this reason it is, that in pieces calculated for the stage, the actors of them, assume the passions of the respective characters they perform, by having them represented on the masks

* *Æn.* iii. 620.

† *Æn.* i. 339.

they

they wear. Thus in tragedy, the mask for Niobe, appears mournful ; for Medea, bespeaking some horrid purpose ; for Ajax, astonishment ; for Hercules, fury. In comedy, besides the distinguishing of each character by a peculiarity of representation on the mask, as of slaves, pimps, parasites, peasants, braggadocio-captains, old women, courtezans, servant maids, morose and gentle old men, well-behaved and rakish young men, matrons, young ladies : the father, which is introduced as a principal character, because he is sometimes in a passion, and sometimes pacified, has a mask on purpose for exhibiting this alternation with one eye-brow imperiously raised, and the other down-cast, to denote a return of placid humour. And this is the custom of our Latin actors, in order to represent with the greater propriety the parts they play.

But scarce any thing in the face is so expressive as the eyes, through which principally the mind manifests itself, and so, as that even without motion they gliten with mirth, and are clouded with sadness. Nature besides has given them tears, faithful interpreters of our interior sentiments ; and these either burst forth through grief, or trickle down through joy. But when the eyes are to be set in motion, they become either unconcerned, or haughty ; or stern, or mild ; or terrible ; and all these passions they are made to assume, as occasion may require. Stiff and staring eyes, or languid and sleepy, or seeming amazed, or wanton and twinkling, or swimming, and suffused with some sort of pleasure, or askance, and, as I may say, lustful ; or asking, or promising something,
are

are all faults that ought to be carefully avoided. As to the keeping of them shut, or squeezed up in speaking, none would do so but some silly and ignorant person. And in order to all this expression of the eyes, it may be said that there is also a sort of a ministering power in the eye-lids and cheeks.

But there is a great action in the eye-brows; for in some respect they form and fashion the eyes, and command in the forehead. By them it is contracted, raised, and lowered; and in it they are the only thing of most effect. The blood, that has different motions, according as the mind stands affected, when through shame-facedness it meets with a thin skin on the eye-brows and forehead, expands itself in blushes; when acted on by fear, it flies back, and these appear frozen with paleness; and when the violence of no passion urges, their serenity shew the calmness of its temperament. It is a fault in the eye-brows, if they be entirely motionless, or too full of motion; or if one be drawn up, and the other down, as I just mentioned in regard to the comic mask; or if not modelled according to what is said. Sorrow appears in their knitting, mirth in their drawing back, and shame in their being downcast. They are also raised or lowered by the manner of granting or refusing.

We scarce shew any thing with decency from an action in the nose and lips, though commonly serving to express derision, contempt, and loathing. To wrinkle the nose, as Horace * says, to bloat it,

* Lib. i. epist. 5. v. 23.

to move and rub it about with the finger, to make it snort suddenly, to pull it often down, and to flat it with the palm of the hand, is quite unbecoming, as may also the blowing of it too often.

There is an indecency in the lips, when they are stretched out, and made to gape; or are screwed together; or are drawn back to leave the teeth naked; or are drawn sideways and almost to the ear; or when they are folded disdainfully upon one another; or are made to hang; or when on one side only they let out the voice. To lick and bite them is also unbecoming; and as their motion ought to be moderate in the pronouncing of words, we should strive to speak more with the mouth than with the lips.

The hinder part of the neck ought to be strait, not stiff nor thrown back. The fore part of the neck with a different but equal deformity, is drawn in and stretched out; but a stretched state is painful to it, and the voice is made smaller and fatigued. The chin made to lean on the chest, hinders the clearness of the voice, though from that position the voice becomes broader.

The shrugging up of the shoulders is seldom graceful. By it the neck is shortened, which begets a sort of mean, servile, and fraudulent gesture, which some give into in flattery, admiration, and fear.

A moderate projection of the arm, the shoulders being kept still, and the fingers opening as the hand advances, is very becoming for continued and smoothly running passages. But when something of greater elegance, or of finer fancy, is to be said, as "the rocks and solitudes are responsive
to

to the voice ;" then it expatiates to the side, and the words come pouring out as it were with the gesture.

But the hands, without which the action would be maimed and weak, it can hardly be said, what and how many motions they have, being emulous to express almost every word. Other parts help the speaker, these, I may partly say, help themselves. Do we not ask with them, promise, call, dismiss, threaten, supplicate, detest, fear, interrogate, deny, shew joy, grief, doubt, confession, penitence, and point out measure, abundance, number, time ? Do not the same stir up to anger, crave pity, hinder, approve, admire, and declare shame ? Do not they serve as adverbs and pronouns in indicating places and persons ? Whence, amidst the great diversity of language of all nations and people, the hands seem to me the common language of all men.

And indeed, the gestures I just spoke of, naturally accompany the words themselves. Some of them signify things by imitation, as if you was to shew by the hands the manner of a physician's feeling his patient's pulse, or that of a harper putting his fingers in a position for playing on his instrument ; but this sort of imitation, far from being attempted, ought always to be avoided in pronouncing a discourse ; for there is a great difference between playing the buffoon and acting the part of an orator, whose gesture should rather be fitted to sense than to words ; otherwise, a thing, though allowable in the graver characters of a stage-player, would be ridiculous in him. Therefore, though I allow him to draw his hand to himself,

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in speaking of himself, and to stretch it towards another for pointing him out, and some other gestures of this sort ; I should not pretend to make the same allowance for his representing any particular state, and every thing he says.

This ought to be a general observation, not only in regard to the hands, but every other gesture, and tone of voice. Cicero describes * the attitude of Verres lolling negligently in public on a harlot ; but in this period, it would have been absurd in him to have imitated Verres's manner of lolling ; as it would likewise in the † whipping of a Roman citizen in the market place of Messina, the motion of the arms and sides in the action of whipping, or the doleful cries of the wretch in the midst of this punishment. I should think even comedians would act out of character, if in the part of a young man giving an account of what was said by an old one, as in the Prologue to the ‡ Hydria ; or of what was said by a woman, as in the Georgus, they should imitate the tremulous voice of the one, or the effeminate of the other. So that in them too, whose whole art consists in imitation, there may be an imitation which is vicious. . . .

The hand begins with great propriety on the left side, to rest on the right ; but it should seem to be laid down, and not to strike ; though in the end it sometimes falls, yet soon to return ; and sometimes rebounds, in the action of denying or admiring.

* Verr. vii. 85.

† Verr. vii. 161.

‡ Hydria and Georgus, the titles of comedies.

Hence the ancient masters of art are very right in adding here a precept, that the hand should begin and rest with the sense. Otherwise the gesture would be either before the voice, or after it, both which is unseemly. But by refining too much upon matters, they have been under a mistake in confining to three words the interval of motion; which is neither observed, nor can be: yet, I am apt to believe, that thereby they only pretended to fix a certain standard for slowness and quickness, apprehending justly the hands remaining too long idle, or, as is the practice of many, that the action might not be intersected by continual motion. . .

These masters of art would not also have the hand to rise higher than the eyes, nor fall lower than the breast; and if so, we must think it faulty to let it run to the height of the head, or bring it down to the bottom of the belly. . .

The left hand never properly alone performs a gesture, but frequently accompanies and conforms itself to the motions of the right, whether we digest our arguments on our fingers, or shew aversion by turning out the palms of our hands to the left, or holding them strait forward; or whether we stretch them out on both sides, either in an attitude of making satisfaction, or being suppliant. . .

We must take care that the breast and belly do not project too much forwards, as by such an attitude too great a hollow will be formed in the hinder parts, besides which every supine position is quite hateful. The sides ought also to agree with the gesture; for the motion of the whole body is of some effect, and Cicero thinks it does

more than the hands themselves, as appears by what he says in his * Orator : “ Let there be no affected motions of the fingers, as of their joints falling in cadence ; rather let the orator’s action proceed from the motion of his whole body, and a manly flexibility of his sides.”

To strike the thigh, a gesture first supposed to be practised at Athens by Cleon, is customary, and it becomes indignant emotions, and serves to excite the attention of the auditory. Cicero found amiss the want of it in Callidius : “ No smiting of his forehead, says † he ; no smiting of his thigh ; no, not even a stamp of the foot, the least thing that might be naturally expected.” However, if allowed to be of a different opinion from Cicero, I cannot say that I like the smiting of the forehead ; and as to the clapping of hands, and smiting the bosom, I think such gestures become only the stage. . .

The stamping of the foot, as it may occasionally be seasonable, especially, as Cicero ‡ says, in the beginning or end of contests ; so, when used too often, it makes a man appear silly, and takes off from the party the attention and notice of the judge. To waver on either side is likewise unbecoming, standing alternately on either leg. . .

The tossing up of the shoulders is another fault, and Demosthenes, who was subject to it, is said to have corrected it in this manner. Having made choice of a narrow pulpit to exercise himself standing in it, he had a spear so fixed up over his shoulder, that if in the heat of action a motion in that

* N. 59.

† Brut. 278.

‡ De Orat. n. 220.

part escaped him, its point might not only be a warning, but a punishment to him. . .

The orator has no particular dress, but dress may be taken notice of in him, and therefore it should be as that of every other person of character, genteel and manly. An over-studied neatness, as well as neglect, are equally reprehensible in the manner of adjusting and wearing the gown, shoes, and hair. . .

V. These are the perfections and imperfections of action, which when the orator has passed in review, he ought first to consider well with himself, what he is to plead, before what judges, and before what auditory ; for not less decorum is to be kept in speaking than in doing any thing before different persons, and therefore the same tone of voice, the like gesture, and demeanour, will not be equally becoming, before the prince, the senate, the assembly of the people, a magistrate, in a public or private cause, in a * petition, or action in form. Every orator, with a little application, will learn to place a distinction between these particulars ; and in the second place, he will consider, how he is to plead, and what he intends to effect by his pleading.

In order hereto four observations are necessary. The first regards the nature of the whole cause, which is either of a mournful or mirthful cast, gives room for suspecting danger or is safe, is on an affair of consequence or otherwise ; so that be

* *Postulatio*, a requisition, or petition, is when, as Ulpian says, we set forth our own desire before him, who presides in the jurisdiction, or that of another, or oppose the desire of another.

the incidents what they may, we cannot help remembering what is principally agitated. The second observation regards the difference of the parts, which are the exordium, narration, proof, and peroration. The third, the thoughts themselves, in which, according to things and sentiments, all admit of variation. The fourth, words, the imitation of some of which is vicious in pronunciation, if we have a mind to pronounce all indiscriminately; whereas some others will lose all their force, unless their nature is fully set forth.

1. Therefore in eulogiums, unless they be funeral, in thanksgivings, exhortations, and the like, the action should be joyous, magnificent, and sublime. In funeral orations, in consolatory speeches, and in most criminal causes, it ought to be mournful, modest, and serious. Authority must be maintained before the senate, dignity before the people, and a certain medium may be kept to in private causes.

2. Of the parts of a cause, and of thoughts and words, which are of a complicated nature, I must speak more at large. Herein pronunciation ought to effect three things, which consist in conciliating, persuading, moving, to which also pleasing is naturally inherent. Conciliating commonly arises from the character of the orator's morals, which, it cannot be said, how they appear through the very tone of his voice, and his action; or are discoverable from the sweetness of his discourse. The force of persuasion comes from asseveration, which sometimes is more effectual than proofs. "These things, if they were true, says * Cicero to Calli-

* Brut. 278.

dius, should they be delivered by you in so languid a manner;" and in another place, "far from being roused by the narrative you made us, we scarce could refrain from sleeping." Confidence and peremptoriness should therefore appear, if the orator be a person of any authority; but the way of moving is either in representing, or imitating the passions.

Therefore when the judge in private causes, or the crier in public, shall give warning to begin, we must rise gently and modestly, and be some time in adjusting our gown, or even putting it on; a liberty, however, which none must presume to take but in ordinary judgments, being never countenanced before the prince, magistrates of the first rank, and the more august tribunals. Thus having put ourselves in a condition to appear with decency, we may use a little delay for recollection; and when we turn to the judge, and the prætor gives us leave to speak, we must not immediately break out, but allow a short moment for thought. The care, indeed, of the orator to answer the expectation conceived of him, is wonderfully pleasing to an auditory, and the judge naturally composes himself for attention: and such is the instruction Homer gives us in the example of * Ulysses, whom he represents as standing with his eyes fixed on the ground, and his sceptre immoveable, before he poured out that storm of eloquence. In this delay, there are some, as stage-players call them, not unbecoming preludes; and these are stroking the head, looking at the hands,

* Il. γ. v. 216.

turning gently the fingers about each other, pretending some effort, expressing sollicitude by a sigh, or using any more becoming manner; and that continued the longer, if the judge does not appear to be yet quite attentive.

Besides this preparative, the attitude ought to appear strait and erect; the feet equally separated at a small distance, or the left a little advanced; the knees strait, but not so as to appear stiff; the countenance serious, not sad, nor seeming amazed, nor languid; the shoulders hanging down; the arms kept a little asunder from the sides; the left hand in the position I above directed; the right hand, on the point of beginning, a little extended beyond the bosom, with the most modest gesture, as expecting when to begin.

What may be foreign to, or the reverse of this attitude and behaviour, is, no doubt, faulty; as gazing at the ceiling; rubbing the face, so as to make it appear rude and impudent; stretching out the countenance into a sort of confidence, or knitting the eye-brows, to make it more fierce and stern; rubbing the hair about the forehead against the grain, that that erect position might strike terror; seeming, as the Greeks do, to be intent on studying what is to be said, by a frequent motion of the fingers and lips; hauking and spitting loudly; extending one foot a great way beyond the other; holding up a part of the gown in the left hand; standing with the legs wide open, or the body quite stiff, or supine, or crooked, or the shoulders drawn and squeezed up, as in persons going to wrestle, to the hinder part of the head.

A mild sort of pronunciation most commonly suits the exordium, nothing being more prevalent than modesty for procuring a favourable hearing. But this gentle manner may not always seem so proper, by reason of the many ways, as I taught, there are for pronouncing an exordium. However, for the most part, a temperate voice, modest gesture, no disorder appearing in the sitting of the gown, and a moderate motion of the body on both sides, with the eyes looking the same way, will best become the exordium.

The narration most commonly requires the hand further advanced, the cloaths beginning to be in some disorder, the gesture more distinct, the voice on the tone of familiar conversation, and only louder, but still simple and uniform. These directions are chiefly calculated for such narrations, as “*Quintus * Ligarius, when there was not the least suspicion of war :*” and “*A. † Cluentius Habitus, this gentleman’s father.*” But in narrations, worked up with passions, a different manner is wanting, as in case of exciting indignation, “*a ‡ mother-in-law marries her son-in-law :*” or commiseration ; “*the market-place of § Laodicea was made choice of for exhibiting a barbarous spectacle, a spectacle which drew tears from the eyes of the whole province of Asia.*”

The proof requires more than one sort of action. To advance a proposition, to divide, to interrogate, are conceived in the familiar way of discourse ; and so is also the resuming of the adversary’s pro-

* *Pro Lig. n. 2.*

† *Pro Cluent. n. 14.*

‡ *Pro Cluent. n. 2.*

§ *Verr. iii. 76.*

position,

position, in order to refute it. Yet do we sometimes pronounce these particulars in a strain of raillery and mimicking. Argumentation most commonly is conducted in a livelier, more sharp, and more pressing way; and requires a suitable gesture, that is, a strong celerity, as some parts must be insisted upon by close and vehement pronunciation.

Digressions are mostly spoke in mild, sweet, and flowing accents, as the * Rape of Proserpine, the † Description of Sicily, the ‡ Eulogium of Pompey; for it is no wonder that things foreign to the question, should have less contention.

Sometimes a descriptive representation of the behaviour of others, done with the view of censuring their conduct, is set forth by a gentle sort of action. "I seemed to myself to see some coming in, others going out, others drunk, and tottering at every step." Here a gesture is allowed, which is expressive with the voice of the thing represented, whence proceeds a certain easy balancing or bandying from one side to the other, and this performed by a motion from one hand to another, and without a motion of the sides.

There are several degrees in the raising of the voice for exciting emotions in the minds of the judges. The following § words were pronounced in the loudest and sharpest tone: "The war having been undertaken, Cæsar, and almost brought to a period;" for he had but just before given warning, that he should raise his voice as high as

* Verr. vi. 105.

† Pro Cornel. Balb. n. 8.

‡ Verr. iv. n. 2.

§ Pro Lig. n. 7.

he possibly could, that the Roman people might hear what he had to say. In the next * words, the voice runs somewhat lower, but has something pleasing in it: "Tubero, what was your sword doing in the battle of Pharsalia?" And in † these, it is much fuller and slower, and therefore sweeter: "But in the assembly of the Roman people, a man in public employ:" here are all the sounds and voyels are to be lengthened out, with an expansion of the mouth: and lastly, in ‡ these, the words flow as through a full channel: "Ye Alban monuments and groves!" As to § these, "Rocks and solitudes are responsive to the voice," they have something musical in them, and the voice after having been supported, insensibly drowns itself.

Such were the inflexions of the voice, which Demosthenes and Æschines upbraided each other with, but on that account are not to be rejected; for the reproach being made to both equally, it is evident that both adopted the practice; and surely Demosthenes did not swear in an ordinary tone of voice by the manes of the brave citizens that were slain fighting for their country in the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis; neither did Æschines in like manner bewail the mournful plight of Thebes.

There is a || voice different from those I have

* Pro Lig. n. 9.

† Phil. ii. 63.

‡ Pro Mil. 85.

§ Pro Arch. 19.

|| He means that voice which the Greeks call Πυροφωνία, that is one that shrieks, or is exceeding shrill. Quintilian says it is *extra organum*, as running beyond any just tone, through an extreme earnestness for finding fault with a person.

mentioned, and not on the key of any just tone of speech. The Greeks give it a name from bitterness, as being shrill or squeaking beyond the measure and almost the nature of the human voice : “ why * do ye not stop that voice which so much betrays your folly, which is so much an evidence of your inanity ? ” But what I said to be overstrained and unnatural, is only in the pronouncing of the first words : “ why do yet not stop that voice.”

The peroration, if it contains only a recapitulation of the principal matters, the pronunciation suiting it, will be as it were a continued repetition of things disjointed by several senses. If it be calculated for irritating the judges, one of the tones above mentioned may be proper ; if for appeasing them, one that is submissive and softening ; if for moving them to mercy, an inflexion of the voice with a certain mournful sweetness ; and this is that which affects minds most, as being very natural : for we may take notice of orphans and widows in funerals giving vent to their grief in a melodious strain of lamentation. Here also that obtuse husky voice, remarked by Cicero in Antonius, has a wonderful effect ; and therefore has something in it deserving of imitation.

There are two ways, however, of exciting pity ; one, which is accompanied with indignation, as that a little before mentioned concerning the condemnation of Philodamus ; the other, conceived in a lower tone with supplication. Wherefore, though there may be a sort of obscure singing in

* Pro Rab. 18.

pronouncing, “ but in the assembly of the Roman people,” for Cicero did not speak these words in a scolding tone ; and in “ ye groves and monuments !” for he did not say them in the way of exclamation or invocation : yet there is a far greater inflexion and modulating of the voice * in “ unhappy man that I am ! how deplorable is my situation !” and in “ what answer shall I make to my children ?” And in “ you could, Milo, by the means of these, now your judges, restore me to my country ; and cannot I, by means of the same judges, keep you in it ?” And in “ oh † how hard, and rigorous my ministry now is !” when Cicero was obliged to make the sorry estimate of one Sestice of the goods of Rabirius.

There is also something of a wonderful effect in the peroration, arising from the confession of one, fainting, as it were, away, with distress and fatigue ; as for the same ‡ Milo : “ But let there be an end ; tears hinder my further speaking ; I cannot longer hold out.” The pronunciation here must agree with the words.

Some other particulars may likewise seem as belonging to this part, and requiring a suitable action ; as producing the defendants, and making a lively picture of their distressed condition ; taking up children in the arms ; introducing relations, and rending of garments ; but these have been spoken of in their place.

3. And, as there is also a variety in other parts of a cause, it sufficiently appears, that the pro-

* Pro Mil. 101.

† Pro Rabir. Post. 46.

‡ N. 105.

BOOK XI. INSTITUTES OF THE ORATOR. 345
nunciation ought to be suited to the sense, as we
have shewn.

4. In like manner the pronunciation ought sometimes to agree with words, but not always. This is what I last mentioned. Do not these words, “that unhappy, that poor man!” require a submissive and humble voice; and “that audacious, that insolent, that robber,” one that is loud and hasty? There is an accession of force and propriety to things by this conformity of pronunciation, which if wanting, the voice will be an indication of one thing, and the mind of another. Are not the same words, by only altering the pronunciation, expressive of shewing, affirming, upbraiding, denying, admiring, resenting, interrogating, mocking, vilifying? For the pronunciation is different, or ought to be in the you’s and thou’s of the following examples:

* You this my kingdom, and Jove’s favour give.

† Thou him in piping?—————

‡ Are you that fam’d Æneas?—————

————— § me do thou arraign

Of cowardice, thou, Drances. TRAPP.

In short, every one by examining within himself these examples, or others, if he pleases; and by making an application of them to all sorts of sentiments, will know that what I here say is true.

* Æn i. 82.

† Æn. i. 621.

‡ Eclog. iii. 25.

§ Æn. xi. 383.

VI. I have now only one reflection to add to these observations, that though decorum is the principal thing which is to be considered in regard to pronunciation ; yet there is often a manner becoming one, which would not become another. There is a something in this we cannot possibly account for, neither can we express it with words ; and as there is truth in saying, that it is the chief accomplishment of art to make us do in a becoming manner, whatever ought to be done ; so in this secret we may say there is something of art, and yet art cannot teach us the whole of it. Perfections in some have no engaging charms ; in others, even imperfections are not displeasing. The two best comedians of our time, and commendable by different qualities, were Demetrius and Stratocles. The one succeeded admirably well in the character of gods, young gentlemen, good fathers, faithful domestics, modest ladies, and grave matrons : the other, in that of covetous old men, crafty valets, parasites, pimps, and all the parts that require a more lively action. I am not surprized at this difference ; for their nature was different. The voice of Demetrius was sweeter, that of Stratocles sharper and stronger. But their peculiarities, and none of them transferable from the one to the other, were the things they were chiefly remarkable for. A certain way of tossing the hands, a delivery that by its sweetness could at any time extort applause ; collecting of the air to puff out the garment at entering, and sometimes a gesticulating with the right side, were becoming in none but Demetrius, in all which he had the additional advantage of a good stature,

and

and comely person. On the other hand Stratocles distinguished himself by his agility, and the perpetual motion he kept himself in; and though laughter is little becoming in any character represented on the stage, no one knew how to time it better for pleasing the people. A trussing up of his neck, seemed also well suited to many of his oddities; and yet the doing of any one thing in his way, would appear highly contemptible in another.

Let every one therefore strive to become acquainted with his abilities, and in order to form his action, let him less consult precepts, than his natural disposition. It is not indeed impracticable for a man to unite in his person, and so as to become him, either all the requisites of action, or at least a good many.

I shall conclude this article, as most others, by recommending a certain moderation; for it is not a comedian I here design to form, but an orator. We need not therefore embarrass ourselves for being perfect in all the niceties of gesture; neither need we in speaking be strictly observant of pauses, times, and the variety of inflexions we are to lend to the expression of passions. Suppose we were to pronounce these * words; "What then shall I do? Shall I not go; no not even when she calls me back? Or shall I put on a resolution of despising the caprices of a jilting mistress?" Would it be proper to affect the scenical manner? Yet the actor would here display all the pauses of doubt; would observe inflexions of the voice, perform

* Terent. Eunuch. act. i. sc. 1.

various gestures of the hand, and make diverse nods.

The taste of an oration is very different, and it does not want to be so highly seasoned ; for it consists of action, not imitation. Therefore with good reason do we find fault with a pronunciation that shifts by changes in the face, that is troublesome by gesticulations, and jumps about by frequent alterations of the voice. This is what our ancient authors called a “ busy action,” and by this meaning it was that Popilius Lenas qualified the import of the Greek * expression. Cicero, who has given us these precepts in his † Orator, was very right herein, as in all other things. In his ‡ Brutus he makes the like observations in regard to M. Antonius. But now something of a lively action is in vogue, and is even required. Such, it is true, suits some parts ; yet in the main it should be so tempered, that whilst we endeavour to imitate the elegance of actors, we might not lose the authority of a good and grave man.

* Popilius Lenas seems to have meant by translating ἀγχολεῖ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὤψεσιν, *inattentam actionem*, an action that is taken up with a constant attention to the framing of the gesture, and air of the countenance to what is said.

† Orat. 59.

‡ Brut. 141.

B O O K XII.

The INTRODUCTION.

The author observes that this last part is the most difficult of his work, in which he attempts to treat not only of the kind of eloquence that best suits the orator, but also of his morals.

I Am now come to the most important part of this work, the weight of which, if I thought it should lean so heavy on me as I find it does, I would have more maturely considered whether my abilities were equal to the task. In the beginning indeed I was ashamed of omitting any thing I had promised; afterwards, though my labour increased in proportion to the difficulty of discussing each part, yet not to lose what I had already effected, I encouraged myself to surmount all difficulties; and now, though weighed down with a greater burden than ever, nevertheless as I look towards the end, I have resolved with myself, rather to faint under it, than want courage.

What brought me under a deception, was my beginning with small matters: afterwards invited, as by a favourable gale, I advanced farther; yet having only delivered precepts concerning common notions, and such as have been treated by most writers of the art, I still did not see myself at any distance from the shore, and had in company several other adventurers: but when I launch-
ed

ed out into a method of elocution unknown to the first rhetoricians, and attempted by very few, I hardly met with any that had got clear at any distance of the harbour. However, since the orator I have undertaken to form, has passed out of the hands of masters of rhetoric, is already wafted along by his own force, or is in quest of greater helps for himself amidst the treasures of philosophy, I have began to feel how far I have been carried out into the deep; for now,

* On the full extended main, the land
No more appears, but all is sea and sky.

TRAPP.

Cicero † is the only who appears to me on this vast ocean, and though he put out into it in a large and well rigged ship, yet does he lower his sails, and ceases to ply his oars, thinking it sufficient to have spoken of the kind of eloquence a perfect orator should use. But my venturous disposition shall proceed farther, attempting to give him morals, and assign duties to him. Now, though I do not pretend to reach beyond that degree of excellency Cicero arrived at before me; yet must I sail farther on than he did in this voyage. But be the matter as it may, the desire of doing good is always laudable, as that boldness cannot be but safe in the attempt, which we cannot help pardoning.

* *Æn.* l. v. v. 9.

† In *Orat.*

C H A P. I.

None but the honest man can be an orator.

- I. *He proves by many arguments that none but the honest man can be an orator.* II. *He refutes examples alledged contrary to this notion in the persons of Demosthenes and Cicero.* III. *He proceeds to prove that the orator cannot be consummately eloquent without virtue.—He exhorts youth to eloquence.* IV. *He answers those who object to him some precepts of oratory delivered by himself as contrary to truth.* 1. *He acquaints us why he has given these precepts.* 2. *He proves that sometimes falsehood and a bad cause may be defended by a good man.*

I. **L**ET therefore the orator, whom we form, be such as is defined by M. Cato, “An honest man skilled in the art of speaking.” What he placed first, is undoubtedly what is best and most estimable in the natural order of things, “An honest man:” Not only, because if the intent of the art of speaking was to furnish wickedness with so powerful an help as eloquence, nothing in public and private concerns would be so pernicious; but also, because we ourselves, who have used our best endeavours to contribute something to the talent of speaking, should deserve very ill of mankind, if we designed these weapons for a robber, and not a soldier. But why do I speak of ourselves? Even nature herself in the very point she seems most to favour man, and
 8 likewise

likewise to distinguish him from other animals, would be not a parent but a step-mother, by endowing him with a faculty of speaking, which should side with wickedness, be adverse to innocence, and the enemy of truth. It would indeed be better for us to have been born dumb, and destitute of all reason, than to convert the gift of providence to our mutual destruction.

But my opinion herein has a further tendency ; for I say, not only, that the orator ought to be a good man ; but that he cannot be an orator unless such. Certainly, you will not deem those rational, who seeing marked out before them the way of virtue and vice, should choose to walk in that which is worse ; neither will you attribute prudence to them, who for want of attending to the consequences of things, should expose themselves frequently to grievous punishments of the laws, and always to those of a guilty conscience. Now, as it is not only a received maxim among philosophers, but also a popular belief, that every bad man is tinctured with folly and madness, how shall it then come to pass that a fool or mad man can ever be an orator.

Add to this, that the mind cannot apply itself to the study of so noble a work, unless free from all vice. First, because in the same breast there can be no association of vicious and virtuous things, it being no more the property of the same mind to harbour at once the most virtuous and vicious thoughts, than it is of the same man to be at once good and bad. Secondly, because the mind intent upon so great a design, ought to be disengaged from all other cares, even such as are
of

of an innocent nature ; for thus free only, and intirely collected within itself, no other cause embarrassing and distracting its attention, it will be able to keep in view the object of its contemplation. And if an over-indulgence of our bodies, or too great a sollicitude in attending to family concerns, or the pleasures of the chace, or days spent at the theatre or other public spectacles, rob our studies of much time, (for time herein is lost that is spent in any thing else), what shall we think ambition, avarice, and envy will be able to effect, the turbulency of which infests even our sleep, filling our minds with the same agitations as by day ? Nothing surely can cut out so much business for itself, is transformed into so many shapes, is mangled and torn by such a variety of passions, as a vicious mind is. When it broods upon mischief, it is divided between hope, anxiety, and pain ; and when it has perpetrated what it has projected, then is it excruciated by inquietude, remorse, and the expectation of the worst sort of punishment. Amidst these, what room is there for literature, or any useful art ? Certainly, not more than for an abundant harvest in a piece of ground over-run with thorns and thistles.

To undergo the fatigue of study, is not temperance necessary ? And if so, what hopes can be conceived from lewdness and debauchery ? Is not the love of praise a very strong incentive to the pursuit of learning ; but can we think the wicked pay any regard to glory ? It is plain that the greatest part of an oration consists in a discussion of what is just and honest ; and will a bad and

unjust man be able to speak of these with propriety and dignity ?

But to bring to a short issue a good part of this question, let us suppose, what is impracticable, an equal share of wit, study, and learning in a bad and good man : which of them will be the better orator ? Undoubtedly the good man ; and the bad will never be a perfect orator ; for nothing is perfect, when any thing else compared with it, is better.

But lest, after the manner of the Socratics, we might seem to make what answers we please to ourselves, let us again suppose one so obstinate against truth as to say, that a bad man with an equal share of wit, study, and learning, may prove an orator in no respect inferior to a good man. Let us likewise convince this opponent of the folly of his assertion. It will not admit of a doubt, that every orator endeavours to make appear true and honest whatever he has stated to the judge. Now, which will more easily enforce this persuasion, the good or the bad man ? Certainly the good man, and truth and honesty will much more frequently shine from his words. But if sometimes, with the view to some duty, which may happen, as I shall soon shew, he shall endeavour to make pass for truth what is not, even then he must deserve a greater degree of credibility from the judges : whereas this very pretence must fail of obtaining its effect in bad men, from the contempt their judgments are held in, and the opinion of their never being conversant with rectitude. Whence they immodestly propose, and affirm

affirm without shame; and the consequence of their not being able to make good their assertions, is a disagreeable obstinacy, and a labour that serves no manner of purpose; for as in life, so also in the causes they may undertake, their schemes as wicked, generally terminate in an unprosperous issue. It likewise frequently happens that they are not believed even when they speak truth; so that such an advocate is commonly an argument of a bad cause.

II. I must now make answer to a popular prejudice, which strives to bear hard against what I have hitherto advanced. Was not Demosthenes an orator, and yet his character seems very equivocal? Was not Cicero an orator, and yet many have found fault with his morals?

Now the question is how to behave, and as my answer may offend several, it may not be amiss first to beg a patient hearing. As to Demosthenes, he does not seem to have been a man of such bad morals, that we should have reason to believe to his prejudice all the aspersions of his enemies, when otherwise there is good authority for being convinced that he gave most excellent counsels to the republic of Athens, and made an * exit worthy of so great a man. Neither do I see that Cicero ever wanted an inclination to do any duty that might be expected from a good citizen. His consulship, in which he behaved nobly; his † pro-

* Demosthenes finding it impracticable to make his escape from Antipater, Alexander's successor, who had shut him up in a temple, put an end to his life, by taking the poison he carried about him under the stone of his ring.

† Cilicia, where he acted in quality of proconsul.

vince, which he administered with all possible integrity; the government of the * Vigintivirate, which he opposed contrary to his own interest; the civil wars, which were desperate in his time, and during which, neither hope, fear, nor intrigues, could make his mind waver, and sever him from the better party, I mean the republic, are sufficient proofs of what I say. He seemed to some, not to have courage enough; but himself made them a proper answer, that he was not timorous at engaging in dangers, but only in his forecast of them; which he justified by his own death, in which he shewed himself resolute and magnanimous.

If consummate virtue was wanting in these two men, I will answer those who ask, if they were orators, what the Stoics would answer, if asked, whether Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus, were sages; that they were indeed great and venerable, but had not attained all the perfection human nature is capable of. For Pythagoras did not assume to himself the title of sage, as was usual before his time, but only chose to be called a philosopher or lover of wisdom.

According, however, to the common way of speaking, I have often said, and will say, that Cicero was a perfect orator, as we commonly style

* After the death of Cæsar, some were of opinion that an alteration was necessary in the state of the republic, and therefore it should be made Aristocratical by electing twenty men to govern the commonwealth. Cicero, though nominated among the twenty, opposed vigorously this design. It appears too, from one of his letters to Atticus. l. ix. ep. 2. that he rejected the same measure, when proposed by Cæsar himself.

our friends good and prudent men, though these qualities cannot be well ascribed to any but the perfect sage.

But if I were to speak properly, and according to the exactness of truth, I shall seek after that orator, whom Cicero himself sought for. And though I confess, that he stood on the summit of eloquence, scarce any thing being found to be added to him, but something perhaps to be retrenched in him; (for so the learned have generally judged, that there were many perfections in him, and some faults; and himself informs us he had much curtailed his juvenile abundance); yet, as he had not attributed to himself the name of sage, though he had no mean opinion of himself, and could certainly have spoken better with longer life, and more peaceable times for study, I should not wrong my judgment in believing he wanted that perfection, to which indeed none approached nearer. If I had thought otherwise, I might have corroborated my sentiments in a stronger and fuller manner. Has not M. Antonius * said, which is a no less bold assertion, that he had not yet seen any one whom he might have called eloquent? Cicero † himself is still in quest of him, and only imagines such, and frames to himself an idea of him: shall I not then presume to say, but that in the immense portion of time which is to come, there may be something more perfect than what has been? I say nothing of those, who in respect to eloquence, have neither done justice to Cicero, nor Demosthenes; though indeed De-

* Orat. xviii.

† De Orat. iii. 83, &c. Orat. vii. &c.

mosthenes does not seem sufficiently perfect to Cicero himself, who, he says, sometimes nods; nor does Cicero to Brutus and Calvus, who to his face find fault with his composition; nor does Cicero likewise to the two Pollios, who with a sort of virulence, stigmatize in many places the faults of his style.

III. Suppose it now granted, which nature will not admit of, that some bad man has been found of consummate eloquence; I will notwithstanding deny that he is an orator. To all expert at fighting, I would not grant the name of brave, because I cannot have an idea of bravery without virtue. Is not a fidelity, not to be corrupted by the desire of gain, not to be warped by interest, not to be dismayed by fear, required in him, who is called in to defend a cause; and shall I bestow the sacred name of orator, on a traitor, deserter, and prevaricator?

If that which is commonly called probity is so essential even to the inferior class of advocates, why should not that orator, who has not yet been, but may be, as well perfect in morals, as the talent of eloquence? It is not the business of an attorney I here pretend to conduct, nor the pleading of a mercenary voice, nor (to avoid any opprobrious kind of expression) what they vulgarly call a lawyer, who cannot be said to be a useless person in the management of a cause; but a man of superior excellence in genius, who has a comprehensive knowledge of many fine arts, who has been at length granted for the happiness of the world, such as no antiquity was before acquainted with, singular, perfect in all respects, and

and conceiving and speaking things in the best manner.

But is a person of such eminent accomplishments wanting to protect injured innocence, to check the insolence of the wicked ; or is there an occasion for his abilities in a money transaction to canvass where a fraud lies to the prejudice of truth ? This great orator may indeed interfere in such sorts of business, but he will shine with much brighter lustre in matters of greater consequence, as when he is to influence the counsels of a senate, and rectify the errors of a people by bringing them back to a better way of thinking. Does not Virgil seem to give us an idea of such a grand personage in him, whom he introduces quelling the fury of an enraged populace :

* Sedition oft in populous towns
Is rais'd, and fierce th' ignoble vulgar storm ;
Now stones, and firebrands fly ; rage arms supplies :
If chance they then espy a sage, rever'd
For piety and worth ; all silent stand
List'ning with ears attentive. TRAPP,

Here integrity is the first thing taken notice of in the orator ; the poet adds afterwards eloquence :

With his words
He rules their passion, and their heat allays.

Shall not likewise in war, the same, whom we here form, if the soldier is to be exhorted to gal-

* Æn. i. 155.

lant behaviour; shall he not, I say, make out his speech from the very pith of the wisest precepts? For how shall they, who are on the point of engaging, rid themselves of the many apprehensions of toil, pain, and death itself, unless love of the country, prowess, and the stimulating image of honour and glory succeed in their place? Of all these he will best persuade others, who has first a thorough conviction of them himself. Dissimulation, how much soever on its guard, will betray itself; neither can the faculty of elocution be ever so great, as not to stumble and hesitate in some measure, when the heart gives the lie to the mouth. A bad man indeed must speak otherwise than he thinks; but a virtuous sincerity of speech will never be wanting to the good; nor will the invention of the best things, their minds being also adorned with wisdom's precepts; and this their invention, though it may be destitute of the little charms of art, yet is it sufficiently embellished by native beauties; because whatever comes recommended by a character of virtue, cannot fail also of being accompanied with persuasion.

Wherefore let youth, nay every stage of life, for no time is late for an upright intention, tend to, and labour to attain this, with all the powers of their mind; perhaps at length they may compass it. For if nature is no impediment to honesty and eloquence being united in the same person, why may not some one be able to attain both? And why may not every one hope to be this some one? If we do not for the purpose find sufficient vigour of genius, yet whatsoever our progress may be, we shall certainly be the better for

both. At least let us rid our minds of the infatuation, that eloquence the finest gift in nature, can be allied to vice. The talent of speaking, if even found in a bad man, should be regarded as an evil, and so much the more, as it makes those worse to whose lot it falls.

IV. But as there will be always in the world many more votaries of eloquence than of virtue, I fancy that I hear some say: Why then is eloquence so much built upon art? Why have you spoken of rhetorical colours, the defence of difficult causes, and something also of confessed guilt, unless the force and powers of eloquence should sometimes impugn truth itself? For an honest man will plead none but good causes, and these truth will be sufficient of itself to defend, even without learning.

I. It will not be improper to satisfy these opponents, first, in answering them concerning what I have written myself; and next, concerning the duty of a good man, if at any time he should have an occasion to undertake the defence of criminals. There is some utility in discussing, how sometimes an orator may speak for falshood or even injustice, if for no other reason than to to be more ready and expert at detecting and refuting them: just so will that physician apply remedies with better success than another, who has acquired a knowledge of such as may be hurtful in the disease he treats. The Academicians, from maintaining both sides of the question in all their disputations, do not therefore equivocate in their moral character. Carneades was not more an unjust man, for having at Rome, before

before Cato the Censor, disputed with not less strength of argument, against justice, than he did the day before for it. It is then the adverse malice that discovers to us what virtue is; and equity becomes more manifest from the consideration of its opposite; and many things are proved by their contraries. Therefore the designs of adversaries should be as well known to an orator, as of an enemy to the general of an army.

2. But that which seems so harsh at first sight, a good man's disguising or concealing sometimes the truth from a judge in his defence of a cause, may admit of its justification. And if any one should be surprised at my advancing this proposition, though it is no particular opinion of mine, but of several grave personages, whom antiquity has acknowledged for masters in the science of morality, let it be considered, that most things are honest or dishonest, not so much in themselves, as by their principle and motive. For if it be often a virtue to kill a man; if sometimes it be a noble act to make a sacrifice of one's children; if certain things, still harsher in their nature, be allowable, when the public welfare is interested; we must not consider in its naked condition, the sort of cause a good man defends, but why and with what intention he defends it.

And first all * must grant me, which the most

* St. Augustine in his book of lies, and in many other passages of his works, proves at large and incontestably, that upon no account whatever any one should tell a lie. Among other testimonies from Scripture, he insists particularly on the following texts: "Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing." Psal. v. 6. "The mouth that believeth, slayeth the soul." Wisd. i. 11. ROLLIN.

rigid of the Stoics would say I am right in, that a good man upon some occasions may tell a lie, and sometimes also in matters of little moment: as when children are sick, we may make them believe many things to engage them to do what may be conducive to their health, and we promise them many things we do not intend to perform. Now, if in such cases a lie may be allowed, how much more will it, when an assassin may be diverted from his horrid purpose of murder, or an enemy deceived for the safety of the country; so that what in one respect may be reprehensible in servants, may in another be commendable in a prudent man: and if these reasons hold good, I see a possibility of many concurring circumstances to induce an orator to undertake a cause on good grounds, which he otherwise would not without an honest and lawful motive.

I do not say this to pretend that a more * rigorous regard should be had for justice in pleading for a father, brother, or friend, whose lives and fortunes are at stake; though here our perplexity is great, suspended on one side by giving justice its due, and on the other warped from it by affection. But let us place this matter beyond doubt. Suppose a man has attempted the life of a tyrant, and for so doing stands indicted: Will not our orator desire to preserve the life of this man, and if he undertakes his defence, will he not conduct

* Quintilian here enlarges further on his precept; thinking not only that bad causes may be undertaken for those we are obliged to defend, either upon account of the ties of kindred, or friendship; but he extends the matter to all persons, provided the motive be good. This therefore is said by Quintilian by way of prolepsis or anticipation.

it by such rhetorical colours, as another would in pleading a bad cause before a court of justice?

Again, if a judge should be thought intent upon condemning some things which argue a rectitude in their nature, will not there be in such case a necessity of denying the fact, and will not by this means the orator save, not only an innocent, but also a good citizen? And if it be known, that some things, though just in their nature, are by the condition of the times rather detrimental to the public welfare, shall he not use an art in speaking, good indeed in the main, but like the stratagems practised for succeeding in a business where direct means would prove ineffectual?

It cannot also be doubted, if the wicked can be reclaimed, and brought to a better course of life, as it is granted they sometimes may, but that it would be more to the advantage of the commonwealth to have them saved, than punished. If therefore the orator is convinced within himself, that the delinquent will approve himself for the future the man of integrity, will not he use his best endeavours to save him from the rigour of the law?

Now, setting the case that a good general is justly accused of some heinous crime, and yet without having recourse to his skill the state cannot well defend itself: will not the common interest assign him an orator for his defence? Undoubtedly, it was with this view that Fabritius, on the threatening of a war, gave publicly his
vote

vote for creating Cornelius * Rufinus consul, as knowing him to be a good general, though otherwise a bad citizen, and one by whom he had been ill treated; and when some were surprised at what he had done, he gave them this answer: "That he had rather be robbed by a citizen, than sold by the enemy." If therefore Fabritius had been an orator, would he not have defended the same Rufinus, though manifestly guilty of embezzling the public money?

Many like cases and precedents might be cited, but any one of these is sufficient; for my intention is not that the orator I form should often have recourse to these measures, but only in consequence of any of the above cogent motives; so that our definition will be not less true, "That an orator is an honest man, skilled in the art of speaking."

It is not less necessary to teach, and to be informed, how things difficult to be proved ought to be treated; as frequently the best causes resemble bad ones, and a man may be accused unjustly, though all appearances make against him. In a case of this sort, the defence is to be conducted, as if there was real guilt. There are also many things common to good and bad causes, as witnesses, letters, suspicions, prejudices; and probabilities are corroborated and refuted much the same way as truth. Therefore every thing may be made to tend in the pleading to the good of

* This Rufinus was guilty of many fraudulent practices, and was accused by Fabritius of embezzling the public money. See this history in Cicero, de Orat. ii. 268. and in Gell. l. iv. c. 8.

the cause, and so far as it will be able to bear, yet always with a reserve to the uprightness of heart and purity of intention.

C H A P. II.

That the knowledge of philosophy is necessary to the orator.

I. *The orator ought to acquire a knowledge in such things as are conducive to the forming of his morals, that he may not only improve thereby in his integrity, but also in his skill of speaking.* II. *Every part of philosophy is necessary to the orator.—Dialectics.—Ethics.—Natural philosophy.—Which he confirms by examples.* III. *Philosophy is not to be learned from any one particular author, but from all such as are reputed good.—Examples likewise of illustrious sayings and deeds deserve to be known, with which the Roman history abounds.*

I. **I**T is essential, as we have shewn, to the orator, to be a person of integrity; but he cannot be thought to be recommended by that quality without virtue; and though virtue borrows its rudiments from nature, yet does it require the help of learning in order to perfection. Morality should therefore be the orator's favourite study, and he should be thoroughly acquainted with the whole discipline of honesty and justice, without which no one can be a good man, nor skilled in speaking. This may be a rational way of thinking, unless perhaps we choose to join those in
opinion,

opinion, who say that nature does all in respect to morals, and stands in no need of any helps from discipline; and though they acknowledge, that manufactures, even such as are of the meanest quality, cannot be learned without a teacher; yet, are they pleased to assert, that virtue, the only quality by which we approach most in quality to the immortal gods, comes to us without seeking after it, and without trouble, and principally because we are born rational beings. But shall that man be temperate, who is ignorant of what temperance is? Shall he be courageous, who has never endeavoured to rid his mind of the apprehensions of pain, death, and superstition? Shall he be just, who never in any learned dissertation has treated of what is honest and equitable, and who has contracted no acquaintance with laws, either those which nature has prescribed to all men, or such as are appointed for the particular observance of certain people and nations? All this indeed, is a matter of little consequence to those, who think it so easy!

But to say no more on this point, which, I think, even the most illiterate will not doubt of, let us return to the following, which is, that he will not be sufficiently skilled in speaking, who has not thoroughly inspected the whole force of nature, and formed his morals by precepts and reflection. It is not without reason L. Crassus asserts in the third book of the Orator, that whatever is discussed concerning equity, justice, truth, goodness, and their opposites, belong properly to the orator; and that philosophers, when they inculcate these virtues by eloquent dissertation, use

not their own weapons, but those of rhetoricians. The same, however, confesses that the knowledge of these things is now to be had from philosophy, as seeming to retain most the possession of them. And this also is what Cicero testifies in many of his books and epistles, that the accomplishments of speaking must flow from the very sources of wisdom; and therefore for a good time the same persons continued teachers as well of morality as of eloquence.

But I do not aim, by what I here advise, at making the orator a philosopher, as no scheme of life recedes more from civil duties, and all the functions of an orator. For who among philosophers has been observed to frequent the bar, or has made himself famous at harangues in the assemblies of the people; and which of them has borne a part in the administration of the commonwealth, of which most of them counsel the declining? But him, whom I form, I would have as a Roman sage, approving himself the true statesman, not amidst the disputations of reclusive life, but by action and due experience in business. But as the study of philosophy had been deserted by them, who had turned their application to eloquence; now, no longer conversant in its natural functions, it has shut itself out from the light of the bar, having first retreated into porticos and academies, and soon after into public schools; so that, whatever is necessary in it for an orator, as not being taught by masters of eloquence, he must seek after from those with whom it has remained.

The

The authors who have written of virtue are to be well studied, that the orator's life may be conformable with the science of divine and human things. And how much more sublime and fine would these appear, if they were to be taught by those, who have distinguished themselves by eloquent speaking? Would to heaven the time would once come, when some orator, perfect as we wish him to be, by making just reprisals, might assert his right to, and incorporate this part with eloquence, which some by the arrogant name they have given it, and others by the vices they have tarnished it with, have made odious and contemptible.

II. Philosophy * is divided into three parts, natural, moral, and ratiocinative, every one of which is naturally allied with the orator's functions.

To begin with the last, the object of which is to think and speak with justness, none will doubt of its belonging to the orator, if it be his business to know the propriety of each expression, to clear up ambiguities, to disentangle perplexed matters, to judge between truth and falsehood, to make accurate inductions, and to display a thing in all its lights according to the prescript of a certain method. This part, however, is not so minutely, and with such precision, to be used in pleadings, as in disputations; because it is the orator's duty, not only to instruct, but to move and please; for which as much vehemence and force are required in one respect, as graceful manner in another.

* Of philosophy, see Cic. in Orat. 113, 120.

Thus a large river, contained in a full and deep channel, flows with a more impetuous current, than a shallow brook, which purling skips over small pebbles.

And as the teachers of athletic exercises do not instruct their pupils in all those gestures and motions they call * attitudes, that they may use them all in any one of the strifes they engage in, (for then more is gained by weight, and firmness, and ardour of grappling with the antagonist) but that out of the many they have learned, one or other may occasionally serve their purpose: so dialectics, or that disputative and contentious part of philosophy, useful as it often is, for definitions, for making things understood, for pointing out their differences, for clearing up their ambiguities, for distinguishing, for dividing, for bringing adversaries into dilemmas, for drawing conclusions by implication; yet, if it assumes to itself the whole strife at the bar, it will be a hindrance to better things, and will consume by subtilities the manly vigour of the discourse, sliced and minced out into its own slender habit. You may therefore find some surprisingly acute in disputation, who, when once they pass out of the byass of cavilling, become quite impotent in their exertions at any important stretch of eloquence; just like some little animals, which have agility enough to escape pursuit in a narrow pass, but are as easily run down and laid hold of in an open field.

* He here calls *numeros* the fitness in conformation of that motion and gesture, which contributes to gracefulness, as appears from the ninth book, where he says: *metrum in verbis modo, rhythmus etiam in corporis motu est.*

As to that part of philosophy, which is called moral or ethics, the whole of it certainly in a very particular manner regards the orator; for in the great diversity of causes, as observed in the foregoing books, some being founded upon conjecture, some on definition, some on a disceptation of right, some on a default of the action, and some on a point in law, the relation of which to the fact in question, is made to appear by induction, or these are shewn to run counter to each other, or to be different in meaning by an ambiguity of terms; in this diversity, I say, scarce one occurs but may be said to imply some discussion concerning what is equitable and honest. It is likewise well known, that a good many causes are intirely on the quality of the fact, which purely constitutes a moral question; but in deliberations, what method of counsel is without a question of honesty? And what shall I say of the demonstrative kind, consisting of praise or dispraise, has it not for object vice and virtue?

Shall not the orator have constantly an occasion to enlarge much on justice, fortitude, temperance, love of the country, and benevolence? Therefore our man of integrity, who is not acquainted with all these virtues by their names only, or has not merely learned them by hearsay for the improvement of language, but has imbibed the essence of virtue in heart and mind; he, and he only, will not be at a loss to speak worthily of them, and to express his real and genuine thoughts.

Now, as a general question is more comprehensive and prevalent than a special one, because the part is contained in the whole, and not the

whole in the part, no one will therefore doubt but that general questions are strictly allied to the kind of knowledge we speak of; and, as there are many things, the nature of which requires to be cleared up by accurate and short definitions, whence the state of causes called definitive; will not they, who have best studied these particulars, be able to elucidate them in the most satisfactory manner to others? Again, does not every question of right, depend either on a propriety of terms, or a disceptation concerning equity, or conjecture about the intention of the lawgiver, part of which belongs to dialects and part to ethics? I therefore conclude that there is no oration, which is truly such, but naturally partakes of these two parts of philosophy; for a readiness of speech will have little effect, if untutored in a knowledge of this sort, and it must of course go astray, as having none or but false guides.

The part of philosophy, which is called natural, besides that it allows eloquence scope for exercise, so much the more spacious, by how much divine things are treated with more force and elevation than human, embraces also the whole moral system, without which, as I said, there can be no eloquence. If the world be governed by providence, it is certain that good men ought to apply themselves to the administration of the commonwealth. If our souls are of divine origin, we must endeavour to adorn them with virtue, and not to make them subservient to the pleasures of an earthly body. Will not the orator frequently treat of these matters? And will not he also of the responses of augurs, and of every thing

pertaining to religion, concerning which there are often important debates in the senate; because, as I think, he ought in all respects to be qualified as the real statesman? And indeed, what degree of eloquence can be imagined in a man, ignorant of the best and most sublime notions in nature?

Though what I say were not self-evident, we could not, however, refuse believing it on the authority of examples. It appears that the great natural philosopher Anaxagoras had for his pupil Pericles, whose eloquence, though no monuments have been transmitted to us, is represented to us, both by historians, and the writers of the old comedy, persons who never disguised their sentiments, as animated by a force surpassing all belief. Demosthenes, the most excellent of all the Greek orators, had Plato for his master in philosophy. Cicero himself * informs us, that he was not so much indebted to schools of rhetoric for his eloquence, as to the shady walks of the spacious gardens of the † Academy. And, indeed, he never would have been possessed of so wonderful a fertility of genius, if he had circumscribed it by the precinct of the bar, and not by the boundaries of nature.

III. But hence arises this other question, “What sect of philosophers can contribute most to the improvement of eloquence?” The dispute cannot indeed extend to many; for Epicurus first debars us of all commerce with him, ordering his

* Orat. xii.

† So called from Academus, a citizen of Athens, who made the philosophers a present of his gardens; and hence also is derived the name of the Academic sect.

disciples to decline the study of all sciences. Ariftippus, by making our chief happiness to consist in the pleasures of the body, can give us no encouragement to engage in this trouble. What service can Pyrrho be to us ; he, who is not certain of the existence of judges, before whom we speak, of defendants for whom we speak, and of a senate to whom we give advice in their deliberations ? Some believe the Academic sect would be of singular utility to eloquence, because its custom of disputing on both sides of the question, is nearly a-kin to the exercises of the bar ; and they add by way of proof, that it has produced men very eminent for eloquence. The Peripatetics also boast of contributing something to the advancement of oratory, being said to be the first who had instituted the maintaining of theses for the sake of exercise. The Stoics, obliged to acknowledge that most of their authors were deficient in the richness and lustre of eloquence, in requital pretend, that none prove with so much force, nor conclude with so much subtilty.

But let this be a disputable matter among those, who engaged, as it were, by oath, or bound by a kind of religious obligation, think they should be guilty of something highly criminal, if in the least they dissented from the persuasion they once embraced. The orator has no occasion to make himself the devotee of any sect. His views tend to something greater and more excellent, being a candidate for consummate abilities, because he is to be perfect as well in life, as in eloquent accomplishments. Let him therefore, as an example of well-speaking, propose to himself the imitation
of

of every philosopher that has been any way remarkable for eloquence; and for forming his morals, let him make choice of the honestest precepts, and the most direct road that leads to virtue. He may use indeed all sorts of exercises, but principally the greatest and noblest subjects; for what more abundant matter for grave and copious discourse can be found than to make dissertations on virtue, the administration of the republic, the wisdom of providence, the origin of human minds, and the laws of friendship? These are the things which inspire at once with elevation both the soul and the discourse: the true goods, that allay fear, restrain desires, rid us of vulgar opinions, and beget in the mind a heavenly disposition.

And it is not only meet in the orator to have a knowledge of the just mentioned philosophic notions; but much more should he revolve in his mind the noble deeds and sayings antiquity has handed down to us; of which indeed there cannot be examples in greater number, nor more memorable and illustrious than those which stand upon record in the monuments of our city. Who can give better lessons of fortitude, faith, justice, temperance, frugality, contempt of pain and death, than a Fabritius, Curius, Regulus, Decius, Mutius, and others without number? For, by how much the Greeks are rich in excellent precepts, by so much the Romans, which is of far more consequence, are great in examples. The * orator

* The text here seems to be corrupt; we have, however, endeavoured to bring it to the most rational sense it could well admit of.

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therefore in having a lively sense of these sublime
maxims, and in copying these noble models, will
not pay so great a regard to the consideration of
immediate circumstances, and the contingencies of
the time present, as he shall to the memory of
posterity, and that immortal glory which waits an
honest life. Let him then drink from such pure
fountains those long draughts of integrity, and
thence let him derive that noble liberty, which
should always exert itself at the bar and in the
senate; for no orator will ever be perfect but him
who knows how, and dares to speak according to
the upright intentions of his mind.

C H A P. III.

*That the knowledge of the civil law is necessary to
the orator.*

THE knowledge of the civil * law will be
likewise necessary for the orator we have hi-
therto described, and together with it that of the
customs and religion of the commonwealth he may
take charge of; for how shall he be enabled to
give counsel in public and private deliberations,
if ignorant of so many things which concur parti-
cularly to the establishment of the state? And
must he not falsely aver himself to be the patron
of the causes he undertakes, if obliged to borrow
from another what is of greatest consequence in
these causes, in some measure like those, who re-

* Of the civil law, see Cicer. de Orat. i. 166, 203.

peat the writings of * poets? And how will he go through with what he has so undertaken, if the things, which he requires the judge to believe, he shall speak on the faith of another; and if he the reputed helper of his clients, shall himself stand in need of the help of another?

But we will suppose him not reduced to this inconveniency, having studied sufficiently at home his cause, and having thoroughly informed himself of all that he has thought proper to lay before the judges: yet, what shall become of him in unforeseen questions, which are often suddenly started on the back of pleadings? Will he not with great unseemliness, look about him? Will he not ask the lower class of † advocates how he shall behave? Can he be accurate in comprehending the things then whispered him, when he is instantly to speak to them? Can he strongly affirm, or speak ingenuously for his clients? Grant he may in his pleadings; but what shall be his fate in altercation, when he must have his answer ready, and he has no time for receiving information? And what if that person learned in the law, is not assisting? What, if one that knows little of the matter, tells him something that is wrong? And this is the greatest mischief of ignorance, to believe such a monitor intelligent.

What I here animadvert upon, is not from being in any wise ignorant of what is ‡ practised

* The poets sometimes distrusting their own pronounciation, had their writings repeated and pronounced by others.

† He there calls advocate him, who prompts the law, as Asconius says.

‡ Among the Romans, as we learn from Asconius, some were advocates, some proctors, attornies, and sollicitors, who

by us in this respect, or' from having forgot that there are always assistants at the bar, ready to furnish the antagonists with what weapons they may have occasion for: neither am I ignorant that the same thing is customary among the Greeks, and that hence came their term pragmatic, to specify this sort of prompters. But I speak of the orator who owes not only to the causes he defends the assistance of his voice, but all and every particular that may be of service to it. I would not therefore have him to be at a loss how to proceed, if on any unexpected emergency he should be obliged to speak extempore; neither would I have him unskilled in the due method of examining witnesses: for who would not rather be prepared for every thing he may think of finding in a cause when he comes to plead it? Unless perhaps one might suppose that man to be a proper general, who is indeed brave and resolute in battle, and can make all the necessary dispositions for fighting it to advantage; but abstractedly from the act of mere fighting, cannot make a draught, nor muster his forces, nor display their ranks, nor secure his convoys, nor encamp to advantage. Making preparations for war, is certainly prior to its being waged. But the orator must resemble such a general, when he leaves to the management of others, many things which contribute to his success; and more especially, as this knowledge of the civil law, which is quite necessary to him, is

helped out the orator and prompted him with the law; so the Greeks had their practitioners and pettyfoggers, who sat behind the pleaders, and upon occasion instructed them, telling them what the law, and the meaning of the law, was.

not so difficult, as it may perhaps appear at a distance.

Whatever is considered as having the force and sanction of law, is either grounded upon some written act, or depends on custom. That, which is supported by neither of these authorities, must be discussed and decided by the rule of equity. The laws that are written, and such as exist from usage and custom, admit of no difficulty, being only objects for knowledge, and not for invention. The laws, which are explained by the commentaries of civilians, either consist of an interpretation of the terms they are conceived in, or of placing a distinction between right and wrong. To understand the import of every term, is either common to the learned, or proper to the orator. Every honest man may be a judge in equity.

Now, as we suppose the orator to be in a very particular manner, both a learned and honest man; when he has made a competent study of that which is naturally best, it will give him little trouble if a lawyer differs from him in opinion, since they even are allowed to be of different opinions among themselves. But if he desires to know their sentiments on any point of law, he need only read a little, which is the least laborious part of study; and if many, from despairing to acquire the necessary talents for speaking in public, have engaged in the study of the law, with how much the more ease will this be effected by the orator, which is learned by those, who from their own confession could not be orators?

M. Cato was as much distinguished by his great eloquence, as by his great learning in the law.

Scævola

Scævola and Servius Sulpitius, both eminent lawyers, were also very eloquent. Cicero, not only in pleading, never appeared at a loss in the knowledge of the law, but also began to write some tracts on it; from all which examples it appears, that an orator may not less attend to the teaching than the learning of it.

But what we have here recommended concerning the improvement of morals, and the study of the law, let none therefore imagine reprehensible; because we have known many, who disgusted at the labour that is necessary for all candidates of eloquence, have taken refuge in these bye-ways of sloth. Some have gone no farther than the * records of some courts, and the titles of some law-chapters, choosing rather to remain, as † Cicero says, in the condition of solicitors; and yet these presume that they had applied themselves to what was most useful, when they only sought what was most easy. Others give into an indolence of a more arrogant nature; by suddenly appearing with a composed countenance, and long beard, as if they looked down with contempt on oratorical precepts: they then frequent for some time the schools of philosophers, that afterwards grave abroad, and dissolute in private, they may at least acquire some authority at the expence of others; for philosophy can play the hypocrite, but not eloquence.

* He calls *album* in the text, either that in which the prætor's edicts were kept upon record, or in which were written the names of judges. He calls *rubricas* the titles of the law, as being tinged with red lead and vermillion,

† De Orat. i. 236.

C H A P. IV.

That the knowledge of history is necessary to the orator:

THE orator ought likewise to furnish himself with a great number of examples, as well ancient as modern ; and therefore ought not only to be acquainted with such as are recorded in history, or handed down by tradition, together with a knowledge of what is daily transacted ; but even ought not to neglect the fictions of the more celebrated poets. The first, are equivalent to testimonies, or adjudged cases ; the second, are either secure under the sanction of antiquity, or are supposed to have been invented by great men in the way of precepts. Let therefore the orator endeavour to store up as many as he can ; and hence it is that the old are suffered to assume more authority than others, because thought to have seen and known more ; which we frequently find attested by Homer. But we must not wait to the last of our lives to study history, which has this prerogative, that those conversant in it seem to have as much experience, as if they had lived many ages.

C H A P.

C H A P. V.

That excellency of mind and confidence is necessary to the orator.—Of the natural instruments of the orator.

THESE are what I promised I should give an account of, instruments not of art, as some have thought, but of the Orator himself. These arms the orator ought to have at hand ; and with the knowledge of them he ought to be well furnished, seconded by a plenty of words and figures flowing in upon him with ease, a methodical invention, a well practised disposition, a strength of memory, and grace of action.

But of these the best and most effectual is, an excellency and confidence of mind, unabashed by fear, unawed by clamours, and uninfluenced by the authority of an audience, so as to make no concessions over and above the respect that is due to them. For, as the contrary vices, presumption, temerity, self-conceit, arrogance, are abominable ; so without a decent assurance, magnanimity, and fortitude, art, study, learning, would avail nothing ; just like weapons put into the hands of the feeble and dastardly. It is indeed with regret I must say, as my words may be liable to be misconstrued, that shamefacedness is a vice, though an amiable one, and easily productive of virtues ; yet sometimes of singular prejudice, as being the cause why many, not venturing to expose the fine qualities of their genius and erudition to public inspection

inspection, have suffered them to be consumed by the rust of obscurity.

But if one in reading what I here say, might not perhaps be sufficiently intelligent at distinguishing the force of words, let him know, that it is not modesty I condemn, but shamefacedness, which is a certain fear withdrawing the mind from what it ought to do; whence ensue confusion, sorrow for having undertaken a thing, and sudden silence. Now, who should doubt of placing among vices an affection, which makes us ashamed of well-doing? Yet would I not have him who is to speak, to rise unconcerned, to shew no change of colour, and to betray no sense of danger; which if they might not happen, they ought at least to be pretended. But this sense should proceed from a sollicitude of well performing our duty, and not from a motive of fear, and we may decently betray emotion, but not faint away. The best remedy therefore for bashfulness, is a modest assurance, and how weak soever the forehead may be, it ought to be lifted up, and well it may, by conscious merit.

There are also natural instruments, as I specified in the beginning of this work, which are helped by care, and these are the voice, lungs, a good presence, and graceful action, which are advantages sometimes so considerable, as to beget the reputation of wit. Our age produced orators, more copious than Trachallus; but when he spoke, he seemed to surpass them all: so great was the advantage of his stature, the sprightliness of his eyes, the majesty of his aspect, the beauty of his
action,

action, and a voice, not as Cicero * desires it should be, almost like that of tragedians, but surpassing all the tragedians I ever heard. I well remember that when he once pleaded in the Julian hall before the first bench of judges, and there also, as usual, the † four classes of judges were then sitting, and the whole place rung with noise, he was not only heard distinctly from the four benches, but also applauded, which was a disparagement to those that spoke after him. But this is the accumulation of what can be wished for, and a happiness hard to be met with ; and as it cannot fall to every one's lot, let the orator strive at least to make himself heard by those before whom he speaks ; and this is what every orator ought to have a due sense of.

C H A P. VI.

At what time the orator ought to begin to plead causes.

THE time for beginning to plead causes ought to be regulated according to the orator's abilities, and for this reason I shall fix no time, it being certain that ‡ Demosthenes, almost in his childhood, pleaded his own cause against his guardians. Calvus, Cæsar, Pollio, took upon them very important causes, before the age for being

* De Orat. i. 128.

† At first, the centumviri, who administered justice, were divided into two classes, and afterwards into four ; but they all assembled most commonly in one hall.

‡ Some say he was then about thirteen years old.

quæstor.

* *quæstor*. Some are said to have pleaded in their † *prætecta* ; and Cæsar Augustus, when he was but twelve years old, appeared in the rostrum to pronounce the funeral eulogium of his grandmother.

It is more advisable, however, to keep to a certain medium, that a countenance yet unripe for the public eye may not be disconcerted by censure, and that a shew may not be made of studies, which, I may say, are still but in a crude state. For hence arises a neglect in taking pains, and a foundation is laid for effrontery, and what is attended with very bad consequences, presumption anticipates abilities. Yet, on the other hand, I would not have deferred till old age, the making of proper trials ; for fear daily grows upon a person, and attempts constantly become more and more difficult ; and whilst we deliberate when to begin, we then find it too late.

It will therefore be not amiss to produce the fruit of studies in their greenness and first sweets, whilst pardon, and hopes, and favour await them ; whilst it is not unbecoming to make an essay ; whilst age is likely to make amends for whatever may seem deficient ; and whilst juvenile sallies are received as indications of a fine and happy genius : such is that whole passage of Cicero for Sextus ‡ Roscius : “ For what is so common as breath to

* None were admitted to the *quæstorship* till they were full twenty-seven years of age.

† Boys wore the *prætecta* till their seventeenth year, at which time they put on the *toga virilis*.

‡ N. 72.

all living animals, the earth for a sepulchre to the dead, the sea for those who expose themselves to its waves, the shore to them who escape shipwreck ? &c." Which was received with the greatest applause, because Cicero was then only in the twenty-sixth year of his age ; but in more advanced life he disliked himself these sorts of exuberant sallies, confessing them to be youthful * ferments, which time had made to evaporate.

And indeed, how great soever the advantages of private study may be, there is notwithstanding a certain proficiency annexed to appearing at the bar ; the light there is different, the face of real contention is also different ; and practice without learning, if you consider them abstractedly, will have a better effect, than learning without practice. Some therefore waxing old in school-exercises, stand amazed at the novelty of the thing when they proceed to the bar, and seem to require a similarity in all pleadings to their former exercises. But there the judge is silent, and the adversary clamorous ; nothing rashly said is forgot ; if you advance a proposition, you must prove it ; and an elaborate pleading that cost many days and nights study, is not sometimes perhaps half-pronounced, when the water spent in the hour-glass calls for a conclusion. You must besides sometimes speak in a plain and familiar way of discourse, and not always think of puffing out great words and flashy thoughts. This is what our pretenders to eloquence are little acquainted with ; and

* Orat. 107.

therefore not a few are met with, who imagine themselves too eloquent for pleading causes.

Now, the young orator, whom we have called to the bar, and who as yet can make but feeble efforts, I would counsel to begin by what is most easy and favourable in a cause. Just so animals feed their young with the most delicate sorts of prey they can find. But I would not have him always continue in the same route, making his genius callous by still pampering it with the same food; but when once he knows what strife and battle is, which should be the object of his study, he then should take care to recruit and renew his strength by more solid aliments. Thus will he get rid of the fears of his first trials, whilst he finds a facility in his attempts; and this facility in attempt will never bring him to the pass of desisting or making flight of what he is about.

Cicero practised this method, and though he had already made himself famous among the orators then extant, he passed over into Asia, where he again studied philosophy and eloquence under different masters, and especially the latter at Rhodes, under Apollonius Molo, whose pupil he had been before at Rome, and then it was that he gave himself up to be fashioned, and, as it were, anvilled out anew. In short, a work may be said to have attained its whole value, when found to consist of a congruity of precepts and experience.

C H A P. VII.

What the orator ought to observe in the undertaking of causes.

- I. *It is an argument of greater honesty to defend than to accuse. Yet accusation is not always to be declined.—What causes ought principally to be undertaken.—The cause ought to be dropped, as soon as known to be a bad one.* II. *Whether causes ought to be pleaded gratis.*

I. **W**HEN our orator has collected sufficient strength for engaging in all sorts of contentions, his first care ought to be to consider what causes he should undertake. A good man would certainly prefer the defence of the distressed to the making of them such; yet will he not be so averse from the name of accuser, as not to be induced by any public or private consideration, to oblige one to give an account of his life and conversation. For the laws themselves would be of no efficacy, unless enforced by a propriety of eloquence in the pleader; and if it was not allowable to bring wickedness to condign punishment, then wickedness itself may be said to receive a kind of sanction, though to leave the licentiousness of the wicked unrestrained, must certainly be contrary to the interest of the good. The orator therefore, shall not suffer to go unrevenge, neither the complaints of allies, nor the murder of a friend or relation, nor conspiracies formed to the ruin of the commonwealth; yet shall he not thirst after the punishment

ment of the guilty, but only shew himself zealous to curb vice, and correct the depravity of morals. All, who cannot be brought to a better course of life by reason, must certainly be kept within bounds by fear. As therefore it may border upon robbery to lead the life of an accuser, and to be induced by a fee to inform against the guilty ; so to avert an intestine plague, cannot be other than an act, worthy of the most generous defenders of their country.

On this account it was that the leading men in a republic did not decline this duty ; and some young men of illustrious birth, are believed to have made such accusation of bad citizens the undoubted pledge of their love for the commonwealth, because they seemed neither to hate the wicked, nor to draw upon themselves the enmity of others, but from a consciousness of their own integrity. This has been the uniform practice, not only of Hortensius, the Luculli, Sulpitius, Cicero, Cæsar, and many others, but also of the two Catos : one of which has been called the Sage, and unless the other is thought such, I do not know who can. In like manner every orator shall stand up in the defence of the accused, yet shall he not open that salutary haven of his eloquence to pyrates, being influenced chiefly by the goodness of the cause to become its advocate.

But as one man alone is not enough to speak for all those who engage in litigations with some appearance of right, and of these there are a good many, nothing will hinder our orator's paying some deference to the request of persons recommending clients to his care, and particularly to that

of judges : still this deference to another's will must proceed from the orator's sense of his character of probity, and with such he will not fail to maintain an intimate friendship. But he must guard against two kinds of vanity, the one in granting only to the great his ministry against those of low degree ; and the other, which is much more arrogant, in taking always the part of the latter, against persons of dignity ; for it is not fortune that makes the goodness or badness of causes.

If the orator has likewise taken upon him the defence of a cause, which he imagined to be just, and afterwards upon examination found it the reverse, he need not be ashamed to decline all further concern in it, on acquainting his party of what he truly thinks of the matter. The greatest service, if I judge rightly, he can render his client, is not to feed him with vain hopes ; and that client is not worthy of a patron's endeavours, who does not choose to abide by his advice. Certainly it is unseemly in him, whom I would have to approve himself an orator, to defend injustice, knowing it to be such ; and though in some causes, as above mentioned, he may not, for particular reasons, speak the exact truth ; yet his upright intention will exculpate him, as indeed what he does is honest.

II. Whether he ought always to plead gratis, is a question that may deserve also to be examined, as it may be imprudent to decide it at first sight. For, who can be ignorant, but that it would be infinitely more noble, and more becoming the honourable sentiments we require in the orator, not to set a price upon his endeavours, nor
extenuate

extenuate by such an act, mean as it is, the important merit of so great a benefaction? Most things must indeed appear of little account, when they can bear having their price. A blind man, it is said, may see through this as well as the most quick-sighted. So that every orator, who is possessed of a competency, and how little will serve a man, must stand accused of avaricious meanness, if he makes a lucre of his talents.

But if the orator's circumstances are too narrow for the exigencies of life, according to all the laws of wise men he may admit of a return being made him, a contribution having been raised for the support of Socrates; and Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, having accepted of a stipend from their pupils. For my part, I cannot see that there is an honest way of acquiring a livelihood, than that which proceeds from so honest a labour, and from those to whom have been rendered such important services; and if no acknowledgments were to be made on their side, they would certainly be very unworthy of them. This appears to me not only just, but even necessary, as this same labour, and all this time, spent in another's business, debars persons of this profession from acquiring a living by any other means.

However, in this too a certain decorum ought to be kept, as it matters greatly from whom a fee is received, and how much, and how long continued. That pyratrical custom of making bargains, and fixing a price in proportion to the risque of the parties, is an abominable traffic, and ought never to be practised even by those who may seem regardless of a virtuous character. An orator,

defending good men, and good causes, is in no dread of being requited with ingratitude, and should the client prove ingrate, I would rather see the dishonour placed to his account, than to the orator's. Therefore the orator shall have no desire of acquiring any thing beyond a sufficiency, and though poor, he shall not receive any thing by way of fee, but rather build upon a mutual benevolence; conscious to himself, that he has done far more for his clients, than they for him; because a benefaction of this nature ought neither to be sold nor lost, and because, also, the party indebted is in a more particular manner obliged to be grateful.

C H A P. VIII.

What the orator ought to observe in the studying of causes.

I. *The orator ought to have an exact knowledge of the cause he is to plead; and not by the information of another, nor from memoirs, briefs, and declarations in law, but from his own inquiries, and examining into the matter.* II. *He must patiently listen to his client's account of the affair, and that not once; and he must often ask him questions.* III. *He must inspect and scrutinize into all the instruments of the suit.—Lastly, he must consult with himself how he should decide in the litigation, if he was to act as judge.*

I. **T**HE next particular that occurs, is the manner of studying a cause, which is the orator's ground-work. There is hardly one of so slender a genius, who, when he has taken pains to learn

learn every thing in a cause, but may be sufficient to inform the judge of it. But how few are there that give themselves much trouble in this respect. To say nothing of the negligent, who give themselves no concern about the main point of the question, so there be incidents from persons and common places which may afford them a handle for being clamorous; there are some so addicted to vanity, who, either partly as busy, and pretending always to have something they must first clear their hands of, order the client to come to them on the eve, or the very morning of the trial, and sometimes they even boast that they heard him only a moment before the court was sitting: or, who partly to glory in their fine wit and parts, and that they may appear to have a most ready conception, pretend to know and be intelligent in the matter before they have scarce heard any thing; so that when they have blabbed out a deal of nonsense in their eloquent strain, and with the greatest fracas imaginable, by which the judge is not a whit the wiser, nor the cause the better, they procure themselves, another instance of their insipid vanity! to be led back through the Forum, in all their noble sweat and fatigue, by a tribe of sycophants.

I can as little bear with the delicacy of those, who give orders for the matter to be laid before their friends; though indeed here the mischief is less, if these inform themselves properly of it, and afterwards state it with the same exactness. But who shall learn this exact state so well as the advocate himself? And how shall that solicitor, that
go-

go-between interpreter, take pains at conning patiently and strictly an action, which he is not to speak to himself?

Again, it is a very bad custom to imagine the information is sufficient, which is had from those briefs or memoirs, which either the parties themselves compose, who have recourse to an orator, as not being qualified themselves to plead in their cause; or are composed by some of those advocates, who acknowledge their inability for pleading, yet execute what is most difficult in regard to it. But one should think that person ought to shew himself the orator, who does a very difficult part of his duty, being able to judge what ought to be said, and what ought to be suppressed; where some things ought to be altered, and where fiction might be substituted in the place of truth. These persons, however, would not hurt the cause so much, if they wrote down every particular, as transacted. Now they add to things as they might have happened, design and plausible pretexts, and something even of worse tendency. In this condition they are received by most orators, who adhere to them inviolably, as a school-boy does to the heads of his theme; but the mischief is, they afterwards find themselves grossly mistaken, and the state of the cause they refused hearing from their clients, they learn to their confusion from the adversary's pleading.

II. Above all, therefore, let us allow free time and place to those, who consult us; sincerely exhorting them to give a detail of every circumstance, how long soever, and to relate the matter as far
back

back as they please. Less inconveniency will attend the hearing of superfluities, than being ignorant of what is necessary ; and it often happens that the orator finds the wound and remedy in the very things which the client fancied to be of no moment on either side of the question. The orator too need not so much trust to his memory, as not to write down the substance of what he hears.

Neither will it be enough to give the client but one hearing. He should be compelled to say over again, and often the same things ; not only because some things may escape in the first recital, especially a man, as it often happens, illiterate ; but also, in order to know whether he is consistent with himself. For many of them tell lies, and behave, as if they pleaded, and not gave an account of their cause ; as if they held a parley with their judge, and not with their advocate. For which reason a client is never over much to be relied on ; but he must be sifted all manner of ways, put out of his byas, and cross-examined, to try if he should contradict what he has said. For, as it is the business of physicians to cure, not only all visible distempers ; but also to discover all latent ones, though the patients themselves may conceal them ; so an advocate should endeavour to pry into more than is laid before him.

When he has spent time enough in giving his client a patient hearing, he must assume another character, and act the adversary's part, starting to him all imaginable objections, and whatever the nature of the disceptation may bear. He must ask him some shrewd questions, and press him

closely for direct answer ; for whilst strict inquiries are made into each particular, we at length hit upon the truth, when least expected. In short, an unbelieving advocate is best at learning the merits of a cause : for the client generally makes mighty promises, averring that he is able to produce a cloud of witnesses, that he has authentic and well-attested vouchers, and that the adversary himself cannot help the giving up of such and such points.

III. Upon this the client's presumption, it will not be amiss to inspect all the papers and documents relating to the intended law-suit, and such as it may not be enough to look over, ought to be read with attention. For most commonly they are either not intirely as they were promised, or they contain less, or they have something in them that may make against the party, or they prove too much, and are therefore likely to forfeit all credit, as being exaggerated. In short, the * binding of the instrument is often found broke, or the seal affixed to it disfigured, or the signatures of witnesses counterfeited ; all which unless examined at home, will be of the utmost disparagement at the bar ; and the instrument thus defeated, will be more hurtful, than if never a one was to be produced.

The advocate likewise will bring to light many things which the client believed to bear no manner of relation to the cause, by passing in review all

* It was customary, as Paulus remarks, to bind, or sew up their written instruments and letters with a thread or twine of three twists, to which they put a seal of wax on the knot. To this Quintilian alludes. *Signa sine agnitione* in the text, means, when none of the witnesses knows his own signature.

the places of arguments we have * before spoken of ; which, as, for the reasons given, it would be inconvenient to keep in view during a pleading, then trying what each might produce : so, in learning a cause it would be necessary to examine minutely whatever might be discussed in regard to person, time, place, motive, instrument, and all other things, from which not only artificial proofs may be deduced ; but also, what witnesses are to be guarded against, and how they are to be refuted : for it is of some consequence, whether the defendant is an object of envy, hatred, or contempt ; of which the first most commonly is levelled at superiors, the second at equals, and the third at inferiors.

Having thoroughly thus examined the cause, by taking an exact view of every thing favourable or contrary in it, he must lastly act a third part by assuming the character of judge, and by imagining the cause to be pleaded before himself. Then what should move and determine him, if he was to pass sentence upon the same matter, he must think the most cogent and powerful to determine any other ; and so he will seldom be deceived in the event, or it will be the fault of the judge.

* Book v. chap. 10.

C H A P. IX.

What the orator ought to observe in the pleading of causes.

- I. *The desire of temporary praise ought not to divert the orator from attending to the good of the cause he undertakes.—He should not proudly disdain the pleading of smaller causes.* II. *He should abstain from the petulancy of expressing himself in any thing of a scurrilous manner.* III. *He must use all possible care in coming properly prepared to speak.*

I. **T**HE things to be observed in pleading we have mostly given directions for throughout the body of this work ; yet, as some few things are peculiar to this place, not so much contained in the art of speaking, as in the duties of the speaker, I shall now touch upon them. Above all, as it happens to a good many, let not the desire of temporary praise withdraw our orator from having an eye to the interest of the cause he has undertaken. For as generals, in waging wars, do not always march their armies over agreeable plains, but must climb often rugged hills, must lay siege to forts and castles, raised on steep rocks and mountains, and fortified both by nature and art : so an orator will indeed be pleased with the opportunity of being able to make great excursions, and when he engages on champion ground, he will display all his forces so as to make an exceeding fine appearance ; but if under a necessity of unravelling the intricacies of some points of law,

or

or placing truth in a clear light from amidst the obscurity thrown round it, he will not then ostentatiously ride about; nor will he use a shower of pointed sentences, as missive weapons; but he will carry on his operations by counter-acting his enemy; by mines, by ambuscade, and by stratagem: all which are not much commended while they are, but after they have been practised. Whence those profit themselves most, who seem least desirous of praise; for when that frivolous parade of eloquence has ceased its bursts of thunder amongst its own applauders, the more potent applause of true talents will appear in genuine lustre; the judges will not dissemble the impressions that have been made on them; the sense of the learned will outweigh the opinion of ignorance: so true it is, that it is the winding up of the discourse, and the success attending it, that must prove its true merit.

It was customary with the ancients to dissemble their eloquence; and M. Antonius * advises orators so to do, in order to their being the more believed, and to the making of their stratagems less suspected. But the eloquence of those times could be well dissembled, having not yet made an accession of so many luminaries, as to break out through every intervening obstacle to the transmission of their light. But indeed all art and design should be kept concealed, as most things, when once discovered, lose their value. In what I have hitherto spoken of, eloquence loves nothing so much as privacy. A choice of words, a weight

* De Orat. ii.

of thought, an elegance of figures, either do not exist, or they appear. But because they appear, they are not therefore to be displayed with ostentation. Or if one of the two was to be chosen, let the cause rather than the advocate be praised; yet will the event justify him, by his having pleaded excellently a very good cause; still it is certain, that no one pleads so ill as he, who endeavours to please, whilst his cause displeases; because the things by which he pleases must necessarily be foreign to his subject.

Neither ought the orator to be so vainly nice, as not to undertake the pleading of the smaller sort of causes, as if beneath him; or as if a matter of less consequence should in any respect lessen the reputation he has acquired. Duty indeed is a just motive for his undertaking them, and he should wish that his friends were never engaged in any other kind of suits, which in the main are set off with sufficient eloquence, when he has spoken to the purpose.

II. But some, if perchance they have undertaken any of these smaller sorts of causes, fancy they should bedaub them round with foreign embellishments; and if these too cannot be dragged in, they must at least fill up their vacant spaces with invectives, with true, if it may so happen; otherwise, with whatever comes uppermost, so it may afford a subject for being witty, and deserve applause, whilst they continue speaking. But this I think so far unbecoming the perfect orator, that I am persuaded he would not object in the way of invective, even what is true, unless the cause ab-

solutely required it. That indeed must be * a snarling and surly kind of eloquence, as Appius expresses it, which subjects a man to the reputation of having an evil tongue; and they who give into it, must be supposed to be endued with the patience of taking up with a return in kind, being often treated with the same opprobrious language, or the client at least suffers heartily for his advocate's petulance. Yet is this behaviour of a less black dye than the vice of the mind itself, the only difference being opportunity between the saying and doing of that which is bad? The pleasure is certainly base and inhuman, and cannot be acceptable to any good man of the audience. It is true, it is often required by the clients, who consult more their revenge than defence. But neither this, as well as many other things, ought to be done according to their fancy; for what man of spirit could endure the making of himself petulant at the discretion of another?

Some also are very liberal in the abuse of the advocate of the adverse party, and unless he has brought it upon him, I think it is acting by him very ungenerously in consideration of the common duties of the profession. Add to this, that these sallies of passion are of no manner of advantage to him that pleads, the respondent having an equal right to abuse in his turn; and they may even be hurtful to the cause, because the adversary, egged on to become a real enemy, musters together all the forces of wit, to conquer, if possible. Above all, that modesty is irrecoverably lost, which pro-

* *Canina Eloquentia.*

cures for the orator so much authority and belief, if once departing from the character of a good man, he degenerates into the brawler and barker, conforming himself, not to the disposition of the judge, but to the caprice and resentment of the client.

The taking of liberties of this kind does likewise frequently lead the orator to hazard some rash expressions, not less dangerous to the cause, than to himself. Pericles was not wont to wish without good reason, that no word might ever enter his mind, that could give umbrage to the people. But the respect he had for the people, ought in my opinion to be had for all, who may have it in their power to do as much hurt; for the words that seemed strong and bold when expressed, are called foolish, when they have given offence.

III. Now, as every orator is remarkable for his manner, the care of one having been imputed to slowness, and the facility of another to rashness, it may not be amiss to point out here a medium.

Let him come prepared for pleading with all possible care, as it must argue not only neglect, but also a wicked and treacherous disposition in him, to plead worse in the cause he undertakes, than he can; and therefore he should not undertake more causes than he is well able to go thro' with.

He should say things studied and written, in as great a degree as the subject can bear; and, as Demosthenes says, deeply engraven, if it were possible, on his memory, and as perfect as may be. This may be done at the first pleading of a
cause,

cause, and when in public judgments a cause is adjourned for some time before it comes to a rehearing. But when a direct reply is to be made, all due preparations are impracticable; and even they, who are not so ready, find what they have written to be rather a prejudice to them, if any thing unexpectedly is objected; for it is with reluctance they part with that which they have prepared, and looking back at it during the whole pleading, they are forced continually to tamper with themselves, prying if any thing can be pulled asunder from it, to be inserted in what they are obliged to speak extempore. And though this may be done, there will still be a want of connection, the commissures not only gaping, as in an ill-joined piece of work, but the incoherency will also be discoverable from the different colouring and inequality of style. Thus, neither is there an uninterrupted fluency in what they say extempore, nor a connection with it of what they recite by heart, and for this reason the one must be a hindrance to the other; for the written matter will always bring to it the attention of the mind, and scarce ever follow it. Therefore in these actions, as country-labouring men say, we must stand * firmly on our legs. For, as every cause consists of proving and refuting, whatever regards the first, may be written; and whatever it is certain the adversary shall answer, as sometimes it is certain what he will, may be refuted with equal care and study.

* Turnebus fancies this to be a proverb drawn from ploughmen, who when they labour most, stand firmly on both feet, otherwise the labour cannot be vehement.

Knowing the cause well, is one essential point for being prepared in other respects; and hearing attentively to all the adversary alledges, is another. Still may we previously think of many particular incidents, and prepare the mind for all emergencies; and it is so best in regard to speaking, the thought being thereby the more easily transmitted and transferred.

But whether in answering or otherwise, there may be a necessity for extempore speaking, the orator will never find himself at a loss and disconcerted, who has been furnished by discipline, and study, and exercise with the powers of facility; and who, as always under arms, and ready for engaging, will no more want a sufficient flow of speech in pleading of causes, than he does in conversation upon daily and domestic occurrences; neither will he ever for want of coming duly prepared, decline burdening himself with a cause, so he has time to learn the state of it; for any thing else he will always be well acquainted with.



C H A P. X.

Of the kind of eloquence that suits best the orator.

- I. *That there are various kinds of eloquence, all which may have their particular admirers.—That the same happens in pictures and statues, of which he mentions the different artists, that excelled in their kind.—He gives an account of the Latin orators that differed from each other.—He gives Cicero the preference to all of them, and defends him against calumniators.* II. *That there are three kinds of eloquence; the Attic, the Asiatic, and the Rhodian.—That the Attic is the best. What it is to speak Attically.—That the Latin eloquence is not upon a par with the Attic, by reason of the poverty of its language.—That this deficiency must be compensated by thought and figures.* III. *He refutes those, who from being too dry reject all ornament.—That we must comply with what is required by the times and ears.—That the manners of writing and speaking should be the same.* IV. *He again touches upon three kinds of eloquence; the simple, the sublime, and the florid.—That between these three there are other middle kinds.—Each of these are to be suited to causes, and the several parts of causes.—That some, but wrong in so doing, go in pursuit only of the more florid kind of eloquence.—The orator may attain to all these kinds in the best and easiest manner.*

- I. **T**HERE remains only to speak of the kind of eloquence, which is the third point I proposed to discuss according to the order of my

first division, having promised to speak, first of the art, secondly of the artist, and thirdly of the work. Now, an oration being the work of rhetoric and of the orator, and having many forms, as I shall shew, it follows, that both the art and artist operate on all these forms; yet, that they are very different from one another, not only in the species, as a statue from another statue, and a piece of painting from another piece of painting, and an action from another action; but also in the genus, as Tuscan statues from Greek, and Asiatic from Attic eloquence. But these different sorts of works, I speak of, have all their admirers and partizans, as well as authors; and this may be a reason why no perfect orator has yet appeared, and, for aught I know, the same observation may take place in regard to the perfection of any art; not only because a person excels in one quality more than another; but because all are not equally pleased with the same form; partly, on account of the condition of time and place; and partly, on account of the judgment, taste, and design of each artist.

The first painters of eminence, whose works are commendable for something more than their antiquity, are said to be Polygnotus and Aglaophon. Their painting with one only colour, has still some so fond of it, that they prefer the rude strokes of art in this style, an art, then only in its infancy, to the nicest touches of the greatest masters; yet, without assigning any sufficient reason, in my opinion, and only through the vanity of being thought connoisseurs in the matter. Afterwards Zeuxis and Parrhasius contributed much
to

to the improvement of the art. These may be said to be contemporaries, having lived much about the time of the Peloponnesian wars, as appears from a dialogue of Xenophon, wherein Socrates and Parrhasius are the interlocutors. The first of these two painters is said to have invented the intermingling of lights with shades, and the second to have drawn out with great accuracy the delineations. Zeuxis painted bodies with greater than real proportions, thinking such a form to be rather more august; and in this, it is imagined, he followed Homer's manner, who took pleasure in representing all his characters, even his women, of large and strong size. Parrhasius, on the contrary, was so exact in every particular, that he is looked upon, even to this day, as the lawgiver of painters, because the paintings of gods and heroes, such as he has left behind him, are held as so many models, which they make it a rule to follow invariably.

This art flourished much more, but with talents of different quality, about the reign of Philip, and till the time of Alexander's successors. Protogenes distinguished himself by his accuracy, Pampphilus and Melanthius by the beauty of design, Antiphilus by the easy and natural strokes of his pencil, Theon of Samos by his lively imagination, and Apelles by his ingenuity, and the graces, which he boasted he had excelled in. Euphranor made himself admirable, by being possessed of these different qualities in as eminent a degree as the best masters, and by being also as excellent a statuary as he was a painter.

The same difference is met with in statues. Calon and Egeſias worked haſhly, and much in the Tuſcan ſtyle; Calamis ſhewed himſelf leſs ſtiff; but Myron more natural and eaſy than any of the juſt mentioned.

Polycletus excelled all his predeceſſors in the beauty and regularity of his proportions; but his ſtatues, in the opinion of moſt connoiſſeurs, tho' they adjudged the preference to them beyond any others, and would beſides detract nothing from their merit, ſeemed to want the weight and fullneſs of a complete ſhape. For, as he added a beauty to the human form over and above what is real, ſo alſo he ſeems not to have adequately expreſſed the majeſty of gods. He is alſo ſaid to have declined more vigorous and grave years, as having preſumed to attempt nothing beyond a ſmooth cheek.

But Polycletus's deficiency is ſaid to have been made up by Phidias and Alcamenus. Phidias, however, is reported to have been more expert at the framing of gods than men. In works of ivory he ſtands far unrivalled, if even he had done nothing more than his Minerva of Athens, or his Jupiter Olympius of Elis, the beauty of which laſt ſeems to have added ſomething to the received religion; ſo much the majeſty of the work has equalled the god.

Lysippus and Praxiteles are eſteemed for having made true likeneſſes of nature; but Demetrius is reprehensible for having carried this care to an exceſs, being more fond of producing a ſimilitude, than flattering with a ſhew of beauty.

Of

Of like nature is eloquence, and if you are inclined to take a view of its different species, you will find almost as many forms of genius as of bodies. But there were some kinds of eloquence that assumed a rough and horrid aspect from the condition of the times, though there appeared through them a great force of genius. Of this sort was the eloquence of Lælius, Africanus, Cato the Censor, and of the Gracchi, whom you may call, if you please, the Polygnotuses and the Calons. L. Crassus, and Q. Hortensius, may claim a middle kind. After them flourished, much about the same time, a great number of orators, all distinguished by particular characters; and among them we find the force of Cæsar, the wit of Cælius, the subtilty of Callidius, the gravity of Brutus, the poniancy of Sulpitius, the tartness of Cassius, the accuracy of Pollio, the dignity of Messala, the austerity of Calvus; and among those of our own time, the copiousness of Seneca, the energy of Africanus, the solidity of Afer, the sweetness of Crispus, the musical pronunciation of Trachallus, and the elegance of Secundus.

But in Cicero we have, not an Euphranor, distinguished by several great qualities, but eminent in all the perfections commendable in any other; whom notwithstanding his contemporaries dared to impeach of rather too great a swell in his style, of Asiatic pomp, of redundancy, of being too repetitious, and sometimes cold in his jests; and of being in his composition, delicate, gay, exuberant, and studious, which is very far from truth, of a softness unbecoming the manly character.

Alter-

Afterwards also, when he was cut off by the triumviral proscription, all who hated, envied, rivalled him, the flatterers of the then power, made a new attack upon him, now no more in a condition to make them an answer.

But what most surprises me is, that this same orator, whom some have censured for being dry and hungry, was spoken ill of by his inveterate enemies chiefly on the account of too great a flow of wit, and profusion of flowers. Both judgments passed upon him are false; but if calumny was suffered to obtain credit, I should think the opinion of his being over florid comes rather nearer the truth. But the heaviest charges brought against his eloquence are by those, who were desirous of appearing imitators of the Attic manner. This band of orators, as if initiated in certain sacred rites, and bound to their observance by religious vows, persecuted him as an outcast, and and the devotee of some prophane superstition. Whence even to this day, dry, sapless, and bloodless; (for these are they, who give the specious name of health, which is quite the reverse, to their imbecillity;) because, dazzled by the brighter lustre of Cicero's eloquence as by the sun, they think to lurk safe under the shadow of the great name of Attic taste. But as Cicero himself has fully answered them in several passages of his works, it will be safer for me to proceed no farther in the clearing up of this matter.

II. The distinction made between the style of the Asiatics and Attics, has indeed been of long standing; the latter having been reputed close and sound; and the former, on the contrary, swollen

swollen and empty: the one having no redundancy; the other, being without judgment and moderation. Some are of opinion, and particularly Santra, that this happened, when, by the gradual spreading of the Greek tongue into the adjacent cities of Asia, some becoming desirous of approving themselves eloquent, though not yet sufficiently skilled in the language, began to express by circumlocution, what they could not immediately in proper terms; and by contracting a habit of so doing, afterwards persevered in the practice. For my part, I am apt to think, that the difference has been occasioned by a natural bent in the genius, both of the speakers and hearers: the Attics, just, correct, and nice in their taste, could suffer nothing idle, nothing redundant; whereas the Asiatics, pompous in their disposition, and great boasters, might well mingle with their eloquence the same vain glory that characterized their manners.

Soon after, they who took notice of this difference of style, added the Rhodian, a middle kind, and, as it were composed of the two others; neither so close as the Attic, nor so abundant as the Asiatic, and seeming to retain something of the country, and something of the author. *Æschines*, who made choice of Rhodes for his place of exile, brought thither with him the studies, then in vogue at Athens, which, like certain plants, degenerating in a different soil and climate, mingled the Attic with a foreign taste. And thus it is, that this kind became smooth and loose, and yet not without weight; rather more like a still
expansive

expanse of water; than a limpid fountain, or turbid torrent.

None therefore need doubt but that the Attic kind is by far the best; and though an exact judgment, and nice taste, be common to all, who have wrote according to its prescript, yet is there discoverable a difference of character in their genius. For which reason they seem to me greatly mistaken, who believe them only to speak in the Attic manner, whose style is plain, clear, and expressive, who content themselves with a certain frugality of eloquence, and who never thrust their hand from under their * cloak. But now, who shall this orator take after, to speak exactly in the Attic taste? Suppose it to be Lyfias; for he is a pattern these partizans seem to be exceeding fond of, and I need not proceed to mention † Coccus and Antocides.

But I should be glad to ask them whether the style of Isocrates is truly Attic; though nothing is so different from that of Lyfias? They cannot deny that it is, and that his school produced the principal orators in Greece. Let therefore something more like what is wanted be looked for. Was not Hyperides remarkable for the same At-

* This is a proverbial saying to signify a tepid orator, or one who speaks in a very composed manner; for such as are earnest and vehement, use a deal of gellure, particularly with their arms, which are tossed about in a variety of directions.

† Antocides is reckoned by Plutarch among the ten Athenian orators. He mentions nothing of Coccus, but Suidas says he was a disciple of Isocrates, and an Athenian orator, who had left behind him some orations. Quintilian, however, seems to mean here, that the style of these two orators, was plainer and more simple than that of Lyfias.

tic taste? He was; but he indulged more the pleasures of his genius. I pass by many others, as Lycurgus, Aristogiton, and their predecessors Isæus, Antiphon; who, though they all pursued the same kind of eloquence, yet differed from one another in their manner.

What was the *Æschines* I a little before made mention of? Was he not more copious, more bold, and more sublime, than any of the just cited? What, in fine, was *Demosthenes*? Did he not exceed all those slender and circumspect orators, in sublimity, force, vehemence, elegance, and harmony of composition? Does he not shew elevation in common places? Does he not animate his style by figures? Does he not shine in metaphors? Does he not put words into the mouth of mute beings? Does not his swearing by the manes of the mighty heroes, slain in the plains of Marathon and Salamis, in defence of their country, manifestly declare that *Plato* was his preceptor? And shall we call the same *Plato*, an Asiatic; him, whom we may compare to the bards of old, as fired in fancy by divine inspiration? What shall I say of *Pericles*? Can we think his eloquence as meagre as that of *Lysias*, when to ridicule it, the poets of the old comedy compared it to the dreadful crash and ravages of thunder?

Why then should we attribute that Attic taste to those only, whose style labours to flow, like small veins of water, which scarce can force a passage through the interstices pebbles leave between them? Shall we in them only find the most
delectable

delectable honey by the flavour of the * thyme it has been extracted from? I believe indeed, that if our connoisseurs had found in the same territory a more fertile piece of ground, or a more fruitful crop of corn, they would say it was not Attic, because it yielded more seed than it received, and because Menander jestingly said that such was the regular † fidelity of the soil. Therefore if one should now add the moving of the passions in any thing of a vehement degree, to the perfections that great orator Demosthenes was possessed of, shall it be said this ought not to be done, because Demosthenes never did so, whose nature perhaps put a negative on it, or at least a regulation in the Athenian form of government? And if an oration should happen to be more harmonious in its composition than any of his, which perhaps it could not, but if it could, would it therefore not be Attic? I could therefore wish that more just notions were entertained of this title, and that all would believe, that to write and speak Attically, is to write and speak in the most perfect manner.

But this is a prejudice of our own, and not of the Greeks, in whom indeed such an opinion would have been tolerable; for though the Latin eloquence seems to me to be like the Greek in invention, disposition, design, and all other particulars of the sort, and to be even intirely its

* This is an allusion to Hymettus, a mountain in the Attic territory, which was much famed for nursing bees, which produced an excellent sort of honey.

† This too is an allusion to some passage in one of Menander's comedies.

disciple; yet in elocution it so far comes short of it, that it can scarce attain to a degree of imitation.

Our words are far from having so sweet a sound as theirs, and chiefly by our wanting those two very agreeable Greek letters Y and Z, the one a vowel, the other a consonant, than which no others are sweeter in respiration, and which we commonly borrow from them as often as we make use of their proper names. Whenever this happens, I know not what strain of hilarity immediately diffuses itself through the discourse, as in *Zephyris Zopyrisque*, which if written with our letters, they would make something of a deaf and barbarous sound, and in their place would, as it were, succeed, those sad and horrid letters, which Greece is unacquainted with.

F, the sixth letter of our alphabet, makes a sound, scarce human, or rather one not proceeding from the voice, because formed intirely by the air puffed out between the teeth. Followed by a vowel it loses its force, and by a * consonant, it breaks the sound, and becomes more harsh and disagreeable.

The Eolic † digamma is so necessary, that though we have rejected its form and character, yet we cannot help retaining its force in the words *servum*, *cervum*, and the like.

The letter Q makes a harshness in syllables,

* As in the word *frangit*.

† The emperor Claudius Cæsar added to the Roman letters the Eolic Digamma, so called, because its figure makes a double gamma F; but this, as Priscian says, was rejected.

though useful for joining the vowels which follow it, as when we write *equos* and *equum*: In other respects it is superfluous. These two vowels also form a sound unknown to the Greeks, and therefore cannot be represented by any of their characters.

Add to this, that very many of our words end with that bellowing letter M, which none of the Greek words do; but instead of it the *v*, which is very sweet and tingling, is there placed, which very seldom happens so with us.

What shall I say of our syllables, which lean upon the letters B and D in so rough a manner, that many, I do not say of our oldest, but of our older Latins, endeavoured to soften them, not only by saying *aversa* for *abversis*, but by adding an *s* to the preposition *ab*, though even the *s* is not without a grating sound?

Our * accents are likewise not so agreeable as theirs, either by reason of their stiffness, or because not recommended by so great a variety of inflexions; for the last syllable is never raised by an acute, nor made flat by a circumflex, but always ends in one or two graves. The Greek tongue therefore is so far superior to ours in sweetness, that our poets, whenever they have a mind

* An *Accent* is a certain law and rule for raising or lowering a syllable in pronunciation, and is of three sorts, *Acute*, as being invented for sharpening or raising a syllable: *Grave*, for sinking, or letting it fall: *Circumflex*, for both blunting and sharpening it. In every part of speech, there is a raising and lowering of the voice in pronunciation, as in this word *natura*, when I say *natu*, the voice is raised, and the elevation lies on *tu*; but when I say *ra*, the voice is lowered, and this is its depression or sinking.

to distinguish themselves by a smoothness of verse, grace their composition by the adopting of Greek words.

But what I have hitherto animadverted upon is nothing comparatively to the want of appellations for a good many things, which we are therefore obliged to express by metaphor, or circumlocution. Even in things that have names, the great poverty of our language in synonymous words, throws us frequently back upon the same; whereas the Greeks have not only a plenty of words, but also many dialects, very different from each other.

He, therefore, who requires from the Latins those graces of the Attic style, let him give me the same sweetness, and the same richness in elocution. If this cannot be done, we shall adapt thoughts to the words we have; and not confound the extreme delicacy of things, not to say by too gross, but strong expressions, that both qualities may not be destroyed by being thus jumbled together. For the less help we receive from our language, the more strenuous ought our efforts to be on the side of invention. Let a variety of sublime thoughts be brought to light; let all the passions be moved, and let the discourse be lighted up by the lustre of metaphors.

If we cannot attain to the Greek delicacy, let us surpass them in strength. Have they the ascendant over us in subtilty, let us bear them down by weight? Are they more copious in the propriety of expressions, let us conquer them by ge-

nus? Has every * minute article among the Greeks its safe harbour of reception, let us generally put out to sea with larger sails, and strive to swell them with a stronger gale of wind? Yet must we not always keep out in the main, but sometimes coast it. The Greeks can without danger pass over shallows; and I shall find some part of the same, not much deeper, over which I can pilot my vessel, without the hazard of sticking.

So that, though the Greeks succeed better than we do in the more simple sorts of subjects, and which require a closer manner; and though in this only they exceed us, and we therefore give it up to them in comedy; yet, far from making over to them intirely this kind of style, we ought rather endeavour to make ourselves masters of it, in as accurate a degree as we are well able. We may be upon a par with them in the judicious choice of things, and the quantity of them that may serve our purpose; but the grace of expression, which the genius of our language is deficient in, must be compensated by the seasoning of foreign ornaments. Was not Cicero in the treating of private affairs remarkable for this delicate simplicity of style? Was he not smooth, sweet, clear, and not too elevated? Was not this in a very particular degree the distinguishing perfection of M. Callidius? Were not Scipio, Lælius, Cato,

* He means that the most simple things are elegantly expressed by the niceties of the Greek language; and that the Latins cannot be masters of so much refinement, but may make amends for it by some amplitude, yet so as to seem delicate, though they cannot to the degree of the Greeks.

in their elocution, the Roman Attics? How then can that not be enough, than which nothing can be better?

III. Besides this notion, regarding the Attic style and taste; some imagine that there is no natural eloquence, but that which comes nearest to the ordinary way of speaking, by which we converse with our friends, wives, children, and domestics; thinking it enough to signify the intention of the mind, and to seek after nothing studied; nothing far fetched; as any addition of the kind must savour of affectation, must be a vain display of words; remote from truth, and calculated for the sake only of the words themselves; in which nature has no other design than to make them merely expressive of our thoughts: just so; the bodies of athletes, though made stronger by exercise; and by keeping to a certain diet, are not therefore natural, because their form, or figure is not the result of nature's fashioning. And where is the occasion; say they; for shewing things by circumlocution and metaphors, that is, by many, or borrowed words, when every thing has its name assigned it? They alledge, in fine, as a thing unquestionable; that in the beginning men spoke the genuine language of nature, and that afterwards, like poets, though more sparingly, yet falsely and improperly they framed a mode of speaking, which they considered in the light of * perfection.

* This is according to what Quintilian has said elsewhere, that some figures would be vices, if they so happened by accident, and were not sought after.

There is some truth in this opinion, and therefore there should be no departing so far as some do, from proper and common words. But, as I observed in speaking of composition, if one to what is merely necessary should add something better, I see no reason why he should incur censure from the partizans of this opinion. To me, indeed, common discourse, and that of an eloquent man, seem to be pretty different in their nature. If it were enough for him to point out things simply, the propriety of words would be all that might require his taking any pains about; but it being incumbent on him to please, to move, and to make a variety of impressions on the minds of his audience, it is very proper he should also use those helps, which are granted us by the same nature; in like manner, as it is very natural by exercise, to supple the arms, to increase bodily strength, and to acquire a fresh and healthy complexion. For which reason in all nations there are some more eloquent, and more sweet in their way of expressing themselves than others; and if it did not so happen, all would be upon an equality in this respect, and the same kind of eloquence would indiscriminately suit every one. All then speak, but their character in speaking is different; whence this just inference may be drawn, that the more every one effects in speaking, the more he may be said to speak according to the eloquence of nature.

And if it be so, I have no great fault to find with those, who think some allowance ought to be made for times and ears, requiring something neater, and something more refined. I am there-

fore of opinion, that the first orators should no more have been as models to Cato and the Gracchi, than they should be to more modern orators. And this I observe to have been done by Cicero, who, though he referred all to the advantage of his cause, yet gave something to the pleasure of the auditor, alledging that what he did was likewise for the interest of his party, pleasure being intimately connected with utility. To the amenities of his style and manner I cannot indeed find that any thing can be added, unless it be, that to flatter the taste of our age, we adopt a greater number of striking thoughts. Yet must I say, that if these thoughts lie too thick, and are crowded upon one another, they cannot help working their own destruction, though at the same time the cause may not be thereby endamaged, nor the orator lose his authority. But if I here make concessions, I hope none will abuse them. In complaisance to the age we live in, I make allowance for the orator's gown not being of coarse stuff, yet not of silk; I would have his hair neatly combed, not but digested into stages of ringlets, because the plainer the dress is, the neater and more decent it will appear, when the desire of making one's self agreeable, does not run into the extravagance of tawdry and lascivious luxury. In like manner, what commonly goes under the denomination of pointed sentences, (none of which have been used by the ancient Greeks, though I find some in Cicero,) so they contain things and not words, are not frequently used, and aim at the gaining of the cause, who doubts but that they may be of great utility? They strike the mind, and often at once determine

it, and make a deeper impression by their conciseness, and persuade by the singularity of their turn.

But some are of opinion that those bright and sparkling eyes of modern eloquence, though some allowance may be made for their use in extempore speaking and conversation, ought to be excluded the composition of orations. On this sentiment too I shall throw together some cursory reflections, because many of the learned think, that there is one manner for speaking, and another for writing; and that therefore some who were famous for action, left nothing written for posterity, as Pericles and Demades; and, on the contrary, that others who excelled in composition, were unfit for action, as Isocrates. And indeed, it appears that in action, a certain impetuosity, and pleasing fancies somewhat boldly hazarded, carry often more weight with them, especially when ignorant minds require to be moved and instructed: whereas whatever is consigned over to books, and is published as something good in its kind, ought to be correct, polished, and extremely exact in composition, as being to come into the hands of the learned, and to have artists judges of the art.

For my part, I should be inclined to think, that to speak well, and to write well, is one and the same thing; and that a written oration is nothing more than the monument of one that has been pronounced. Therefore, I imagine, it ought to have all perfections; I do not say, no faults; for I well know that the ignorant have sometimes a great liking to what is faulty.

Where then must we place the difference? I answer, that if I could have a bench of wise judges, I should retrench many things, not only in the orations of Cicero, but also in those of Demosthenes, who is much closer. There would be no manner of occasion for moving the passions, nor flattering agreeably the ear. The exordium too would be unnecessary, so Aristotle thinks, in the case of having such judges; and all that need be done, would be to state the matter in clear and proper terms, and prove well where proofs were wanting.

But when the assembly of the people is to act as judge, or some few chosen from among the people; or when often illiterate persons, or sometimes persons taken from the plow, are to pass sentence; we shall enforce every thing we imagine will avail us for obtaining our purpose; and these things are to be set in all their various lights, as well when we speak, as when we write them, that we may thoroughly inform these judges how to act. Would Demosthenes have spoken ill in the manner he wrote, or would Cicero have done the same? Can we otherwise know them to have been excellent orators than by their written orations? They therefore pronounced better or worse. If worse, they ought then to have spoken as they wrote. If better, they ought to have written as they spoke.

What then, shall the orator always speak as he writes? Yes, always, if possible; and if the time assigned him by the judge is rather short, he will retrench many things from what he might have said; but his oration when published will contain every thing in its due detail. What he may have

said for adapting' himself to the capacity of the judges, he will not leave so written for the canvassing of posterity, lest it be imputed to his taste, and not to the circumstances of time: for it is of vast significancy, in what manner the judge would choose to hear the orator speak, and therefore Cicero advises him, to look him strait in the face, to know how he is disposed; and then, whatever is understood to please him, should be insisted upon, and the contrary course followed in what he dislikes. In short, if any one manner of elocution is to be wished for more than another, it is that which is most proper for instructing the judge.

This is not surprising, when even for the sake of witnesses we make many alterations in our way of speaking. The orator, who on asking a peasant, if he knew "Amphion," and being answered, no; shewed good presence of mind by taking away the aspiration, and shortening the second syllable, upon which he knew him perfectly well. Such chance cases often occasion speaking differently from what is written, when it may not be so proper, nor even well practicable to speak as one has written.

IV. There is another division, which is also subdivided into three parts, and by which the different kinds of eloquence seem to be very aptly distinguished. The first is called the * subtle kind; the second, the † sublime and strong; the third, by some the mean between the two others, and by some, the ‡ florid. Their use and

* *λεπτόν.*† *αἰθρόν.*‡ *αἰνθρόν.*

application

application are chiefly, of the first, for instructing; of the second, for moving; of the third, whatever way called, for pleasing or conciliating minds; so that, to instruct requires plainness; to conciliate mind, gentleness; and to move, weight and strength.

The style of the narration and proofs is best conducted according to the subtle kind, which abstracting from all other perfections, is sufficiently full of itself. The middle manner will abound more with metaphors, will seek to please more by figures, will shew an air of gaiety in digressions, an elegance in composition, a prettiness in thought, and will flow gently and smoothly, like a clear river, the banks of which are shaded by the verdure of forests. But the moving and forcible kind will resemble an impetuous torrent, rolling huge stones along in its current, resenting to be confined by a bridge, making for itself banks, greatly swelled and rapid, and compelling the judge, notwithstanding all his struggles to the contrary, to go wherever it shall hurry him.

By this it is, that the orator summons the dead from out of their graves, as * Cicero did Appius Cæcus; by this the country bitterly complains, and expostulates with a bad subject, as may be seen in one of Cicero's † orations against Cataline. This is what raises a discourse by amplifications, and extols it by the force of hyperboles: as “What ‡ more insatiable gulph than the avarice of that man? No, the ocean itself, the ocean with its vast abyss of waters, &c.” These shining beau-

* Pro Cæli. 33.

† Catil. i. 12.

‡ Philip ii. 67.

ties of eloquence are now well known to its votaries. By this we invoke the gods themselves, that by speaking to them in their presence, we may interest them in what we have to lay before them : “ * ye groves and sacred monuments of the Albans ! ye holy altars ! which the impiety of that monster had prophaned or destroyed ! ye, whom the same worship had always kept united with the religion of the Roman people ! it is you I now here call to witness ! ” By this we also excite anger, and inspire with compassion ; by this we say, “ he saw you, he wept, and he implored your pity : ” and by this the hearer, seized with all sorts of emotions, follows blindly his leader, quite regardless where he is led.

Now, if there was a necessity of making choice of any one of these three kinds, who would hesitate in preferring this to all, which also is the most powerful, and best adapted to great causes. Homer attributes to Menelaus a conciseness in eloquence, recommending itself by a sprightliness of mind, and a propriety of expression, subject to no mistakes in the choice of words, and excluding superfluities, all which are qualities belonging to the first kind. From the mouth of Nestor, he says, words flowed sweeter than honey, and with the most engaging charms. But thinking to give an idea of the height of eloquence, as in Ulysses, he joins grandeur to it, and assigns him a manner of speech, equal in impetuosity, and in its copious flow of words, to the rushing down of torrents of melted winter snow from the tops of mountains. With

* Pro Mil; 85.

him therefore no man living will be able to dispute the prize of eloquence, and men will admire him as a god. Eupolis expresses his astonishment at his force and rapidity in Pericles; Aristophanes compares it to thunderbolts; it is indeed the true power of speaking.

It is not, however, to be supposed that eloquence is comprehended in these three forms; for, as between the slender and the robust, there is a third holding the middle; so each of them has its degrees, and amongst those degrees, there is something mixed, being the middle between two of them. The subtile kind does not consist of such a precision, as not to admit a greater and a less: like degrees of more and less are perceptible in the vehement kind; and the middle kind either ascends to something stronger, or is lowered to something weaker. Thus may almost innumerable species be found, capable of being characterized by some slight difference; as the four winds, which are said generally to blow from four cardinal points, tho' several other intermediate winds are discoverable from the variety of climates, and the direction of rivers. The same observation holds good in regard to musicians, who having fixed five principal tones for the lyre, afterwards fill up with great variety the interval from one to the other, by the insertion of several other tones, which makes these few transitions to have a number of degrees.

There are therefore many species of eloquence, but it would be foolish to inquire by which the orator should guide himself, when every species, so it be genuine, has its use; and every kind of eloquence belongs properly to the orator; all
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which he will occasionally use, as well for the parts of the cause, as for the cause itself.

For, as he will not plead the same way for a man accused of a capital crime, and for one who sues for an inheritance; so neither will he in cases of sequestrations, bails, and loans. He will be observant of the decorum that is respectively to be kept in giving his opinion in the senate, the assembly of the people, and private deliberations. He will strive to accommodate himself to the difference of characters, of circumstances, time, and place. In the same discourse he will raise indignant emotions, in a manner different from what he should do for procuring benevolence. From the same places he shall not excite anger and pity; neither shall he employ the same arts for instructing, as he does for moving.

The same style and colouring does not equally take place in the exordium, narration, proofs, digression, and peroration. He shall speak gravely, austere, sharply, vehemently, rapidly, copiously, bitterly, affably, gently, subtly, softly, mildly, sweetly, concisely, politely, not indiscriminately, upon any subject, but wherever it is meet he should. Thus will he accomplish that for which the use of an oration has been principally calculated; that is, to speak to the purpose, and with powers of eloquence sufficient for accomplishing what he has in view; and by so doing, he will not only merit the applause of the learned, but also of the people.

They are much mistaken, who imagine that a vicious and corrupt sort of eloquence, which bounds by a licentiousness of words, or plays the wanton
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in childish conceits, or is bloated by an immoderate swelling, or madly makes excursions into frivolous common places, or glistens with little flowers, which would drop off, if slightly shaken, or reputes precipices the sublime, or runs mad through a misguided notion of liberty and patriotism, is that which is most popular and plausible.

I neither deny, nor am I surprized at its having gained the approbation of many. It is a sort of eloquence that assumes a pleasing aspect, and is attractive to procure favour. Every voice indeed, affecting to be heard in public, attracts naturally minds; and hence the throngs of a gaping multitude about all places of resort. So that when any thing exquisitely said happens to tingle upon the ears of the ignorant, and be it what it may, provided they cannot think of effecting the like themselves, of course it begets their admiration, and not without reason, for even speaking in that manner is not easily attained, nor within the reach of every one.

But all this gaudiness fades and dies away the moment of being compared with any thing better, as cloth dyed red may please, when not seen near purple. If it should also be compared with cloth of an inferior dye to purple, still would it be, as Ovid says, defaced by it in lustre, as a greater beauty is by a smaller. If then this corrupt eloquence should be put to the test, by comparing it with that which is good, it will be like a * spurious purple compared with the true. That which

* *Ui buccinis purpuram* : he calls *buccinum* the juice expressed from a sort of shell-fish, by which a colour is dyed like that of purple, but thinner, fainter, and paler.

at first imposed on the eye, will divest itself of its counterfeit colour, and appear horridly pale in competition with the genuine. This eloquence therefore may glisten in obscurity, but not when examined in the light, as certain little animals, which in the dark seem to emit luminous particles. In short, many approve of what is bad, but none find fault with that which is good.

All I have hitherto spoken of, the orator will not only well execute, but likewise with great facility. For be his force of eloquence ever so great, it will not in the main be so worthy of admiration, if he suffers himself to be continually haunted, to be perplexed, emaciated, and to pine away from the wretched anxiety of turning, weighing, and adjusting words. The orator, I frame to myself an idea of, elegant, sublime, and rich, shall have a command over all the powers of eloquence, which from all parts shall flow in upon him. He that has got to the top, has no occasion to climb higher; the difficulty is only for them, who are below, and strive to ascend. Yet the more you proceed forward, the more will the ground be smoothed to your steps, the more will it appear rich and gay about you; and if induced by these blandishments, you still persevere in your progress till you have reached the summit, then will fruits present themselves, to the culture of which you may seem to yourself to have contributed none of your labour; and every thing spontaneously will shoot up in bloom before you: but these fruits must be daily plucked, otherwise they will dry up and wither.

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However, let even this abundance have bounds set to it, without which nothing is laudable, nothing advisable; and let that splendor exhibit a manly elegance, and that invention judgment. Thus will they be great, and not too much; sublime, and not abrupt; strong, and not rash; austere, and not harsh; grave, and not slow; gay, and not luxurious; pleasant, and not dissolute; full, and not swollen. The same may be observed in respect to other qualities. The middle way is commonly the safest, because vice lies on the extremes.

C H A P. XI.

What ought to be the orator's occupations, when he has left off speaking in public. An exhortation to eloquence.

I. *The orator ought to leave off, before he is weighed down by years.—Then he may apply himself to the forming of youth.* II. *Quintilian excuses himself for requiring from the orator, as well virtue, as the knowledge of many arts.—That virtue is chiefly the result of the will.—That we have full time enough for learning arts.—He produces instances of many who were learned in all arts.* III. *An exhortation to eloquence.*

I. **T**HE orator having distinguished himself by these perfections of eloquence at the bar, in counsels, in the assemblies of the people, in the senate, and in all the duties of a good citizen, ought to think likewise of making an end, worthy of
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of an honest man, and the sanctity of his ministry : not that during the course of his life he ought to cease being of service to society, or that endowed with such integrity of mind and such talents for eloquence, he can too long continue in the exercise of so noble an employment ; but because it is meet he should guard against degrading his character, by doing any thing which may fall short of what he has already done. The orator is not indebted only for what he is, to knowledge, which increases with his years, but to his voice, lungs, and strength of body : which impaired by years, or debilitated by infirmities, it is to be feared that something might be wanting in this great man, either by stopping short fatigued, and out of breath at every effort ; or, by not making himself sufficiently heard ; or lastly, by seeking after, and not finding himself what he formerly was.

I have myself seen Domitius Afer, the greatest orator I ever had the honour of being acquainted with ; I have seen him in very advanced life, daily losing something of the authority he had so justly acquired : so that, when he pleaded, he who without dispute was formerly the principal orator at the bar ; some laughed at him, (a thing very unbecoming), and others blushed for him ; which gave occasion to its being said, that he had rather sink under his burden, than give over. Yet his performance, such as it was, was not bad, but short of what it had been. Before being exposed to these snares of old age, the orator therefore would do well in founding a retreat, and putting into port with a whole and sound ship.

When

When he does so, not less ample fruits of study will attend on him. He will either write the history of his time for the instruction of posterity ; or, as L. Crassus designed to * do, he will explain the law to those who come to ask his advice ; or, he will write a treatise on eloquence ; or that worthy mouth of his will employ itself in inculcating the finest moral precepts. As it was customary with the ancients, well-disposed youth will frequent his house, consulting him as an oracle on the true manner of speaking. As the parent of eloquence will he form them, and as an old experienced pilot will he give them an account of shores, and harbours, and what are the presages of storms, and what the ship may require for the working of her in winds contrary and favourable. To all this will he be induced, not only by a duty of humanity, common to mankind ; but also, by a certain fondness for the business : for no one would be glad to see an art on the decay, in which himself excelled ; and what is more laudable than to teach others, that which one is perfectly skilled in ?

It was so, as Cicero himself informs us, that † Coelius was brought to him by his father. It was so preceptor-like, that he exercised Pansa, Hir-tius, Dolabella, daily pronouncing before them eloquent speeches, and hearing them do the same. For aught I know, the happiest time of an orator's life is, when retired from the world to devote himself to rest, and remote from envy, and remote from strife, he looks back at his reputation,

* De Orat. i. 199.

† Pro. Cael. n. 9.

as in a harbour of safety ; and whilst still living, has a sense of that veneration, which commonly awaits the dead only ; thus anticipating the pleasures of the noble idea posterity will conceive of him. I am conscious to myself, that to the extent of my poor abilities, whatever I knew before, and whatever I could collect for the service of this work, I have candidly and ingenuously made a communication of, for the instruction of those, who might have been willing to reap any advantage from it : and it is enough for an honest man to have taught what he knows.

II. I fear, notwithstanding, I may seem to have required, either things too great, by desiring the fame to be an honest man and skilled in the art of speaking ; or too many things, by my adding to the many arts to be learned in youth, the study of moral philosophy, and the knowledge of the civil law, exclusive of the precepts that have been delivered on eloquence : and, as I thought all these particulars necessary to my work, I am again apprehensive, that some dreading them as too burdensome, might despair before they try.

But let these first reflect with themselves, how great the force of human wit is, and how powerful it is for effecting whatever it has an inclination to ; when even arts of an inferior sort, yet more difficult, can prescribe methods for crossing the seas, for knowing the course and number of the stars, and for measuring in a manner the world itself. Let them next think, how great the thing is they would fain accomplish, and how no labour ought to be refused, when the attainment of this same great thing is proposed as its reward. If
once

once they have a just conception of the matter, they will easily grant, that the road which leads to eloquence, is neither impracticable, nor so dreadful as they imagined.

For to be good men, which is the first and most important affair, consists chiefly in the will ; and whoever has a sincere desire of being a man of integrity, will easily learn the arts that teach virtue ; and these arts are not involved in so many perplexities, neither are they in such great number, as not to be known by a few years application. It is repugnancy that creates pains and difficulties. The ordering of an upright and happy life, is attainable by an easy and compendious method, when inclination is not wanting. Nature begat us with the best dispositions, and it is so easy to the well-inclined to learn that which is good, that we cannot help being surpris'd, on making a due estimate of things, how there can be so many bad persons in the world. For, as water is naturally a proper element for fishes, the dry land for quadrupeds, the air for birds ; so indeed it ought to be more easy to live according to the precept of nature, than to infringe her laws.

As to the rest, tho' we might measure our age, not by the space of more advanced years, but by the time of youth, we should find that we had quite years enough for learning, all things being made shorter by order, method, and the manner of application. The first fault lies in masters, who keep lads on their hands, partly through a spirit of gain to receive the longer a salary for them ; partly through ambition, by making to be believed that what they teach them is very difficult ;

and partly through their own ignorance, or neglect in teaching. The next fault lies in ourselves, who think it more advisable to stop at what we are acquainted with, than to give ourselves the trouble of learning what we do not yet know.

But to bring the matter home to our oratorical studies ; of what significancy is the custom I see kept up by many, of declaiming so many years in schools, (not to speak of those who waste in this exercise a good part of their lives), and of expending so much labour on imaginary subjects, when in a moderate time the rules of eloquence may be learned, and pursuant to their directions a real image framed of the contests at the bar ? This I do not say to hint in the least, that exercises for speaking should ever be discontinued, but rather that none should wax old in any one particular exercise for that purpose, for we may acquire the knowledge of many sciences, and learn the precepts of morality, and exercise ourselves in such causes as are agitated at the bar, even while we continue in the state of scholars. And, indeed, the art of oratory is such, as need not require many years for learning it. Each likewise of the arts I mentioned, may be abridged into few books, there being no occasion to consider them so minutely, and so much in the detail. Practice remains, which soon makes us well skilled in them. The knowledge of things is daily on the increase, and yet the books are not so many ; it is necessary to read for acquiring this knowledge, of which either examples may be met with in history as to the things themselves, or the eloquent expressing of them may be found in orators. It is also necessary

cessary we should read the opinions of philosophers and lawyers, with some other things deserving of notice.

All which indeed may be compassed ; but we ourselves are the cause of our not having time enough. How small a portion of it do we allot to our studies ? A good part of it is spent in frivolous compliments and paying and returning visits ; a good part of it is taken up in the telling of idle stories, a good part at the public spectacles, and a good part in the pleasures of the table. Add to these our great variety of amusements, and that extravagant indulgence we bestow upon our bodies. One time we must go upon a course of travels, another time we want recreation amidst the pleasures of rural life, and another time we are full of painful solicitude in regard to the state of our fortune, calculating and balancing our loss and gain ; and together with these, how many causes do we seek for gratifying our lusts ; how often do we give ourselves up to the intoxication of wine ; and in what a multiplicity of voluptuousness does our flagitious mind suffer itself to be immersed ? Should there be an interval for study amidst these avocations, can it be said to be proper ? But were we to allow all this idle or ill-spent time to study, should we not find life long enough, and time more than enough for becoming learned ? And this is evident by only computing the time of the day, besides the advantages of the night, of which a good part is more than sufficient for sleep. But we now preposterously compute, not the years we have studied, but the years we have lived. What, though geometers and grammarians,

and the professors of other arts, spent all their life, how long soever, in treating and discussing their respective arts, does it thence follow that we must have as many lives, as there are many things to be learned? But they did not extend the learning of them to old age, being contented with learning them only; and they spent so many years, not not so much in their study, as in their practice.

To say nothing of Homer, in whom the vestiges of every art are found, either perfect, or at least greatly improved; to pass by Hippias of Elis, who not only was eminent for his skill in the liberal sciences, but also wore cloaths, ring, and shoes, all of his own making, that he might not want any thing, or be indebted to any one's assistance; was not Gorgias, even in extreme old age, wont to desire his pupils to put to him questions on any subject whatever they pleased? But what art deserving of being learned was wanting in Plato? How many ages did Aristotle spend in learning, whose knowledge comprehended not only the things which belong to philosophers and orators, but also the nature of all plants and animals. These great men had all these matters to invent, and we have them only to learn. Antiquity has furnished us with so many masters, so many examples, that it seems no age can be happier for being born in than ours, for the instruction of which the former have laboured.

M. Cato, the Censor, united in his person the orator, historian, civilian, and experienced husbandman. Amidst so many labours in war, so many contests in peace, already in the decline of years, he learned, though in an unpolished age, the
Greek

Greek language, whereby he may be set as an example, that even in old age men are capable of learning when they give their minds to it. How vast and universal was the erudition of Varro, there being hardly any thing he has not written upon ! What accomplishment in regard to eloquence was wanting in Cicero ! Where is the occasion for more examples, when even Cornelius Celsus, a person of slender parts, wrote treatises not only on all these arts, but left besides precepts on the art of war, on agriculture, and on physic ? Worthy in my opinion, was he only commendable for the design, to be thought well versed in all these sciences.

III. But it is difficult to perfect so great a work, and none yet have brought it to perfection. Yet, one should think that it is a fully sufficient incitement to the study of sciences, that there is no negation in nature against the practicability of a thing, which has not hitherto been done, since all the greatest and most admirable works have had some time or other, in which they were first brought to a degree of perfection. For by how much poetry is indebted for its lustre to Homer and Virgil ; by so much eloquence is to Demosthenes and Cicero. And indeed, what is now excellent, was not so at first.

Now, tho' one should despair of reaching to the height of perfection, a groundless despair in a person of genius, health, talents, and who has masters to assist him ; yet it is noble, as Cicero * says, to have a place in the second, or third rank. He,

* De Orat. n. 4.

who cannot rival the glory of Achilles in military exploits, shall not therefore have a mean opinion of the praise due to Ajax, or Diomedes ; and he, who cannot come near Homer, need not despise the fame of Tyrtæus. If men likewise were to give into the thought of imagining none capable of exceeding such eminent persons as went before them, they even, who are deemed excellent, would not have been so : Virgil would not have excelled Lucretius and Mæcenas ; nor Cicero, Crassus and Hortensius, and no one for the future, would pretend to any advantage over his predecessor.

Tho' the hope of surpassing these great men be but faint, yet it is an honour to follow them. Have Pollio and Messala, who began to appear at the bar when Cicero was already possessed of the empire of eloquence, acquired little dignity in their life-time, and left but a small degree of glory for the remembrance of posterity ? True it is, that arts brought to perfection, would deserve very ill of human affairs, if afterwards they could not at least be kept up to the same standard.

Add to this, that a moderate share of eloquence is attended with no small advantages ; and if measured by the fruits gathered from it, will almost be upon a par with that which is perfect. It would be no difficult matter to make appear from many ancient or modern examples, that no other profession acquires for men, greater honours, wealth, friendship, present and future glory, were it not a degrading to the honour of letters to divert the mind from the contemplation of the most noble object, the study and possession of which is such a source of contentment, and to fix it on the
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less momentous rewards it may have, not unlike those, who say they do not so much seek after virtue, as the pleasure resulting from it.

Let us therefore with all the affections of our heart endeavour to attain the very majesty of eloquence, than which the immortal gods have not imparted any thing better to mankind; and without which, all would be mute in nature, and destitute of the splendor of a present glory, and future remembrance. Let us likewise always make a continued progress towards perfection; and by so doing, we shall either reach the height, or at least shall see many beneath us.

This is, Marcellus Victorius, all, as far as in me lies, I could contribute to the promoting and perfecting of the art of eloquence; the knowledge of which, if it does not prove of any great advantage to studious youth; will, at least, what I more heartily wish for, give them a more ardent desire for doing well.

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